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Executive Summary 
 
This public reporting document describes the approach adopted by PARIS in the task of getting 
an understanding of the contexts and the concepts relevant for developing SALT frameworks. 
(Work Package 2 – WP2, Task 1). In order to achieve this task, the following activities are 
performed in this deliverable.  
 
Chapter 1 (Introduction: A Multidisciplinary Approach to Privacy) aims at providing a general 
introduction of the deliverable. After recalling its objectives and scope, it starts with a section 
which is dedicated to terminology. Some conceptual remarks needed for the well 
understanding of the progression of this study. First ones concern the important notion of 
“privacy”. Second ones concern the notion of “surveillance”. Third ones concern privacy-
surveillance paradigms, where are exposed different rationales regards to the balance between 
surveillance and privacy. Following a section devoted to the concept of privacy-by-design, the 
risks and the challenges of this approach. Then, as a result of those precedent remarks, a set of 
remarks concerns the prism through which the SALT Framework is developed and offers the 
opportunity to underline the uniqueness of the SALT framework compared to other privacy 
frameworks used for the privacy by design of a system-to-be. Finally, a final round of remarks 
concern the multidisciplinary approach adopted in this text.  
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Chapter 2 (Privacy from Socio-Political and Ethical Perspectives) focus on different parts: one 
about psychosocial perspective, one about socio-political perspective and a last one regards to 
ethical perspectives. The section (“Privacy from a Psychosocial perspective”) deals with the 
privacy of systems seen from psychosocial perspective. It includes different definitions of 
privacy relevant to the PARIS project, stressing the Altman’ psychosocial model of privacy1. 
Then it discusses the different dimensions of privacy (solitude, isolation, anonymity, reserve 
and intimacy) and adds a classification depending on the privacy spaces (public spaces, semi-
private and private spaces). Besides, this section also explains the effects of lack of privacy and 
the relationship between the psychological perception of privacy and the effects of the lack of 
privacy. Finally, this part of the document identifies the different functions and types of privacy 
and the relationship between them. The following section (“Privacy form a Socio-political 
perspective”) is devoted to privacy as it is theorized from a socio-political perspective, by socio-
political scholars and legal theorists. After a general overview of the main claim from the socio-
political perspective, this section suggests that for the purpose of the framing of the SALT 
Framework, a good starting point is the study and analyse of different taxonomies, their 
benefits and defaults. The last section (“Privacy from an ethical perspective”) follows the same 
structure: a general overview of the main claims regards to ethical dimensions of privacy and 
close the chapter with some existing manners to apprehend privacy’s ethical dimensions. 
 
Chapter 3 (Privacy from a Legal perspective - European Legal Framework for Privacy and Data 
Protection) aims at providing a global review of the European legal requirements in the matters 
of privacy and data protection, in particular in order to understand the balance between 
privacy public space, understood as the extent to which privacy interests are at stake when 
surveillance systems are deployed, especially in public spaces, and the legal ‘concepts’ that the 
SALT framework will have to integrate.  In this aim, the chapter is divided in six parts. The first 
section will come back on the essential issues of the debate surrounding the privacy v. public 
security balance in the European Union in order to have an overview of the legal “context” 
within which the PARIS project intends to produce innovative solution. The second section will 
present the legal landscape of the protection of privacy and personal data in the Member 
States, which will be the occasion to identify the main relevant normative sources that may be 
taken into account by the SALT framework. The third section will present the caselaw of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) with regard to the right to private life and data 
protection, with specific attention on some important developments in relation to the extent of 
protection of private life to informational issues and public surveillance. Section four will 
present the core concepts and principles enshrined in the Directive 95/46, which is the main 
relevant EU wide instrument on the protection of personal data applicable in all Member 
States. Finally, because this instrument does not address the issues of protection of personal 
data in relation to specific surveillance technologies, we will look at European guidance with 
regard to videosurveillance activities (section five) and biometric technologies (section 6), 
which are PARIS use cases, and how these matters are dealt with in two Member States, 
Belgium and France.  
 
                                                     
1 Irwin Altman, The environment and social behavior: Privacy, personal space, territoriality and crowding 
(Monterey (Ca.): Books/Cole, 1975). 
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Chapter 4 (Accountability by Design – a Way to Ensure Transparency and Trust) proceeds to a 
review of the state-of-the-art on the principle of accountability in view of extracting preliminary 
criteria for the design of an accountability-based approach for personal data governance 
practices within the SALT framework. In section 1, we will see that “accountability” is a concept 
which can be approached as a normative concept, in its broad and active sense of 
“organizational virtue”, or as a social relation or mechanism, in its narrow or passive sense, as 
“mechanism of control” and that both approaches are of interest for the SALT Framework. As 
elaborated in section 2 we will see that both concepts share common features. In short, 
accountability relationships involve a third party external to the accountable agent and in which 
the latter is asked to answer the requests of the former, which may result in corrective actions 
taken by the agent. The review of the different initiatives in view of the introduction of an 
accountability-based approach within the data protection framework in section 3 shows that 
they approach accountability as implementation and enforcement mechanism of the existing 
framework, although none of the policy instruments reviewed provides for a definition of the 
principle of accountability. The different initiatives reviewed do however not address the 
specifics of surveillance practices, which means that further work is required to tailor these 
preliminary criteria to the context of surveillance. The next deliverable (D.2.2.) will build on the 
findings of this Chapter to provide a definitive list of requirements, adapted to the context of 
surveillance.  
 
Chapter 5 (Privacy from a Computer Engineering Perspective) deals with the privacy of 
systems seen from a technological point of view. The most common principles for privacy are 
listed, including OECD principles. With these principles in mind, the section defines some 
important concepts related to ICT privacy (such as anonymity, pseudonymity, unlinkability, etc.) 
and privacy in video-surveillance systems. Privacy-enhancing technologies are also mentioned: 
encryption, access control, obfuscation, etc. Once the basis of privacy is planted (i.e., principles 
and concepts) this section disserts about new technologies and how they affect current 
systems’ privacy (making a distinction between hardware and software advances), and 
nowadays advances in connectivity and ubiquity. Finally, it focuses on the different applications 
and technologies regarding to surveillance and what type of impact they can have on people. 
Considering PARIS project main use-cases (i.e., video-surveillance and biometrics systems) a 
large set of heterogeneous surveillance systems are described: imaging scanners, satellites, 
photography, fingerprint recognition, iris recognition, dataveillance, GPS, etc. Biometric 
systems functionality is also described for a better understanding of this type of systems. 
 
Chapter 6 (Preliminary Recommendations for the SALT Framework) concludes with 
recommendations to be considered in the development of SALT Frameworks and, as a 
consequence, in the preparation of the next deliverable. Those recommendations are based on 
all previous findings identified within this report. 
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Abbreviations and definition 
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CNIL Commission Nationale Informatique et Libertés (FR) 
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IP Internet Protocol 
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MB Moniteur Belge (BE) 
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OJEC Official Journal of the European Community 
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OJEU Official Journal of the European Union 
PARIS PrivAcy pReserving Infrastructure for Surveillance 
PbD Privacy by Design 
PET Privacy-Enhanced Technologies 
PIA Privacy Impact Assessment 
PRAT  Passive Reader Active Tag 
RFID Radio Frequency Identification 
RTP Real Time Transport 
SALT Social, ethicAl, Legal, Technical 
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
US United States 
USA United States of America 
VoIP Voice over Internet Protocol 
Wi-Fi Wireless Fidelity 
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1 Introduction: a Multidisciplinary Approach to Privacy 
 
Nathalie Trussart (CRIDS – University of Namur) 
1.1 Deliverable Objectives and Scope 
The mission of PARIS, as presented in the description of work of the project, is to define and 
demonstrate a methodological approach for the development of surveillance infrastructure 
which enforces the right of citizens for privacy, justice and freedom. The methodological 
approach will be based on two pillars: 
 A theoretical framework for relating surveillance and privacy/data protection, and 
integrating the concept of accountability. 
 An associated process for the design of surveillance systems which takes from the start 
privacy (i.e. privacy-by-design) and accountability (accountability-by-design). 
 
 
Figure 1 PARIS Methodological Approach 
 
The following objectives will be addressed during the PARIS project: 
 01: Definition of a Social, Anthropological, Legal and Technical or SALT framework for 
an evolving understanding of the concept of privacy in a surveillance system, while fully 
integrating the concept of accountability. 
 02: Development of a SALT framework management tool. This tool allows for a digital 
reference and representation of a SALT framework. It is used by stakeholders as a 
reference, including for the design of surveillance systems. It includes mechanisms for 
creating and updating a SALT framework. 
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 03: Definition of a SALT compliant process for surveillance. It uses a reference SALT 
framework and integrates process activities and process artifacts for privacy-by-design 
and accountability-by-design. 
 04: Provide evidence of the value of SALT compliant process for surveillance in two 
cases. A laboratory demonstration will show how a surveillance system can be 
developed using a SALT compliant process for video data lifecycle management based 
applications and for biometrics based applications. 
 
The aim of this deliverable D21 is to contribute to the making of the theoretical framework 
above cited as the first objective of the PARIS project.  
 
This theoretical framework, while being conceived through a triple prism - (1) a Socio-political 
and ethicAl prism, (2) a Legal prism and (3) a Technological prism – , is the SALT framework 
which is at the heart of this project. A SALT framework describes a consistent socio-political, 
ethical, legal and technological skeleton concerning the balance between privacy and 
surveillance.  
 
This study, carried out in Work Package 2, in the scope of Task 1 on “Concepts and Contexts”, 
aims to help the characterisation and definition of the main relevant criteria - regards to the 
relationships between privacy and surveillance - which have to be considered in the making of 
the SALT framework, while taking into account socio-political, ethical, legal, technical privacy’s 
dimensions and the concept of accountability. This aim is achieved through a well documented 
overview of the current European landscape recorded about the relationship between privacy 
and surveillance. The materials used for this task consist in scientific literature, laws, 
institutional and policy documents, and studies (co-)funded by the European Commission.  
1.2 Terminology 
For the well understanding of the progression of this study, we have to start with some 
conceptual remarks. First ones concern the important notion of “privacy”. Second ones concern 
the notion of “surveillance”. Third ones concern privacy-surveillance paradigms. Fourth ones 
concern the critique addressed to the privacy-by-design concept for adopting a techno-centric 
perspective. And finally, as a result of those precedent remarks, the last set of remarks 
concerns the prism through which the SALT Framework is developed.  
 
1.2.1 Privacy 
The notion of “privacy” is used through this document in a very generic sense as long as it is not 
precisely specified otherwise. Indeed, as we consider several perspectives, the notion of 
“privacy” has different specifications and characterisations. Thus, for example, inside the legal 
practice, as well as from the theoretical legal perspective, the notion of “privacy” is well 
distinguished from the one of “data protection”. Nevertheless, this single distinction is not 
relevant from ethical and social perspectives for which several other distinctions are identified. 
As this document will show, these different disciplinary perspectives bring different distinctions 
which intersect and partially overlap while bringing interesting nuances. At each step, a point is 
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made about the main characterisations of privacy which are highlighted by the relevant 
discipline. And finally, the conclusive part of this document aims at gathering those dimensions 
of privacy which were provided through this study and gives a provisional list of criteria which 
should be taken into account in the design of the SALT framework. A series of 
recommendations for the integration of those dimensions in a SALT framework are gathered, 
while paving the way for the preparation of the next deliverable (D 2.2).  
 
A second remark has to be made about this notion of privacy and the way this study carve a 
pathway through its conceptual muddle. The aim of this report is not to provide a definition of 
privacy. Nevertheless, as the aim of this study is to provide a well documented set of privacy’s 
dimensions which may be of interest in the making of the SALT framework, several definitions, 
dimensions and classifications of privacy are presented. Despite the differences between the 
proposals presented in this study, the chosen authors share the common convictions that 
privacy counts, that privacy is in danger and that privacy should be protected. Although, in this 
task, their strategies are different, their enterprise in defining or describing privacy is sustained 
by these common assumptions.  
 
This “privacy counts”2 thesis may seem obvious. However, it still faces another one, the 
“privacy is dead” doctrine for which struggling to protect privacy is a vain activity which comes 
too late: the body (of privacy) is cold3. “You have zero privacy anyway. Get over it!”4: that is its 
most popular motto and (re)appears regularly when a new breach into our privacy is 
discovered5. For our purpose – to make clear the standpoint adopted in this document and the 
choices made among the numerous literatures relating to privacy issues – there is no need to 
                                                     
2
 Despite, or precisely because, the critiques surveillance studies address to the concept of privacy, I consider them 
as being part of those who share this “privacy counts” thesis, even though they precisely critics the concept of 
privacy because it is too narrow and leaves aside crucial issues. What is at stake in this general assumption is the 
critique which targets the propensity of privacy protection policy to reduce any issue to informational terms and to 
the definition of successful privacy governance in terms of the application of the ‘fair information principles (FIPS)’ 
doctrine for which any surveillance must involve a moment of capture of personally identifiable data. For more 
details of the arguments in favor of the defence of privacy and an interesting response to the critiques addressed 
by scholars working in the field of Surveillance Studies, see this enlightening paper: Colin Bennett, "In the defense 
of privacy. The concept and the regime", Surveillance & Society, 8 (4) (2011): 485-96.  
3
 A longer development about the “privacy is dead” thesis is provided here: Serge Gutwirth et al., "Deliverable D1: 
Legal, social, economic and ethical conceptualisations of privacy and data protection," in PRESCIENT. Privacy and 
emerging fields of science and technology: Towards a common framework for privacy and ethical assessment  (EC: 
Seventh Framework Programme, March 2011). 
4
 In 1999, the chief executive officer of Sun Microsystems, Scott MacNealy made this declaration in front of a 
group of reporters and analysts. (Sprenger s.d.). If at this time, it was a shocking  statement – Jodie Bernstein, 
director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection at the US Federal Trade Commission, said that McNely’s remarks 
were out of line: “Millions of American consumers tell us that privacy is a grave concern to them when they are 
thinking about shopping online” – nowadays, things look like getting worse. (Couts s.d.) 
5
 A very recent resurgence of this slogan stands to designate the news revealed by the Washington Post in June 
2013: “The U.S. government is accessing top internet companies’ servers to track foreign targets. (...) GCHQ, 
Britain’s equivalent of the NSA, also has been secretly gathering intelligence from the same internet companies 
through an operation set up by the NSA”. See: Barton Gellman and Laura Poitras, "U.S., British intelligence mining 
data from nine U.S. INternet companies in broad secret program", The Washington Post, 2013, June 6. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-
broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html  See the use of the 
motto: (Dignan s.d.) 
PARIS Project     Deliverable 2.1     v1.0 
31/07/2013    SEC - 312504      17 
enter in the details of its proponents’ similar remarks6, which go from spelling end of privacy to 
actively blurring the private and public divide7. Nevertheless, it is worth noting the existence of 
this doctrine.  
 
1.2.2 Surveillance 
The notion of “surveillance” that is taking into account as a start in this deliverable is a generic 
one. It is not restricted to security situations, neither to the only cases of video surveillance and 
biometrics which are under focus in this study, except as otherwise specified.  
 
The main argument in favour of a broader definition of “surveillance” is the large amount of 
practices which implies surveillance and which, while not being linked to security, stricto sensu, 
are likely to cause harms to privacy. Those practices of surveillance have existed for a long time, 
e.g. records of people by and for administration purposes. New ones, with new specificities 
(technologically speaking), implies new possible and actual harms to privacy.  
“Understanding surveillance society as a product of modernity helps us avoid two 
key traps: thinking of surveillance as a malign plot hatched by evil powers and 
thinking that surveillance is solely the product of new technologies (and of course 
the most paranoid see those two as one). But getting surveillance into proper 
perspective as the outcome of bureaucracy and the desire for efficiency, speed, 
control and coordination does not mean that all is well. All it means is that we have 
to be careful identifying the key issues and vigilant in calling attention to them”8. 
                                                     
6
 Few examples among others:  
 Marc Zuckerberg, the billionaire founder of Facebook, is accredited with having said that people no longer 
have an expectation of privacy on line as the rise of social networking online shows, that means that 
privacy is no longer a social norm. See: (Johnson 11 Jan 2010) 
 Eric Schmidt, Google’s chief executive officer, spoke in those terms about its company’s aspirations: 
“When we talk about organizing all of the world’s information, we mean all”. See: Randall Stross, "Google 
anything, So Long as It's Not Google"", The New York Times, 28 Aug 2005. 
 “Sir David Omand, the former Whitehall security and intelligence co-ordinator, sets out a blueprint for the 
way the state will mine data - including travel information, phone records and emails - held by public and 
private bodies and admits: "Finding out other people's secrets is going to involve breaking everyday moral 
rules. (...) Modern intelligence access will often involve intrusive methods of surveillance and 
investigation, accepting that, in some respects this may have to be at the expense of some aspects of 
privacy rights”. See: (Travis s.d.) 
7
 Danah Boyd, Microsoft’s social media expert, “argued strongly that privacy is not dead and has no diminished in 
importance, but rather that the distinctions between private and public are different in the network age. (...) she 
contrasts what she calls personally identifiable information with personally embarrassing information and notes 
that these need to be treated differently because the consequences of exposure are different.” Actually, 
companies might try to convince their users they care about their privacy, while adding privacy options which 
protect them from any embarrassing situation – personally embarrassing information -, they are more interested 
in personally identifiable information for marketing purposes.  See: (Thompson s.d.) . For more details about the 
market use of personally identifiable information: Louise Story, "To Aim Ads, Web is keeping Closer Eye on You", 
The New York Times, 2008: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/10/technology/10privacy.html?pagewanted=all. 
8
 Surveillance Society Network, A report on the Surveillance Society. For the UK Information Commissioner (U.K.: 
Information Commissioner’s Office, 2006), 2. Available at: 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/about_us/research/reports_to_parliament.aspx. 
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Some authors, like Michel Foucault9 or Ulrich Beck10, to mention only two among others, have 
extensively documented this understanding of surveillance as a product of modernity. 
Based on this historical perspective, the Report on the Surveillance Society for the UK 
Information Commissioner suggests this definition of surveillance: 
“Where we find purposeful, routine, systematic and focused attention paid to 
personal details, for the sake of control, entitlement, management, influence or 
protection, we are looking at surveillance.”11  
And the Report goes on with the definition of those characteristics: 
“To break this down: 
 The attention is first purposeful; the watching has a point that can be 
justified, in terms of control, entitlement, or some other publicly agreed 
goal. 
 Then it is routine; it happens as we all go about our daily business, it’s in the 
weaves of life. 
 But surveillance is also systematic; it is planned and carried out according to 
a schedule that is rational, not merely random. 
 Lastly, it is focused; surveillance gets down to details. While some 
surveillance depends on aggregate data, much refers to identifiable persons, 
whose data are collected, stored, transmitted, retrieved, compared, mined 
and traded. 
The personal details in question may be of many kinds, including CCTV images, 
biometrics, such as fingerprints or iris scans, communication records or the actual 
contents of calls, or most commonly, numerical or categorical data.”12 
 
In this study, this broad definition offers a sufficient generic scope likely to accommodate 
different species of surveillance technology13, regarding different characteristics that must be 
specified before any examination: 
 the type of surveillance’s practices (watching, listening, following, etc.); 
                                                     
9
 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish:The birth of the prison. (New York: Random House, 1975). 
10
 Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage, 1992). 
11
 Surveillance Society Network, A Report on the Surveillance Society. For the UK Information Commissioner (U.K.: 
Information Commissioner's Office, 2006), 4. Available at: 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/about_us/research/reports_to_parliament.aspx. 
12
 Ibid., 4. 
13
 For taxonomy and mapping of surveillance technologies, see: Alberto Crespo García et al., "D1.3. Report on 
Technology Taxonomy and Mapping", PACCT: Public perception of security and privacy: Assessing knowledge, 
Collecting evidence, Translating research into action, June 2012. 
For a complete description of smart surveillance systems, see: Michael Frieddewald and Rocco Bellanova, 
"Deliverable 1.1: Smart Surveillance - State of the Art," in SAPIENT. Supporting fundamental Al rights, Privacy and 
Ethics in surveillance Technologies (EC: Seven Frameworks Programme, January 2012). 
 For details about the development and use, by both authorities and private actors in Europe,  of surveillance 
systems and technologies for fighting crime and violence, see: Trilateral Research and Consulting LLP, "Deliverable 
D1.1: Surveillance, fighting crime and violence," in IRISS: INcreasing Resilience in Surveillance Societies (EC: Seventh 
Framework Programme, 2012), Available at: http://irissproject.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/IRISS-D1-
MASTER-DOCUMENT-10-June-2013.pdf.  
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 the type of surveillants14 (public authorities, private actors, etc.); 
 the target of the surveillance (people or objects, particular individuals, groups or social 
categories of persons, etc.); 
 the technology used (video surveillance, imaging scanners, fingerprint recognition, 
etc.)15 ; 
 the purpose of the surveillance (crime control, marketing, etc.); 
 the locations and perimeters kind of surveillance (transport facilities, public space, 
communication facilities, etc.); 
 the publicity/visibility of the surveillance (do the surveilled know precisely when, where, 
why and how they are under surveillance?); 
 etc. 
 
Starting from this generic definition of surveillance will allow, in further steps of the PARIS 
project, to characterize, among those technologies of surveillance, on the one hand, the ones 
which are chosen as case studies and, on the other hand, the other ones for which the SALT 
Framework is also relevant.  
 
1.2.3 Privacy-Surveillance Paradigms 
The two last set of remarks regarding privacy and surveillance tend, both, to avoid fixing those 
terms into absolute values that are inversely proportionate to each other. Indeed a rapid 
overview of the literature regards to privacy and surveillance shows a wide range of possible 
definitions and theories which are not necessarily in opposition. Instead they can and they 
should take turns each other regards to different situations and to different privacy problems 
which can occur in one single situation. The inversely proportionality between surveillance and 
privacy is characteristic of a trade-off-paradigm of privacy and surveillance in which an 
increase of one part necessarily results in a decrease of the other part: more privacy is seen as 
being only achievable by less surveillance and more surveillance is seen as being only 
achievable by less privacy.  
 
By privacy-surveillance paradigms, I refer to a set of assumptions about their relations and 
their definitions. These assumptions collectively set the agenda of argumentation, policies and 
research and yet are often not made explicit. A paradigm produces an approved and common 
understanding about the nature and scope of a particular problem.16 Those paradigms do not 
                                                     
14
 Surveillants and surveillers are neologisms coined by surveillance studies scholars with the aim of offering a 
generic identity for those actors of surveillance system whose actions are not reduced to the only one of watching.  
15
 A complete list of technologies of surveillance is developed thereafter in this deliverable (Section 4.7). 
16
 The notion of privacy paradigm is interestingly used in Colin Bennett and Charles Raab, "The privacy paradigm," 
in The Governance of Privacy. Policy instruments in Global Perspective, ed. Colin Bennett and Charles Raab 
(Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 2006), 3-28. A similar set of paradigms as general worldviews is developed in 
Wolfgang Hofkirchner, Twenty questions about a Unified Theory of Information. A Short Exploration into 
Information from a Complex System View (Litchfield Park (AZ): Emergent Publications, 2010), 37. This attempt of 
categorization is based on a similar one made about the relationship between security and privacy in the PACT 
project: Anthony Amicelle et al., "D1.1. Report on Theoretical Frameworks and Previous Empirical Research," in 
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pretend to describe reality as it is – reality is of course much more complex –, neither grant an 
exhaustive categorization, but rather provide a way to organize and discuss relevant 
assumptions, arguments and theories underlying such privacy-surveillance paradigms, included 
the problems they address and the errors they induce. This discussion is beyond the scope of 
the present document. This is also the case for the necessary clarification of the links between 
security, surveillance and privacy. Nevertheless, this overall explicit categorization may be a 
useful tool in order to have common milestones when the relationships between privacy and 
surveillance are at issue.  
Here are the three main privacy-surveillance paradigms. 
 
 A Trade-off Surveillance-Privacy Paradigm. 
a. Surveillance Prevalence Paradigm. 
Needs for surveillance explain, causally determine and dominate the scope of 
privacy. 
i. Example of arguments used in this paradigm 17: 
 The Nothing-to-hide argument: 
“If you are not a criminal or terrorist, then you got nothing to fear 
from application of surveillance technology and therefore nothing 
to hide.” 
  The All-or-Nothing fallacy: 
“For protecting security, we need to reduce/abolish privacy 
because the latter shields criminals and terrorists.” 
 The Pendulum Argument: 
“Times of exception, such as terror and war, require the 
curtailment of civil liberties.” 
b. Privacy Prevalence Paradigm. 
Needs for privacy explain, causally determine and dominate the scope of 
surveillance. 
i. Example of arguments used in this paradigm : 
 The privacy-first-Argument: 
“Privacy or other values are absolute and need to be protected 
even if this results in less security” 
 The Privacy-Surveillance as Dualistic Paradigm. 
Surveillance and Privacy are seen as causally independent and have an 
autonomous existence. 
i. Example of arguments used in this paradigm : 
                                                                                                                                                                           
PACT. Public perception of security and privacy. Assessing knowledge Collecting evidence, Translating research into 
action (EC: Seventh Framework Programme, 2012), 120-4. 
17
 Those arguments are all developed by the legal theorist, Daniel Solove, about Security and Privacy. Daniel J. 
Solove, Nothing To Hide. The False tradeoff between privacy and security (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011). 
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“Privacy and surveillance technologies can both be achieved. They are not 
causally connected.” 
 The Privacy-Surveillance as Interconnected Paradigm. 
Surveillance and Privacy are different and connected, they depend on each other 
and constitute each other mutually. 
i. Example of arguments used in this paradigm : 
“A society that respect privacy of the weak and bases itself on equality can 
enhance and secure stability and social peace, which can further enhance 
basic rights. Privacy enhances security and security should be understood 
and implemented in a way that enhances privacy.” 
 
1.3 Privacy-by-Design  
That categorization being showed, it is worth adding a remark about the dualistic paradigm. 
Indeed, some scholars in the field of security studies18 noted that the concept of privacy-by-
design, which is at the core of the PARIS project, was one of its examples. They quote 
extensively the Ontario’s Information and Privacy Commissioner, Ann Cavoukian who has 
pioneered this concept: 
 
“Adding privacy measures to surveillance systems need not to weaken security or 
functionality but rather, could in fact enhance the overall design (…) privacy must be 
proactively built into the system, so that privacy protections are engineered directly into 
the technology (…) The effect is to minimize the unnecessary collection and uses of personal 
data by the system, strengthen data security, and empower individuals to exercise greater 
control over their own information. The result would be a technology that achieves strong 
security and privacy (…) By adopting a positive-sum paradigm and applying a privacy-
enhancing technology to a surveillance technology, you develop, what I may call 
‘transformative technologies’. Among other things, transformative technologies can literally 
transform technologies normally associated with surveillance into ones that are no longer 
privacy-invasive, serving to minimize the unnecessary collection, use and disclosure of 
personal data, and to promote public confidence and trust in data governance structures 
(…) I am deeply opposed to the common view that privacy is necessarily opposed to, or an 
obstacle to, achieving other desirable business, technical or social objectives. For example:  
 Privacy versus security (which security? Informational, personal or public/national?)  
 Privacy versus information system functionality 
 Privacy versus operational or programmatic efficiency 
 Privacy versus organizational control and accountability 
 Privacy versus usability 
The zero-sum mentality manifests itself in the arguments of technology developers and 
proponents, vendors and integrators, business executives and program managers – that 
individual privacy must give way to more compelling social, business, or operational 
                                                     
18
 Anthony Amicelle et al., "D1.1. Report on Theoretical Frameworks and Previous Empirical Research," in PACT. 
Public perception of security and privacy. Assessing knowledge Collecting evidence, Translating research into action 
(EC: Seventh Framework Programme, 2012), 123-4. 
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objectives. At the same time, defenders or advocates of privacy are often cast, variably, as 
Luddites, technological alarmists, or pressure groups largely out of touch with complex 
technological requirements and organizational imperatives. Because of this prevailing zero-
sum mentality, a proliferation of surveillance and control technologies is being deployed, 
without appropriate privacy checks and balances.”19  
 
After noting that privacy-by-design mainly means the creation of privacy-enhancing 
technologies (PETs), the critics quote another scholar, from the field of Surveillance Studies20, 
for whom privacy-by-design and its dualistic paradigm are “a technocratic approach to 
managing information that fails to grasp how power shapes the agenda and overall context in 
which struggles over technological design occur”21. According to these authors, this dualistic 
paradigm is based on a belief in a technological fix to societal problems. 
 
Indeed, in the last ten years, a range of scholars in the emerging field of Surveillance Studies 
have raised criticisms with respect to Privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) and/or the privacy 
as confidentiality paradigm. These critiques have focused on describing modern day conditions 
in order to show that the computer scientists’ conception of privacy through data or 
communication confidentiality has been mostly techno-centric and has used to displace end-
user perspectives.  
 
1.3.1 Techno-Centricity 
 
Techno-centricity is generally defined as a viewpoint which is mainly involved in understanding 
how technology influences human action, taking a largely functional or instrumental 
approach.22 Within such approaches, people – engineers  are not the only ones who may be 
attached implicitly to this viewpoint - tend to assume unproblematically that technology is 
largely neutral, exogenous, homogenous, predictable, and stable, performing as intended and 
designed across time and place. This perspective tends to put technology in the centre, blend 
out cultural and historical influences, and products technologically deterministic claims.  
 
Facing techno-centricity, there is human-centricity, a view which focuses on how humans make 
sense of and interact with technology in various circumstances. In human-centric accounts, 
                                                     
19
 Ann Cavoukian, Privacy by Design. Take the Chalenge (Ontario (Canada): Information and Privacy Commissioner 
of Ontario, 2009), 51. Available at: http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/PrivacybyDesignBook.pdf 
20
 Surveillance Studies is a cross-disciplinary initiative to understand the rapidly increasing ways in which personal 
details are collected, stored, transmitted, checked, and used as a means of influencing and managing people and 
populations. See one its promoters, in the editorial he wrote for the first issue of the first volume of the journal 
created in 2002 entirely dedicated to Surveillance Studies: David Lyon, "Editorial. Surveillance Studies. 
Understanding visibility, mobility and the phenetic fix", Surveillance and Society, 1 (1) (2002). The objective of 
these studies is to critically understand the implications of current day surveillance on power relations, security 
and social justice. 
21
 Dwayne Winseck, "Netscapes of power. Convergence, network design, walled gardens, and other strategies of 
control in the information age," in Surveillance as social sorting, ed. David Lyon (New York: Routledge, 2003), 176-
98. 
22
 For a well documented reading of the techno-centric view, see: W. J. Orlikowski, "Sociomaterial practices: 
Exploring technology at work.", Organization Studies, 28 (2007). 
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technology is understood to be different depending on meanings human attribute to it and 
through the different ways people interact with it. This approach takes cultural and historical 
contexts into consideration, but has a tendency to minimize the role of technology itself. 23 
 
Besides these two positions in dichotomy, there is also a mediate position for which the 
materiality of technology and the human processes, where those processes are inseparably 
individual and collective at the same time, are constitutively entangled24. “Social practices in 
space subject to surveillance are constituted by existing surveillance practices and by PETs, 
whereas PETs are the products of humans, their own social practices and conceptions of how 
surveillance is made effective and can be countered.”25 
 
Among computer scientists, some authors have also raised criticisms with respect to PETs 
and/or privacy as confidentiality paradigm. More exactly, these criticisms were directed against 
the trend, within the computer science community, to follow one single guiding principle that is 
that privacy equates confidentiality. That principle has gained so much importance that 
technical alternative privacy solutions are left over and not taken into account.26 In addition, 
this trend is often accompanied by forgetfulness or contempt of other practices that are also 
involved in the protection of privacy, practices including, for example, that of a judge, or that of 
a data controller, or that of an end-user, or that of a legislator, or that of a activist of the League 
of Human Rights, or that of a “privacy council” in a hospital, and so on. 
 
Discussions about PETs and privacy exclusively considered as confidentiality are beyond the 
scope of this chapter. The same remark applies to a discussion that would decide between Ann 
Cavoukian’s presentation of privacy-by-design concept and criticisms that have been addressed 
to it. However, it is worth bearing in mind those critiques, while recalling them:  
A techno-centric proposal; a technological fix to privacy which is a societal problem; a 
technocratic approach to managing information that fails to grasp how power shaped 
the agenda and overall context in which controversies over technical design occur; an 
unproblematic assumption that technology is stable and performing as intended and 
designed across time and place; a proposal that places technology in the centre of 
privacy issues while blending cultural and historical influence.  
 
Rather than considering them as describing the reality of what is a privacy-by-design process 
and what are its outputs, those criticisms may be seen as showing some risks any privacy-by-
design process runs. In that sense, the privacy-by-design concept may gain robustness in 
demonstrating how it avoids these risks. This is surely a challenge for the PARIS’ project. 
                                                     
23
 For a general presentation of this human-centric perspective, see: Ibid. 
24
 For a general presentation of this inseparability and co-constitution of technology and human’s processes, see: 
W. J. Orlikowski, "Sociomaterial practices: Exploring technology at work.", Organization Studies, 28 (2007). One of 
its promoters, see: Langdon Winner, "Do artifacts have politics?", Daedalus, 109 (1) (1980). And see also: Langdon 
Winner, "How technology reweave the fabric of society", The chronicle of higher education, 39 (48) (1993). 
25
 Seda Gürses, Multilateral Privacy Requirements Analysis in Online Social Network Service. PhD thesis (Leuven: 
HMDB, Department of Computer Science, K.U.L., 2010). 
26
 The computer scientist, Seda Gürse, reviewed and analysed these critiques addressed to privacy understood as 
confidentiality and proposed a classification of different types of privacy solutions through three privacy paradigms 
in computer sciences: privacy as confidentiality, as control, as practices. See:  Ibid. 
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1.3.2 Privacy-by-Design: a Challenge 
 
Indeed, from the sole point of view of rhetoric, those criticisms do not do justice to the general 
spirit of Privacy-By-Design as it is developed in its seven foundational principles27 listed below:  
1. Proactive not Reactive; Preventative not Remedial 
2. Privacy as the Default Setting 
3. Privacy Embedded into Design 
4. Full Functionality – Positive-Sum not Zero-Sum 
5. End-to-End Security – Full Lifecycle Protection 
6. Visibility and Transparency – Keep it Open 
7. Respect for User Privacy – Keep it User-Centric 
 
While leaving the sole point of view of rhetoric, the critics exposed above not only identify risks 
any Privacy-by-Design process runs, they also identify the gap between the spirit of the Privacy-
by-Design and the incorporation of Privacy-by-Design into a system-to-be.  
 
The Paris project offers the opportunity to put these difficult challenges to the test. In that 
sense, it is a real scale experiment of what may be the actualisation of high privacy-by-design 
expectations. The first step of this real scale experiment lies in the building of the SALT 
framework which is characterized by its multilateral perspectives: different knowledge and 
practices – be they come from academic or private sectors. 
 
1.4 The Singularity of the SALT Framework  
As presented in the description of work of PARIS’ project, the initial formulation of the SALT 
Framework has been at first set as referring to Socio-political, Anthropological, Legal and 
Technological dimensions of privacy. Indeed, for theoretical and methodological reasons, this 
wording must be specified and may be amended in the future of this project. 
 
1.4.1 Beyond Compliance 
 
Among the computer science community working in the research field of privacy research28, 
most of the efforts have been made, during those last forty years, in addressing privacy during 
                                                     
27
 Ann Cavoukian, Privacy by Design: The 7 Foundational Principles Implementation and Mapping of Fair 
Information Practices (Ontario (Canada): Information & Privacy Commisionner of Ontario, Originally published: 
May 2010, Revised January: 2011). Those principles and many other resources regards privacy-by-design are 
available at: http://www.privacybydesign.ca/index.php/about-pbd/7-foundational-principles/  
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requirements engineering mainly with a focus on engineering security and legal compliance. 
That means that, for efficiency reasons, “requirements engineers have avoided the complexity 
of reconciling different privacy notions and solutions by implementing one selected definition 
of privacy in the methods they propose, e.g., privacy as data confidentiality or as legal 
compliance”29. This strategy is efficient but it does not provide the means to address some 
other types of privacy concerns e.g., informational self-determination, and it does not take into 
account other technical, social or legal mechanisms that enable different types of privacy.  
  
By contrast, the singularity of the PARIS project lies in its aim to broaden the scope of privacy 
concerns taken into account, while integrating two supplementary dimensions to the usual 
legal and technical ones, going beyond the technical security requirements and the legal 
compliance30. It aims at integrating potential individual and collective privacy’s concerns, while 
taking into account from the start the concept of accountability. The privacy-by-design process 
in which the PARIS is engaged seeks to respond to the challenges posed by such a 
consideration. That being said, the question arises about the knowledge which are likely to 
inform regarding those individual and collective dimensions of privacy which may be taken into 
account in the building of the SALT framework. 
 
1.4.2 Individual and Social Privacy’s Dimensions  
 
Pragmatically, while the socio-political dimensions cover a wide range of privacy concerns 
regards to collective issues, the only anthropological dimensions which was hoped to address 
the individual privacy dimensions in the SALT Framework, have quickly appeared both too 
narrow and too specific to address privacy dimensions which are related to individual issues. 
Indeed, regards to individuals, many other dimensions of privacy are of interest and are studied 
by many academic disciplines (e.g. psychological or psychosocial dimensions of privacy) other 
than anthropology alone. Furthermore, as it will be developed in this second chapter, the claim 
in favour of the recognition of privacy as a social value induces to take into account privacy’s 
value both to the individuals as well as to society. Among privacy scholars, anthropology have 
not yet produced this kind of interlinked insights likely to keep individual and social dimensions 
of privacy intertwined. Hereafter, there are several issues proper to the used that have been 
                                                                                                                                                                           
28
 For more details about the development of this privacy research field among computer scientists, see: Seda 
Gürses and Bettina Berendt, "PETs in the Surveillance Society. A critical review of the potentials and limitations of 
the privacy as confidentiality paradigm," in Data protection in a profiled world, ed. Serge Gutwirth, Yves Poullet 
and Paul De Hert (Dordrecht Heidelberg London New York: Springler, 2010). 
29
 Seda Gürses, Multilateral Privacy Requirements Analysis in Online Social Network Service. PhD thesis (Leuven: 
HMDB, Department of Computer Science, K.U.L., 2010), 5. 
30
 Within the computer science community, it’s worth noting that similar objectives – going beyond simple 
compliance - have already guided the development of requirements methods which are especially interesting since 
they often go beyond questions of legal compliance and propose new ways of approaching the privacy problems. 
The preliminary work in this direction is: A. K. Massey and A. Antòn, "A requirements-based comparison of privacy 
taxonomies", Requirements Engineering and Law, 2008. An interesting one which formalizes access control models 
using the privacy framework proposed in 2004 by the legal scholar Helen Nissenbaum: Adam Barth et al., "Privacy 
and Contextual Integrity: Framework and Applications", SP '06: Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on 
Security and Privacy, May, 2006: 184-98. The thesis of Seda Gürses already mentioned is another attempt to follow 
a similar direction.  
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made by social sciences in their links with decision-making processes. They are worth 
underlying in order to avoid the risks identified. 
 
1.4.2.1 The social Acceptability Paradigm 
Anthropology - like other disciplines among the social sciences31 as e.g. psychology, 
psychosociology, philosophy, political sciences, ethics, etc. - has been used in diverse studies 
and surveys about the public perception of privacy, or of privacy and security, or privacy and 
surveillance.  Unfortunately, it is worth noting that some of these uses have been proven to be 
methodologically weak, their findings and conclusions being often biased, yet these are 
interpreted and used selectively by participants in the process of policy-making to support their 
different causes.32 Among the many traits that explain this methodological weakness, there are, 
for example: 
  the methodological opacity of surveys regards to the methodology that have been used 
to get and to analyze their results; 
 the elusive wording of the questions that makes unsure the way the question and the 
response may be interpreted: 
a.  asked in terms of general concepts - privacy, surveillance, security, liberty – 
where elusiveness and confusions – for example between technologies and 
practices of surveillance and/or of privacy – are common33; 
b. asked in the form of a trade-off between privacy and other values such as 
security rather than put in concrete situation. Indeed, as an example of question 
asked you may find such a wording: “would you accept to lose parts of your 
privacy in order to guarantee a better security to your family?”; 
                                                     
31
 The category of “social sciences” is here used with ease to designate all the academic disciplines which are not 
included in natural and engineering sciences. More specifically, regards to the multidisciplinary perspective 
adopted in this PARIS project, to designate the academic disciplines which study humans in their constitutive 
relation to themselves or their environment: e.g. psychology, sociology, anthropology, philosophy, political 
sciences, etc. 
32
 There is an important methodological study made by the “PRISMS Project”, in its Deliverable D7.1 “Report on 
existing surveys”, about the perception of the public regards to privacy. They identify and methodologically 
analyse existing public opinion surveys regards to privacy and security/surveillance. They compiled an inventory of 
about 260 surveys, from 1985 to early 2012. Nevertheless, this study reports that, among those 260 surveys, very 
few are of good quality regarding methodological considerations. See: Haley Watson and David (ed.) Wright, 
"Deliverable 7.1: Report on Existing Surveys," in PRISMS. The PRIvacy and Security MirrorS: Towards a European 
framework for integrated decision making. (EC: Seventh Framework Programme, March 2013). Available at 
http://prismsproject.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/PRISMS-D7-1-Report-on-existing-surveys.pdf 
Another interesting study was conducted within the “SAPIENT Project”, in part 4 of its Deliverable 1.1 Smart 
Surveillance- State of the art. This section studies citizen’s perceptions on surveillance and privacy, with a special 
focus on public sector practices of surveillance, where “these are framed in a discourse promoting security through 
surveillance”. This study analyses academic discourses and empirical researches. Specifically, it addresses 
methodological questions to the empirical researches,- e.g. how the public opinion is measured? How is framed 
the most prominent research tool used to measure them, that is the survey? How are analyzed the results of those 
surveys in order to decide upon the public acceptance of surveillance and of specific surveillance technologies? 
See: Michael Frieddewald and Rocco Bellanova, "Deliverable 1.1: Smart Surveillance - State of the Art," in SAPIENT. 
Supporting fundamental Al rights, Privacy and Ethics in surveillance Technologies (EC: Seven Frameworks 
Programme, January 2012), 129-84. 
33
 (Harper et Singleton s.d.) 
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 the difficulty to get the identity of the client who command the survey and, therefore, 
their interests and purposes in commissioning it. 
 Etc. 
 
Another feature of the uses of social sciences in studies and surveys about the public 
perception of privacy is also worth noting, while being more directly link to individual traits. 
Indeed, the types of categorization used in order to organize the panel of respondents, while 
using social and anthropological traits - e.g. gender, age, ethnicity, philosophical and political 
views - is at risk of reproducing and/or prolonging the discrimination induced by the 
categorization of individuals. This is especially critical when the political or personal histories of 
the respondents are not taken into account to structure the surveys and to assess their results. 
In this case of isolation of individual traits from the context (personal, social, political...) in 
which they appear, those individual traits look like having a causal and explanatory strength on 
perception of privacy that, actually, is unjustified as soon as other elements are taken into 
account. Indeed, as an example we can mention that “different countries’ political histories 
vary greatly in terms of the populations experience with different state propensities to interfere 
with privacy and to maintain extensive and intensive surveillance”.34 Those methodological 
difficulties and bias are of general nature in social sciences and are well documented.  
 
In this context, it is worth noting that any survey which may feed or influence a decision-making 
process regards to privacy, including when they are parts of rhetorical campaigns led in mass-
media, is at risk of falling in what has been called the social acceptability paradigm35. This latter 
has been identified in the well documented academic work which has been produced over 
those last 30 years, since in particular the widespread public campaigns in relation to nuclear 
energy and environmental controversies. 
 
In such a paradigm, the discipline aims at establishing scientifically the political necessity for a 
public and for society of a proposed technology, mainly by showing that the public perception is 
in deficit regards to this technology and by proposing the manners and the tools to make it 
acceptable for the public (e.g. with a better communication with the public about the 
technology in question or with the development of educational frames about this technology). 
What is central in this paradigm is what has been called the deficit model of science and 
technology: the public rejection or resistance to new scientific and technological developments 
is sawn solely as an outcome of a lack of information or understanding or knowledge about 
                                                     
34
 Haley Watson and David (ed.) Wright, "Deliverable 7.1: Report on Existing Surveys," in PRISMS. The PRIvacy and 
Security MirrorS: Towards a European framework for integrated decision making. (EC: Seventh Framework 
Programme, March 2013). For more details about methodological remarks regards to surveys which focus on the 
elicitation of privacy attitudes in a variety of countries: Elia Zureilk and Lynda Hardling Stalker, "The Cross-Cultural 
Study of Privacy: Probelms and Proepcts," in Surveillance, Privacy and the Globalization of Personal data: 
International Comparisons, ed. Elia Zureik et al. (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010), 8-
30. 
35
 By paradigm, I refer, as above about the privacy-surveillance paradigms, to a set of assumptions about their 
relations and their definitions. These assumptions collectively set the agenda of argumentation, policies and 
research and yet are often not made explicit. A paradigm produces an approved, common and implicit 
understanding about the nature and scope of a particular problem. It provides a way to organize and discuss 
relevant assumptions, arguments and theories underlying it, included the problems they address and the errors 
they induce. 
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these scientific and technological developments and the benefits to society and citizens 
associated with them. Put in short: objective knowledge belongs to the side of an already made 
political decision in favour of a technology and the public has only perceptions and opinions 
about its development in its daily life, perceptions and opinions which have to be corrected if 
they do not equate with the knowledge-based political decision. This paradigm has been widely 
analyzed and criticized in the last years36. One of this work’s outputs is in showing that 
campaigns aiming simply to “inform and educate” the public of the benefits of technologies 
encounter with little success regarding the preliminary objectives of information, education and 
acceptance.37  
 
1.4.2.2 Public Engagement 
 
In order to move beyond the deficit model of science and technology, social scientists have 
introduced and developed new conceptions of engaging public into sciences and technologies. 
One line of research has been in offering a specifically well-built theoretical reasoning in 
stressing public attitudes to those technologies that might be considered controversial or with 
strong implications for citizens and societies and in highlighting alternative meanings to give to 
these resistance attitudes.38 Indeed, an important theoretical and empirical work has been 
produced which demonstrates the links between public involvement - be it resistance or 
acceptance or engagement - to new technologies and the manners sciences and technological 
research are conducted and governed.39 The study of the governance of science and 
technologies has become an important subject for theoretical and empirical work in social 
sciences, and more specifically in the field of research of science studies. “So successful has 
some of this been that in examining European funded research, the call for the public to be 
engaged or involved with the research and innovation process has been a critical development. 
                                                     
36
 We are waiting for the deliverable of the EU project PRISMS in which a part will be devoted to this social 
acceptability paradigm regards to privacy and surveillance technologies. There is already some important insights 
dealing with public acceptance and public perception of privacy, and of privacy and security in the fourth part of 
the deliverable 1.1 of the SAPIENT Project: Michael Frieddewald and Rocco Bellanova, "Deliverable 1.1: Smart 
Surveillance - State of the Art," in SAPIENT. Supporting fundamental Al rights, Privacy and Ethics in surveillance 
Technologies (EC: Seven Frameworks Programme, January 2012), 175-84. 
For a general overview of the social acceptability paradigm, see: Daniel Barben, "Analyszing acceptance politics: 
Towards an epistemological shift in the public understanding of science and technology", Public Undesrtanding of 
Science, 19(3) (2010): 274-92.   
See also studies for specific technologies, e.g. Genetically Modified Organisms: L. Levidow and Cl Marris, "Science 
and Governance in Europe: lessons from the case of agricultural biotechnology", Science and public policy, 2001: 
345-60. And: Nathalie Trussart, "Publics et expérimentations", Multitudes, 23 (2005): 169-79. And : Tom Horlick-
Jones, The GM debate: risk, politics and public engagement (London: Routledge, 2007). About the 
nanotechnologies: François Thoreau, Embarquement immédiat pour les nanotechnologies responsables. Comment 
poser et re-poser la question de la réflexivité? (Liège: Université de Liège, 2013). 
37
 James Wilsdon and Rebecca Willis, See through science: Why public engagement needs to move upstream 
(London: Demos, 2004). Available at: http://www.demos.co.uk/files/Seethroughsciencefinal.pdf?1240939425  
38
 See as an example of such a work: Lisa M. Pytlikzillig and Alan J. Tomkins, "Public engagement for informing 
science and technology policy: What do we know, what do we need to know, how do we get there?", Review of 
Policy Research, 28 (2) (2011): 197-217. 
39
 For a general overview, see: Monica Kurath and Priska Gisler, "Informing, involving and engaging: Science 
communication in the ages of atom, bio- and nanotechnology", Public Understanding of Science, 18 (5) (2009): 
559-73. 
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This has shaped how European science and technological innovation is conducted and 
performed through mechanisms of public engagement in science and technology policy. This 
deliberative and participatory approach has leg arguably to a democratising of science and 
technology policy”.40 Indeed, “seeking to engage and involve the public in science and 
technology discourse has been one strand of a potential democratising of science and 
technology policy”.41  
 
Same theoretical efforts - in moving beyond the deficit model of public and developing models 
of public engagement into science and technology - have been made about surveillance 
technologies and more especially about new and controversial surveillance technologies.42 
However, the particular argumentative setting in which surveillance technologies are deployed 
- i.e. with redundant links made to (national) security, war on terror 43 - has made this approach 
difficult to implement both into opinion ‘s surveys and political agenda. “For example, citing 
decision as being in the national interests (whether justifiable or not) means opening up such 
processes to public engagement or involvement difficult to achieve”.44 Some authors have 
argued that public resistance to implementations of new surveillance practices or technologies 
“will continue unless new models of public engagement are pursued” regards to new 
surveillance technologies.45  
 
Well inspired by former works made in environmental studies, in life sciences and in sciences 
and technologies studies, several attempts of public engagement – participative technology 
assessment (PTA), interactive technology assessment (ITA), workshop around scenarios, etc. -  
regards to surveillance technologies have been made and several tools as be created and 
experimented. It is not our mandate to make a complete review of them.46 Nevertheless, it is 
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 Michael Frieddewald and Rocco Bellanova, "Deliverable 1.1: Smart Surveillance - State of the Art," in SAPIENT. 
Supporting fundamental Al rights, Privacy and Ethics in surveillance Technologies (EC: Seven Frameworks 
Programme, January 2012), 178. 
41
 Ibid, 181. 
42
 For a reading of European research projects which have participated in these efforts, see Michael Frieddewald 
and Rocco Bellanova, "Deliverable 1.1: Smart Surveillance - State of the Art," in SAPIENT. Supporting fundamental 
Al rights, Privacy and Ethics in surveillance Technologies (EC: Seven Frameworks Programme, January 2012). 
43
 For more details about the historical development of this link between privacy, surveillance, (national) security, 
war and terror, see: Darren W. Davis and Brian D. Silver, "Civil Liberties vs. Security: Public Opinion in the Context 
of the Terrorist Attacks on America", American Journal of Political Science, 48 (1) (2004): 28-46. See also an 
overview of the effects beyond America: D. Bigo and A. Tsoukala (ed.), Terror, Insecurity and Liberty: lliberal 
Practices of Liberal Regimes after 9/11 (London: Routledge, 2008). And also: L. Amoore and M. De Goede (ed.), 
Risk and the War on Terror (London: Routledge, 2008). 
44
 Michael Frieddewald and Rocco Bellanova, "Deliverable 1.1: Smart Surveillance - State of the Art," in SAPIENT. 
Supporting fundamental Al rights, Privacy and Ethics in surveillance Technologies (EC: Seven Frameworks 
Programme, January 2012), 178. 
45
 Ibid., 178. 
46
 For a review of several of those models of public engagement, both theoretical and practical, see: Michael 
Friedewald, "Deliverable 2: Engaging stakeholders and civil society in the assessment of surveillance practices," in 
SAPIENT: Supporting fundamentAl rights, PrIvacy and Ethics in surveillaNce Technologies (EU: Seven Framework 
Programme for Research and technological development, 2012). 
For a general overview and analysis of those tools which are likely to help in involving “a public” around issues 
relating to new technologies, see:  V. Beekman and F. W. A. Brom, "Ethical tools to support systematic public 
deliberations about the ethical aspects of agricultural biotechnologies", Journal of Agricultural and Environmental 
Ethics, 20(1) (2007): 3-12. 
PARIS Project     Deliverable 2.1     v1.0 
31/07/2013    SEC - 312504      30 
worth noting that added to the traditional stakeholders taken into account regards to 
surveillance technologies, that those who are involved in developing, implementing and 
operating surveillance systems, as well as the technological, economic, political and social 
drivers associated with this implementation – government and public authorities, industry, 
academia, policy makers, NGOs, the media – there is also civil societies and citizens or groups of 
citizens who are targets of surveillance technologies or who simply are or may be supporting 
the effects of those technologies. Indeed, in the case of surveillance technologies, people who 
are under surveillance are not end-users. But more important is the asymmetrical stakeholder 
participation in different decision-making processes or Privacy Impact Assessment exercises. 
From a practical perspective, “not all stakeholders have the same possibility to participate in 
key meetings and key moments of the decision-making, and, even when they can attend, they 
do not have adequate resources to weight their opinions in the same way as other non-
institutional actors (such as private companies)”.47 The effective participation of civil society in 
a decision-making process or a PIA exercise has impacts on the credibility of those processes 
and exercises and on the trust civil societies, citizens and consumers may place in the actors 
who are in charge of them48. 
 
It is not the mandate of the SALT Framework to respond to this challenge of engaging a public 
into surveillance system-to-be. Nevertheless, it is of interest for the SALT Framework to be 
aware of those issues concerning the asymmetrical stakeholder participation in different 
decision-making processes and the democratic importance of the involvement of citizens into 
the development of surveillance technologies in order to guarantee credibility and trust.  
 
1.4.2.3 “ethicAl” 
Those arguments presented above were sufficient to make us think about another word to 
anchor the A of the SALT Framework, regards to the knowledge likely to feed the SALT 
Framework.  Two main constraints guide this choice. (1) The first one is to avoid the use that 
has been made by academic knowledge in favour of social acceptability paradigms and the 
methodological bias that have been induced by such a posture. (2) The second one is to inform 
about individual and collective dimensions of privacy. 
 
While seeking for a new wording of the SALT framework, it is also the methodological and 
epistemological question about the possible academic disciplines we may use in this research 
that are at stake. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
See also: Volkert Beekman et al., "Ethical Bio-Technology Assessment Tools for Agriculture and Food Production. 
Final Report Ethical Bio-TA Tools," in Ethical Bio-TA Tools (EC: Fifth Framework Programme, February 2006). 
47
 Michael Friedewald, "Deliverable 2: Engaging stakeholders and civil society in the assessment of surveillance 
practices," in SAPIENT: Supporting fundamentAl rights, PrIvacy and Ethics in surveillaNce Technologies (EU: Seven 
Framework Programme for Research and technological development, 2012), 42. 
48
 About the importance of trust and concerns in the relationships between privacy and security, see: Anthony 
Amicelle et al., "D1.1. Report on Theoretical Frameworks and Previous Empirical Research," in PACT. Public 
perception of security and privacy. Assessing knowledge Collecting evidence, Translating research into action  (EC: 
Seventh Framework Programme, 2012). 
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PARIS’ concern is surely to take into account both collective and individual dimensions of 
privacy. Those dimensions are not conceptualized as opposite but as relating to each other in 
mutually constitutive ways.49 While institutional or organizational contexts do not determine 
completely the behaviour of actors, they nevertheless mark a range of options for decision-
making and acting. On the other hand, people's work, lives and identities are shaped by their 
participation in contexts that determine what is relevant to them – many processes that imply 
their sense-making. 
 
Three possible terms were proposed: agentiAl, contextuAl and ethicAl. First, agential was 
considered. In their aim of avoiding the dichotomy between society and individuals, social and 
political scientists propose the couple of following notions: society and agency (the capacity of 
an agent, an actor, to act)50. But it sounds quickly too specific to social and political scientists. 
Second, contextual was considered, well inspired in this change by Helen Nissenbaum’s book, 
i.e. “Privacy in context”51 in which she invites the reader to consider privacy in the specific 
context where it is an issue: an hospital is a very different context than an airport. While this 
focus on context of surveillance and privacy is an important feature we focus on in this project, 
with the only social and context dimension’s, we take the risk to lose important characteristics 
of individual’s dimensions of privacy and to make those dimensions invisible in the wording of 
the SALT Framework. We finally adopted ethicAl. While maintaining a special care for the 
individual’s dimensions, this term allows avoiding the very old and confusing debate in 
sociology about the relation between individuals and society, while being ground on well 
documented studies which tend to include ethical concerns to privacy issues.  
For all those reasons, from now on, the SALT Framework refers to the Socio-political, ethicAl, 
Legal and Technical dimensions of privacy.52  
                                                     
49
 This constitutive approach on collective and individual dimensions was well initiated and theorised in the 
pragmatist tradition of social and political philosophy, with the aim of avoiding the endless and confusing debate 
about the relation between individuals and society. See one of the coiners and promoters of this approach:  John 
Dewey, The public and its problems (Ohio: Swallow Press, Ohio University Press, 1991).  
In the sociology tradition, Anthony Giddens is also well known to have developed alternatives to the dichotomy 
between society and individuals, with his theory of structuration, ana analysis of agency and structure, in which 
primacy is granted to neither. See: Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society. Outline of the Theory of 
Structuration. (Cambridge: Polity, 1984). 
More recently, in United-States, this approach was largely developed by post-structuralism theories. A very good 
example of its use in Privacy Studies is Seda Gürses’ PhD thesis: Seda Gürses, Multilateral Privacy Requirements 
Analysis in Online Social Network Service. PhD thesis (Leuven: HMDB, Department of Computer Science, K.U.L., 
2010). 
50
 See one of the coiners of “agential” perspective: Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society. Outline of the 
Theory of Structuration. (Cambridge: Polity, 1984). Bruno Latour also developed agential proposals. See: Bruno 
Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Pess, 
2005). 
51 See: Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context. Technology, Policy and the Integrity of Socail Life (Standford: 
Standford University Press, 2010). 
52
 The conduct of the following state of the art into socio-political, ethical, legal and technical aspects of privacy 
will be led while being aware of the criticisms addressed to this kind of study known as “ethical, legal and social 
aspects or implications (ELSA/ELSI) studies”. Indeed, the main criticism of the ELSA approach made by social 
scientific disciplines is that “ethics and law have been central to ELSA research becoming institutionalised in the 
decision-making and policy process” because “ethics and legal approaches are perceived as giving easy answers 
which policy makers can utilise “, in terms of simplistic binary alternatives (i.e. ethical or not, legal or not). This 
criticism echoes the ones already exposed about the social acceptability paradigm. The same solution to avoid 
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1.5 A Multidisciplinary Approach 
 
A rapid overview of the recent research initiatives funded by the European Commission within 
the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7, 2008-2013) and United States agencies such as the 
Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) and the National Science Foundation 
(NSF) shows that the majority of the EU projects and the totality of the US ones are technical, 
i.e. “they focus on engineering issues and technological development and demonstrations”.53  
 
However, in Europe, there is also a place devoted to the analysis of the broader ethical and 
legal issues related to surveillance and security technologies: there is an “ethics, security and 
society” theme in the Security Programme under Activity 6 (Security and Society) in the current 
Seventh Framework Programme where several related “Science and Society” themes cover also 
social and individuals implications of surveillance and security technologies.54 Among this 
European research landscape, yet, it is still a singularity to lead a multidisciplinary research on 
privacy where computer scientists and legal scholars and scientists coming from social sciences, 
partners coming from private and public sectors, work together as it is the case in the PARIS 
project. This situation requests some methodological insights in order to be able to work 
together. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
such a risk has been proposed: the incorporation of stakeholders and publics into the research process, in order to 
give them the opportunity to express their views and correct the ones expressed in the studies. See: Michael 
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1.5.1 Privacy: a « Slippery Concept »55 
As many scholars have already stated, privacy is “a flexible and fluid concept”56, for which there 
is no single definition or meaning57, a concept which is very difficult and challenging to define58.  
“Attempts to define it have been notoriously controversial and have been accused of 
vagueness and internal inconsistency – of being overly inclusive, excessively narrow, or 
insufficiently distinct from other value concepts”59.  
 
Is privacy “a claim, a right, an interest, a value, a preference or merely a state of existence”60? 
The enterprise of defining privacy conceptually has often resulted in adding confusion to the 
point of, eventually, thwarting progress in helping to clarify privacy issues. The one of 
describing empirically the way people do experience their privacy, either individually or 
collectively, has not filed better results. Indeed, a lot of empirical surveys about the perception 
citizens have of privacy in general and of their own privacy in particular are of poor 
methodological quality, as a very recent study shows61.  
 
The difficulties are very important while attempting to grasp the parameters which make sense 
of privacy and privacy harms for people or groups of people and while attempting to give an 
account of them in order to reinforce privacy protection against possible privacy harms, risks 
and concerns. Taking in isolation those parameters have no utility while most of them overlap 
and interact with each other, are possibly in contradiction or in mutual reinforcement, are 
highly dependent of a political regime, a personal and/or a political history, and while their 
relevance concerning privacy issues is possibly changing regards to the type of surveillance 
technology at hand and the specific context in which they operate. Among those classical 
parameters, there are: class, race, sex, age, culture, country, profession, social statute, health, 
political regimes, legal system, economic wealth and/or (in)stability in their country, 
surrounded or not by  trustworthy people (friends, family), etc. 
 
Although the admission of inability to grasp the concept of privacy has become an obligatory 
exercise opening any study devoted to this matter, a wise first step is to start “by identifying a 
series of different ways that the topic of privacy is approached in the research literature”.62 
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 James Q. Whitman, "The two western cultures of privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty", The Yale Law Journal, 113 
(2004): 1153-54. 
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1.5.2 From Multi- to Inter-Disciplinary Approach 
In this PARIS project, the multidisciplinary approach has been chosen in order to give to all the 
partners engaged the full opportunity to make visible from the perspective of its own discipline 
and background, the different ways that the topic of privacy has been approached. In that 
sense, this multidisciplinary approach is a first step before a second one which will be defined 
as an interdisciplinary approach and which will be useful for the second task of the WP2 
devoted to the structure and dynamics of SALT Framework. 
A multidisciplinary approach is defined as the presentation of privacy as it is developed inside 
different disciplinary frameworks.  
Beside the aims of understanding each other among the different partners of the project, and 
to create a common vocabulary, the multidisciplinary phase is also a way to introduce ourselves 
to each other from the perspective and the constraints proper to our own discipline, knowledge 
and background. While situating the way we pose, we word and we solve problems in our own 
discipline, we present situated knowledge and situated practice63 to each other. We may say 
that it is a polite manner to get acquainted. 
An interdisciplinary approach is defined as the work between disciplines from the perspective 
of what may be blinding in them regards to privacy issues. The hypothesis is that the difficulties 
and controversies existing inside a discipline, in its aim of understanding and protecting privacy, 
will receive a better understanding with the help of the other disciplines. While identifying the 
limits of our mainstream discipline regards to privacy issues, the interdisciplinary work is 
needed in order to look outside our discipline and draw insights from other disciplines. 
 
1.5.3 Benefits of this Approach 
 
Multi-perspectivism and disciplinary perspectives are the first step before the interdisciplinary 
work. The emphasis on disciplinary practices serves for reminding several traits of this 
research: 
 A State of the art: research literature. 
 A research practice and its internal controversies or different points of view on privacy 
issues and privacy impacts.  
 A research practice among other research practices. 
 Researches practices among other kind of practices through which privacy or privacy 
impacts make sense. 
The advantages of this approach are: 
 It helps avoiding the temptation of  grasping an essence of privacy, a core concept with 
stable characteristics and to keep an elusiveness for the privacy concept. More about 
the advantages of this elusiveness is expressed thereafter.  
                                                     
63
 The concept of situated knowledge was coined by the feminist philosopher Donna Haraway. See: Donna 
Haraway, "Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective", 
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 It makes less evident  the “implicit feeling” or “common sense” most of us share about 
privacy and attempt to produce a rationale and reflexive knowledge on what is and 
what might be privacy in order to ensure it a better protection. 
 It makes visible the constraints and values which animate a specific disciplinary 
construction of privacy, without giving any privilege to one discipline to the exclusion or 
detriment of others. 
 It helps avoiding the methodological and political risks already mentioned above such 
as a technocentricity posture or the participation to the social acceptability paradigm. 
 
1.5.4 Elusiveness and Undecidability  
Starting from a multi-perspectivism approach does not solve the problem of how to articulate 
the different conceptions of privacy. This problem of articulation induces more precise 
questions, like: 
 WHAT: what is holding the articulation (e.g. what technical system? A decision-making 
process? A practice of judging?)? 
 WHO: who is in charge of articulating these different conceptions (e.g. a legislator? A 
judge? A computer scientist?)? And for which purposes (e.g. a decision-making process? 
An impact assessment? A judging practice? )  
 HOW: What are the procedures, the constraints, the criteria adequate to reach this 
articulation with regard to the specific practice of the person (or people) who are in 
charge with this articulation? 
 SCOPE: What are the scopes of the articulation and what are the zones which should 
not be articulated, regards to the responses to the previous questions? Those zones are 
the zones of undecidability.  
 
Let’s illustrate this with an example. 
 
In 1992, “the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has ruled that it is neither possible or 
necessary to determine the content of privacy in an exhaustive way. Furthermore, maintaining 
flexibility in a conceptualisation of privacy could ensure that a wide range of issues such as 
integrity, access to information and public documents, secrecy of correspondence and 
communication, protection of the domicile, protection of personal data, wiretapping, gender, 
health, identity, sexual orientation, protection against environmental nuisances and so on are 
covered by the law”.64 
 
The argument in favour of the elusiveness of the concept of privacy is, in this case, expressed 
from the perspective of a judging practice (WHAT), which involves for the judge (WHO) the 
responsibility to “qualify” in law (HOW) what is privacy and what is a privacy harm. Regards to 
this practice, the judge has to articulate different dimensions of privacy and has to leave some 
of those dimensions out of the scope of his/her practice of judging. The borders between the 
articulated zones and the zones of undecidability are not framed once for all, rather their 
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PARIS Project     Deliverable 2.1     v1.0 
31/07/2013    SEC - 312504      36 
possible redefinition, regards to novelty (the case, the issues, the technology involved and so 
on) is part of the practice of judging. 
 
Those zones of undecidability are also of interests for the SALT Framework. There are several 
reasons for this: 
 In order to avoid for the system (the SALT Framework management tool) to take the 
place of decision-making processes that it is devoted to help finalizing and that is in 
charge of possible redefinition of the borders between zones which has to articulated 
and those which has to remain undecidable.  
 In order to be able to adapt e.g. to the emergence of new surveillance technologies, 
new negative impacts on privacy, new public claims regards to their privacy, new rules 
regards to privacy. 
 
For any practice which is engaged in its protection, privacy has become a “key lens through 
which many new technologies, and most especially new surveillance technologies, are 
critiqued.”65 “The notion of privacy remains out of the grasp of every academic chasing it. Even 
when it is cornered by such additional modifiers as ‘our’ privacy, it still finds a way to remain 
elusive“, says Serge Gutwirth who explains why privacy is substratum of democracy and “of 
contemporary Western Society because it affects self-determination; the autonomy of 
relationships, behavioural independence; existential choices and the development of one’s self; 
spiritual peace of mind and the ability to resist power and behavioural manipulations.” 66 
 
Many scholars have argued in favour of the elusiveness of the privacy’s concept for the main 
reason that its inherently heterogeneous, fluid and multiple dimensions “may be necessary to 
provide a platform from which the effect of new technologies can be evaluated” and, therefore, 
the relevant protection be identified and created. “This potential necessity is supported by the 
fact that different technologies impact upon different types of privacy, and further 
technological changes may introduce or foreground previously unconsidered privacy 
dimensions”.67 
1.6 Deliverable Structure 
This public reporting document describes the approach adopted by PARIS in the task of getting 
an understanding of the contexts and the concepts relevant for developing SALT frameworks. 
(Work Package 2 – WP2, Task 1). In order to achieve this task, the following activities are 
performed in this deliverable.  
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Chapter I (Introduction: A Multidisciplinary Approach to Privacy) aims at providing a general 
introduction of the deliverable. After recalling its objectives and scope, it starts with a section 
which is dedicated to terminology where conceptual remarks needed for the well 
understanding of the progression of this study are made. First ones concern the important 
notion of “privacy”. Second ones concern the notion of “surveillance”. Third ones concern 
privacy-surveillance paradigms. Different rationales are exposed regards to the balance 
between surveillance and privacy. Following a section devoted to the concept of privacy-by-
design, the risks and the challenges of this approach. Then, as a result of those precedent 
remarks, a set of observations concerns the prism through which the SALT Framework is 
developed and offers the opportunity to underline the uniqueness of the SALT framework 
compared to other privacy frameworks used for the privacy by design of a system-to-be. Finally, 
a final round of remarks concern the multidisciplinary approach adopted in this text.  
 
Chapter II (Privacy from Socio-Political and Ethical Perspectives) focus on different parts: one 
about psychosocial perspective, one about socio-political perspective and a last one regards to 
ethical perspectives. The section (“Privacy from a Psychosocial perspective”) deals with the 
privacy of systems seen from psychosocial perspective. It includes different definitions of 
privacy relevant to the PARIS project, stressing the Altman’ psychosocial model of privacy68. 
Then it discusses the different dimensions of privacy (solitude, isolation, anonymity, reserve 
and intimacy) and adds a classification depending on the privacy spaces (public spaces, semi-
private and private spaces). Besides, this section also explains the effects of lack of privacy and 
the relationship between the psychological perception of privacy and the effects of the lack of 
privacy. Finally, this part of the document identifies the different functions and types of privacy 
and the relationship between them. The following section (“Privacy form a Socio-political 
perspective”) is devoted to privacy as it is theorized from a socio-political perspective, by socio-
political scholars and legal theorists. After a general overview of the main claims from the 
socio-political perspective, this section suggests that for the purpose of the framing of the SALT 
Framework, a good starting point is the study and analyse of different existent taxonomies, 
their benefits and defaults. The last section (“Privacy from an ethical perspective”) follows the 
same structure. It begins with a general overview of the main claims regards to ethical 
dimensions of privacy and of the context of the use of ethics at the European Union level. The 
chapter closes with some existing manners to apprehend privacy’s ethical dimensions and 
existent ethical framework which are of interest for the integration of ethical issues in the SALT 
framework. 
 
Chapter III (Privacy from a Legal Perspective ) aims at providing a global review of the 
European legal requirements in the matters of privacy and data protection, in particular in 
order to understand the balance between privacy public space, understood as the extent to 
which privacy interests are at stake when surveillance systems are deployed, especially in 
public spaces, and the legal ‘concepts’ that the SALT framework will have to integrate.  In this 
aim, the chapter is divided in six parts. The first section will come back on the essential issues of 
the debate surrounding the privacy v. public security balance in the European Union in order to 
have an overview of the legal “context” within which the PARIS project intends to produce 
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innovative solution. The second section will present the legal landscape of the protection of 
privacy and personal data in the Member States, which will be the occasion to identify the main 
relevant normative sources that may be taken into account by the SALT framework. The third 
section will present the caselaw of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) with regard to 
the right to private life and data protection, with specific attention on some important 
developments in relation to the extent of protection of private life to informational issues and 
public surveillance. Section four will present the core concepts and principles enshrined in the 
Directive 95/46, which is the main relevant EU wide instrument on the protection of personal 
data applicable in all Member States. Finally, because this instrument does not address the 
issues of protection of personal data in relation to specific surveillance technologies, we will 
look at European guidance with regard to videosurveillance activities (section five) and 
biometric technologies (section 6), which are PARIS use cases, and how these matters are dealt 
with in two Member States, Belgium and France.  
 
Chapter IV (Accountability by Design – a Way to Ensure Transparency and Trust) proceeds to a 
review of the state-of-the-art on the principle of accountability in view of extracting preliminary 
criteria for the design of an accountability-based approach for personal data governance 
practices within the SALT framework. In section 1, we will see that “accountability” is a concept 
which can be approached as a normative concept, in its broad and active sense of 
“organizational virtue”, or as a social relation or mechanism, in its narrow or passive sense, as 
“mechanism of control” and that both approaches are of interest for the SALT Framework. As 
elaborated in section 2 we will see that both concepts share common features. In short, 
accountability relationships involve a third party external to the accountable agent and in which 
the latter is asked to answer the requests of the former, which may result in corrective actions 
taken by the agent. The review of the different initiatives in view of the introduction of an 
accountability-based approach within the data protection framework in section 3 shows that 
they approach accountability as implementation and enforcement mechanism of the existing 
framework, although none of the policy instruments reviewed provides for a definition of the 
principle of accountability. The different initiatives reviewed do however not address the 
specifics of surveillance practices, which means that further work is required to tailor these 
preliminary criteria to the context of surveillance. The next deliverable (D.2.2.) will build on the 
findings of this Chapter to provide a definitive list of requirements, adapted to the context of 
surveillance.  
 
Chapter V (Privacy from a Computer Engineering Perspective) deals with the privacy of 
systems seen from a technological point of view. The most common principles for privacy are 
listed, including OECD principles. With these principles in mind, the section defines some 
important concepts related to ICT privacy (such as anonymity, pseudonymity, unlinkability, etc.) 
and privacy in video-surveillance systems. Privacy-enhancing technologies are also mentioned: 
encryption, access control, obfuscation, etc. Once the basis of privacy is planted (i.e., principles 
and concepts) this section disserts about new technologies and how they affect current 
systems’ privacy (making a distinction between hardware and software advances), and 
nowadays advances in connectivity and ubiquity. Finally, it focuses on the different applications 
and technologies regarding to surveillance and what type of impact they can have on people. 
Considering PARIS project main use-cases (i.e., video-surveillance and biometrics systems) a 
large set of heterogeneous surveillance systems are described: imaging scanners, satellites, 
PARIS Project     Deliverable 2.1     v1.0 
31/07/2013    SEC - 312504      39 
photography, fingerprint recognition, iris recognition, dataveillance, GPS, etc. Biometric 
systems functionality is also described for a better understanding of this type of systems. 
 
 
Chapter VI (Preliminary Recommendations for the SALT Framework) concludes with 
recommendations to be considered in the development of SALT Frameworks and, as a 
consequence, in the preparation of the next deliverable. Those recommendations are based on 
all previous findings identified within this report. 
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2 Privacy from a Socio-Political and Ethical Perspectives  
2.1 Introduction 
 
With the objective of helping in the characterisation and definition of relevant criteria that have 
to be considered in the making of the SALT Framework, this chapter provides a state of the art 
analysis of different conceptions on privacy and its relations to surveillance technologies from 
the perspectives of different social sciences. The chapter is structured in three sections. The 
first one focuses on psychological and psycho-social perspectives on privacy. The second one is 
devoted to the socio-political perspective on privacy. The third one deals with ethical 
perspectives on privacy.  
2.2 Privacy from a Psychosocial Perspective  
Carmen Hidalgo, Antonio Maña, Fernando Casado and Francisco Jaime (University of 
Malaga) 
 
One of the main goals of this deliverable is providing knowledge for the future creation of SALT 
frameworks from multidisciplinary perspectives. The psychological sciences are of interest in 
the aim of completing a wide understanding the balance between privacy and surveillance 
technologies. Therefore, in this section we will concentrate on the psychological perspective, 
but not in isolation, but with the aim of using this perspective in an integrated way with other 
perspectives and in relation to the project objectives. 
2.2.1 Definitions 
Nowadays there is a considerable level of confusion and ambiguity for psychologists who work 
in the research field of privacy69. Attempts to understand and analyse privacy are focused on 
several single perspectives, as diverse as anthropology, ethology, politics, sociology, law, and 
psychology. As a result, there are many different definitions of privacy found in the literature.  
 
Even from a psychological point of view, we find different definitions of privacy relevant to this 
project:  
 “Freedom to choose what, when and to whom one communicates” and “personal control 
over personal information”70. 
 “Control of personal space”71. 
 “A voluntary and temporary condition of separation from the public domain”72. 
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 “Regulating the amount of information that is shared with others by creating boundaries 
that represent the level of control of others access to private information about an 
individual”73. 
 “A process of sharing information, with visual access regulation (ability to inspect the 
immediate environment) and visual exposure (ability to expose to the view of other)”74. 
 
Some of these definitions are of special interest for PARIS project, such as “control of personal 
space and visual exposure”. It is important to know how the loss of control over personal 
spaces affects to people, and how it feels to be observed. 
 
A relevant psychosocial model of privacy was proposed by Irwin Altman75. In this model, privacy 
is defined as: “selective control of access to the self or to one’s group”. It addresses two key 
aspects of privacy: (i) control of social interaction; and (ii) control of offered information. Privacy 
is a boundary control process in which an individual regulates with whom contact will occur, 
and how much and what type of contact it will be, as well as how much and what type of 
information you want to share with others. Altman does not propose only a theory of private 
spaces but a broader theoretical perspective on social interaction, beyond the traditional 
concept of privacy as isolation or seclusion. He also proposes an adequate theory of privacy to 
analyse other social spatial behaviours such as crowding, territoriality and personal space. 
Altman’s model highlights the dialectical process that is established among the person, its 
needs and its expectations. The definition of the SALT framework needs to consider the 
different processes of privacy because it is important to know the process control or regulation 
limits of people, together with the optimal level of access to the self and cultural, social, 
personal and environmental mechanisms. Gifford76 reflects Altman’s theoretical model, and 
defines it as a three dimensional process:  
 Process control or regulation limits. People not only seek the exclusion of others, but also 
seek other people to engage in interaction. 
 Optimization process. Privacy can be understood as a mechanism to achieve certain goals in 
social interaction. Altman believes that the ultimate goal of privacy is an optimal level of 
access to the self, choosing to be alone or in company when desired. 
 Multi-instrumental process. The mechanisms for privacy are multiple and including: cultural, 
social, personal and environmental mechanisms. 
2.2.2 Dimensions of Privacy 
Alan Westin77 suggested five types or dimensions of privacy: solitude, isolation, anonymity, 
reserve and intimacy.  These dimensions can be classified in two groups: 
 Control of interaction from the person. This group includes two dimensions: 
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o Solitude: refers to placing yourself in a situation where other people can’t see or hear 
what you are doing. 
o Isolation: involves using physical distance to separate oneself from others to obtain 
privacy.  
 Selective control the information into interaction situations. This group contains three 
dimensions, of which the first two are the most relevant to the design of surveillance 
systems. 
o Anonymity: is seeking privacy by going unnoticed in a crowd of strangers. 
o Reserve: is controlling verbal disclosure of personal information to others (especially to 
strangers).  
o Intimacy: a form of privacy as a reference to the group. Pedersen78 distinguishes: 
 Intimacy with family: refers to being alone with members of one’s family to the 
exclusion of other people. 
 Intimacy with friends: is like intimacy with family except that the reference group is 
friends. 
 
As with many other security concepts, we observe a difficulty for researchers in separating the 
concepts and objectives (e.g. avoiding that others know about your acts) from the ways or 
mechanisms used to achieve such goals (e.g. using physical distance to separate oneself from 
others). This distinction is a very necessary step, because it is the only way to capture and 
analyse the motivations behind the concepts.  
 
Private space, semi-private space and public space 
Each space can be characterized by the degree of privacy it offers. That is, each environment 
offers a different level of control to regulate the interaction. Zimring79 proposed a theoretical 
distinction among private spaces that allows a high degree of privacy (are areas where 
accessibility is determined by one person or a small group of people, they are characterized by 
intimacy) semi-private o semi-public spaces (are accessible to members of the public, they are 
characterized by a certain intimacy which might be experienced therein) and public spaces 
(social spaces that are open and accessible to all). Visual exposure of people, their identification 
and their relationship with the different spaces in which they are, will condition the acceptance 
of different IT-empowered surveillance. 
 
The public space can take many different forms, can be a gathering place defined by its social 
function, a civic space, a community space, a virtual space… The strength of the public space is 
its potential in reaching out and involving a wide and diverse group of people. From 
psychosocial theories of privacy, a public space is a space in which it is not possible to apply 
direct and effective control of our interaction with others, unlike a private space in which 
interaction regulation strategies are more varied and effective. 
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In an empirical study, Krämer80 extended this theoretical distinction, performing a classification 
of spaces depending on the degree of privacy: 
 Public spaces: street, station, airport, university, beach, shopping mall, bank, hospital, sport 
club, supermarket, café, pub, market square, post office, swimming pool, hairdresser´s, sport 
ground, etc. 
 Semi-private spaces: park, cinema, specialist’s shop, museum, office, concert hall, library, 
theatre, school, art gallery, church, hall, meeting room, etc. 
 Private spaces: one’s home, friend’s house, bathroom, private office, car, bedroom, etc. 
 
It is important for the PARIS project to understand the extent to which people are willing to 
lose some of their privacy in different places in relation to their safety. The new configurations 
of the borders between public and private are shaped by the interactions among social and 
anthropological practices, legal norms, and technology creating four main streams. Therefore 
this concept of public space and privacy must be seen through this multidisciplinary 
perspective. The SALT framework is precisely the mechanism that PARIS will develop in order to 
provide comprehensive descriptions of such concepts as public space and privacy which are of 
major interest regarding the balance between privacy and surveillance infrastructure. 
2.2.3 Psychological Effects of Lack of Privacy 
Although, not much work is available dealing with the perception of privacy in the framework 
of IT systems, and more specifically, IT-empowered surveillance81, we can find interesting 
studies that provide analyses about the psychological perception of privacy and the effects of 
the lack of privacy.  
 
Traditionally, lack of privacy appeared to depend on the cognitive appraisal made by the person 
whose space has been invaded. Consequently, when there was an obvious legitimate reason for 
the invasion, no ill effects were reported82. This is a crucial finding for PARIS because it 
highlights the importance of informing the subjects of surveillance about the goals and 
limitations of the system, and indicates that providing adequate information is crucial in 
developing non-intrusive systems.  
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The discomfort of an invasion of privacy initiates a variety of conscious and unconscious 
behaviours that attempt to regulate personal boundaries83. These may take the form of 
movement away from the invasive individual or group to increase interpersonal distance, 
reorientation of the face or body to reduce visual contact, or complete retreat to another 
environment, all of which represent types of avoidance behaviours84. For PARIS, this indicates 
that the psychological effects of a surveillance system that represents a privacy breach must be 
taken into account in order to design systems that are non-intrusive and that perform their 
function without affecting the observed subjects. 
 
Baum & Greenberg85 have shown that the potential for spatial invasion can inﬂuence the choice 
of seating, with those anticipating the invasion choosing seats in a corner or along a wall, 
making use of the physical environment to help regulate privacy. Other findings suggest that 
individuals will avoid invading the personal space of others86 or will engage in submissive 
gestures or verbalized apologies to minimize the impact of invasion87. This is relevant for PARIS, 
since it shows that people will protect their privacy, while reacting against systems that do not 
respect their privacy. Even if, as we have already pointed out, in some cases the will to lose 
parts of privacy in favour of the surveillance system is conditioned by the legitimacy and 
importance of the surveillance goals, in some other cases, a badly designed surveillance system 
may result in reactions that may defeat the original goal of the surveillance system. As an 
example, consider a very intrusive surveillance system in a supermarket, designed with the goal 
of increasing the revenues by avoiding shoplifting. If the perception of the privacy invasion is 
such that customers decide to shop somewhere else, the system will not achieve the goal of 
increasing the revenues, even if it totally prevents shoplifting. 
 
Privacy regulation may also involve the use of physical barriers to reduce the amount of 
stimulation as well as reduce the uncertainty associated with exposure, giving the individual a 
sense of control over an environment88. Again, we can obtain interesting conclusions for PARIS 
from this study: The provision of user-control mechanisms can increase the users’ perception of 
the system legitimacy and efficiency.  
 
The effects of lack of privacy may be permanent, we must be careful. “The social media and 
online data collection are conditioning our privacy and a lot of it is our own fault. Six in 10 think 
people should stop sharing so much of their personal thoughts and experiences online; they 
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believe society needs to re-establish its privacy boundaries. Concern is most pronounced for 
the millennial generation: 7 in 10 believe today’s youth have no sense of personal privacy”89. 
2.2.4 Functions of Privacy 
The terms privacy needs and privacy functions have been used synonymously. Westin90 
described four functions of privacy:  
 Personal autonomy: refers to the desire to avoid being manipulated, dominated, or exposed 
by others. 
 Emotional release: release refers to release from the tensions of social life such as role 
demands, emotional states, minor deviances, and the management of losses and of bodily 
functions. 
 Self-evaluation: refers to integrating experience into meaningful patterns and exerting 
individuality on events. 
 Limited and protected communication: limited communication sets interpersonal 
boundaries and protected communication provides for sharing personal information with 
trusted others. 
Altman91 organized privacy functions ranging from the interpersonal aspect to the self, being 
the relationship between the self and other people the middle point: interpersonal functions, 
the relationship between self and others, self-identity. Newell92 proposed that privacy 
provides for the maintenance and development of the individual as a system.  
Pedersen93 identified five privacy functions: autonomy, confiding, rejuvenation, 
contemplation, and creativity. He examined the relationships between their types and 
functions.  
This is interesting for PARIS to identify the relation between the types of privacy and the privacy 
functions model, and thus obtaining more accurate information to develop SALT frameworks. 
The model secures the link between the types of privacy people need and the way they are 
used. He suggested that autonomy, a function, is reasonably supported by all six types but is 
supported best by intimacy with family and intimacy with friends. This model represents a 
significant extension of Westin’s94 theory of privacy. 
 
2.3 Privacy from a Socio-Political Perspective 
Nathalie Trussart (CRIDS – University of Namur) 
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The claim of privacy as a social value is the keystone of the socio-political perspective on 
privacy. Indeed, different scholars, from political sciences and social sciences, have advocated 
the recognition of the social and political values of privacy, while addressing a challenge both to 
the conception of privacy as an individual right and/or value and to the one of its consequential 
turn of mind, that is the balancing relationships between privacy – conceived as an individual 
interest and/or value and/or right – and other social values such as (national) security. As Colin 
Bennet and Charles Raab put it: “The conception of privacy as an individual right could be 
challenged by an emergent recognition of privacy as a social value”.95 Accepting to reduce 
privacy to “only” an individual right and/or value and/or interest, especially in our current 
context overloaded of discourses in favour of security and safety96, and to balance privacy 
against other social values such as (national) security, is a very risky posture. Indeed, privacy, 
while being conceived only as an individual interest and/or right and/or value and not as a 
social value, is at risk of becoming the loser in the balance against social values. 
 
2.3.1 General Overview 
 
Priscilla M. Regan was one of the first who identifies why the protection of privacy is important 
to society. In her book, Legislating Privacy: Technology, social values and public policies, 
published in 1995, her arguments are clear. 
“Privacy has a value beyond its usefulness in helping the individual maintain his or her 
dignity or develop personal relationships. Most privacy scholars emphasize that the 
individual is better off it privacy exists. I argue that society is better off as well when 
privacy exists. I maintain that privacy serves not just individual interest but also 
common, public and collective purposes. If privacy becomes less important to one 
individual in one particular context, it serves, to several individuals in several context, it 
would still be important as a value because it serves other crucial functions beyond 
those that it performs for a particular individual.” 97 
She unfolds the social importance of privacy in three dimensions: (1) a common value; (2) a 
public value; (3) a collective good. 
The common value of privacy. “Some rights, which protect individual interests, are 
regarded as so fundamental that all individuals in common have a similar interest in 
them...in much the same way that people of different religious beliefs have a common 
interest in a right to free conscience, people of different privacy beliefs or preferences 
have a common interest in a right to privacy”. 
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The public value of privacy. “A public value of privacy, then, is derived from its 
importance to the exercise of rights that are regarded as essential to democracy, such 
as freedom of speech and association, and from its importance as a restraint on the 
arbitrary power of government”. 
Privacy as a collective good. “No one member of society can enjoy the benefit of a 
collective goof without others also benefiting”. It is the case for clean air, for national 
security and for privacy.98 
 
In the same line of though, Arthur Cockfield contends that both, privacy as an individual right 
and as a social value have to be preserved. 
“Judges, lawyers and policy-makers need to take into account more explicit account of 
the individual rights aspect of privacy as well as the social value or privacy, that is, 
society’s interest in preserving privacy apart from a particular individual’s interest. 
Both of these aspects of privacy are critical to the functioning of our democratic state 
(...) Even if privacy becomes less important to certain individuals..., it continues to serve 
other critical interests in a free and democratic state (e.g. the need to protect political 
dissent) beyond those that it performs for a particular person”.99 
Cockfield also contends about the risky balance between privacy and social values such as 
(national) security and takes this risk as a reason of major importance for advocates in favour of 
privacy as a social value. 
“The traditional understanding of privacy often focuses on the individual rights aspect of 
privacy by emphasizing privacy as an individual’s claim against state interference. This 
understanding generally leads to legal analysis that sees privacy as an interest which 
competes with security, sometimes resulting in calls for the need to dilute privacy to 
protect the public against criminal and/or terrorist activities”.100 
 
Alan Westin, in his seminal work published in 1967, supports also the defence of privacy as a 
social good which is necessary in democratic societies. 
“The importance of that right to choose, both to the individual’s self-development and 
to the exercise of responsible citizenship, makes the claim for privacy a fundamental 
part of civil liberty in democratic society. If we are switched on without our knowledge 
or consent, we have, in very concrete terms, lost our rights to decide when and with 
whom we speak, publish, worship, and associate. Privacy is therefore a social good in 
democratic societies, requiring continuous support from the enlightened public.”101  
 
Stephen Margulis, on his side, offers a short classification of the social dimensions of privacy. 
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“Privacy is social in two senses: the socio-psychological and the social-political. This 
duality is a bridge between socio-psychological privacy as social behaviour and socio-
political privacy as a social issue.”102 
Regards to the socio-political dimensions of privacy, Margulis takes up the classification of 
Regan, that is:  privacy as (1) a common value, (2) a public value and (3) a collective good. 
Regards to the socio-psychological dimensions of privacy, he identified three dimensions: 
“(a) Privacy’s foci are interpersonal communication and social interaction. This view of 
‘social’ predominates... There are two less frequent referents. (b) How we experience, 
understand, react to, and enact privacy are products of our social and cultural 
development ... (c) Privacy is an attribute not only of individuals but also of groups and, 
for some theorists, organizations.”103 
 
Daniel Solove shares with Cockfield the necessity to challenge the balance paradigm between 
privacy and other social values. 
“Privacy is often cast as an individual right and balanced against the greater social good, 
which results in privacy being frequently undervalued in relation to many conflicting 
interests.” 104 
That is the main reason for him to advocate in favour of privacy as a social value. 
“When privacy protects the individual, it does so because it is in society’s interest (...) 
The value of privacy should be understood in terms of its contribution to society”.105 
 
For Julie Cohen, as for the aforementioned scholars, privacy is a fundamental value for both 
individual and society, a value which underlies other values such as autonomy and anonymity. 
“A degree of freedom from scrutiny and categorization by others promotes important 
non instrumental values, and serves vital individual and collective ends (...) 
Informational autonomy comports with important values concerning the fair and just 
treatment of individuals within society (...) A realm of autonomous, unmonitored 
choice, in turn, promotes a vital diversity of speech and behaviour. The recognition that 
anonymity shelters constitutionally-protected decisions about association – decisions 
that otherwise might be chilled by unpopularity or simple difference – is part of our 
constitutional tradition (...) The autonomy fostered by informational privacy also 
generates more concrete collective benefits. Development of the capacity for 
autonomous choice is an indispensable condition for reasoned participation in the 
governance of the community and its constituent institutions – political economic and 
social (...) Examination chills experimentation with the unorthodox, the unpopular, and 
the merely unfinished. A robust and varied debate on matters of public concern requires 
the opportunity to experiment with self-definition in private, and (if one desires) to keep 
distinct social, commercial, and political associations separate from on another”. 106 
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Valerie Steeves makes the observation that, in Alan Westin’s seminal work, privacy is defined, 
of course, as a social value, but also as informational control and that there is something wrong 
with this definition of privacy as informational control. More than forty years after the 
publication of Alan Westin’s book, Privacy and Freedom, both the theoretical work and the 
legislative activity, which were boosted by his claim in favour of privacy as a social value, have 
done little to constrain the collection of massive amounts of personal information on the part 
of government and of corporations. Steeves argues that the reason is that advocating privacy as 
a social value is not enough, this avocation must by accompany with reliable conceptualisations 
of privacy which goes beyond the sole “information control” definition. 
“Sociologists have been particularly critical of Westin’s conceptualization of privacy, 
arguing that as ‘appealing and seemingly intuitive as this concept is, it plainly doesn’t 
work”.107 
Among the criticisms addressed by sociologists to Westin’s concept of privacy as “information 
control”, Steeves quoted these ones:  
 “data protection has been unable to stop the rollout of technologies like closed-circuit 
television cameras in public places, remote-activated location devices in cell phones, iris 
scans in school cafeteria lunch lines, and security cameras in bathrooms, hotel rooms, 
and school buses, 
 In spite of concerns that the surveillance these technologies enable may have 
deleterious effects on our social and political relationships. 
 The conceptualization of privacy as informational control has also arguably displaced 
broader – and potentially more empowering – discourses rooted in a human rights 
model that seeks to protect human dignity and democratic freedoms in the surveillance 
society.”108 
Steeves’ concern is about a reconceptualization of privacy in which there is a place for normal 
social interactions through which people negotiate their privacy and the borders between their 
different privacy’s spheres and what does not concern those spheres.  
“The gap between the goal of data protection legislation and the reality of life in 
surveillance society is not just a matter of poor implementation. I suggest it reflects the 
fact that we rely upon a definition of privacy that is problematic because it strips 
privacy out of its social context (...) goes back to the source and revisit Westin’s theory 
of privacy with a view to recapturing the social elements of the privacy equation. I argue 
that, although Westin’s theory is rich in sociality, he limits his insights into the social 
nature of privacy by focussing on the flow of information rather than on the social 
interaction of persons seeking or respecting privacy. In addition, Westin equate 
perfect privacy with social withdrawal; from this perspective, any social interaction 
becomes a risk to privacy, making privacy not only asocial, but also antisocial.” 109 
Steeves goes on, in her very interesting paper, and proposes an alternative framework that 
conceptualizes privacy as a dynamic process of negotiating personal boundaries in 
intersubjective relations. 
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“In doing so, I am not arguing in favour of a collective right versus an individual right. 
Rather, I am suggesting that by placing privacy in the social context of intersubjectivity, 
privacy can be more fully understood as a social construction that we create as we 
negotiate our relationships with others on a daily basis. This conceptualization frees the 
policy questions from the narrow procedural considerations of data protection, and 
reinvigorates our ability to question – and limit – the negative impact of surveillance on 
our social and democratic relationships”.110 
 
As those different authors show us, and in a very explicit manner in the case of Steeves, the 
general claim in favour of privacy as a social value must be sustained by a conceptualization of 
privacy. Regards to the kind of conceptualization proposed, the effects are very different. In 
fact, the way privacy is conceptualised allows identifying very different kind of harms or 
concerns. 
 
This is worth emphasizing for the construction of the SALT framework which may be very 
different regards to the kind of taxonomy or conceptualization of privacy retained for its 
construction. Indeed, as a short term research aim, the reading of different existent taxonomies 
of privacy reveals that, while planning the construction of the taxonomy which will be relevant 
for the SALT Framework, it is necessary to be transparent in the methodological design of the 
taxonomy and reasons for choosing certain criteria rather than others.  
 
For this reason, the next subsection identifies different taxonomies of privacy which are of 
interest for the construction of the SALT Framework. In the next deliverable (D 2.2), a detailed 
analysis of their content still must be done regards to different details such as, for example,  
 the types of categories retains in the taxonomies. For example, a taxonomy which takes 
into account as a relevant criteria the intellectual property rights regime over 
information is very different than one which takes into account the social context of 
intersubjectivity; 
 their purpose. Indeed, the purpose of the taxonomy is not trivial. Helping Law 
enforcement or helping the design of a system-to-be which integrates Privacy-By-Design 
principles are two very different purposes. Regards to the kind of purpose, some 
common criteria to the analyzed taxonomy may be relevant (or not) for the SALT 
Framework; 
 the sources used. For example, legal sources or theoretical rationales built on the study 
and analyze of new and emerging technologies provide very different perspective on 
privacy; 
 the consequences and the types of consequence of the breaking of the criteria used in 
those different taxonomies. For example, the consequence may be law pursuit or a 
psychological effect on individuals. 
 criticisms that have been addresses to those different taxonomies. 
 
2.3.2 Privacy Frameworks Regards to Socio-Political Issues 
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This subsection identifies existent taxonomies of privacy which are of interest for the SALT 
Framework and which may be studied in more details during the next step of this project and 
more specifically regards the two specific surveillance technologies that are at the core of the 
PARIS project: CCTV and biometric surveillance technologies. 
 
The following privacy frameworks were chosen among many others possible ones because of 
the different focus they put on privacy.  
 
2.3.2.1 Finn, Wright and Friedewald: Seven Types of Privacy 
In their paper, Seven Types of privacy111, those authors propose to extend the definition of 
privacy – using in a way this notion as a springboard or a lever – to any “specific elements of 
privacy which are important and must be protected”, attempting “to capture the complexity of 
privacy issues within frameworks that highlight the legal, socio-psychological, economics or 
political concerns”112 that surveillance technologies present. They define their approach as pro-
active and protective regards to privacy, “over-arching protection that should be instituted to 
prevent harms”113, offering “a forward-looking privacy framework that positively outlines the 
parameters of privacy in order to prevent intrusions infringements and problems.”114 
 
They identify their taxonomy of types privacy by contrast with taxonomy of privacy harms 
which they identify as being the result of a reactive posture regards to privacy, a “reactive 
highlighting of concerns or intrusions”115. According to these authors, most privacy “scholars’ 
focus on the ways in which privacy can be infringed and the legal problem which must be 
solved is largely reactive. They focus on specific harms which are already occurring and which 
must be stopped.”116 Indeed, starting from the many dimensions of privacy, many scholars have 
tried to generate taxonomies of privacy problems, harms or intrusions. Among those scholars, 
Finn, Wright and Friedewald identified Daniel Solove’s taxonomy of privacy problems117 and 
Debbie Kaspar’s typology of privacy intrusions118 as the figures of reactive posture regards to 
privacy.  
 
They illustrate this difference between a taxonomy of privacy harms and a taxonomy of types 
of privacy with an analogy with “the difference between outlawing murder and adopting a right 
to life (...) a positive right to life forces individuals, governments and other organisations to 
evaluate how their activities may impact upon a right to life and introduce protective 
measures.” 119 
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It’s worth noticing that the seven types of privacy retained in this taxonomy expand a former 
categorization of four types of privacy identified in 1997 by Roger Clarke120. The main argument 
formulated by Finn, Wright and Friedewald in favour of the partial reworking and the expansion 
of this previous categorization is that the coming of new and emerging technologies and 
applications has meant to have new impacts of privacy in such a way “that previously 
unconsidered types of privacy now need to be addressed in order to adequately protect 
individuals’ rights, freedoms and access to goods and services”.121 
 
Clarke identified those four types of privacy: 
1. Privacy of the person 
2. Privacy of personal behaviour 
3. Privacy of personal communication 
4. Privacy of personal data 
Finn, Wright and Friedewald, while reworking Clarke’s first classification, defined those seven 
types of privacy: 
 
1. Privacy of the person 
2. Privacy of personal behaviour and action 
3. Privacy of personal communication 
4. Privacy of personal data and image 
5. Privacy of thoughts and feelings 
6. Privacy of location and space 
7. Privacy of association 
2.3.2.2 Steeves: Privacy in Intersubjective and Social Interactions 
As exposed above, Steeves offers an alternative framework that conceptualizes privacy as a 
dynamic process of negotiating personal boundaries in intersubjective relations. Her framework 
is particularly interesting for the construction of the SALT Framework for two main reasons. (1) 
First she gives an important focus on surveillance in public space. (2) Secondly, her main 
concern is to keep vivid the intersubjective negotiation between people regards to their 
personal privacy’s boundaries. 
 
Steeves’ privacy framework is based on a critic of Westin’s privacy concept conceived as 
informational control. About it, she argues that: 
“Once the focus shifts to the flow of information, privacy is no longer grounded in the 
social interaction of subjects, but becomes located in the individual’s unilateral control 
over keeping information on the internal side of the boundary (...) From this 
perspective, privacy is no longer asocial – it is antisocial. Because disclosure is 
dependent on the trustworthiness of intimate others and the sensitivity of the 
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generalIpublic to respect the individual’s reserve, any social interaction poses a risk to 
privacy, and privacy can only be fully protected by a withdrawal from others.”122 
The table below shows the way she represents Westin’s privacy concept. 
 
 
Figure 2 Privacy as Informational Control123 
 
And as a corrective to Westin’s theory of privacy - based on a definition of privacy as 
informational control - she draws on Irvin’s Altman’s work on territoriality and Georges Mead’s 
work on social interactionism. As the table below shows it, the alternative privacy’s framework 
she proposes is based on the boundaries people negotiate throughout a range of social 
interactions, in situations of low to high contact with others. 
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Figure 3  Privacy as Boundary124 
 
2.3.2.3 Solove: A taxonomy of Privacy Problems 
Daniel Solove created a taxonomy of privacy problems that is devoted to provide a useful tool 
for further development of legislative protection of privacy. Indeed, as he wrote it, his 
“taxonomy aims to carve up the landscape in a way that the law can begin to comprehend and 
engage.”125 He explained clearly, extensively and in different documents, the method he used 
and dedicated a full chapter to his taxonomy of privacy in his famous book “Understanding 
Privacy”.  
 
Privacy is best understood as a « family of different yet related things.”126 Solove arrives at this 
conclusion by outlining a taxonomy of privacy problems that must be addressed, regardless of 
whether they conform to a precise definition of privacy. The criteria retained for the choice of 
privacy problems that are accounted is that they have achieved a significant degree of social 
recognition. Even if those problems are “identified through a bottom-up cultural analysis, he 
said, using historical, philosophical, political, sociological, and legal sources”, his primary focus 
is on “the law because it provides concrete evidence of what problems societies have 
recognized as warranting attention.”127 
 
His taxonomy is an extension of the four categories of privacy torts that were articulated by 
William Prosser in 1960128 : 
“1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs. 
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff. 
3. Publicity that places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye. 
4. Appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.”129 
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Solove discerned the need to expand upon these four categories of privacy torts for different 
reasons. First, the epoch has changed and new technologies are likely to produce new kind of 
harms. Second, Prosser focused only on tort law and it is not enough according to Solove. “A 
new taxonomy to address privacy violations for contemporary times is sorely needed.”130 This 
new taxonomy “focus on activities that can or do create privacy problems. A privacy violation 
occurs when a certain activity causes problems that affect a private matter or activity.”131 Those 
activities which structure his taxonomy in four main categories, each including sub-categories, 
are: 
 
 information collection, such as surveillance or interrogation,  
 problems associated with information processing, including aggregation, data insecurity, 
potential identification, secondary use and exclusion,  
 information dissemination, including exposure, disclosure breach of confidentiality, etc. 
 Invasion, such as issues related to intrusion and decisional interference.132 
2.3.2.4 Nissenbaum: Contexts of Privacy 
In his book, “Privacy in context”133 , Helen Nissenbaum invites the reader to consider privacy in 
the specific context where it is an issue: a hospital is a very different context than an airport. In 
different context, privacy responds to different kind of norms. What is appropriate, regards to 
privacy, in a context, can be a violation of privacy in another context.134 
 
It is worth noting that the privacy framework proposed by Nissenbaum has been used by 
requirement engineers who have developed a requirement method which formalises access 
control models.135 
 
2.3.2.5 Extended Version of Privacy Impact Assessment 
Several scholars have worked upon an extended version of privacy impact assessment (PIA). 
Indeed, different forms of privacy impact assessment are proposed – existing guidelines, 
analyses and recommendations for legal enforcement purpose – and form a continuum which 
is bordered by two extremities we may be called, for ease purpose, a limit version of PIA and an 
extended version of PIA. As a caricature we may say that the limited version of PIA is limited by 
the legal requirement regards to privacy and may adopt the minimal form of an administrative 
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questionnaire which looks like a check-list of different question (YES/NO choice or Multiple 
choice form). On the other extremity, there is the extended version which includes legal 
requirements, socio-political and ethical requirements. This extended version is defined as a 
process. A complete analysis of the current existent forms of PIAs has been provided by the 
PIAF project.136 Another analysis has been made by Roger Clarke.137 Charles Raab and David 
Wright have also provided very interesting proposals regards to extended version of PIA, and 
more specifically about a version of PIA which might assess the impact of surveillance on 
broader range of individual and societal values (such as autonomy and dignity) as well as on 
other rights and freedoms that are not generally taken into account in minimal version of 
PIA.138 A very well documented and argued overview is also extensively presented in the book 
edited in 2012 by Paul De Hert and David Wright: Privacy Impact Assessment.139 
 
We suggest taking these studies about extended version of PIA into consideration in the next 
step of the project, while the different features retained by different versions of PIA might be of 
interest for the design of the SALT Framework. Different reasons exist. 
 
A first reason regards the arguments express in favour or in disfavour of specific features. They 
provide a good methodological transparency.  
 
A second reason is about the “extension” of the concept of privacy taken into account and 
which goes beyond the sole legal compliance. 
 
A third reason that can be put forward is that in order to make those proposals of Privacy 
Impact Assessments, a same kind of preliminary work that the one we have to process for the 
design of the SALT Framework had to be done, that is identifying the privacy features to be 
taken into account for such an assessment. Of course, several dimensions retains for an 
extended version of PIA are at first sight not relevant for the SALT Framework, as for example, 
the institutional environment and the stakeholders specific to this environment.  
 
A last reason lies in the process through which those two privacy tools – a SALT system and a 
PIA -, which are different regards their tasks, objectives and actors, operate. Indeed, they 
appear at different stages of the process and the Salt Framework occurs far before any PIA. 
Nevertheless, as an anticipatory posture, the SALT Framework may already be “PIA compliant”. 
In that sense, taking into account extended version of PIA is of interest for the SALT Framework 
regard to the anticipatory perspective they offer on what may be guaranteed in privacy matter.   
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2.4 Privacy from an Ethical Perspective 
NathalieTrussart (CRIDS – University of Namur) 
 
Generally speaking, ethics can be defined as “a philosophical inquiry in concepts involved in 
practical reasoning, i.e. concepts related to the ways in which human beings choose among 
possible different courses of actions, according related criteria such as good/bad or 
right/wrong.”140 As a discipline, ethics contains three main streams:  
(1) Meta-ethics investigates “where our moral principles come from.” 
(2) Normative ethics tries “to come up with moral standards for right and wrong 
behaviour.” 
(3) Applied ethics focus “on specific moral issues within a given context and practical 
case”.141 
“Provided that there are events which are actions (i.e. events that are controlled, at least in 
part, by an agent, who contributes to cause them according to some intentions), ethics 
investigates”142, related to the three main streams identified above: 
(1) “the notions involved in actions, say, ethical principles such as good and evil, right and 
duty, virtues, obligations, free will, etc., their foundation and their rationale; 
(2) Claims made in these terms, their soundness and consistency; 
(3) And practical problems which involve the ethical principles and the assessment, of their 
rationale behind each option of action”.143 
Different ethical theories exist in order to identify and to respond to ethical issues arising from 
scientific and technological innovation, while the first of them has been developed as bioethics 
in the field of medicine and medical research.144 These different ethical theories can be set 
along a continuum bounded by two limits that are presented later in this section:  
(1) An essentialist conception of ethics which assesses innovations with a normative frame 
based on universal and prescriptive principles.  
(2) A pragmatist conception of ethics which defines ethics as a “savoir-faire”, a capacity to 
make moral choice when faces with situations raising unprecedented ethical dilemmas 
or challenges. 
 
A wide range of values may all legitimately contribute to an ethical decision and determining 
ethical issues regards to surveillance technologies is a value-laden operation that critically 
depends on the ethical perspective chosen by those who will carry it out.  
 
It is not our mandate to make a complete review on the many approaches of ethics. 
Nevertheless, regards to the aim of this text of indentifying relevant criteria for the design of an 
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ethical-based approach within the SALT framework, the focus is placed on (1) several ethical 
approaches that may be of interest for extracting ethical issues relating to surveillance 
technologies and (2) on several existent ethical frameworks. Different key sources are identified 
along this section and listed at this end with the recommendation to analyze them in details 
during the next step of this research. The next deliverable (D 2.2) will build on the findings of 
this Chapter to provide a definitive list of requirements, adapted to the context of surveillance. 
 
2.4.1 General Overview 
 
In this subsection, different ethical aspects are stated. First, a general remark about ethics and 
surveillance technologies. Second, the presence of ethics in the official texts at the European 
Union (EU) level. And third, a general overview of two main approaches and tools for 
identifying ethical issues regards to technology.  
 
2.4.1.1 Surveillance Technologies: a Challenge for Ethics 
 
If generally speaking, what is an “ethical issue” is in itself an issue, the question remains largely 
open regards to surveillance technologies. This is true for different reasons.   
 
A first reason is related to surveillance technologies itself. The argument is also true for ICT’s 
technology at large. Indeed, “the development of new ICTs and other security technologies 
are generally complicating the definition of the role of ethics, as well as the identification of its 
theoretical approaches and operational instruments needed to address ICTs-related issues.”145  
One explanation is that intentional actions are at the heart of traditional ethics of science and 
technology which thinks from the duo of the lonely scientific Frankenstein who intentionally 
creates his creature. However, scientific and technological developments “have the potential to 
bring unintentional or highly unpredictable consequences that are usually the result of 
collective decisions”.146 According to René von Schomberg, we do not have ethical theory at 
our disposal which would be an Ethics of Knowledge Policy and Knowledge Assessment147 that is 
an ethics which addresses “both the aspect of unintentional side consequences (rather than 
intentional actions) and the aspect of collective decisions (rather than individual decisions).”148 
A second reason is that it is not sure that a specific field of research such as surveillance ethics 
exist. If Gary T. Marx was one of the first scholars who identified ethical issues and coined 
ethical tools in order to help in identifying them regards to surveillance technologies149, most of 
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the inspirations for offering ethical perspective on surveillance technologies come from ICTs 
ethics, computer ethics, ethics of technology, technology ethics, philosophy of technology, 
professional ethics or applied ethics.150  Few researches have been devoted to ethical issues 
relating specifically to surveillance technologies. A lot of research still has to be done. 
 
2.4.1.2 Ethics in the Official Documents at the European Union (EU) Level 
At the European Union (EU) level, ethics appears at different stages. 
2.4.1.2.1 The Ethical Key frame for Design and Implementation of all EU Policies 
 
The ethical key frame for design and implementation of all EU policies set in the articles of the 
Lisbon treaty – and its reformed version signed on 13 December 2007151 - and of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. This is nowadays representing the basis upon which the ethical issues of 
emerging technologies are identified. Fundamental human rights, ethical, human and societal 
concerns intermingle in what is becoming the European innovation model and their references 
are scattered in various several official documents.152 The values stated in those two key 
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documents are, for example, human dignity, freedom, democracy, human rights protection, 
pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and gender equality. 
 
2.4.1.2.2 The European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE) 
 
The European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE) is the organ which 
“provides the Commission with high quality and independent advice on ethical aspects of 
science and new technologies in connection with the preparation and implementation of 
Community legislation or policies”153. EGE publishes more specific texts dedicated to specialized 
fields of ethics154. EGE is currently working on an Opinion on the Ethics of Security and 
Surveillance Technologies which is to be finalised by the beginning of 2014. It would be the first 
EGE’s opinion regards to those issues.155  
 
2.4.1.2.3 Commission’s Framework Programme Seventh (FP7) of Research 
 
Regards to researches funded under the Commission’s Framework Programmes Seventh (FP7) 
of research and technological development, a set of ethical questions are asked to whom make 
proposals in order to help candidates in identifying ethical dilemmas and issues that may rise in 
their research156. The questions-based approach is particularly interesting. Questions are 
classified under headings relating to ethical issues – e.g. Informed Consent, Privacy, Dual Use – 
and to specific “object” of research – e.g.  Research on Human embryos/foetus, research on 
Animals or research involving Developing Countries. The specific Data protection and privacy 
ethical guidelines157 is of interest and may be a start to identify ethical issues that may be taken 
into account in the SALT Framework. Nevertheless, other ethical issues listed for example under 
the heading Informed Consent must also be considered in more details. 
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2.4.1.3 Ethical Approaches  
As already mentioned, different ethical theories exist in order to identify and to respond to 
ethical issues arising from scientific and technological innovation, while the first of them has 
been developed as bioethics in the field of medicine and medical research.158 These different 
ethical theories can be set along a continuum bounded by two limits that are presented later in 
this section:  
(1) An essentialist conception of ethics which assesses innovations with a normative frame 
based on universal and prescriptive principles.  
(2) A pragmatist conception of ethics which defines ethics as a “savoir-faire”, a capacity to 
make moral choice when faces with situations raising unprecedented ethical dilemmas 
or challenges. 
2.4.1.3.1 Essentialism: Definition and Limits 
 
For the common approach, ethics is dealing with notions of goodness, justice and dignity. This 
ethical vision can be qualified as essentialist or principled conception of ethics since the ethical 
vocation and expertise is to assess innovations with a normative frame based on universal and 
prescriptive principles. This is the way, Beauchamp and Childress159, understand ethics when 
questioning the benevolence of the technology. When considering emerging technologies which 
confront us to unknown situation and unprecedented questions, this essentialism can lead to a 
normative violence well explained by Butler, in her book “Giving An Account of Oneself”160 in 
which she refers to Adorno’s text, “Minimum Moralia” (1969). Adorno, says Butler, guards 
against the universalizing pretension of a collective ethos, which can exert a certain form of 
violence. For Adorno, moral questions only arise when the community as a whole no longer 
shares a collective ethos. It is at this crux that the collective ethos can take a violent turn by 
laying claim to universality in order to recover its lost collective character. 
 
This position is very in line with Dewey161who considers that the permanent research of 
universal and fixed norms into ethical approach can be compared to the quest of certainty in 
epistemology, which is at the source of so many problems badly defined and solved. 
 
2.4.1.3.2 Ethics as a “Savoir Faire”: a Pragmatic Approach 
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Opposite to this essentialist approach of ethics, Ladrière162 suggests a pragmatist approach of 
ethics. According to him, ethics is a “savoir-faire”, a capacity to make moral choice when faced 
with situations raising unprecedented ethical dilemmas or challenges. In that frame, Ladrière 
emphasizes that ethics is not the ‘exclusive matter’ of experts in ethics: ethics cannot be 
transferred or learned as a theoretical knowledge but has to be practiced in order to be 
genuinely appropriated by those who face an ethically challenging situation. 
 
As a consequence, Ladrière explains: 
 
“ ... nobody has a privileged competency in ethics. This is why an ethical approach 
could only be a collective process through which the different positions have to be 
confronted, with the hope of a convergence of these positions justified by the believe of 
the universality of the human reason”163 
 
Hence, ethics is not a theoretical or normative abstract knowledge that one could define and 
transfer to others. But it is a praxis, an ability to face a situation ethically. It is a praxis through 
which someone has the ability to address an ethical issues that is one that embodies questions 
about whether an action is good or bad, right or wrong, appropriate or inappropriate, or , e.g., 
whether an action have potential negative impact on others and on different social groups.   
 
In that sense and according to Ladrière (op cit), the role of the so-called ethical expert is not to 
decide in place of the concerned actors but to make the deliberation possible and to enlighten 
it by clarifying the ethical questions raised by the situation at work. 
 
For Dewey as for Ladrière, the ethical approach can only be collective and democratic, based on 
the confrontation of different positions. 
 
In this collective deliberation, the responsibilities of the so-called expert are to explore the 
ethical issues involved by the technologies in progress, to elaborate methodologies to support a 
sound democratic deliberation and to inform this deliberation with his/her knowledge of the 
ethical tradition or cultural ethical heritage framing the deliberation. 
 
So those authors do not refuse ethical principles but they do refuse to confer to them a 
normative or a prescriptive status. As well suggested by Dewey164, we never affront an ethical 
problem from a “tabula rasa”, without using some ethical references or principles transmitted 
by the tradition. For Dewey as for Ladrière, these principles are not fixed rules that could, as in 
a cooking recipe, tell by themselves what to do, how to act, determining quasi mechanically the 
fair way or the ethical course for our decision and action. For Dewey, these principles are 
explorative or analytical tools useful to enlighten a situation and to assess the various points of 
view expressed by the concerned actors. Dewey admits that general ideas such as justice, 
dignity, or fairness are of value as tools of inquiry to question and forecast unknown ethical 
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puzzles. They have no intrinsic normative force but constitute a sort of moral background that 
may help facing an unknown moral situation. 
 
2.4.2 Privacy Frameworks Regards to Ethical Issues 
In this subsection, we propose two existent privacy frameworks relating to ethical issues which 
are of interest for the design of the SALT Framework and which should be analysed in more 
details during the second step of this project and more specifically regards the two specific 
surveillance technologies that are at the core of the PARIS project: CCTV and biometric 
surveillance technologies. 
 
The following privacy frameworks regards to ethical issues were chosen among many others 
possible ones because of the different focus they put on ethical perspective regards to privacy 
and because they already treat, sometimes partially, CCTV and/or biometric surveillance 
technologies. Nevertheless, a deeper analysis is necessary in order to achieve a complete 
translation of those frameworks for the specific cases of CCTV and biometric surveillance. 
 
2.4.2.1 Beatrice von Silva-Tarouca Larsen: Ethics and CCTV Surveillance 
 
Beatrice von Silva-Tarouca Larsen developed an ethical principles approach in her book Setting 
the watch, Privacy and the Ethics of CCTV Surveillance.165 After carrying a deep and thorough 
analysis of the Ethics of video surveillance, with a focus on the privacy interests in public space, 
anonymity interests of people being monitored, the possible legitimising role of crime 
prevention and the policy principles and the regulation of public CCTV surveillance, the author 
concludes that, first of all, there are moral reasons for broadening the concept of privacy to the 
public space. She focuses on two principles on what constitutes a “good life” – Dignity and 
Autonomy of the person – and that are the founding bases of the International Declaration of 
the Human Rights.  
 
Von Silva–Tarouca Larsen argues in that sense that to “maintain his dignity and autonomy, a 
person must be able to control access to himself and protect himself against unwanted scrutiny 
and judgment, irrespective of whether or not he is secluded in his private home or is abroad in 
public”.166 
 
She also identifies anonymity, like all privacy-related claims, as of particular value in fending off 
the controlling powers of the State. Surveillance by CCTV is indeed seen by the author as “an 
instrument of social control with a wider scope than routine police enforcement” in that it 
“exercises pressure to conform to the expectations of the authorities ’standards of good 
behaviour and could create a chilling and oppressing effect”. In that sense, in a report on video 
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surveillance commissioned by the Council of Europe, Butarelli, Secretary General of the Data 
Protection Supervision Authority of Italy, had already identified that the widespread use of 
video surveillance was triggering a series of risks for human rights, endangering the freedom of 
behaviour (in so far as seeing without being seen could trigger submissive behaviours amongst 
citizens being watched) or the right to move anonymously and the right to privacy.167 
 
Finally, when examining the question of “how much risk of intrusion into citizens’ rights should 
policy makers be prepared to accept in the interest of trying to enhance protection against 
street crime”, von Silva-Tarouca Larsen recognises that citizens are usually willing to accept a 
high level of intrusion and trade their anonymity for “unbstantiated promises of security”. The 
responsibility of balanced policy making in the field of Security is thus devoted first and 
foremost to policy makers who should make a careful use of such a powerful tool. von Silva-
Taruca Larsen argues that “CCTV is often ill thought-out and an unnecessary overreaction”, 
pushing towards society into a “total surveillance society” where CCTV plays the role of 
informer. She therefore advocates for the implementation of complex regulatory schemes and 
administrative procedures to contain the negative potential of public CCTV surveillance 
schemes as there remains always a risk of intrusive practices. Proportionality of the 
interference, i.e. a careful balancing of the interests in Security and in protecting the social 
values at stake (e.g. the protection of fundamental rights), should guide public action.  
 
2.4.2.2 David Wright: an Ethical Framework to Assess the Impact of ICTs 
 
In order to reach his aim of developing a framework for the ethical impact assessment of 
information technology168, David Wright had to study both ethical methods and issues related 
to ICTs. Reviews on related literature and pro-active proposition are parts of his paper which is 
structured in three distinct parts. The first one is devoted to specific values which may be of 
interest for the ethical impact assessment. A second one “identifies several ethical tools which 
can be used by decision-makers to engage stakeholders in considering the principles, values 
and issues contained in the previous section”169, in considering ethical principles, values and 
issues. A third part is dedicated to the procedural aspects or practices of an ethical impact 
assessment.  
  
For identifying relevant criteria for the SALT Framework which is the main task of our text, the 
first part of Wright’s paper is an interesting guidance and may seem to be the sole relevant part 
regards to PARIS project. Indeed, the second and the third parts appear to be relevant to 
inform and/or to foster appropriate policies.  
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Nevertheless, Wright is right in showing, with the help of different scholars he quotes, that 
technology assessment as a process, or a practice or a policy instrument, is not detachable from 
ethical question and issues. The same can be said about the various ethical tools listed, those 
“practical methods designed to improve ethical deliberation by capturing all ethically relevant 
aspects of an issue”170.  
 
As he indicated, the identification of ethics regards to values, on a one side, and to policy 
design, on the other side, is somehow artificial. They “are two different needs. Although the 
former supports the latter.” For example, in Wright’s proposed framework of ethical issues and 
principles, “under the principle of respect for autonomy, dignity is a social value (indeed, a 
fundamental right) while informed consent is a matter of policy. However, in particular 
situations, say with regards to the consequences of the application of a new technology, 
stakeholders could debate whether dignity is being respected or whether consent has truly 
been informed. The ethical tools can be used to engender debate over the extent to which 
social values are respected by a new technology (or whatever) and what might be the ethical 
implications arising from the application of a new technology”.171  
2.4.2.2.1 Stakeholders: Definition and Involvement 
 
The need to involve stakeholders in the process, in the sense that stakeholders are defined as 
all the people who are or may be interested in or are or may be affected by the outcome172, is 
another good example of ethical value that is directly linked to the way the TA as process or 
policy instrument is designed. Beyond the regular emphasis of European Union on the need to 
involve general public in regulatory processes with respect to modern technologies, this need 
for engaging stakeholders - as defined above-  is well explained by the claim that technologies 
are neither neutral nor value-free. “Because IT artefacts are designed, constructed, and used by 
people, they are shaped by the interests, values, and assumptions of a wide variety of 
communities of developers, investors, users, etc”173  say Orlikowski and Iacono. Those authors 
published an important paper in 2001 - “Reasearch commentary: Desperately seeking the "IT" 
in IT research-a call to theorizing the IT artifact” - in which they reviewed 188 articles published 
over 10 years in the journal Information Systems Research. Among the several 
conceptualisations of IT artefacts they found there, they make several points. One is worth 
being mentioned here. They mentioned the difficulty or sometimes the impossibility to 
understand or identify all the critical implications of an IT artefacts – both intended and 
unintended - for individuals, groups, organisations and society. Following this line of thought, 
Wright claims that “while it may be impossible to foresee all the ethical or other consequences 
of an emerging technology, nevertheless, an ethical impact assessment, involving different 
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stakeholders from different disciplines and backgrounds, may be a good way of avoiding the 
traps discerned by Orlikowski and Iacono – i.e. of not seeing the context specificity of a 
technology and of not examining its critical implications for individuals, groups, organisations 
and society”.174 It is because “what I might regard as negative in the architecture of, let’s say, a 
national IT system for electronic health records may well differ from what the designers think. 
This is clearly why it is useful (necessary) to engage all relevant stakeholders to discuss the 
consequences, to minimise information asymmetries and for all stakeholders, especially the 
proponents of the architecture, system, project, technology or whatever to engage with their 
peers with an open mind and a willingness to address problems and to recognise that it will 
most likely be in their own interests to do so at an early stage, rather than, when the system or 
architecture in installed and when there may be significant antipathy on the part of other 
stakeholders”.175 
 
It will be a challenge for the SALT framework to be able to translate such a necessity to involve 
different stakeholders who are not solely the experts who prepare the SALT framework. It is 
evident that the involvement of stakeholders – more than experts and less than a general 
public – is out of the scope of a SALT framework. The same can be said about the integration of 
the ethical tools above mentioned, ethical tools which may facilitate the involvement of 
stakeholders.  However, I suggest investigating about the possible integration of several 
questions about the involvement of stakeholder into the SALT framework: Were stakeholders 
consulted or are going to be consulted? Who are those stakeholders? Is there one or several 
ethical tool which are used in order to help the involvement of those stakeholders and which 
ones?  
2.4.2.2.2 A Questions-Based Approach 
Wright rejects a prescriptive ethical guidance for the main reason that ethical values and 
principles are influenced by the context in which they are considered. He cited Moor176 and 
Nissenbaum177 as authors who highlight the need to consider ethics in context. Rather than this 
prescriptive ethical guidance, Wright adopts a pragmatist approach based on questions aiming 
of identifying ethical issues178. Those questions aim at generating personal reflexion and 
debate among stakeholders. 
 
Another challenge for the SALT framework will be to address privacy issues (including ethical 
issues) in such a way that those questions will be likely to generate self questioning for the user 
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of the SALT framework and eventually debate among stakeholders (with the meaning defined 
above). 
 
Wright uses the ethical values that form the key frame for design and implementation of all EU 
policies and that was mentioned above in this section. “The values set out in these texts could 
serve as an ethical guidance. In fact, it has been adopted here as the baseline for identifying the 
key values or ethical principles or issues.” 179 
 
He structures his ethical frameworks with four ethical values/principles posited in Beauchamp 
and Childress180, used as headings for several ethical issues. A brief explanatory text and a set 
of questions follow each of those ethical issues “aimed at helping the technology developer or 
policy-maker to facilitate a consideration of the ethical issues which may arise in their 
undertaking.”181 
 
A remark is worth to be mentioned here, regards to the SALT framework. The specific people 
or person or group of people who use the SALT framework should be identified considering 
their role or undertaking or responsibilities regarding privacy issues (including ethical issues). 
Indeed, the perspective on privacy issues (including ethical issues) will be different for different 
stakeholders.  
 
2.4.2.2.3 Ethical Values/Principles and Related Ethical Issues  
 
Here are the several ethical values/principles and related ethical issues retained by Wright: 
(1) Respect of autonomy (right to liberty) 
i. Dignity 
ii. Informed consent 
iii. Nonmaleficience (avoiding harm) 
iv. Safety 
v. Social solidarity, inclusion and exclusion 
vi. Isolation and substitution of human contact 
vii. Discrimination and social sorting 
(2) Beneficence 
i. Universal service 
ii. Accessibility 
iii. Value sensitive design 
iv. Sustainability 
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(3) Justice 
i. Equality and fairness (social justice) 
(4) Privacy and data protection 
i. Collection limitation (data minimisation) and retention 
ii. Data quality 
iii. Purpose specification 
iv. Use limitation 
v. Confidentiality, security and protection of data 
vi. Transparency (openness) 
vii. Individual participation and access to data 
viii. Anonymity 
ix. Privacy of personal communications: monitoring and location tracking 
x. Privacy of the person 
xi. Privacy of personal behaviour 
 
Further analysis of those ethical values/principles and related ethical issues is needed and must 
imply a particularly focus on the questions formulated by Wright regards to each of them. They 
may be particularly interesting for the SALT Framework. 
2.5 Socio-political and ethicAl Recommendations for SALT Framework 
In the section 2.2., devoted to psychological perspective on privacy, several recommendations 
have been made. Psychology is an applied and academic field that studies the human mind and 
behaviour. Research in psychology seeks to understand and explain how we think, act and feel. 
Applied psychology focuses on the use of different psychosocial principles to solve real world 
problems. So it is important to take into account the psychology perspective when developing 
the SALT framework. It must consider its definition, its dimensions, its functions and the effect 
the lack of privacy can cause on the population. People expect to have a balance between the 
privacy they desire and the one they obtain. We have to keep in mind that one of the objectives 
of PARIS is to help in developing privacy-enhanced surveillance systems. The study of privacy-
security relationship from the point of view of social psychology must:  
 Analyze the balance between desired privacy and achieved privacy in different types of 
spaces. 
 Evaluate the optimal degree of surveillance in different spaces (public, semi-private and 
private). 
 Analyze the acceptance of security systems implementation. 
 Evaluate how the provision of information influences the public’s will to trade certain 
degrees of privacy in favor of the benefits provided by surveillance systems.  
 Evaluate the conflict among privacy, security and surveillance systems in the population. 
 Analyze the social and psychological consequences of the invasion (lack) of privacy. 
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The section 2.3 (Privacy from a Socio-Political Perspective) contains two main inputs. (1) The 
claim of privacy as a social value is the keystone of the socio-political perspective on privacy. 
That is defending privacy as a social value, while challenging the sole addressing a challenge 
both to the conception of privacy as an individual right and/or value and to the one of its 
consequential turn of mind, that is the balancing relationships between privacy – conceived as 
an individual interest and/or value and/or right – and other social values such as (national) 
security. (2) The general claim in favour of privacy as a social value must be sustained by a 
conceptualization of privacy. Regards to the kind of conceptualization proposed, the effects are 
very different. In fact, the way privacy is conceptualised allows identifying very different kind of 
harms or concerns. This is worth emphasizing for the construction of the SALT framework which 
may be very different regards to the kind of taxonomy or conceptualization of privacy retained 
for its construction. Indeed, as a short term research aim, the reading of different existent 
taxonomies of privacy reveals that, while planning the construction of the taxonomy which will 
be relevant for the SALT Framework, it is necessary to be transparent in the methodological 
design of the taxonomy and reasons for choosing certain criteria rather than others. 
Therefore a full subsection is dedicated to the identification – their outline and their interests 
for the SALT framework - different taxonomies of privacy which are of interest for the 
construction of the SALT Framework. In the next deliverable (D 2.2), a detailed analysis of their 
content still must be done regards to different details such as, for example: (1) The types of 
categories retains in the taxonomies. For example, a taxonomy which takes into account as a 
relevant criteria the intellectual property rights regime over information is very different than 
one which takes into account the social context of intersubjectivity; (2)Ttheir purpose. Indeed, 
the purpose of the taxonomy is not trivial. Helping Law enforcement or helping the design of a 
system-to-be which integrates Privacy-By-Design principles are two very different purposes. 
Regards to the kind of purpose, some common criteria to the analyzed taxonomy may be 
relevant (or not) for the SALT Framework; (3) the sources used. For example, legal sources or 
theoretical rationales built on the study and analyze of new and emerging technologies provide 
very different perspective on privacy; (4) The consequences and the types of consequence of 
the breaking of the criteria used in those different taxonomies. For example, the consequence 
may be law pursuit or a psychological effect on individuals. (5) Criticisms that have been 
addresses to those different taxonomies. 
The several existent taxonomies which are worth being analyzed in the next deliverable are the 
following ones. (1) Finn, Wright and Friedewald: seven types of privacy (2) Steeves: privacy in 
intersubjective and social interactions (2) Solove: A taxonomy of privacy problems (3) 
Nissenbaum: contexts of privacy (4) Extended version of Privacy Impact Assessment.  
 
The section 2.4 (Privacy from an Ethical Perspective), proceeds to a review of the state-of-the 
art of the ethical perspective on privacy. Regards to the aim of this text of indentifying relevant 
criteria for the design of an ethical-based approach within the SALT framework, the focus is 
placed on (1) several ethical approaches that may be of interest for extracting ethical issues 
relating to surveillance technologies and (2) on several existent ethical frameworks. Different 
key sources are identified along this section and listed at this end with the recommendation to 
analyze them in details during the next step of this research. The next deliverable (D 2.2) will 
build on the findings of this section to provide a definitive list of requirements, adapted to the 
context of surveillance. 
One specific remark is worth mentioning. Surveillance technologies are a challenge for ethics. 
If generally speaking, what is an “ethical issue” is in itself an issue, the question remains largely 
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open regards to surveillance technologies. This is true for different reasons.  A first reason is 
related to surveillance technologies itself. The argument is also true for ICT’s technology at 
large. Indeed, “the development of new ICTs and other security technologies are generally 
complicating the definition of the role of ethics, as well as the identification of its theoretical 
approaches and operational instruments needed to address ICTs-related issues.”182  One 
explanation is that intentional actions are at the heart of traditional ethics of science and 
technology which thinks from the duo of the lonely scientific Frankenstein who intentionally 
creates his creature. However, scientific and technological developments “have the potential to 
bring unintentional or highly unpredictable consequences that are usually the result of 
collective decisions”.183 According to René von Schomberg, we do not have ethical theory at 
our disposal which would be an Ethics of Knowledge Policy and Knowledge Assessment184 that is 
an ethics which addresses “both the aspect of unintentional side consequences (rather than 
intentional actions) and the aspect of collective decisions (rather than individual decisions).”185 
A second reason is that it is not sure that a specific field of research such as surveillance ethics 
exist. If Gary T. Marx was one of the first scholars who identified ethical issues and coined 
ethical tools in order to help in identifying them regards to surveillance technologies186, most of 
the inspirations for offering ethical perspective on surveillance technologies come from ICTs 
ethics, computer ethics, ethics of technology, technology ethics, philosophy of technology, 
professional ethics or applied ethics.187  Few researches have been devoted to ethical issues 
relating specifically to surveillance technologies. A lot of research still has to be done. 
Several sources were identified for further investigating towards ethical issues and criteria that 
may be relevant for their integration into the SALT framework. (1) The Lisbon treaty and its 
reformed version signed in 2007. (2) The Charter of Fundamental Rights. (3) The European 
Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE) and specially its current work on an 
Opinion on the Ethics of Security and Surveillance Technologies which is to be finalised by the 
beginning of 2014, Opinion that will be the first one regards to those issues.  A first public 
Round table is organised on 18 September 2013 in Brussels, involving experts from inside and 
outside academia, the Chairs of the National Ethics Councils (NECs) or equivalent bodies within 
the EU and beyond, representatives of the European and international institutions, civil society 
organizations and other stakeholders and members of the public. (4) Commission’s Framework 
Programme(FP7) Seventh of research. Regards to researches funded under the Commission’s 
Framework Programmes Seventh (FP7) of research and technological development, a set of 
ethical questions are asked to whom make proposals in order to help candidates in identifying 
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ethical dilemmas and issues that may rise in their research188. The questions-based approach is 
particularly interesting. The specific Data protection and privacy ethical guidelines189 is of 
interest and may be a start to identify ethical issues that may be taken into account in the SALT 
Framework. Nevertheless, other ethical issues listed for example under the heading Informed 
Consent must also be considered in more details. 
Among different ethical approaches, we favoured an ethical approach that consider ethics as a 
savoir-faire, a pragmatic approach, for which the questions-based approach developed, as we 
seen above, by the Commission’s Framework Programme (FP7) Seventh of research, and also 
by David Wright whom ethical framework is developed further in the chapter. The questions-
based approach is especially of interest for the integration of ethical perspective in the SALT 
framework. This approach implies also a challenge for the design of the SALT framework while 
fostering stakeholder’s thinking and decision, rather than offering them stable responses. 
Two existent privacy frameworks regards to ethical issues were presented. Other ones may 
still be identified during the next step of this research. Those two ones are of interest for the 
design of the SALT Framework and should be analysed in more details during the second step of 
this project and more specifically regards the two specific surveillance technologies that are at 
the core of the PARIS project: CCTV and biometric surveillance technologies. (1) Beatrice von 
Silva-Tarouca Larsen: Ethics and CCTV surveillance. Her book is especially interesting because 
it deals specifically CCTV surveillance technologies. (2) David Wright: an ethical framework to 
assess the impact of ICTs. This author makes very important proposals which are of interest for 
identifying relevant criteria for the SALT framework. He identifies different ethical 
values/principles/issue, explains them and offers a question-based approach with concrete 
questions that may be addressed regards to all of those ethical issues.  Here are those ethical 
values/principles and related ethical issues retained by Wright. Further analysis of those ethical 
values/principles and related ethical issues is needed and must imply a particularly focus on the 
questions formulated by Wright regards to each of them.  
(1) Respect of autonomy (right to liberty) 
xii. Dignity 
xiii. Informed consent 
xiv. Nonmaleficience (avoiding harm) 
xv. Safety 
xvi. Social solidarity, inclusion and exclusion 
xvii. Isolation and substitution of human contact 
xviii. Discrimination and social sorting 
(4) Beneficence 
i. Universal service 
ii. Accessibility 
iii. Value sensitive design 
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iv. Sustainability 
(5) Justice 
i. Equality and fairness (social justice) 
(6) Privacy and data protection 
i. Collection limitation (data minimisation) and retention 
ii. Data quality 
iii. Purpose specification 
iv. Use limitation 
v. Confidentiality, security and protection of data 
vi. Transparency (openness) 
vii. Individual participation and access to data 
viii. Anonymity 
ix. Privacy of personal communications: monitoring and location tracking 
x. Privacy of the person 
xi. Privacy of personal behaviour 
Beside the list of ethical values/principles and related issues, several points received a 
particularly strong attention because they are real challenges for the design of the SALT 
framework 
(1) The need to involve stakeholders in the process, in the sense that stakeholders are 
defined as all the people who are or may be interested in or are or may be affected by 
the outcome. It will be a challenge for the SALT framework to be able to translate such 
a necessity to involve different stakeholders who are not solely the experts who prepare 
the SALT framework. It is evident that the involvement of stakeholders – more than 
experts and less than a general public – is out of the scope of a SALT framework. The 
same can be said about the integration of the ethical tools above mentioned, ethical 
tools which may facilitate the involvement of stakeholders.  However, I suggest 
investigating about the possible integration of several questions about the involvement 
of stakeholder into the SALT framework: Were stakeholders consulted or are going to be 
consulted? Who are those stakeholders? Is there one or several ethical tool which are 
used in order to help the involvement of those stakeholders and which ones?  
(2) Another challenge for the SALT framework will be to integrate the questions-based 
approach chosen by Wright and to address privacy issues (including ethical issues) in 
such a way that those questions will be likely to generate self questioning for the user 
of the SALT framework and eventually debate among stakeholders (with the meaning 
defined above). 
(3) A remark is worth to be mentioned here, regards to the SALT framework. The specific 
people or person or group of people who use the SALT framework should be identified 
considering their role or undertaking or responsibilities regarding privacy issues 
(including ethical issues). Indeed, the perspective on privacy issues (including ethical 
issues) will be different for different stakeholders.  
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3 Privacy from a Legal Perspective - European Legal 
Framework for Privacy and Data Protection 
 
Claire Gayrel (CRIDS - University of Namur) 
 
The present chapter aims at providing a global review of the European legal requirements in 
the matters of privacy and data protection, in particular in order to understand the balance 
between privacy and other counterveiling interests and the legal ‘concepts’ that the SALT 
framework will have to integrate. 190 The objectives of the present section is : i) to understand 
the balance between privacy and public space, which we understand as the extent to which 
privacy interests are at stake when surveillance systems are deployed, notably in public spaces 
and; ii) to identify the relevant criteria which structure the perimeter of a SALT framework. 
From a legal perspective, such criteria are composed of the applicable 
international/European/national relevant sources of law with respect to the protection of 
privacy and personal data and sectoral legislations in relation to specific technologies (e.g. 
videosurveillance), their scope of protection/application, definitions, principles and obligations.  
 
In this aim, the present chapter is divided in six parts. First, we will come back to the essential 
issues of the debate surrounding the privacy v. public security balance in the European Union in 
order to have an overview of the legal “context” within which the PARIS project intends to 
produce innovative solution (1). Second, we will present the legal landscape of the protection 
of privacy and personal data in the Member States, which will be the occasion to identify the 
main relevant normative sources that may be taken into account by the SALT framework (2). 
Third, we will present with more details the caselaw of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) with regard to the right to private life and data protection, with specific attention on 
some important developments in relation to the extent of protection of private life to 
informational issues and public surveillance (3). Fourth, we will present the core concepts and 
principles enshrined in the Directive 95/46, which is the main relevant EU wide instrument on 
the protection of personal data applicable in all Member States (4). Because this instrument 
does not address the issues of protection of personal data in relation to specific surveillance 
technologies, we will finally look at European guidance with regard to videosurveillance 
activities (5) and biometric technologies (6) and how these matters are dealt with in two 
Member States, Belgium and France.  
3.1 Balancing Privacy v. Surveillance: General ‘Context’ 
The present section intends to inform the PARIS project (and the consortium partners) about 
the “context” within which it intends to produce innovative solution for balancing privacy/data 
protection rights against competing interests. It constitutes an “introductory” section to the 
legal perspective and challenges of surveillance operations to privacy and data protection 
rights. It starts by coming back to the notion of privacy, in order to briefly recall the evolution of 
the scope of this right from the right to be let alone towards the emergence of a right to data 
protection. Follows the presentation of some contrasted views and issues raised regarding the 
relation and interaction between the right to privacy and the right to data protection, which are 
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both highly relevant for PARIS project. We will then discuss the issue of balancing privacy with 
public competing interests and the current trends in EU lawmaking in the balance between 
privacy and security. We will finally see the various tools/methods under development to carry 
out and enforce a proper and fair balance.  
3.1.1 Scope of Privacy: from the Right to be let Alone to the Right to Data 
Protection191 
The conceptualization of the right to privacy is attributed to Warren and Brandeis’s famous 
article published in 1890 in the Harvard Law Review in reaction to the development of modern 
devices to reproducing sounds and images, in particular photographs and exploitation or 
publication by press of the said images.192 They conceived the right to privacy as a general right 
of the individual to be let alone. Although implicit, traditions of privacy can also be traced back 
in continental law.193 Withman notably traces back the rise of French privacy law partly in the 
introduction of the freedom of press, which was considered as a threat to one’s personal 
honour194, and partly in relation to the culture of Paris art world, which made arise the right to 
one’s image195. In Germany, the conception of privacy is wholly based on the concept of 
personality, which rests on the idea of free self-realization, inspired by Christian Humanism. 
Referring to Robert Post, Whitman considers that the fundamental contrast between the US 
and the continental conceptions of privacy consists in the distinction between privacy as an 
aspect of dignity and privacy as an aspect of liberty. European privacy protections are a right to 
respect personal dignity, as the rights to one’s image, name and reputation. By contrast, privacy 
in America is rather oriented toward the value of liberty, especially the right to freedom from 
intrusions by the State and the right to one’s own home.196  However, Whitman also specifies 
that this contrast is far from being absolute, and that there are actually only “relative 
differences” between both systems. 
 
Indeed, the acknowledgement of the right to privacy in Europe in Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) of 1950197 precisely aimed at preventing intrusions by the 
State in the sanctity of home and correspondence. Providing that “everyone has the right to 
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respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence” and that “there shall be 
no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in 
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society … ”, the right to privacy 
primarily focused on interferences by States in one’s private sphere, conceiving the right to 
privacy as conferring a right to “opacity”.198  
 
As the Court enjoys recalling, the Convention is a “living instrument”199 that seeks to provide 
effective and concrete rights. This has led the Court to expand progressively the notion of 
private life and the obligations held by States under Article 8. Privacy evolved from an opacity 
tool against the State towards a much wider instrument of decisional autonomy.200 Its scope 
came to cover virtually all the domains in which individuals are confronted with the need to 
make fundamental choices in their life, such as sexual life and sexual preferences, personal and 
social life, relationships with other human beings, choice of residence et cetera.201 Along the 
expansion of the scope of protection afforded under Article 8, the Court also interpreted 
extensively the obligations of the States under the horizontal effect of the Convention. This 
allowed the Court to address interferences into individuals’ privacy by non-State actors.  
 
The adoption by the Council of Europe of the Convention for the protection of individuals with 
regards to automatic processing of personal data in 1981202, formalized fundamental fair 
information practices, such as the principle of fair processing, purpose limitation principle, 
principle of legitimacy and recognition of subjective rights of data subjects to access and rectify 
data relating to them et cet… As will be explained in the next section of the present chapter, 
the Court of Strasbourg progressively integrated elements of data protection within Article 8 
caselaw. The adoption in the EU of legislative instruments aiming at the harmonization of data 
protection regulations between Member States (and subsequent liberalization of flows of 
personal data)203 further contributed to the rise of a right to data protection, today formally 
recognized in Article 8204 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.205  
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3.1.2 Relation Between the Right to Privacy and the Right to Data Protection 
While the legislations in the field of data protection clearly originate in the right to privacy, the 
relation between both rights, in particular in view of the recent autonomisation of the right to 
data protection from the right to privacy in the EU Charter, raises some issues.  
 
From the point of view of the ECHR, it must be highlighted that if elements of data protection 
have been integrated under the notion of private life in ECHR caselaw, the Court did not bring a 
general recognition of data protection rights under Article 8 of the Convention.206 The notion of 
private life is broader insofar as it aims at protecting the underlying values of dignity and 
autonomy of the individuals (right to self-determination).207 In particular, private life concerns 
may be raised under Article 8 of the ECHR regarding a processing technology in spite of the 
absence of processing of personal data as such.208 However, the scope of personal data 
protection may also be broader than the one of private life in that it enshrines a series of 
principles that are presently not fully integrated within ECHR caselaw under Article 8 or as far 
as data protection regulations may apply to certain processing that do not raise private life 
concerns according to the Court.209 This implies that Privacy and data protection do not fully 
overlap, raising questions as to their respective roles and interactions. 
 
P. De Hert and S. Gutwirth identified these differences in scope on the basis of a distinction 
between privacy as a ‘tool of opacity’ (stopping power, setting normative limits to power), and 
data protection mainly as ‘tools of transparency’ (regulating and chanelling 
necessary/reasonable/legitimate power).210  They address and support the underlying 
normative character/potential of privacy as a tool to prohibit certain uses of powers, while data 
protection as “transparency tools” would intervene only after the normative choices to resort 
to such powers is taken in order to frame them. From that perspective, the authors welcome 
positively the constitutionalisation of the right to data protection in the EU Charter, insofar as 
                                                                                                                                                                           
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her. 
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person 
concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has 
been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified. 
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority. 
205
 For the record, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights adopted in 2000 has now binding effect since 2010 with 
the entrance into force of the Lisbon Treaty on European Union (Art. 6) that the Charter has acquired the same 
value than the EU Treaties.  
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the Court’s case law in the light of surveillance and criminal law enforcement strategies after 9/11”, Utrecht Law 
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 Antoinette Rouvroy and Yves Poullet, “The Right to Informational Self-Determination and the Value of Self-
Development”,op. cit.    
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 Personal data are defined in Convention 108 and other EU instruments as “any information relating to an 
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 See in section II of the present chapter an example in relation to videosurveillance. For a detailed analysis see 
Paul De Hert, “Balancing security and liberty within the European human rights framework…”, op. cit.  
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 Paul De Hert and Serge Gutwirth, “Privacy, data protection and law enforcement. Opacity of the individual and 
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data protection has a precise target which is distinct from privacy concerns and aims at 
organizing the fair processing of personal data by both public and private actors.  
 
In contrast, A. Rouvroy and Y. Poullet have raised concerns regarding the constitutionalisation 
of the right to data protection from the right to privacy, in that it risks obscuring the essential 
relation between them and further weaken the anchorage of data protection in the 
fundamental values of dignity and autonomy.211 In their perspective, both data protection and 
privacy must not be seen as a final, intrinsic value, an end in itself, but rather as an 
intermediate, instrumental tool in order to preserve and promote other fundamental values 
and rights. Privacy is conceived as a pre-condition for the exercise and enjoyment of most other 
fundamental rights and freedoms. Further, the authors argue that privacy and data protection, 
as far as they contribute to foster autonomic capabilities of individuals are, in a given society at 
a given time, necessary for sustaining a vivid democracy.212  In this sense, privacy is not only an 
individual right but also a social value.213  
 
Besides the constitutionalisation of the right to data protection in the Charter, the relation and 
future articulation of this right with the right to privacy is also questioned by the Draft 
Regulation214 and Draft Directive215 proposals of the European Commission for the respective 
replacement of the Directive 95/46 and Framework Decision 2008/977. In both proposals, 
references to the right to privacy have been removed from both the explanatory 
memorandums and content of the instruments, and widely known notions of “privacy by 
design” and “privacy impact assessment” have been transformed into “data protection by 
design” and “data protection impact assessment”.216 The deletion of privacy behind personal 
data protection in the proposals seems to support an evolution in the favour of an 
autonomisation of the right to data protection from the right to privacy, in addition to its 
constitutionalisation.217 However, as strengthened by G. González Fuster, “there is nothing in 
EU pointing unequivocally in that direction”. Therefore, the degree to which the right to the 
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protection of personal data can be regarded as autonomous from the right to privacy is 
questionable.218  
 
The intrinsic link between privacy and data protection seems to remain in spite of the 
constitutionalisation of the right to data protection in the Charter. Indeed, if the European 
Court of Justice recently recognized the fundamental right to data protection enshrined in 
article 8 of the EU Charter219, it has also stated that “the limitations which may lawfully be 
imposed on the right to the protection of personal data correspond to those tolerated in relation 
to Article 8 of the Convention ECHR ”.220 Further, the Court recalled that “that fundamental 
right is closely connected with the right to respect of private life expressed in Article 7 of the 
Charter.”221 In line with the Court’s judgement and in line with Y. Poullet and A. Rouvroy, we 
believe data protection is not an end per se, but rather an instrument to the service of the 
protection of private life and other values, in particular the autonomy and dignity of individuals. 
Above the academic debate on the interaction/relation and future of privacy and data 
protection rights, the SALT framework should address and integrate both rights, as Member 
States are bound by their commitments both towards the ECHR and the European Union.  
 
3.1.3 Balancing Privacy v. Countervailing Interests: the Proportionality Principle 
The right to privacy may conflict with other values, human rights, or public and private 
interests. It may indeed conflict with other fundamental rights, such as freedom of expression, 
or freedom of the press. Privacy may also conflict with public interests, among which 
public/national security interests that are more specifically foreseen in the framework of the 
present research project.  
 
Indeed, privacy is not an absolute right and remains subject to legitimate limitations according 
to article 8§2 of the ECHR. This implies that when privacy conflicts with other interests, this 
requires arbitration between those competing interests. The resolution of conflicts in the 
matter of fundamental rights, in particular those enshrined in Articles 8 to 11 of the ECHR, 
generally requires a balancing of interests, which derives from the proportionality policy 
applied by the Court. The proportionality principle originates in German administrative law in 
the XIX century and has migrated to EU, ECHR and elsewhere222 to become “one of the defining 
feature of global constitutionalism”.223 It has been analysed as one of the most significant factor 
of extension of the judicial power during the XXth century, implying substantial modifications of 
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the function of adjudication of litigations.224 But proportionality is not the only way of 
adjudication. The balancing method used by the ECHR can be distinguished from a categorical 
approach, dominant in the US Supreme Court caselaw.225 American Courts do not explicitly 
engage in balancing but rather in categorisations, in that they determine the scope of a right in 
order to leave out or include within it elements of this right and avoid conflict with other 
interests. The proportionality principle, as a balancing method, is said to offer more flexibility in 
the adjudication of conflict between human rights and national security interests, provided that 
the Court are willing to exercise its power of judicial review independently.226 Nevertheless, the 
application by the ECHR of the proportionality principle reveals a case by case approach that 
also raise concerns regarding legal certainty227, in particular in relation to the application of the 
proportionality test in the framework of Article 8§2 of the Convention. As yet, from a legal 
perspective and for the purposes of the SALT framework, the balancing objective of PARIS 
project is understood in reference to the proportionality principle. In section 3 of the present 
report, we will come back with more details on the content of the proportionality principle in 
ECHR caselaw, since it is of primordial relevance for surveillance system implemented in EU 
Member States. 
 
3.1.4 Balancing Privacy v Surveillance: Some Current Trends in EU Lawmaking 
Prior to the power of the judicial power to review privacy limitations, it is first and foremost the 
role of the legislator to address the issue of the balance between privacy and security interests. 
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Member states of the European Union have adopted 
particular measures to face the terrorist threats, but more generally to reinforce the judicial 
and police cooperation in criminal matters in the so-called “area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice” of the EU228. The various initiatives adopted under this objective composes the 
increasingly complex landscape of collection, storage and cross-border exchange of personal 
data between Member States in this area. This landscape cannot be exhaustively restituted 
here.229 Instead, based on previous research in this field, we believe it is worth mentioning 
some major trends in the development of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice challenging 
the balance between privacy and security: a broad notion of security, the enlargement of 
access to European databases, the increasing recourse to commercial data for law enforcement 
purposes and the deletion of privacy/freedoms considerations behind data protection 
safeguards.  
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3.1.4.1 A Broad Notion of Security  
Numerous texts providing for the processing of personal data for security-related purposes and 
relevant for the question of balancing have been adopted or are currently discussed. They 
translate a broad notion of security addressing a broad spectrum of issues230, including border 
controls, asylum, immigration, the prevention and repression of crime and the police and 
judicial cooperation between Member States authorities. Transfers of information between 
Member States authorities in charge of borders control have considerably been developed, 
notably in the framework of the CIS (Custom Information System)231, the VIS (Visa Information 
System)232, the SIS I and II (Schengen Information System I and II)233 and Eurodac234. 
Reinforcement of the exchange of information between police forces and criminal jurisdictions 
has also been developed in particular in the framework of Europol235, Eurojust236, and wholly 
articulated under the principle of availability.237 Moreover, transatlantic cooperation in the 
fight against terrorism providing for the exchange of personal data such as the Swift238 
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(financial information) and PNR239 (Passenger Name Records) Agreements, but also bilateral 
agreements between the US and Member States240 are part of the privacy v. security landscape. 
Member States or European Commission’s initiatives goes in the direction of an increasing 
interoperability of existing databases originally established for different purposes and 
increasing regulation of vast governmental access to private data.  
 
3.1.4.2 Enlargement of Access to European Databases: Towards More 
Interoperability 
The European Council has called for an increasing interoperability of databases created under 
the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, leading to some controversial proposals and 
decisions providing for the connection of systems created originally for different purposes.241 
The concept of interoperability has first been defined by the European Commission as the 
“ability of IT systems and of the business processes they support to exchange data and to enable 
the sharing of information and knowledge”242. According to a very restrictive vision of the 
Commission, “interoperability is a technical rather than a legal or political concept”. The 
European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) expressed strong concerns with respect to this 
emerging political concept: “Interoperability is mentioned not only in relation to the common 
use of large scale IT systems, but also with regard to possibilities of accessing or exchanging 
data, or even of merging databases […] this Communication intends to propose new objectives 
for large scale IT systems which go beyond their original purpose and will therefore 
automatically require a new and complete analysis of their impact on the protection of personal 
data.243” The Commission’s definition is narrow, since it reduces the concept of interoperability 
to the issue of interconnecting IT-systems, leaving apart the political, legal, but also economic, 
social, cultural or semantic dimensions of this concept244. Interoperability between European 
databases is currently under progress. A Council decision has been adopted, providing the 
access by Europol and national competent authorities to the European Visa Information System 
(VIS)245. Although the VIS has originally been developed in view of the application of the 
European visa policy and not as a law enforcement tool, such access is provided for the 
purposes “of the prevention, detection and investigation of terrorist offences and of other 
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serious criminal offences”. The European Parliament however refused to provide an automatic 
access to Europol and Eurojust to the Custom Information system (CIS).246 The proposal for a 
decision allowing access by national competent authorities to Eurodac, the European central 
database containing the fingerprints of asylum seekers and illegal immigrants, for law 
enforcement purposes has also been abandoned for the moment. Full interoperability is highly 
questionable, since it contributes to simply deny the fundamental purpose limitation principle 
of data protection. Nevertheless, enlargement of access to various European databases by 
various authorities for increasingly various purposes is presently the trend.247 
 
3.1.4.3 The Increasing Recourse to Commercial Data for Law Enforcement 
Purposes 
Another major threat challenging the privacy v. security balance, relates to the increasing 
recourse to personal data held by the private sector, originally collected for commercial 
purposes. In 2004, the EU already adopted an instrument providing the obligation for air 
carriers to transmit API data (Advanced passenger information) to Member States public 
authorities on their request248. Destined to improve border controls and to combat illegal 
immigration249, the use of API data was based on the objective to fight against terrorism250. The 
EU, willing to go a step further in this matter, introduced a first proposal in 2007251 and a 
second proposal for a Directive on the transmission and exchange of PNR data for all 
international flights252. The Data Retention Directive of 2006253 constitutes another example of 
the increasing recourse to commercial data for law enforcement purposes. It provides the 
obligation on electronic communications providers and networks to retain traffic and location 
data for a term between 6 to 24 months to be determined in each Member State. This 
information is made available to national competent authorities for the purpose of 
investigation and prosecution of serious crimes. All these proposals and instruments generate 
considerable debate among legal scholars and NGOs for the strong concerns they raised in 
relation to the right to privacy.  
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3.1.4.4 The Evacuation of the Privacy Debate Behind Data Protection Safeguards 
Another major trends in EU instruments/proposals relevant regarding the privacy v. security 
balance is the progressive deletion of fundamental rights debate behind the discussion 
surrounding data protection safeguards. Such deletion can also be compared with the deletion 
of privacy in EU data protection legislative proposals discussed earlier. EU legislative proposals 
are often accompanied by poor and limited discussion and debate of the fundamental rights 
and liberties are stake by the envisaged security-related measure. This is particularly striking in 
the Impact assessment carried out by the European Commission and accompanying legislative 
proposals.254 Till now, the impact assessment carried out by the European Commission for 
legislative actions such as the establishment of a PNR system, or the Directive on the retention 
of traffic data, shows a restrictive analysis of the fundamental rights challenges. The 
proportionality analysis is extremely poor. In the case of the Data retention Directive, no 
serious data have been produced concerning the various options capable of showing that there 
were no less intrusive means, and the IA analysis in this respect can be reduced to a formal 
statement that the proposal is proportionate. In general, these IAs only provides a general 
statement recognizing the privacy interference of the measure and immediately turn to more 
extensive discussion regarding the data protection safeguards. The balance between privacy 
and security generally shifts to a balance between data protection and security.255 But in view 
of the differences in scope of both rights, any interference by a processing of personal data into 
privacy should also be addressed in relation to the proportionality test of Article 8§2 of the 
ECHR.  
 
3.1.5 Balancing Privacy and Data Protection v. Surveillance: in Search of 
Methods and Tools 
The search for a fair balance between privacy and other competing interests, in particular 
security-related interests raise question as to how achieving this correct balance. Various 
initiatives, at various levels translate a search for tools and methods for balancing privacy and 
other competing interests.  
 
At European Union legislative level, it is worth mentioning the development of specific 
lawmaking tools destined to help the decision-making process, although not specifically 
focused on the privacy v. security balance. For example, the concern for addressing specific 
attention to fundamental rights issues in any legislative action has recently been established 
through a specific strategy for the effective implementation of the Charter256 and Specific 
operational guidelines on taking account of fundamental rights in impact assessments.257 The 
legal validity of legislative proposals should be examined not only formally, but substantially, by 
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answering to a “fundamental rights checklist”: “1. What fundamental rights are affected? ; 2. 
Are the rights in question absolute rights (which may not be subject to limitations … ; 3. What 
is the impact of the various policy options under consideration on fundamental rights … ?; 4. 
Do the options have both a beneficial and negative impact, depending on the fundamental 
rights concerned … ?; 5. Would any limitation of fundamental rights be formulated in a clear 
and predictable manner?; 6. Would any limitation : a) be necessary to achieve an objective of 
general interest or to protect the rights and freedoms of others? Be proportionate to the desired 
aim? Preserve the essence of the fundamental rights concerned?”.258 A lot of improvement is 
expected in this matter from the European legislator. These tools are destined to help the 
decision-making process.  
 
On the other side of the Atlantic, It is worth mentioning the initiative of the Office of the 
privacy Commissioner of Canada of a reference document proposing a guide for a “trust 
inspiring balancing of privacy and security”.259 From “Making the case” to “setting the stage”, 
“running the program” and “calibrating the system”, this document intends to provide a 
guiding tool to public security and national safety stakeholders when they are envisaging the 
implementation of surveillance measures.260 
 
At the level of operators implementing surveillance measures interfering with the right to 
privacy of individuals, the elaboration of privacy impact assessment, as a tool to identify, assess 
and mitigate privacy risks, constitute an important development.261 Important discussion 
remains regarding the nature and scope of a privacy impact assessment evaluating personal 
data processing technologies.262 The Draft Regulation on data protection proposes to establish 
the obligation to carryout “data protection impact assessment” for processing presenting 
specific risks263. Those processing said to present specific risks are those implying: “(a) a 
systematic and extensive evaluation of personal aspects relating to a natural person or for 
analysing or predicting in particular the natural person's economic situation, location, health, 
personal preferences, reliability or behaviour, which is based on automated processing and on 
which measures are based that produce legal effects concerning the individual or significantly 
affect the individual; (b) information on sex life, health, race and ethnic origin or for the 
provision of health care, epidemiological researches, or surveys of mental or infectious diseases, 
where the data are processed for taking measures or decisions regarding specific individuals on 
a large scale; (c) monitoring publicly accessible areas, especially when using optic-electronic 
devices (video surveillance) on a large scale; (d) personal data in large scale filing systems on 
children, genetic data or biometric data.”  
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The integration of privacy requirements at early stage of the development of new processing 
technologies, called “privacy by design”264, may also become an obligation of the controller 
under the future European data protection regulation. It is provided that the controller “shall, 
both at the time of the determination of the means for processing and at the time of the 
processing itself, implement appropriate technical and organisational measures and procedures 
in such a way that the processing will meet the requirements of this Regulation and ensure the 
protection of the rights of the data subject.”265 Additionally, the Draft Regulation introduces the 
principle of privacy by default according to which “the controller shall implement mechanisms 
for ensuring that, by default, only those personal data are processed which are necessary for 
each specific purpose of the processing and are especially not collected or retained beyond the 
minimum necessary for those purposes, both in terms of the amount of the data and the time of 
their storage. In particular, those mechanisms shall ensure that by default personal data are not 
made accessible to an indefinite number of individuals.” Privacy by default aims at the effective 
enforcement of the principle of minimisation.266These principles are discussed further in 
relation to “Accountability”. 
 
3.1.6 Relevance for the PARIS Project 
This brief overview of the issue of the balance between privacy and security at EU legislative 
level is particularly instructive for the context of the PARIS project. Although the PARIS project 
aims at addressing the privacy v. surveillance at the level of operators of surveillance system, it 
is important to recall that the question of proportionality is central for this task and that the 
aim to develop a methodology, a way to achieve a correct balance is actually a concern shared 
at various levels, legislative and operational, and a challenge for the European Union and its 
Member States. In view of this legal context, it seems to us that the SALT framework, as far as 
legal aspects are concerned, should focus on two major challenges: the integration of both 
privacy and data protection requirements in order to adopt a human rights perspective and not 
only a technical/data protection approach, and a way to operationalize the proportionality 
requirement at all stages. Section 3 of the present chapter will explain the content of this 
proportionality requirement.  
3.2 Sources of Protection of Privacy and Personal Data 
The protection of privacy and personal data is enshrined in Europe in several instruments, both 
at Council of Europe (1), European Union (2) and national levels (3), referring to both legal 
binding and non-binding instruments. It is necessary to recall that the PARIS project is carried 
out while a revision of the legal instruments of personal data protection are presently under 
study, both at Council of Europe and European Union levels (4).  
 
3.2.1 Council of Europe 
All EU Member States are Member States of the Council of Europe, set up in 1949 in the 
aftermath of the second world war, and which original objective and function is to promote 
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fundamental rights, democracy and the Rule of law in Europe. In contrast with the EU, which 
explicitly referred to fundamental rights only in 1997 at the time of adoption of the Amsterdam 
Treaty, the Council of Europe has been the leading European organization in this field. As far as 
the protection of privacy and personal data are concerned, one must first recall the 
fundamental role of the European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms of 1950267. This Convention is of great influence in Europe, since all the 
signatory parties are under the obligation to enforce the Convention and the case law emerging 
from the disputes settled by the instituted European Court of Human Rights of Strasbourg 
(further referred to as ECHR), in charge of the interpretation of the Convention. Article 8 of the 
ECHR is specifically dedicated to the protection of private life, family life, home and 
correspondence and is of particular interest for the purposes of understanding the scope of 
‘private life’ and the limitations to this right.   
 
Besides, it is worth mentioning that all EU Member States are also signatory Parties to the 
Council of Europe Convention 108 for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data signed in Strasbourg in 1981. It lays down the fundamental 
principles of data protection that we will generally find in Member States EU legislations. The 
COE Convention 108 applies to any automated processing (excluding manual processing) of 
personal data by public or private entities, and among the public entities, does not distinguish 
the processing of personal data for police or judicial purposes. That is why this instrument is 
generally considered as the most comprehensive data protection instrument in Europe. We will 
see that the ECHR has often referred to Convention 108 in its reasoning, although it has not yet 
fully incorporated a systematic data protection perspective when dealing with surveillance 
technologies. Convention 108 has further been supplemented by Additional Protocol 181 
regarding supervisory authorities and transborder data flows laying down specific rules on 
these issues that were lacking in the original convention.  
 
Although non-binding, the recommendations adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe are very relevant sources in relation to privacy and data protection matters. 
Among more than 20 Recommendations are related to data protection, and for the purposes of 
the present report, it is worth mentioning the R87(15) regulating the use of personal data in the 
Police sector, and R(2010)13 on the protection of individuals with regard to automatic 
processing of personal data in the context of profiling. 
 
3.2.2 European Union 
3.2.2.1 Data Protection: an Autonomous Fundamental Right Closely Connected to 
the Right to Private Life 
In the EU, the protection of private life and data protection is enshrined in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. Its Article 7 provides the right to private and family life, home and 
communications, while Article 8 innovates through the explicit recognition of the fundamental 
right to data protection.268 Both rights are therefore protected under an equal value. In this 
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sense, if the European Court of Justice has been led to recognize the fundamental right to data 
protection enshrined in article 8 of the EU Charter269, it has also recalled that “that 
fundamental right is closely connected with the right to respect of private life expressed in 
Article 7 of the Charter.”270 As argued earlier, we believe that the autonomy of the right to the 
protection of personal data does not imply denying privacy as its fundament.  
 
3.2.2.2 Data Protection in EU Law: a Fragmented Approach Inherited from the 
Pillars Structures of the EU 
The regulation of the processing of personal data at EU level comprises several instruments. In 
contrast with the Convention 108 of the Council of Europe which has adopted a rather 
comprehensive approach, the EU legal landscape for the protection of personal data is 
characterized by a fragmented approach widely inherited from the former pillar structure of 
the EU.  
 
The first and fundamental instrument regulating the processing of personal data in the EU is the 
Directive 95/46 of 25 October 1995.271  The Directive aimed at the approximation of Member 
States legislations in the field of data protection in view of the subsequent liberalization of 
flows of personal data within the internal market. The Directive was therefore adopted on the 
basis of the former Treaty of the European Community (TEC, former first pillar).272 Because of 
the limitations of competences of the European Community in the matters of police and judicial 
cooperation, the Directive 95/46 explicitly excludes from its scope of application those 
matters.273 The EU further adopted a specific instrument destined to apply to the processing of 
personal data in the field of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters on the basis of 
the former Treaty of the EU (TEU – former third pillar). The scope of Framework decision 
2008/977/JHA274 is however limited to the protection of personal data which “have been 
transmitted or made available between Member States”275 and does not regulate the 
processing of personal data by police and judicial authorities at national level. In any case, 
neither the Directive 95/46 nor the framework decision 977/2008 applies to the processing of 
personal data necessary for ‘national security purposes’, which remains within the sovereign 
competence and responsibility of Member States. Besides, the protection of privacy in relation 
to electronic communications has been the object of a specific legislation, the so-called e-
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privacy Directive 2002/58.276 Finally, the processing of personal data by EU institutions and EU 
agencies is regulated under Regulation 45/2001.277  
 
Except in relation to electronic communications, European Union law in the field of data 
protection does not specifically address one or another processing technology. Guidance 
regarding the interpretation of the concepts and principles enshrined in this instrument is an 
essential challenge.  The National Data Protection authorities, gathered at EU level within the 
Article 29 Working Party plays a key role in this respect, providing opinions and 
recommendations on general and specific aspects of the law, constituting very valuable sources 
of interpretation of the Directive 95/46 and Directive 2202/58.278 This chapter extensively relies 
on these sources of interpretation of the data protection concepts and principles.  
 
3.2.3 National Law 
As explained above, since the EU does not have an exclusive competence for the regulation of 
protection of personal data (even under the Lisbon Treaty)279, national legislations remain the 
primary source of legislation in the field of data protection. Member States are bound by both 
the ECHR and EU law and are therefore responsible for their proper and correct 
implementation. Also, Member States are not subject to the separation of competence 
between former first pillar ad third pillar matters, which implies that most Member States’ 
legislations generally include police, judicial and even intelligence activities within the 
framework of their general data protection law (with adaptations). The national caselaw and 
the opinions and recommendations of the national Data Protection Authorities should also be 
taken into account. Moreover, to the exception of the e-privacy Directive, there is no 
specific/sectoral legislation at EU level governing the use of specific surveillance technologies. 
However, as we will see in the case of videosurveillance, there may be sectoral national 
legislations that requires to be taken into account. This is why the last two sections of the 
present chapter will provide a brief overview of the French and Belgian framework for 
videosurveillance and biometrics (PARIS use cases).  
 
3.2.4 Data Protection Under Revision 
Data protection is under revision, both at Council of Europe and European Union levels. Thirty 
years after its adoption, the Council of Europe launched in 2011 a public consultation in order 
to assess the necessity and desirability to revise the Convention 108 in the light of new 
technological challenges.280 The European Commission is also at the initiative of recent 
proposals destined to revise current instrument, in view of promoting a “comprehensive 
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approach on personal data protection in the European Union.”281 A proposal of Regulation and a 
proposal of Directive have been made in view to replace the Directive 95/46 and the 
Framework decision 2008/977/JHA. We discussed earlier the deletion of privacy behind 
personal data in the current proposals and the proposals for the introduction of the principles 
of ‘data protection by design’, ‘data protection by default’ and ‘data protection impact 
assessment’ will be discussed later in relation to accountability. The present draft proposals are 
still awaiting the first reading of the European Parliament. About 4000 amendments should be 
examined in relation to the Draft Regulation, the legislative process of which is under great 
pressure of multiple lobbyings activities. While the Draft Regulation was planned to be adopted 
during the year 2014, it seems that an adoption should not occur before 2015. In view of the 
uncertainty regarding the outcome of the legislative process, in particular with respect to the 
Draft Regulation, the present chapter will first and foremost rely on the existing applicable 
requirements (namely the Directive 95/46).   
3.3 The Right to Privacy and Data Protection in ECHR Caselaw  
 
Article 8 
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 
 
It is immediately obvious that Article 8 is divided into two parts. The first part, Article 8§1, sets 
out the precise rights which are to be guaranteed to an individual by the State – the right to 
respect for private life, family life, home and correspondence. The second part, Article 8 §2, 
makes it clear that those rights are not absolute in that it may be acceptable for public 
authorities to interfere with the Article 8 rights in certain circumstances.282 Article 8§2 also 
indicates the circumstances in which public authorities can validly interfere with the rights set 
out in Article 8§1; only interferences which are in accordance with the law and necessary in a 
democratic society in pursuit of one or more of the legitimate aims listed in Article 8§2 will be 
considered to be an acceptable limitation by the State of an individual’s Article 8 rights. 
Furthermore, the Court has held that, while the essential object of Article 8 is to protect the 
individual against arbitrary action by public authorities, there may in addition be positive 
obligations where the State may have to act affirmatively to respect the wide range of personal 
interests set out in this provision283. It means that interferences by private actors may 
nevertheless be imputable to the States as long as they can be considered to have failed to take 
measures to secure respect for private life of individuals.    
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ECHR caselaw in relation to article 8 of the Convention is extensive and it is not the purpose of 
the present report to provide an exhaustive view in this respect.284 We will therefore focus our 
attention on some important developments of the ECHR caselaw that are of particular interest 
for the definition of a SAlegalT framework in relation to surveillance technologies. We will start 
by recalling the scope of protection afforded by Article 8 under the notion of private life 
(leaving aside the scope of protection afforded by Art. 8 under the notions of family life, home 
and correspondence) with a specific attention to the integration of data protection aspects 
under Art. 8 caselaw and the elements taken into account for the interference assessment. We 
will then examine the conditions for legitimate interferences into private life under Art. 8§2, 
namely the legality, legitimacy and necessity requirements. 
 
3.3.1 The Right to Respect for Private Life: Scope of Protection 
Originally, the right to privacy was conceptualized in a negative way. It referred to the “right to 
be let alone”, implying that the State and the public authorities should prevent themselves 
from any interference in the sphere of the private life of the individuals. But as the Court of 
Strasbourg enjoys recalling, the Convention is an “alive instrument”285. On this ground the 
Court expressly stated that “the notion of ‘private life’ is a broad one, which is not susceptible to 
exhaustive definition”286. The Court has filled the notion of private life gradually.  
 
An overview of the notion of private life (although not exhaustive) was given by the Court in the 
Pretty case, where it held as follows: “ It covers the physical and psychological integrity of a 
person […] it can sometimes embrace aspects of an individual’s physical and social identity  […] 
elements such as, for example, gender identification, name and sexual orientation and sexual 
life fall within the sphere protected by article 8 […] Article 8 also protects a right to personal 
development, and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and 
the outside world [see Niemietz] Though no previous case law has established any right to self-
determination as being contained in article 8 of the Convention as such, the Court considers that 
the notion of personal autonomy is an important principle underlying the interpretation of its 
guarantees. 287” The Court has then officially recognized the right to self-determination in the 
Evans case of 2006288.  
 
3.3.1.1 The Protection of Personal Data in Article 8 ECHR Caselaw 
On several occasions, the Court has brought several data protection aspects within the scope of 
Article 8 of the Convention. The Court notably ruled that the storing by a public authority of 
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information relating to an individual’s private life amounts to an interference within the 
meaning of Article 8.289 The subsequent use of the stored information has no bearing on that 
finding.290 Not only private information, but also public information can also benefit from the 
protection of Article 8 “where it is systematically collected and stored in files held by public 
authorities.”291 The refusal to give a data subject access to the personal data held by public 
authorities falls within Article 8 allowing the data subject to bring a claim for access under this 
article.292  
 
Nevertheless, it cannot be considered that the ECHR has brought a general recognition of data 
protection rights under Article 8 of the ECHR.293 Indeed the Court asserts that “in determining 
whether the personal information retained by the authorities involves any of the private-life 
aspects mentioned above, the Court will have due regard to the specific context in which the 
information at issue has been recorded and retained, the nature of the records, the way in 
which these records are used and processed and the results that may be obtained.”294 It is 
precisely in cases involving ‘public surveillance systems’ that the Court has been led to carry out 
such evaluation. These cases are indeed highly relevant for the purposes of the present report 
in several aspects since the outcome of the evaluation of the ECHR contribute to question 
and/or illustrate the traditional public/private borders. 
 
3.3.1.2 Protection of Article 8 Beyond the “Private Sphere” 
The first important ruling in this respect is the Niemietz case where the Court ruled that “it 
would be too restrictive to limit the notion of private life  to an ‘inner circle’ in which the 
individual may live his own personal life as he chooses and to exclude therefrom entirely the 
outside world not encompassed within that circle. Respect for private life must also comprise to 
a certain degree the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings.” This 
has led the Court to expand the protection of Article 8 to professional activities: “ t here 
appears, furthermore, to be no reason of principle why this understanding of the notion of 
‘private life’ should be taken to exclude activities of a professional or business nature since it is, 
after all, in the course of their working lives that the majority of people have a significant, if not 
the greatest, opportunity of developing relationships with the outside world.” On this basis, the 
Court further recognized that there is a “a zone of interaction of a person with others, even in a 
public context, which may fall within the scope of “private life”.”295 As explained above, the 
Court takes into account the specific context in which data are gathered and used in order to 
determine whether monitoring of individuals outside a person’s home or private premises (in 
other words in public spaces) may nevertheless be considered to interfere with individual’s 
private life. ECHR caselaw shows that the Court has taken into account several elements, giving 
weight to one or more of these elements according to the specific circumstances of the case. 
These elements are not cumulative conditions, but enlighten factors helping the Court in its 
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evaluation as to whether certain surveillance measures, although occurring in public spaces or 
public context, may constitute interference into one’s private life. 
 
3.3.1.3 Elements Taken Into Account for the Interference Assessment 
Whether the individual has or not a reasonable expectation of privacy 
The U.S. Supreme Court has originally introduced this criterion in 1964 in a case involving the 
right to privacy of individuals under the Fourth Amendment.296 Although not explicitly foreseen 
in the European Convention of Human Rights, the Court introduced the criterion of “reasonable 
expectation of privacy”297, but further asserted that it is generally not a conclusive factor: 
“Since there are occasions when people knowingly or intentionally involve themselves in 
activities which are or may be recorded or reported in a public manner, a person’s reasonable 
expectations as to privacy may be a significant, although not necessarily conclusive, factor. A 
person who walks down the street will, inevitably, be visible to any member of the public who is 
also present.”298 If the underlying reasoning seems to imply that there may be spaces where 
individuals’ expectation of privacy may be less important, the Court generally does not give 
weight from this criterion solely in its evaluation.  
 
Whether there is systematic recording and storage of the data 
This is a very important element in the Court’s evaluation, notably with respect to ‘public 
information’ or behaviour of individuals in public spaces. In Rotaru, the Court recognized that 
files gathered by security services on a particular individual fall within the scope of Article 8, 
even if the information has not been gathered by any intrusive or covert method. With regard 
to surveillance by cameras, the Court however considered that the monitoring of the actions of 
an individual in a public place by the use of photographic equipment which does not record the 
visual data does not, as such, give rise to an interference with the individual's private life.299 In 
the Court’s view “given that nothing is recorded, it is difficult to see how the visual data 
obtained could be made available to the general public or used for purposes other than to keep 
a watch on places …  the data available to a person looking at monitors is identical to that 
which he or she could have obtained by being on the spot in person. Therefore, all that can be 
observed is essentially public behaviour. The applicants have also failed to demonstrate 
plausibly that private actions occurring in public could have been monitored in any way.”300 The 
Court’s approach in this ruling is problematic from a data protection perspective301, since the 
definition of “processing” does not distinguish whether data is recorded or not.302 Whether 
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there is systematic recording of the data or not remains significant in the Court’s assessment. 
Moreover, the Court has confirmed this approach in the Perry case: “the normal use of security 
cameras per se whether in the public street or on premises, such as shopping centres or police 
stations where they serve a legitimate and foreseeable purpose, do not raise issues under Article 
8 § 1 of the Convention.”303 
 
Whether the data is recorded in view to identify individuals 
This is an important, and sometimes decisive, criterion. In P.G. and J.H. v. The United Kingdom, 
the Court had to determine whether the voice samples of suspects recorded with a covert 
device at the Police station constituted or not an interference into the applicant’s privacy. The 
Government of United Kingdom argued that “the use of the listening devices in the cells and 
when the applicants were being charged did not disclose any interference, as these recordings 
were not made to obtain any private or substantive information. The aural quality of the 
applicants’ voices was not part of private life but was rather a public, external feature. In 
particular, the recordings made while they were being charged – a formal process of criminal 
justice, in the presence of at least one police officer – did not concern their private life. The 
applicants could have had no expectation of privacy in that context.”304 Making reference to 
convention 108, The Court rejected this argument, taking into account that since “a permanent 
record has nonetheless been made of the person’s voice and it is subject to a process of analysis 
directly relevant to identifying that person in the context of other personal data …  the 
recording of the applicants’ voices when being charged and when in their police cell discloses an 
interference with their right to respect for private life.”305 The Court came to the conclusion that 
the recording of a voice sample constituted an interference into the applicant’s right to private 
life, precisely because it was used in view of identifying these persons. Similarly, in the case of 
Perry, concerning surveillance by cameras of a suspect in police station premises, the Court also 
gave weight to the purpose of identification of the person to characterize the interference: “the 
footage in question in the present case had not been obtained voluntarily or in circumstances 
where it could be reasonably anticipated that it would be recorded and used for identification 
purposes.”306  With respect to the general retention of fingerprinting data, the Court has also 
stressed their importance as unique element of identification of individuals (see Infra). In 
contrast, in the Friedl case regarding the use of photographs by public authorities during public 
demonstrations and records of these photographs in a police file, the Court considered that 
there was no interference since the photographs were not taken in view of identifying 
individuals, but only retained as a record of the demonstration.307  
 
Whether the data is disclosed beyond a foreseeable degree 
Regarding surveillance by cameras, we have explained above that the Court takes consideration 
whether the visual data is recorded or not and can therefore be made available to the general 
public. In another case relating to surveillance cameras in the streets, the Court gave weight to 
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the fact that the disclosure to the medias of the footage concerning the applicant’s suicide 
attempt in the street characterized an interference into the applicant’s privacy: “the relevant 
moment was viewed to an extent which far exceeded any exposure to a passer-by or to security 
observation …  and to a degree surpassing that which the applicant could possibly have 
foreseen when he walked in Brentwood on 20 August 1995.”308  
  
Whether the information may give rise to ‘private life concern’ considering possible unknown 
future uses 
This is in relation to biometric data, in particular fingerprinting and DNA data that the Court 
gave weight to the capabilities and possible future uses of these data to consider that the sole 
retention of such data disclosed an interference into one’s private life.309  
 
Referring to its previous ruling in P.G. and J.H. v. United Kingdom regarding voice samples, the 
Court has adopted a broad approach, referring widely to the notions of ‘personal data’ and 
‘processing’ with respect to the retention of fingerprinting. If this is true that fingerprinting 
“constituted neutral, objective and irrefutable material and, unlike photographs, were 
unintelligible to the untutored eye and without a comparator fingerprint”310, the Court 
nevertheless considers that since fingerprints “objectively contain unique information about the 
individual concerned allowing his or her identification with precision in a wide range of 
circumstances”, there are thus capable of affecting his or her private life and “retention of this 
information may in itself give rise, notwithstanding their objective and irrefutable character, to 
important private life concerns”.311  
 
In the same case, the Court had to consider the collection and retention of cellular samples and 
DNA profiles.  With respect to these data the Court has given weight to the possible uses that 
may give rise, in the future, to privacy concerns: “bearing in mind the rapid pace of 
developments in the field of genetics and information technology, the Court cannot discount the 
possibility that in the future the private life interests bound up with genetic information may be 
adversely affected in novel ways or in a manner which cannot be anticipated with precision 
today.”312 In its analysis, the Court distinguishes cellular samples from DNA profiles. While the 
retention per se of cellular samples must be regarded as interfering with the right to private life 
given the nature and the amount of personal information that they contain313, the retention of 
DNA profiles (although they contain a more limited amount of personal information) is equally 
regarded as an interference in view of their capacity to be used beyond neutral identification 
(e.g. identification of genetic relationships between individuals, which is a very sensitive 
issue).314  
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Ad hoc approach: the case of GPS surveillance 
There are also cases where the Court has developed, in addition to some criteria explained 
supra, an ad hoc approach to specific circumstances. A recent example of such ad hoc 
evaluation of the interference into one’s private life can be found in a case involving 
surveillance of the applicant by GPS (Global Positioning System).315 The Court has considered 
that “GPS surveillance is by its very nature to be distinguished from other methods of visual or 
acoustical surveillance which are, as a rule, more susceptible of interfering with a person's right 
to respect for private life, because they disclose more information on a person's conduct, 
opinions or feelings.”316 The Court has therefore considered that surveillance by GPS and 
processing and use of the data obtained thereby may constitute an interference with an 
individual’s private life, according to the specific circumstance, such as: the duration of the 
surveillance, its objective, the systematic recording or not of the data obtained through GPS 
surveillance and the use of such data “in order to draw up a pattern of the applicant's 
movements, to make further investigations and to collect additional evidence at the places the 
applicant had travelled to, which was later used at the criminal trial against the applicant.”317  
In this perspective, the Court does not seem willing to consider that surveillance by GPS, 
irrespective of the circumstances, amounts to an interference into private life of individuals. It 
does not give the same weight to GPS surveillance and acoustic surveillance for example, for 
which the Court has adopted a rather principled approach according to which wiretapping 
amounts to an interference. Surveillance by GPS will require examination of the specific 
circumstances to determine whether in a given case, there is interference or not with an 
individual’s privacy.  
 
While article 8 affords protection to one’s private life, the Court has become familiar with the 
notion of “personal data” (understood as any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable individual) and increasingly willing to make reference to Convention 108 in 
determining that automatic processing of personal data may disclose interference into one’s 
private life. Nevertheless, in certain significant cases (notably regarding surveillance by 
cameras), the Court caselaw has not fully incorporated a data protection perspective in its 
reasoning, remaining attached to the demonstration that certain type of “information” or 
certain type of “processing” must involve private life concerns to benefit from the protection of 
Article 8. This contributes to illustrate that privacy does not fully equal data protection. Privacy 
may be broader than data protection, since privacy concerns may be raised even when there is 
no processing of personal data. Also, data protection may be applicable although a certain 
processing may not involve private life issues. 
 
We will now turn to explain the conditions under which “interferences” into one’s privacy may 
be allowed under Article 8§2 of the Convention.  
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3.3.2 Legitimate and Proportionate Interferences Into the Right to Private Life 
by Public Authorities 
Once the Court has assessed whether the circumstances of the case involve an interference 
into the private life of the applicant, the Court comes to assess whether this interference may 
be justified. The interference must first be “in accordance with the law” (the legal requirement) 
and “necessary in a democratic society” to achieve one or more of the goals listed in Article 
8§2.  
  
3.3.2.1 The Legal Requirement 
Interferences into one’s private family life, home and correspondence must be in “accordance 
with the law”. If the Court finds that the legal requirement is not satisfied in a given case, the 
measure interfering into the individual’s private life will be considered as violating Article 8 and 
the case will end there. The legal requirement enshrines two conditions: the interference must 
have a legal basis and must be foreseeable, in particular “the quality of the law in question must 
be such that it is accessible to the persons concerned, and formulated with sufficient precision to 
enable them, if need be with appropriate advice, to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in 
the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail.”318 
Certain surveillances practices appear to be particularly vulnerable in this regard, in particular 
telephone tapping. It is notably in this specific area that the Court has been led to condemn 
State Parties in a series of cases.319 Scholars have also noticed that the Court is more willing to 
exercise a strict standard of review in relation to the legality requirement than to the much 
more political test of “necessity”.320 Regarding cases evoked in the present chapter, the Court 
found that interferences by the defendant State were not “in accordance with the law” in the 
case of Perry (covert videosurveillance in a police station) and, P.G. and J.H. v. UK (covert 
recording of voice samples in police station premises. In the case of Uzun regarding surveillance 
by GPS, the Court however considered that the interference was in accordance with the law. It 
therefore turned to the legitimacy and necessity requirements to determine whether the said 
interference was admissible or not. 
 
3.3.2.2 The Interference Must Pursue a Legitimate Aim 
It falls on the respondent State to identify the objective or objectives of the interference, such 
as enumerated in Article 8§2: “national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” Actually, the Court’s caselaw does not 
question the argument of State Parties in this regard. It has rarely if ever rejected the legitimate 
aim or aims identified, even when this may be disputed by the applicant on the ground that the 
reason given by the State is not the actual reason motivating the interference.   
 
To come back to some of the legitimate aims advanced by States in some of the cases discussed 
in the present report, the Court agreed that “the retention of fingerprint and DNA information 
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pursues the legitimate purpose of the detection, and therefore, prevention of crime”321 or that 
the disclosure of the CCTV material to the media contributed to pursue “the legitimate aim of 
public safety, the prevention of disorder and crime and the protection of the rights of others.”322  
  
3.3.2.3 The Interference Must Be Necessary in a Democratic Society: a 
Proportionality Policy 
First, with respect to the term “necessary”, the Court ruled that “while it is not synonymous 
with ‘indispensable’, neither has it the flexibility of such expressions as ‘admissible’, ‘ordinary’, 
‘useful’, ‘reasonable’ or ‘desirable’.”323 The Court further ruled that “the notion of ‘necessity’ 
implies that an interference corresponds to a pressing social need, and in particular that it is 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued” and “if the reasons adduced by national 
authorities to justify it are relevant and sufficient.”324 Instead of a simple necessity test, the 
Court applies a proportionality policy, which at its simplest, involve balancing the rights of the 
individual with the interests of the State.  
 
Content of the proportionality test  
The proportionality test or balancing test has raised considerable discussion among scholars. As 
explained earlier, it originates in German administrative law in the XIX century and has 
migrated to EU, ECHR and elsewhere to become “one of the defining feature of global 
constitutionalism”.325 In its fully developed form, the proportionality test involves a three-steps 
analysis: i) the suitability stage, that is to say whether the interference is appropriate in that it 
effectively achieves the aim pursued; ii) the least-restrictive means test or subsidiary principle, 
or whether the State could have achieved the legitimate aim pursued with a less restrictive 
measure for the fundamental right at stake; iii) the balancing test stricto sensu, which in 
concreto balance the interests in presence.326  
 
Application of the proportionality test by the ECHR: an ad hoc approach 
It is worth mentioning that the approach of the ECHR is generally considered as an ad hoc 
balancing, in that it favours an adjudication of the litigation in concreto rather than in 
abstrato.327  
 
Most importantly, the Court’s caselaw affords a margin of appreciation to Member States to 
make the initial assessment of proportionality of an interference, the breadth of which varies 
according to the circumstances, the subject matter and its background. The margin of 
appreciation left to Member States will vary according to the nature and seriousness of the 
interests to be protected from interference, the nature of the interference and the pressing 
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social need served by the interference.328 Member States may enjoy a broader margin of 
appreciation in areas showing a variety of customs and practices across Member States or 
when national security interests are at stake. With respect to secret surveillance, the Court has 
considered for example that if “the existence of some legislation granting powers of secret 
surveillance over the mail, post and telecommunications is, under exceptional conditions, 
necessary in a democratic society”, “this does not mean that the Contracting States enjoy an 
unlimited discretion to subject persons within their jurisdiction to secret surveillance. The Court, 
being aware of the danger such a law poses of undermining or even destroying democracy on 
the ground of defending it, affirms that the Contracting States may not, in the name of the 
struggle against espionage and terrorism, adopt whatever measures they deem appropriate.”329 
Special attention will be paid to the existence of adequate and effective guarantees against 
abuse and arbitrariness, also in relation to the legal requirement. 
 
The ECHR has not explicitly transposed into its caselaw the threefold requirements (points i), ii) 
and iii) explained above). The caselaw of the ECHR demonstrates that there is no consistent and 
systematic application of these three stages of the proportionality test. 330 It may exercise its 
control over the suitability of the interference and apply the least-restrictive means test or may 
avoid to exercise such controls. The broader the margin of appreciation of the State is, the less 
scrupulous the judicial review of the Court over the suitability and the least-restrictive means 
principles will be. In particular, in relation to Article 8, P. de Hert asserts that “a lot of mist 
remains to cloud our understanding of the Court’s approach to legitimate limitations of 
privacy”.331 The three stages of the proportionality test would be more systematically applied in 
the context of art. 10 of the Convention, while the varying tests applied (from loose to strict 
scrutiny) under Article 8 make the Court’s caselaw often unpredictable.332  
 
We cannot provide a complete review of the ECHR caselaw in relation to the application of the 
proportionality test under Article 8§2, which would require an entirely dedicated research. 
Neither this section intends to provide a global overview of ECHR caselaw in relation to new 
technologies.333 Instead we will focus here on the reasoning of the Court in some specific cases 
involving videosurveillance activities and biometrics systems and their outcomes. The two cases 
presented hereunder have been chosen as far as they constitute illustrations of the complexity, 
as an ad hoc approach, of the proportionality analysis in ECHR caselaw in relation to Article 8.  
 
                                                     
328
 ECHR, Z. v. Finland, 25 February 1997. For an exhaustive analysis of the factors determining the breadth of the 
margin of appreciation of States see Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, The margin of appreciation doctrine and the principle 
of proportionality in the jurisprudence of the ECHR (Antwerpen:  Intersentia, 2002) 
329
 ECHR, Klass v. Germany, 6 September 1978, §48-49 
330
 Sebastien Van Drooghenbroeck, op. cit., in particular chap. III 
331
 Paul De Hert, “A Human Rights Perspective on Privacy and Data Protection Impact Assessments”, in Privacy 
Impact Assessment, ed. David Wright and Paul de Hert, (London, Brussels: Springer, 2012), 42.  
332
 Ibidem 
333
 For a global overview of the ECHR caselaw in relation to new technologies in the last decade, see Claire Gayrel 
and Jean Herveg, “Chronique de Jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des Droits de l’Homme 2002-2008 , Revue 
du Droit des Technologies de l’Information 37 (2009) and  Jean Herveg, Chronique de Jurisprudence de la Cour 
européenne des Droits de l’Homme 2009-2011, , Revue du Droit des Technologies de l’Information 48-49 
(2012) 
PARIS Project     Deliverable 2.1     v1.0 
31/07/2013    SEC - 312504      99 
Non proportionality of indefinite retention of biometric data of non-convicted persons 
In the case of Marper v. UK, the particular circumstances of the case submitted to the Court 
concerned the retention of fingerprint and DNA data of persons who have been suspected, but 
not convicted, of certain criminal offences. The control of the Court was therefore strictly 
limited to the issue of whether the retention of biometric data of non-convicted persons was 
justified or not under Article 8 §2 and did not address whether the retention of such data in 
general could be regarded as justified or not.  
 
The Court considered that the United Kingdom did not enjoy a broad margin of appreciation 
with regard to the retention of biometric data such as fingerprints and DNA information taking 
into account two main factors. First, the Court gave weight to “the intrinsically private character 
of this information”, which “calls for the Court to exercise careful scrutiny of any State measure 
authorizing its retention and use by the authorities without the consent of person concerned.”334 
Second, the Court proceeded to an overview of the rules established for the retention of 
fingerprint and DNA information in Council of Europe Member States and noticed that 
“England, Wales and Northern Ireland appear to be the only jurisdictions to allow the indefinite 
retention of fingerprint and DNA material of any person of any age suspected of any recordable 
offence”. Given the strong consensus existing among the contracting States who have chosen to 
set limits on the retention and use of such data with a view to achieve a proper balance, the 
Court judges that it narrows the margin of appreciation of the United Kingdom in the said case.  
 
Although the Court adopts a rather critical view with respect to the suitability of the 
measure335, it nevertheless refrains to conclude that the interference at stake would not be 
suitable: “While neither the statistics nor the examples provided by the Government in 
themselves establish the successful identification and prosecution of offenders could not have 
been achieved without the permanent and indiscriminate retention of the fingerprint and DNA 
records of all persons in the applicant’s position, the Court accepts that the extension of the 
database has nonetheless contributed to the detection and prevention of crime.”336 The Court 
will not proceed to the least-restrictive means test and will turn directly to the final balancing 
stricto sensu. 
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In this respect the Court considers that the “blanket and indiscriminate337 nature of the powers 
of retention of the fingerprints, cellular samples and DNA profiles of persons suspected, but not 
convicted of offences, fails to strike a fair balance between the competing public and private 
interests”.338 The Court also notices the risk of stigmatisation, stemming from the fact that non 
convicted persons are treated in the same way as convicted person, raising concern with regard 
to the right to presumption of innocence.339  
 
To conclude, Member States do not enjoy a very broad margin of appreciation in the 
implementation of biometric systems. Even though there are differences among Member 
States in this respect, the Court is not willing to allow a very wide margin of appreciation, in 
particular regarding the purposes of collection, retention periods and conditions for disclosure, 
requiring that they be strictly provided by law (in connection with the legal requirements) and 
accompanied with adequate safeguards.340 
 
Non proportionality of disclosure to medias of camera footage 
In the case of Peck, the applicant had been filmed in the public space while he was attempting 
suicide. The police, thanks to the videosurveillance system, intervened promptly. In order to 
advertise about the benefits of videosurveillance in the prevention of crime, the camera 
footage (showing the applicant with a knife just before his suicide attempt) was disclosed to 
local and national medias.  
 
The suitability of videosurveillance and advertising of CCTV system and its benefits for the 
detection and prevention of crime, as argued by the Government of the United Kingdom, is not 
disputed by the Court. However, the Court will emphasize its control in the specific 
circumstances of the case on the least-restrictive means test: “The Court notes that the Council 
had other options available to it to allow it to achieve the same objectives. In the first place, it 
could have identified the applicant through enquiries with the police and thereby obtained his 
consent prior to disclosure. Alternatively, the Council could have masked the relevant images 
itself. A further alternative would have been to take the utmost care in ensuring that the media, 
to which the disclosure was made, masked those images. The Court notes that the Council did 
not explore the first and second options and considers that the steps taken by the Council in 
respect of the third were inadequate.”341 Moreover, the fact that the footage had been publicly 
disclosed to promote the effectiveness of CCTV system in the detection of crime, whereas the 
applicant had in fact been not charged of any offence, should have been carefully 
                                                     
337
 The Court notes §119: “The material may be retained irrespective of the nature or gravity of the offence with 
which the individual was originally suspected or of the age of the suspected offender; fingerprints and samples may 
be taken – and retained – from a person of any age, arrested in connection with a recordable offence, which 
includes minor or non-imprisonable offences. The retention is not time-limited; the material is retained indefinitely 
whatever the nature or seriousness of the offence of which the person was suspected. Moreover, there exist only 
limited possibilities for an acquitted individual to have the data removed from the nationwide database or the 
materials destroyed (see paragraph 35 above); in particular, there is no provision for independent review of the 
justification for the retention according to defined criteria, including such factors as the seriousness of the offence, 
previous arrests, the strength of the suspicion against the person and any other special circumstances.” 
338
 Ibidem, §125 
339
 Ibidem, §122 
340
 See also the analysis of Nancy Yue Liu, Bio-Privacy, Privacy Regulations and the Challenge of Biometrics (New 
York: Routledge, 2012) p. 113 
341
 Peck, §80 
PARIS Project     Deliverable 2.1     v1.0 
31/07/2013    SEC - 312504      101 
considered.342 On these grounds the Court concludes that the disclosure of the said footage 
constituted a disproportionate and unjustified interference.343  
 
3.3.3 Conclusions  
The purpose of this section was to provide a general overview of the ECHR caselaw in relation 
to Article 8 of the Convention, in particular as far as it is relevant for the identification of the 
public/private borders. First, an individual’s right to private life exists beyond the private 
sphere, since the right to privacy actually encompasses a right to self-determination of the 
individual. Second, legitimate and justified interferences into an individual’s private life is 
submitted to the proportionality test. If Member States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation 
(varying according to the case), such margin is in no case unlimited. Although not systematically 
and consistently applied by the ECHR, the proportionality principle (as described in its three-
steps analysis: suitability test; Least-restrictive means test; and balancing stricto sensu) is highly 
relevant for the SALT framework, and should be integrated, at all relevant stages of the 
implementation of a surveillance system. Finally, It is important to understand that privacy does 
not equal personal data protection. Privacy may be broader than data protection, since privacy 
concerns may be raised even when there is no processing of personal data. Also, data 
protection may be applicable although a certain processing may not involve private life issues. 
This is why data protection rules are presented distinctly from private life considerations in the 
present chapter. 
 
3.3.4 Relevance and Perspectives for the SALT Framework 
As far as the SALT framework should integrate privacy requirements, the elements of the ECHR 
caselaw in relation to Article 8 are of fundamental importance. At this (early) stage of the 
research project, we can make two general suggestions regarding the integration of these 
privacy requirements into the SALT framework. 
 
First, as far as the identification of privacy interests are at stake, we would suggest that the 
SALT framework establish as a principle that any envisaged surveillance technology involve 
potential concerns according to Article 8§1. This could be established as a precautionary 
principle. Indeed, in view of the voluntarily open and broad definition of the notion of private 
life, it would be very hazardous for the SALT framework to aim at determining whether an 
intended surveillance technology constitutes or not an interference into one’s private life. It 
appears much wiser and privacy-productive to start from the principle that any surveillance 
measure involves an interference into private life of individuals, wherever or whenever it 
occurs. 
 
Second, the SALT framework should instead focus its attention on the way to integrate the 
elements of the ECHR caselaw in relation to legal and legitimate interferences. We propose to 
build on the permissible limitation test proposed by P. De Hert, who has identified seven core 
elements: the technology should be used in accordance with and as provided by the law; the 
technology or processing should serve a legitimate aim; the technology should not violate the 
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core aspects of the privacy rights; the technology should be necessary in a democratic society; 
the technology should nor have or give unfettered discretion; the technology should be 
appropriate, least intrusive and proportionate; the technology should be consistent with other 
human rights.344  
 
3.4 General Data Protection Law: Directive 95/46, Core Concepts and 
Content Principles 
This is the basic EU legal instrument regulating the processing of personal data and the free 
movement of such data within the EU. It enshrines core concepts and principles that are also 
widely common to other major sources of regulation of data protection, such as the Convention 
108345 or the OECD Guidelines346. It applies to the processing of personal data wholly or partly 
by automatic means, and to the processing otherwise than by automatic means of personal 
data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system.347 
Because of the choice of the instrument, a directive, the regulation of data protection leaves 
Member States a substantial margin of appreciation for the implementation of the Directive 
into their national law. It is therefore important to keep in mind that the purpose of the 
Directive was primarily the approximation of national laws in the field of protection of personal 
data so as to liberalize the flows of personal data between Member States. The Directive did 
not aim at achieving a full harmonization of Member States laws. For the purposes of the SALT 
framework, it is therefore essential to understand the importance of EU law legal requirements, 
but also of Member States legal requirements, which will frame in practice the implementation 
of any surveillance measure. If the Directive has contributed to a closer approximation of 
national laws, many divergences of interpretation on several aspects of the law remain.348 
Moreover, besides divergences between Member States, Studies Reports regarding the 
implementation of the Directive 95/46 has also demonstrated a range of difficulties that arise in 
relation to the application of Directive 95/46 within the new global and technological 
environment.349 This part will not provide an exhaustive analysis of the Directive. It will leave 
aside the enforcement mechanisms provided in the Directive 95/46 to ensure compliance with 
the law (establishment of national independent supervisory authorities, provision of sanctions 
et cet…), the data subject’s rights in relation to the processing of personal data pertaining to 
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them (access, rectification, opposition) and many specific issues (territorial scope of 
application, processing of personal data for historical, statistical or scientific purposes, 
processing of personal data for literary, journalistic or artistic purposes). This first part of the 
present chapter rather intends to focus on the core concepts and content principles enshrined 
in the Directive, without specific attention to one or another technology or context of 
processing. They constitute a first list of requirements that the SALT framework will have to 
deal with.  
 
3.4.1 Material Scope of Application 
In line with the Convention 108, it does not cover the processing of personal data carried out by 
a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity.350 Moreover, the 
Directive does not apply to the processing of personal data “in the course of an activity which 
falls outside the scope of Community law, such as those provided for by Titles V and VI of the 
Treaty on European Union and in any case to processing operations concerning public security, 
defence, State security (including the economic well-being of the State when the processing 
operation relates to State security matters) and the activities of the State in areas of criminal 
law.”351 Police and judicial processing of personal data are typically excluded from the scope of 
application of Directive 95/46, which has led the European Union to adopt a specific instrument 
in this field, the Framework decision 977/2008. Besides, Directive 95/46 provides for specific 
regimes regarding processing for journalistic, literary or artistic purposes352 and processing for 
historical, statistical or scientific purposes.353  
 
Member States have all implemented specific rules regarding processing of personal data while 
exercising freedom of expression rights and in the field of research and generally provide for 
the exclusion of personal and household activities in compliance with the Directive. However, 
the majority of Member States have not necessarily implemented the wide exclusion of 
security-related processing activities, although the obligations and principles applicable to 
these processing have been adapted. National laws of data protection are generally inclusive, 
applying, in principle (with special limitations, exceptions, exemptions) to the matters of police 
or state security. However, there are fundamentally different approaches between Member 
States legislations as to which extent security-related surveillance processing fall under the 
requirements of data protection national laws. States may be more or less flexible with regard 
to police and security-related processing activities.  
 
For example, the Belgian Privacy Act provides for exemptions to the processing of personal data 
carried out by intelligence services on one hand, and by police services on the other hand.354 
Intelligences agencies are quasi-excluded from the scope of application of the Act, while the 
police sector benefit from a much rather restrictive set of exemptions. Police services are only 
exempted from the obligation of information of the data subject, and from the general regime 
of data subjects’ rights of access, rectification and opposition. In contrast, the UK Data 
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Protection Act provides for rather broadly-phrased exemptions concerning data used to 
safeguard national security, and concerning processing for the purpose of the prevention or 
detection of crime, the apprehension or prosecution of offenders, or the assessment or 
collection of any tax or duty.355 
 
If national laws generally provide exemptions to the police sector and judicial processing, not all 
security-related related processing are excluded from the scope of application of data 
protection legislations. This implies that many public authorities, and in particular police forces, 
may nevertheless be submitted to data protection law.  
  
3.4.2 Main Notions 
The material scope of application of the principles enshrined in the Directive 95/46 also follows 
from the definition and understanding of the essential notions of ‘personal data’ and 
‘processing’. The notions of ‘controller’ and ‘processor’ also require a short examination in 
order to understand the allocation of responsibility under the Directive.  
 
3.4.2.1 Notion of Personal Data  
Personal data are defined both in Convention 108 and in the Directive 95/46 as “any 
information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person ('data subject'); an 
identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference 
to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, 
mental, economic, cultural or social identity.”356 The definition of this notion is of considerable 
importance since it determines whether the national legislations of data protection apply or not 
to certain types of processing.  
 
The uncertainty as to whether certain type of data should be considered as personal data and 
the divergences of interpretation of the notion between Member States has led the Article 29 
Working Party to issue an Opinion.357 The Opinion analyses the various elements in the 
definition (“any information”, “relating to”, “identifiable” and “natural person”) providing a 
very wide interpretation of the notion. This opinion is briefly summarized hereunder. 
 
In relation to the element of “any information”, the Article 29 Working Party has expressed that 
it covers not only objective information (factual records, such as name, date of birth, bank 
account number et cet…), but also subjective information (opinions, assessments regarding one 
individual). It includes information on individuals, regardless of the position of those persons 
(consumer, patient, employee et cet…) in whatever type of activities he undertakes (private, 
public, recreational, work activities). Finally, it includes information available in whatever form, 
be it alphabetical,  numerical, graphical et cetera. 
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According to the Article 29 Working Party, “in order to consider that the data “relate” to an 
individual, a content element OR a purpose element OR a result element should be present”.358 
A content element is present when the information is “about” one person, such as for instance 
the results of a medical analysis. The purpose element is present when the data are used or 
likely to be used, taking into account all the circumstances surrounding the present case, with 
the purpose to evaluate, treat in a certain way or influence the status or behaviour of the 
individual. The result element will be present when the use of the data is likely to have an 
impact on a certain person’s rights and interests, taking into account all the circumstances 
surrounding the precise case.  
 
Regarding the element of “identifiable” individual, the Opinion of the Article 29 Working Party 
is quite detailed. To summarize, the approach of the Working Party insists on the fact that 
identification is not only whether one knows the name of the person, but rather whether that 
person can be distinguished from others of the group, or whether one can link information 
about this unknown person to information held elsewhere. Crucially, an individual may be 
identifiable directly or indirectly. As mentioned in recital 26 of the Directive, in order “to 
determine whether a person is identifiable account should be taken of all the means likely 
reasonably to be used either by the controller or by any other person to identify the said 
person”. The criterion of “all means likely reasonably to be used” should take into account all 
the factors at stake: the cost of conducting identification, the intended purpose, the way the 
processing is structured, the advantage expected by the controller, the interests at stake for the 
individuals, as well as the risk of organizational dysfunctions and technical failures.  
 
In spite of these clarifications/explanations from the Article 29 Working Party, several issues 
remain in particular regarding anonymisation and profiling activities. Basically, if it is effectively 
impossible to identify someone, this person cannot be considered as ‘identifiable’ and the 
regime of the protection of personal data should consequently not apply to the data. Such data 
could be considered as ‘anonymised data’. However, it is now pointed out that because highly 
sophisticated ‘data matching software’ will be much more readily available, anonymity 
becomes much harder to achieve. Member States prove to have different approaches in this 
respect, which much rest on the question of whether the national law or Data protection 
authority considers the question of ‘identifiability’ as relative or not. Certain countries only 
considers pseudonimised data or encoded data as ‘personal data’ with respect to the person 
who detain the ‘key’, and considers that the same data are not ‘personal data’ in relation to 
other persons. Other Member States, such as Belgium, will continue to consider that encoded 
data are ‘personal data’ with respect to anyone (whether that person has the ‘key’ or not) and 
will only consider fully anonymised data (data that cannot be linked anymore to anyone and by 
anyone) as falling outside the scope of the law.  
 
3.4.2.2 Notion of ‘Processing’ 
For the record, the notion of processing covers “any operation or set of operations which is 
performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic means, such as collection, 
recording, organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, 
disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or 
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combination, blocking, erasure or destruction.”359 First of all, this definition is said to be 
technologically neutral, translating the unambiguous will of the Legislator to regulate the 
processing of personal data through any technological means. Second, the collection of 
personal data, whether manually or by automatic means is considered as a processing. Third, 
the list of operations mentioned in the definition is generally not considered as an exhaustive 
list, implying that the notion of “processing” is susceptible of evolution in the light of new 
technologies.  
 
3.4.2.3 Notions of ‘Controller” and ‘Processor’ 
The Directive defines the 'controller' as ‘the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or 
any other body which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the 
processing of personal data’.360 The identification of the controller is essential as it allows 
allocating responsibility for the compliance with data protection rules, but also for the 
determination of which national law is applicable. The Article 29 Working Party made clear that 
being a controller is primarily the consequence of factual circumstances.361 Therefore, it is the 
concrete circumstances as to who actually ‘determined’ the purposes and means of the 
processing who will be identified as the ‘controller’ and therefore responsible for the 
processing activity. In practice, it is the level of influence on the ‘why’ (purposes) and ‘how’ 
(means) of the processing that will guide the qualification of the controller. Regarding the 
means of the processing, the Article 29 Working Party considers that there are essential 
elements of a processing that are inherently reserved to the determination of the controller: 
which data shall be processed? Which third parties shall have access to the data? When data 
shall be deleted?362  
 
The 'processor' is the “natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which 
processes personal data on behalf of the controller”.363 The identification of the processor plays 
to identify which national law for security of processing will apply. Indeed, the core 
responsibility of the processor is ensuring the security of the processing and the personal 
data.364  
 
3.4.3 Principle of Fair and Lawful Processing 
This principle is mentioned both in Convention 108 and in Directive 95/46 stating that personal 
data must be processed “fairly and lawfully”. The general requirement of lawfulness imply that 
any processing must comply with the law, not only with data protection legislation, but also 
with other relevant legal requirements. The requirement of fairness is a broad standard calling 
for a general duty of transparency and legitimacy in the processing of personal data. This is 
                                                     
359
 Article 2 b) of Directive 95/46 
360
 Article 2 d) of Directive 95/46. The definition specifies that “where the purposes and means of processing are 
determined by national or Community laws or regulations, the controller or the specific criteria for his nomination 
may be designated by national or Community law” 
361
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 01/2010 on the concepts of ‘controller’ and ‘processor’, 16 
February 2010, WP169, pp. 8-9 
362
 Ibidem, p. 14 
363
 Article 2 e) of Directive 95/46 
364
 Article 17 of Directive 95/46 
PARIS Project     Deliverable 2.1     v1.0 
31/07/2013    SEC - 312504      107 
made explicit in the Draft Regulation which provides that personal data must be processed 
“lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to the data subject.” Processing can, in 
theory, meet the specific requirements of the Directive (or of national laws), yet still be “unfair” 
and therefore, not allowed. The requirement of fairness allows a certain margin of appreciation 
and must be considered for each type of processing. 
 
3.4.4 Purpose Limitation Principle 
The Directive 95/46 provides that personal data must be “collected for specified, explicit and 
legitimate purposes and not further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes.” It is 
one of the central feature of data protection instruments and the Article 29 Working Party has 
recently issued an extensive Opinion on the purpose limitation.365 This Opinion is of interest for 
the purposes of the SALT framework, since it provides general guidance of interpretation of 
what is meant by a “specific, explicit and legitimate purpose” and the prohibition for further 
“incompatible use”. 
 
The Article 29 Working Party recalls that the purpose limitation principle contributes to 
transparency, legal certainty and predictability, preventing the use of personal data in a way 
that the individuals might find unexpected, inappropriate or otherwise objectionable.  
 
3.4.4.1 The Purpose Must Be Specific 
The controller must carefully consider what purpose or purposes the personal data will be used 
for. The Article 29 Working Party explains that it requires “an internal assessment” by the 
controller, which is conceived as the key first step to ensure compliance with applicable data 
protection law.366 It is identified as a necessary condition for accountability. The Working Party 
suggests that the controller who is responsible for the determination of the purposes of a 
processing, must adopt the most thoughtful and reflexive approach on the purposes of the 
processing prior to, or in any event, no later than the time when the collection of personal data 
occurs. Besides, the purpose of the collection must be detailed enough to determine what kind 
of processing is and is not included within the specified purpose. The Working Party 29 rejects 
purposes that would be too vague or general, such as “marketing purposes”, “IT security 
purposes” or “research”, but also warns about overly legalistic approach which may be counter-
productive (e.g. very detailed description of purposes providing extensive disclaimers and 
therefore unhelpful information to data subjects). 
 
3.4.4.2 The Purpose Must Be Explicit 
The purposes of the processing must be clearly revealed, explained or expressed in some 
intelligible form, so as to be understood in the same way not only by the controller (and all 
relevant staff), third-party processors, but also by the data protection authorities and the data 
subjects.367 This requirement contributes to transparency and predictability.  
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3.4.4.3 The Purpose Must Be Legitimate 
The Working Party 29 makes clear that the requirement of a legitimate purpose is not 
necessarily satisfied when the processing is based on one of the legitimating grounds for 
processing listed in article 7 of the Directive 95/46 (see further). The requirement of legitimate 
processing is broader, implying that the processing must be “in accordance with the law” in the 
broadest sense.  
 
3.4.4.4 Principle of Prohibition of Further Processing for Incompatible Use  
The Article 29 Working Party provides a guidance for assessing the compatibility of any further 
use. Some key factors (the list is not exhaustive but indicative) to be considered during the 
compatibility assessment are the following: 
- The relationship between the purposes for which the data have been collected and the 
purposes of further processing: the greater the distance between the purposes of 
collection and the purposes of further processing, the more problematic is the further 
use in view of the compatibility assessment. 
- The context in which the data have been collected and the reasonable expectations of 
the data subjects as to their further use: an important aspect is the nature of the 
relationship between the controller and the data subject, and in view of the nature of 
this relationship whether the processing falls under generally expected practices in this 
given context.  
- The nature of the data and the impact of the further processing on the data subjects 
- The safeguards applied by the controller to ensure fair processing and to prevent any 
undue impact on the data subjects 
 
3.4.4.5 Exceptions  
Where the compatibility assessment would lead to the conclusion that the processing is 
incompatible, the only grounds on which it can nevertheless be carried out are those provided 
in article 13 of the Directive 95/46, providing that “Member States may adopt legislative 
measures to restrict the scope of obligations and rights provided for in article 6(1) purpose 
limitation principle  when such a restriction constitutes a necessary measure to safeguard (a) 
national security; (b) defence; (c) public security; (d) the prevention, investigation, detection and 
prosecution of criminal offences, or of breaches of ethics for regulated professions; (e) an 
important economic or financial interest of a Member State or of the European Union, including 
monetary, budgetary and taxation matters; (f) a monitoring, inspection or regulatory function 
connected, even occasionally, with the exercise of official authority in cases referred to in (c), (d) 
and (e); (g) the protection of the data subject or of the rights and freedoms of others.” 
 
It must be highlighted that exceptions to the purpose limitation principle must be provided by 
legislative measures, implying that it is to the Legislator to provide for such exception. 
Moreover, when adopting such derogations to the purpose limitation principle, the Legislator is 
subject to several conditions. First, the measure must be aimed at safeguarding important 
public interests as listed in article 13 of the Directive 95/46, including public security, national 
security, important economic or financial interest or prevention and repression of crime. 
Second, the legislative measure is obviously submitted to the conditions established in Article 8 
of the ECHR and related caselaw. For the record, the measure will need to satisfy the 
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requirements of clarity and foreseeability on the one hand, and must be necessary in a 
democratic society (proportionality test). Public authorities and the private sector are therefore 
not allowed to carry out further processing for an incompatible use in the absence of a 
legislation explicitly authorizing such processing. 
 
Actually, this demonstrates that discussion about the purpose limitation principle is also a key 
feature of the general issue of balancing privacy v other competing interests, in particular 
security related purposes. The extent to which the European Legislator, and sometimes 
national legislators, use their power to allow derogations to the purpose limitation principle has 
raised considerable concerns with respect to the right to privacy. Scholars have discussed in 
detail the fact that the purpose limitation principle is actually so much eroded by the European 
Legislator itself, that it allows us to wonder whether this principle still have any meaning.368 In 
particular, the adoption of the so-called Data Retention Directive and the proposals for a 
European Passenger Name Records (PNR) System in the aftermath of the EU-US agreement on 
the transfer of PNR data raise many questions. Both systems basically provide for the further 
use of data by competent public authorities for law enforcement purposes (which are by the 
way not always well defined) of data originally collected by the private sector (Internet 
Providers, Airlines) in the framework of commercial activities. These two examples clearly 
illustrate the incompatibility of uses between the original purpose and the further purpose of 
the processing.369 Beyond discussion on the purpose limitation principle, many doubts are 
expressed regarding the compatibility of some legislative measures with Article 8 of the ECHR.  
 
3.4.5 Principle of Legitimacy 
Any processing must rely on one of the lawful grounds for processing provided in the 
Directive370 and as implemented in national law. The Directive provides for six legitimating 
grounds for processing, which are also recalled in the Draft Regulation with only very slight 
differences.371 Personal data may be processed only if:  
(a) the data subject has unambiguously given his consent.  
(b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party 
or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract 
(c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is 
subject 
(d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject 
(e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in 
the exercise of official authority vested in the controller or in a third party to whom the data 
are disclosed 
(f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller 
or by the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed, except where such interests are 
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overridden by the interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which 
require protection under Article 1 (1). 
We will discuss further and with more details the lawful grounds for processing in the specific 
contexts of videosurveillance and biometrics. Let’s mention here that the European Court of 
Justice has judged that this list of lawful grounds was exhaustive.372 The controller is required to 
justify the processing on one of these grounds and cannot therefore invoke another ground.   
 
3.4.5.1 Consent 
The possibility to process personal data on the basis of the consent of data subjects is not 
uniformly dealt with by Member States. The Article 29 Working Party has progressively adopted 
some guidance regarding the issue of consent in specific contexts373, and finally adopted a 
general opinion.374 First of all, the Working Party recalls that data subject’s consent is only one 
ground, among others, for the processing of personal data and that it is not always the primary 
or the most desirable means of legitimating a processing of personal data.375 The data subject’s 
consent is defined in the Directive as “any freely given, specific and informed indication of his 
wishes by which the data subject signifies his agreement to personal data relating to him being 
processed.”376 If the notion of ‘indication’ is wide (insofar as it can take different forms), it 
seems to imply a need for action. In order to be ‘freely given’, the data subject must be able to 
exercise a real choice, and the refusal to provide consent should not entail negative 
consequences. In the context of employment in particular, the Article 29 Working Party 
generally considers that there is a strong presumption that the consent is weak in such context. 
To be valid, the consent must also be specific to a processing which has itself a specific purpose. 
Finally, there must always be information before there can be consent.  
 
3.4.5.2 Authorization by Law 
Where a processing will find to be based on a ‘legal obligation’ or where necessary for the 
performance of a public task, one must not forget the requirements established by the ECHR 
under Article 8. Such a law authorizing/providing a processing of personal data should satisfy 
the legal and legitimacy requirements and be considered as ‘necessary in a democratic society’.   
 
3.4.5.3 Legitimate Interests of the Controller 
In this case, the legitimate interests of the controller must also be balanced with the interests 
for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject. Such balance leaves some margin of 
appreciation to Member States. In practice, it makes this legitimate ground for processing the 
most open-ended and vaguest criteria. We will see in the cases of videosurveillance and 
biometrics dealt with further what is the guidance of the Article 29 Working Party in this 
respect.  
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3.4.6 Transparency Principle 
The principle of transparency commands that the data subject be informed about the 
processing of his/her personal data. The Directive distinguishes between two situations: 
the cases of direct collection from the data subject and the cases of indirect collection. 
Moreover, there are exceptions to the transparency principle. 
In case of direct collection, the controller must provide to the data subject all the necessary 
information, having regard to the specific circumstances of the processing, to ensure a ‘fair’ 
processing, and at least the following information: “(a) the identity of the controller and of 
his representative, if any; (b) the purposes of the processing for which the data are intended; 
(c) any further information such as - the recipients or categories of recipients of the data, - 
whether replies to the questions are obligatory or voluntary, as well as the possible 
consequences of failure to reply, - the existence of the right of access to and the right to rectify 
the data concerning him”.377  
In case of indirect collection, the controller must “at the time of undertaking the recording of 
personal data or if a disclosure to a third party is envisaged, no later than the time when the 
data are first disclosed provide the data subject with at least the following information, 
except where he already has it: (a) the identity of the controller and of his representative, if 
any; (b) the purposes of the processing; (c) any further information such as - the categories of 
data concerned, - the recipients or categories of recipients, - the existence of the right of 
access to and the right to rectify the data concerning him; in so far as such further 
information is necessary, having regard to the specific circumstances in which the data are 
processed, to guarantee fair processing in respect of the data subject.”378 
This principle is closely related with the principle of a fair processing. There are however 
exceptions to the obligation of transparency. The Directive provides that Member States may 
limit the obligation of information where necessary to safeguard: “(a) national security; (b) 
defence; (c) public security; (d) the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of 
criminal offences, or of breaches of ethics for regulated professions; (e) an important economic 
or financial interest of a Member State or of the European Union, including monetary, 
budgetary and taxation matters; (f) a monitoring, inspection or regulatory function connected, 
even occasionally, with the exercise of official authority in cases referred to in (c), (d) and (e); (g) 
the protection of the data subject or of the rights and freedoms of others.”379 Much of these 
exceptions are understandable, notably in the context of criminal investigations and 
intelligence activities. Such exception must nevertheless be provided by law. This implies that 
the controller alone cannot invoke one of the exception without the authorization of the law.  
As explained earlier, if the scope of application of national laws implementing the Directive 
95/46 is in general inclusive, all national laws generally provide exceptions to the 
obligation of transparency for criminal justice (investigation) purposes.  
 
There is also an exception to the obligation of information for the cases of indirect 
collection, “where, in particular for processing for statistical purposes or for the purposes of 
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historical or scientific research, the provision of such information proves impossible or would 
involve a disproportionate effort or if recording or disclosure is expressly laid down by law.”380 
 
3.4.7 Data Quality Principle 
The personal data processed must be “adequate, relevant and not excessive  in relation to the 
purposes for which they are collected and/or further processed”, and “accurate and, where 
necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable step must be taken to ensure that data which are 
inaccurate or incomplete, having regard to the purposes for which they were collected or for 
which they are further processed, are erased or rectified”. This is a fundamental principle of the 
protection of personal data. Since the processing of personal data often entails effects for 
individuals (credit decision, billing, granting of a social service et cet…), it is of capital 
importance that the controller be under the obligation to process accurate and up to date data.  
 
3.4.8 Proportionality Principle: Towards an Explicit Principle of Data 
Minimisation 
The Directive 95/46 and Convention 108 provide that the personal data processed must “not be 
excessive” in relation to the purposes for which they are collected. It commands that the 
controller shall collect only the personal data necessary to carry out the purposes of the 
processing. It is generally agreed that this principle of proportionality in relation to the 
“amount” of data collected must be understood as a principle of minimisation. The Draft 
Regulation clarifies this approach providing that personal data shall be “limited to the minimum 
necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed”.381 
 
3.4.9 Principle of Limited Retention 
The personal data shall be “kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no 
longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the data were collected or for which they are 
further processed.”382 As explained earlier in relation to the notion of ‘controller’, the 
determination of the retention duration is an essential element of the processing and this is a 
core responsibility of the controller. In this determination, the controller shall take du account 
of the purposes (specific, explicit and legitimate) for which he processes personal data and 
delete, destroy the personal data once the purpose is achieved. Nevertheless, the Directive 
further provides that “Member States shall lay down appropriate safeguards for personal data 
stored for longer periods for historical, statistical or scientific use”. Retention beyond the 
“necessary period” for statistical purposes for example is possible under the conditions 
established by national law (e.g. anonymisation of the data).  
 
3.4.10 Security principle 
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This is the principle according to which “the controller must implement appropriate technical 
and organizational measures to protect personal data against accidental or unlawful 
destruction or accidental loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure or access, in particular where 
the processing involves the transmission of data over a network, and against all other forms of 
processing.”383 It refers to the ‘protection of personal data’ in the literal sense. The obligation 
to implement appropriate technical and organization measures to secure the data is often 
shared between the controller and its processor. When resorting to a processor, the controller 
must “choose a processor providing sufficient guarantees in respect of technical security 
measures and organizational measures governing the processing to be carried out, and must 
ensure compliance with those measures.”384 The controller and the processor shall be bound by 
a contract.385 The security rules that will apply to the processing will be those provided by the 
national law of the place where the processor is established.386  
 
3.4.11 The Processing of Sensitive Data 
The Directive provides specific attention, and lays down certain additional rules, 
concerning the processing of special categories of data, referred to as ‘sensitive data’. In 
particular three ‘categories of data’ are foreseen. First, the Directive provides, as a 
principle, the prohibition of processing of “personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, 
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the 
processing of data concerning health or sex life.”387 Second, the Directive addresses the 
processing of data relating to offences, criminal convictions or security measures.388 Third, the 
Directive foresees the use of a national identification number or similar general identifiers.389 
The Directive also provides for a series of exemptions that proceed from the same logic 
than legitimate grounds for processing.390 The Directive further provides a broad, open-
ended exemption, allowing Member States to adopt further exemptions “for reasons of 
substantial public interests”.391 The exemptions allowing the processing of sensitive data 
will not be detailed here. It is enough, at this stage of the project, to highlight that the 
processing of certain categories of personal data are submitted to specific, stricter rules 
and that the SALT framework will obviously have to integrate the specific requirements in 
this respect. 
 
3.4.12 Restrictions on International Transfers 
If the Directive aims at the approximation of national legislations in view of the liberalization of 
flows of personal data within the Union, there are however restrictions regarding the transfer 
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of personal data outside the European Union (and European Economic Area392. This is a rather 
complex matter. This section explains the basic principles and requirements of the Directive in 
this respect.  
 
First, the Directive establishes that transfers of personal data may only occur towards of 
countries ensuring an ‘adequate level of protection’.393 The European Commission is competent 
(but this competence is shared with Member States) to assess the level of protection of 
personal data provided in third countries and to adopt what is commonly called ‘adequacy 
decisions’.394 Such decisions have been adopted only with regard to a quite limited list of 
countries: Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Switzerland, Faeroe Island, Guernsey, Israel, Isle of 
Man, Jersey, New Zealand and Uruguay.395 Some decisions have also been limited to certain 
sectors, such as in the case of Canada and the US Safe Harbour Scheme.396  
 
Transfers of personal data towards ‘non adequate’ destinations must either comply with one of 
the derogations established under article 26§1 of the Directive 95/46397 or must be 
accompanied by ‘adequate safeguards’ provided by the controller and subject to the 
authorization of the Member State.398 It is also possible for the controller to resort to ‘standard 
contractual clauses’ adopted by the European Commission399 and for which national 
authorization for the transfer is not necessary, at least in theory.400 
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3.4.13 Automated Individual Decision 
The Directive provides that automated individual decisions, that is to say decisions which 
produce legal effects concerning the data subject or decision which significantly affect him 
based solely on automated processing of data intended to evaluate certain personal aspects 
relating to him, such as his performance at work, creditworthiness, reliability, conduct et cet…, 
must be accompanied by appropriate safeguards such as the right for the data subject to 
express his point of view.401 Basically, the Directive aims here at expert systems, in which 
aspects of a person’s personality or other intangible matters are evaluated. Such system should 
always provide for some ‘human intervention’ and should never rely exclusively on the 
automated system. There are some divergences between Member States regarding the 
‘adequate safeguards’ framing the use of such automated systems.402   
 
3.4.14 Perspectives for the SALT Framework 
A brief overview of the general principles and obligations enshrined in the Directive 95/46 
allows to identify various challenges raised by the objective of the SALT framework. First of all, 
the Directive 95/46 is written in general terms, and intends to apply to any processing 
technology. This implies that these general (technologically neutral) terms may sometimes be 
difficult to apply to a specific processing technology and context of processing. However, this is 
not so unusual, since law generally requires a work of interpretation. Second, because the 
Directive 95/46’s first objective is the ‘approximation’ of national laws, there are many 
significant divergences of interpretation between Member States regarding the 
implementation of such principles and obligations in concrete circumstances. This implies that 
the legal framework for any surveillance technology must be found primarily at national level, 
in national regulations. Third, as far as security-related processing activities are concerned, in 
particular those carried out by public authorities vested with public security/public order 
competences, national law may provide legitimate exemptions to some of data protection 
obligations and principles, and Member States approach in this respect requires closer 
examination on a case by case basis. 
 
3.5 PARIS Use Case: a First Look Into Videosurveillance 
Videosurveillance is widely used in European Member States, while its regulation is far from 
being harmonized. The legal framework for Member States of the European Union consists of 
international and national legal instruments. It is one of the area where the divergences of 
approaches among Member States are the most striking. Although Directive 95/46 explicitly 
intends to apply to the processing of image and sound data, along with convention 108, some 
Member States have adopted specific legislation in relation to certain uses of videosurveillance. 
We will briefly recall how videosurveillance is dealt with at Council of Europe level (1), 
European Union level (2), and look into Belgian and French legislations in this respect (3) to see 
how the data protection principles presently finds to apply to cameras. In particular, the 
analysis of the French and Belgian legislations will allow to see how the Legislator distinguishes 
the installation of cameras according to different spaces/premises.  
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3.5.1 Council of Europe and Videosurveillance 
Article 8 of the ECHR therefore applies to the processing of image and/or sound data if they 
provide information on a identified or identifiable. The European Court of Human Rights has 
already judged that surveillance by cameras raise privacy concerns when there is systematic 
recording of the data captured. Moreover, Individuals who are lawfully within s State’s territory 
also have the right to free movement, as protected in Article 2 of Additional Protocol No. 4 to 
the ECHR. This means that individuals have a general right o enjoy freedom of movement and 
conduct without being subject to detailed monitoring. As has been already explained, 
interferences into one’s privacy may be legitimate if such interference finds to be necessary in a 
democratic society. Besides, videosurveillance activities generally fall within the scope of 
application of Convention 108, as far as sound and image data provide information on 
identified or identifiable individuals. In compliance with convention 108, the Council of 
Europe’s European Committee on Legal Co-operation (CDCJ) has adopted guiding principles for 
the protection of individuals with regard to videosurveillance. More recently, the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe has adopted a specific resolution regarding videosurveillance 
of public areas. Noting that several Member States provided minimum guarantees in this 
respect, the CDCJ nevertheless stressed the need for more specific regulation: “Considering 
that the existing equipment for video surveillance and software allows the use of a very strong 
zoom (with enlargement of up to 30-50 times) and high resolution, the Assembly strongly 
encourages Council of Europe member states to adopt legislation laying down limits for the 
installation of such equipment with respect to each specific place concerned.”403 
 
3.5.2 European Union and Videosurveillance 
There is no specific legal instrument regulating videosurveillance at EU level. The main 
applicable instrument is therefore the Directive 95/46, as briefly presented earlier. It is 
applicable to the processing of sound and image data, as explicitly foreseen in recital 14 of the 
Directive, which unambiguously intended to take into account the rapid growth of 
videosurveillance. Article 33 of the Directive requires that the European Commission report, at 
regular intervals, on the application of the Directive to the processing of sound and image 
data.404 Because of important divergences between Member States regarding the 
implementation of data protection principles and obligations in relation to videosruveillance, 
the Working Party issued a first Opinion in 2002405  and a subsequent opinion in 2004406 with 
the aim to contribute to uniform application of national measures.  
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3.5.2.1 Scope of Application of Directive 95/46 to Videosurveillance Activities 
As explained earlier, the Directive 95/46 does not apply to the processing of sound and image 
data for purposes concerning public security, defence, State security, and the activities of the 
State in the areas of criminal law. However, as underlined by the Working Party 29, many 
Member States applies their national law to these activities and provide for specific 
exemptions. In carrying out such surveillance activities and in all cases and circumstances, 
Member States remain submitted to Article 8 of the ECHR.407  
 
3.5.2.2 The Notions of Personal Data and Processing Applied to Videosurveillance 
Capture of images and sounds constitute a processing.408 In contrast with the Council of Europe 
Consultative Body, the Working Party 29 has also made clear that surveillance by camera may 
involve a processing of personal data irrespective of whether there is continuous or 
discontinuous image acquisition.409  The Working Party 29 recalls that the Directive 95/46 
applies to any information, including sound and image data, concerning an identified or 
identifiable individual. As explained earlier, “to determine whether a person is identifiable 
account should be taken of all the means likely reasonably to be used either by the controller or 
by any other person to identify the said person”. One of the essential factor to determine 
whether the means likely reasonably to be used to identify the person will be the purpose of 
the processing. With respect to videosurveillance processing, which is generally implemented in 
order to allow the use of the images to possibly identify certain individuals, the Working Party 
29 has stated that all the data captured by the cameras should therefore be considered as 
personal data, although identification will be necessary only rarely.410 It has also considered 
that image and sound data are personal data even when a car number plate or a PIN code is 
filmed, instead of an individual’s face.411  
 
3.5.2.3 Lawfulness of the Processing 
The principle that a processing should be “lawful” is of particular interest in the framework of 
videosurveillance. We have explained that any processing shall be in accordance with the law, 
and not only data protection legislation. This is particularly relevant in the case of 
videosurveillance, which may involve a range of laws and regulations according to the 
circumstances of installation of cameras (e.g. right to image, civil law et cetera…). Certain public 
bodies or local authorities may be subject to limited competences in the field of security and 
public order. The data controller, whether a public or private body, must check all the 
applicable national provisions before installing cameras.  
 
3.5.2.4 Purpose Limitation Principle 
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The data controller shall identify clearly the purpose or purposes sought and should refer those 
purposes in a document with other important privacy policy features.412 
 
3.5.2.5 Legitimate Grounds for Processing 
The Working Party 29 provides examples in relation to each legitimate ground for processing. 
Except some cases where the videosurveillance may possibly (although it is very questionable) 
rely on consent413 and cases where the videosurveillance may be necessary to protect the vital 
interest of the data subject414, there are mainly three legitimate grounds that may justify 
videosurveillance. 
 
Legal obligation 
In some cases, the installation of cameras is the result of a legal obligation on part of the 
controller. For example, in Belgium, it is notably the case regarding the installation of cameras 
in stadiums during certain football matches. The circumstances in which cameras shall be 
installed (masculine matches of football of 2nd and 1st national division and international 
matches), the number of cameras, the places to monitor, and the filming arrangements are 
regulated in detail.415 Again in Belgium, it is compulsory for certain categories of casinos and 
gambling establishments to install a videosurveillance system.416  
 
Performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority 
vested in the controller 
This is notably the case when the controller is required to perform a task in the public interest, 
such as to detect road traffic offences or violent conduct on public transportation means. In 
general, the Article 29 Working Party considers that processing operations by means of 
videosurveillance should always be grounded on express legal provisions if they are carried out 
by public bodies.417  
 
The legitimate interest of the controller 
The legitimate interest pursued by the data controller should not override data subject’s 
interests or fundamental rights and freedoms. In carrying out this analysis, careful 
consideration should be given to the scope of the tasks, powers and legitimate interests of the 
controller. “Superficiality and the groundless extension of the scope of the tasks and powers 
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should be absolutely banned.”418 Additionally, the Working Party 29 recommends that the 
parties concerned be heard in advance. 
 
3.5.2.6 Principle of Subsidiarity of Videosurveillance 
Videosurveillance systems should only be deployed on a subsidiary basis, implying that they 
shall be implemented only if other protection and security measures (stronger lighting of 
streets at night, alarms, armoured doors et cet…) prove clearly insufficient and/or inapplicable. 
This principle is actually consistent with ECHR caselaw under Article 8 according to which an 
interference into one’s privacy may only be justified if there is no less intrusive means available 
to achieve the aim pursued.  
 
This also requires assessing the indirect effects produced by massive recourse to 
videosurveillance, in particular considering the increasingly use of cameras near public buildings 
and offices.  
 
3.5.2.7 Principle of Proportionality 
Videosurveillance systems should only be installed for purposes that actually justify recourse to 
such systems. Basically, “whilst a proportionate video surveillance and alerting system may be 
considered lawful if repeated assaults are committed on board buses in peripheral areas or near 
bus stops, this is not the case with a system aimed either at preventing insults against bus 
drivers and the dirtying of vehicles, or else at identifying citizens liable for minor offences such 
as the fact of leaving waste disposal bags outside litter bins and/or in areas where no litter is to 
be left about.”419 This is the a basic example illustrating Article 8 ECHR caselaw according to 
which in order to be “necessary”, the interference must be justified by a “pressing social need”.  
 
3.5.2.8 Proportionality of the Filming Arrangements 
The principle under which data must be adequate, relevant and not excessive requires a careful 
assessment of the filming arrangements, by having regard, notably, to the following issues: 
a) the visual angle as related to the purposes sought. Basically, the Article 29 Working 
Party explains that if the surveillance is performed in a public place, the visual angle 
should not allow visualising areas inside private places. 
b) The type of equipment, fixed or mobile. 
c) Actual installation of arrangements, fixed vie and/or movable cameras. 
d) Possibility of zooming. 
e) Image freezing functions 
f) Connection with a center to send sound and/or visual alerts 
g) The steps taken as a result of videosurveillance.420  
 
3.5.2.9 Retention Periods 
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First, it will be necessary to consider whether retention of images is necessary or not. And 
where retention will be found necessary, the retention period should be in line with the 
purpose pursued.  
 
3.5.2.10 Principle of Data Minimisation 
The Article 29 Working Party underlines that many purposes can actually be achieved with a 
minimum of personal data. The data controller should therefore reduce, to the greatest 
possible degree, the processing of personal data. For example, where a camera aims at 
calculating the number of tills to be kept open in a supermarket, depending on the number of 
incoming customers, the system should process the minimum personal data necessary. 
 
3.5.2.11 Transparency Principle 
In order to ensure a fair processing, data subjects should be informed that videosurveillance is 
in operation in the area they are crossing. The information should be visible, positioned at a 
reasonable distance from the places monitored and may be provided in a summary fashion 
(such as symbols) provided that it is sufficient to ensure a fair processing in the circumstances 
of the case.  
 
3.5.2.12 Additional Safeguards 
The Article 29 Working Party stresses the need that specific processing operations be examined 
on a case by case basis, following notably from article 20 of the Directive 95/46 according to 
which certain processing presenting specific risks to the rights and freedoms of the data 
subjects should be subject to prior checking by supervisory authorities. Among the processing 
operations presenting specific risks, the Working Party mentions the “permanent 
interconnection of videosurveillance systems managed by different data controllers”, “the 
possible association of image and biometric data such as fingerprints”, “the use of voice 
identification systems”, the use of facial recognition systems, the possibility to trace routes and 
trails and/or reconstruct or foresee a person’s behaviour, the taking of automated decisions.421  
 
We will now present hereunder an overview of the legal framework applicable to the 
deployment of videosurveillance in France and Belgium. This “overview” does not intend to 
provide an exhaustive analysis of each legal framework. Instead, it aims at identifying how 
these legal frameworks address the issue of the type of space/premise/place where cameras 
can be installed. We will see that both legal frameworks distinguish different categories of 
spaces, providing specific rules for the monitoring of each category of places. This is highly 
relevant for the definition of a SALT framework to see how these categories of spaces are 
established.  
 
3.5.3 Overview of the French Legal Framework in Relation to Videosurveillance 
Activities 
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The regulation of videosurveillance in France mainly follows from two laws. The Act on 
Information Technologies and Civil Liberties (‘Loi Informatique et Libertés’)422 is mainly 
applicable to cameras monitoring non publicly accessible spaces. The monitoring of publicly 
accessible spaces/premises by means of cameras is regulated by the ‘Loi d’orientation et de 
programmation pour la sécurité intérieure’423 (further referred to as the “LOPSI Act”) as 
amended, notably by the Loi d’orientation et de programmation pour la performance de la 
sécurité intérieure (known as the  “LOPPSI Act”). The criterion to determine if a space or 
premise is publicly accessible or not is whether there exist access restrictions to such 
space/premise. Publicly accessible spaces include all spaces, whether public or private for which 
there is no access restrictions. The payment of a fee to access the place is not considered as an 
access restriction. Libraries, public services premises, restaurants, shops, cinemas enter within 
the scope of publicly accessible premises. In contrast, non publicly accessible spaces/premises 
will be those spaces where there are access restrictions, such as schools, public or private 
offices.424 It must be noticed that certain controllers may be simultaneously subject to both 
laws according to the place/space/premise that is monitored. For example, if the entrance of a 
school must be considered as a publicly accessible space submitted to the LOPSI Act, cameras 
monitoring the playground area will be considered as falling under the scope of the Information 
Technology and Civil Liberties Act. 
 
3.5.3.1 “Videoprotection” of Publicly Accessible Spaces/Premises 
Videosurveillance activities of publicly accessible areas are regulated under article 10 of the 
LOPSI Act of 1995 as amended. The modification of the law in 2011 by the LOPPSI Act II has 
modified all previous references to “videosurveillance” into “videoprotection”. It is important 
to notice that the scope of application of the LOPSI Act covers all videosurveillance systems, 
irrespective of whether they include the processing of personal data or not.  
  
Regarding public spaces (“voie publique”), the LOPSI Act provides that video monitoring can be 
implemented only by the competent public authorities for the following purpose: 1) protection 
of buildings and public installations and nearby; 2) safeguard of national defence installations; 
3) regulation of transportation flows; 4) detection of road traffic offences; 5) prevention of 
offences against people or goods; 6) prevention of terrorist acts; 7) prevention of natural or 
technological disasters; 8) emergency assistance to individuals and fire protection; 9) safety of 
installations in amusement parks.425  
 
Regarding publicly accessible premises (whether public or private premises), videosurveillance 
may be justified “to ensure the security of people and goods where these premises are 
particularly exposed to risks of aggression, theft or acts of terrorism.”426 
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Installation of cameras in both public spaces and publicly accessible premises is subject to the 
prior authorization of the State representative authority (“Préfet”) with the opinion of a local 
commission presided by a Magistrate.427 In this aim, the controller (owner of the cameras) shall 
submit a report containing information regarding the purposes of the surveillance system, the 
number and location of cameras and all necessary information regarding the filming 
arrangements.428  
 
The CNIL reports that there are divergences in the interpretation and implementation of 
authorizations among local authorities. Some doubts and divergences arose with regard to the 
scope of application of the LOPSI Act to certain spaces (day nursery) and regarding the zones 
that may be filmed or not (certain local authority considers that the camera should not film 
people when they are eating whereas others do).   
 
3.5.3.2 “Videosurveillance” of Non Publicly Accessible Spaces/Premises 
Videosurveillance systems of non publicly accessible premises are subject to the Information 
Technology and Civil Liberties Act, implementing the Data Protection Directive 95/46, and 
subject to a declaration to the French Data Protection Authority, the CNIL (‘Commission 
Nationale Informatique et Libertés’). The processing of image and sound data must therefore 
rely on one of the legitimate grounds provided under the national data protection legislation 
and ensure compliance with all principles (purpose, proportionality et cet…) and obligations 
(information, declaration et cetera…) enshrined in the law. 
 
3.5.3.3 Role and Competences of the Data Protection Authority 
The National Data Protection Authority (CNIL) is competent to ensure the supervision and 
control of cameras. In 2011, the CNIL proceeded to 150 controls over “videoprotection” 
systems. Interestingly, the CNIL reports that the main breaches to the laws encountered during 
controls related to: 
- lack of authorisation of the State representative authority for cameras monitoring 
publicly accessible premises while the CNIL was actually controlling a “videosurveillance 
system” in non-publicly accessible premises (30% of the controls) 
- Lack of declaration to the CNIL in cases of videosurveillance submitted to the national 
data protection act (60%) 
- Insufficient or absence of information of data subjects (40%) 
- Wrong orientation of the cameras (20%) 
- Excessive retention period of the data (10%) 
- Insufficient security measure (20%)429 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
lieux et établissements sont particulièrement exposés à des risques d’agression ou de vol ou sont susceptibles d’être 
exposés à des actes de terrorisme. » 
427
 Article 10 III. of the LOPSI Act 
428
 Décret n°96-926 du 17 octobre 1996 relatif à la vidéoprotection pris pour l’application des articles 10 et 10-1 de 
la loi n° 95-73 du 21 janvier 1995 d’orientation et de programmation relative à la sécurité 
429
 See CNIL Press Release of June 2012 on best practices in relation to videoprotection and videosurveillance, op. 
cit.  
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The CNIL has also issued specific information notices to ensure a better compliance of 
controllers with their obligations, providing for best practices, recommendations of retention et 
cet…These “Best Practices notices” provide guidance in relation to videosurveillance in public 
spaces, at work, in schools, shops, living buildings, and home.430  
  
3.5.4 Overview of the Belgian Legal Framework in Relation to Videosurveillanve 
Activities431 
The legal framework applicable to videosurveillance in Belgium is complex since it follows from 
a series of general and sectoral legislations, the articulation of which has raised many questions 
and issues.432 Belgium provides for a specific legislation in relation to videosurveillance adopted 
in 2007433, and further amended in 2009434. Besides this specific legislation, the Privacy Act of 
1992435, implementing the Directive 95/46, remains applicable in several circumstances. About 
20 other specific legislations have been identified to be relevant in relation to the installation of 
cameras.436 To name a few, the work collective convention (Convention collection de travail 
n°68), the law relating to security during football matches, the law on the function of police, the 
law regulating private security and others may be applicable alternatively or additionally to the 
Videosurveillanve Law. We will present hereunder a summary of the videosurveillance law, 
because of its relevance as a specific legislation.  
 
3.5.4.1 Scope of Application of the Videosurveillance Law 
The Videosurveillance law applies to the installation of “cameras” defined as any system, 
whether fixed or mobile, aiming at preventing or detecting offences against goods or people, or 
maintaining the public order and which collect, process or record image data.437 It must be 
noticed that the law applies irrespective of whether the cameras record or not image data. The 
simple processing, without any recording is subject to the law. However, the legislation does 
                                                     
430
 All these information notices are downloadable at http://www.cnil.fr/les-themes/videosurveillance/  
431
 Information provided in this section is partly based on CRIDS report URBAN EYES submitted to the Service 
Publique Fédéral Intérieur regarding videosurveillance 
432
 Marie-Sophie Devresse and Jean Pieret (under the dir.), La vidéosurveillance. Entre usages politiques et 
pratiques policières (Bruxelles: Politeia, 2010) In particular, Frank Dumortier, « Caméras de surveillance: la 
cohabitation légale reste houleuse…A propos du champ d’application de la loi du 21 mars 2007 et de sa 
coexistence avec d’autres normes réglant les caméras de surveillance » : 27-47 
433
 Loi réglant l’installation et l’utilisation de cameras de surveillance du 21 mars 2007, M.B., 31/05/2007, further 
referred to as the “videosurveillance law” 
434
 Loi visant à modifier la loi réglant l’installation et l’utilisation de cameras de surveillance du 12 novembre 2009, 
MB, 18/12/2009 
435
 Privacy Act of 8 December 1992 on the protection of privacy in relation to the processing of personal data – Loi 
du 8 décembre 1992 relative à la protection de la vie privée  à l’égard des traitements de données à caractère 
personnel, MB, 18/03/1993  
436
 Privacy Commission, Recommandation d’initiative n°04/2012 du 29 février 2012 sur les diverses possibilités 
d’application de la surveillance par caméras, further referred to as « Privacy Commission Recommendations 
regarding the Videosurveillance Law of 2012 ».  
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 Unofficial translation of article 2, 4° of the Law on videosurveillance : « tout système d'observation fixe ou 
mobile dont le but est de prévenir, de constater ou de déceler les délits contre les personnes ou les biens ou les 
nuisances au sens de l'article 135 de la nouvelle loi communale, ou de maintenir l'ordre public, et qui, à cet effet, 
collecte, traite ou sauvegarde des images;  est réputée mobile, la caméra de surveillance qui est déplacée au cours 
de l'observation afin de filmer à partir de différents lieux ou positions » 
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not apply to “simulated” cameras.438 It also applies irrespective of whether the camera 
processes or not personal data (which is a relevant criterion for the application of the data 
protection law.) 
 
It does not apply in cases for which a specific legislation exists and to cameras installed at work 
place in a series of cases.439 This has led to a series of questions regarding the articulation of the 
videosurveillance law with other specific legislations.  
 
Furthermore, it is provided that the general Privacy legislation remains applicable, except 
where it is explicitly contrary to the videosurveillance law. This last applies to cameras aiming at 
preventing or detecting offences against goods or people, or maintaining the public order. In 
fact, it is the purpose aimed at by the camera which is relevant to determine whether it is 
submitted to the videosurveillance law or nor. Any other camera that will not be installed in 
such aim will fall under the scope of the Privacy Act. And where a camera will find to contribute 
to several purposes (e.g prevention of theft and control of production process), the camera will 
be simultaneously submitted to both legislations. 
 
The videosurveillance law distinguishes three categories of places: publicly accessible open 
spaces, publicly accessible closed premises and non publicly accessible closed premises. This 
distinction is of great importance because each category of places is submitted to a specific 
legal regime.  
  
3.5.4.2 Videosurveillance in Publicly Accessible Open Spaces (“Lieu Ouvert”440) 
Following the definition of “lieu ouvert”, there are two relevant cumulative criteria: the place 
must be “open” and accessible to the public. A place will be considered as “open” if there is no 
visible delimitation.441  They are considered to include all “public spaces” in general, such as 
public roads (“voie publique”), market place, streets, squares, public gardens and parks.442 It 
has been made clear that the will of the Legislator was not to allow private persons to monitor 
open public spaces. Therefore the monitoring by cameras of open public spaces must be 
considered as falling under the competence of public authorities.443  
 
The decision to install cameras monitoring one or more publicly accessible open spaces is 
subject to the positive opinion of the local authority (‘Conseil communal’) after consultation of 
                                                     
438
 Frequently Asked Questions, Privacy Commission Recommendations regarding the Videosurveillance Law of 
2012, p. 4 
439
 Article 3 of the Law on videosurveillance 
440
 Defined as “tout lieu non délimité par une enceinte et accessible librement au public” 
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 Arrêté Royal du 2 juillet 2008 relatif aux déclarations d’installation et d’utilisation de caméras de surveillance, 
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 Privacy Commission Note relative à la loi réglant l’installation et l’utilisation de caméras de surveillance, 
20/01/2010, p. 5,  
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 Circulaire ministérielle du 10 décembre 2009 relative à la loi du 21 mars 2007 réglant l’installation et l’utilisation 
de caméras de surveillance, telle que modifiée par la loi du 12 novembre 2009, M.B., 18/12/2009, as amended on 
13 may 2011, M.B., 20/05/2011, further referred to as the « Ministerial Circular of 2009 » 
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the Chief Police Zone.444 Notification of the decision to install cameras shall also be notified to 
the Belgian Data Protection Authority, the ‘Privacy Commission’. 
 
The controller should not monitor other places for which it has no competence, as private 
premises, except with the approval of the person concerned.445 This means that when a camera 
monitoring a street will include in its visual angle the entrance of a private habitation or a café, 
the controller should either obtain the express (and preferably written) consent of the owners 
of the habitation and café or should mask the said premises by technical means.446 The 
videosurveillance system should be announced via a standard pictogram as provided by Royal 
Decree.447 
 
The viewing in real time of images is allowed only under the control of police services and for 
the purpose of immediate intervention in case of breaches of the law, damages, or nuisances or 
to maintain public order.448 The recording of images is allowed only to gather evidence of 
breaches of the law, damages and nuisances, and for the identification of offenders, witnesses 
or victims. If the images recorded do not contribute to provide such evidence, they should be 
deleted after one month.  
 
3.5.4.3 Videosurveillance in Closed Spaces, Publicly Accessible (“Lieu Fermé 
Accessible au Public”449) or Non-Publicly Accessible (“Lieu Fermé Non 
Accessible au Public450) 
In contrast with “open spaces”, all “closed spaces” are actually delimited and therefore 
basically include all kind of premises/buildings. The law further distinguishes between closed 
publicly accessible spaces from closed non publicly accessible spaces. Following the definitions 
provided in the law, the relevant criterion to operate this distinction in practice is whether such 
place is destined to provide services to the public.451  As in the French regulation, the fact that 
the access to a specific space may be subject to conditions (such as a price entrance) is not 
relevant to consider such a place as non-publicly accessible. 
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 Article 5§2 of the Law on videosurveillance 
445
 Article 5§3 last alinea of the Law on videosurveillance : « Le responsable du traitement s'assure que la ou les 
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451
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In this framework, shops, banks, metro stations, cafés, restaurants and cinemas must be 
considered as publicly accessible closed premises. A contrario, private homes, habitations 
buildings will be considered as non publicly accessible premises.  
 
The decision to install cameras monitoring one or more closed spaces whether publicly 
accessible or not must be notified to the Privacy Commission after consultation and to the Chief 
Police Zone.452  
 
The controller should not monitor other places for which it has no competence. However, it has 
been interpreted that when the filming of the entrance of a private buildings requires the 
filming of a little portion of the street, it is not considered that the camera is monitoring an 
open space. The camera will remain subject to the regime established for closed premises.453 
The cameras should be oriented so as to limit to the maximum extent the filming of the open 
space.454 The videosurveillance system should be announced via a standard pictogram as 
provided by Royal Decree.455 
 
Regarding publicly accessible closed premises, the viewing in real time of images is allowed only 
for the purpose of immediate intervention in case of breaches of the law, damages, or 
nuisances or to maintain public order.456 The recording of images is allowed only to gather 
evidence of breaches of the law, damages and nuisances, identification of offenders, witnesses 
or victims. If the images recorded do not have such evidential value, they should be deleted 
after one month. Regarding non publicly accessible closed premises, the law does not provide 
for the possibility to watch the images in real time. 
 
The Law further provides that the controller only or the person acting under its authority can 
access to the images.457 The controller can nevertheless transmit the images to police 
services.458 The police services can request the access to images from cameras installed in 
“closed spaces” whether publicly accessible or not.459 However, regarding non publicly 
accessible premises, the law provides that the controller can require the presentation of a 
judicial mandate in case of access request by the police.460  
 
Moreover, the Privacy Commission explained that the viewing in real time by police services of 
images from cameras installed in closed places (whether publicly accessible or not) is not 
allowed by the law on videosurveillance, except under specific legal circumstances: during the 
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investigation phase where the police acts upon its explicit competences following all relevant 
legislations (law on the Function of Police; criminal procedure code) and under the instructions 
of the competent judiciary authority.461  
 
3.5.5 Perspectives for the SALT Framework 
The processing of image and sound data is, in general, submitted to general data protection 
legislations. It implies that all the concepts and principles explained earlier in relation to 
Directive 95/46 generally finds to apply. Because of its general character, the Directive 95/46 
nevertheless fails to address all the specific (and numerous) issues raised by videosurveillance. 
At Council of Europe level, the adoption of specific legislations has been recommended, in 
particular with respect to the monitoring of ‘public spaces’. The implementation (both in law 
and in practice) in Member States of the general requirements of the Directive 95/46 to 
videosurveillance activities is not consistent. Some Member States have adopted specific 
legislations, which come to apply simultaneously or alternatively to data protection legislations, 
as in France or Belgium. In UK however, there is no specific legislation applicable. The Working 
Party 29 has provided some general guidance in order to contribute to harmonize the approach 
at EU level, but it did not address in details the problems raised by the use of cameras 
according to the type of places monitored (public, private et cetera…). The reason is that the 
Directive 95/46 does not provide such competence to the Article 29 Working Party. It is 
therefore mainly at national level that different categories of spaces have been distinguished in 
order to frame the use of cameras.  
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3.6 PARIS Use Case 2: a First Look Into Biometric Technologies  
If biometric technology exists for a quite long time (e.g. fingerprinting used for law 
enforcement), new applications are emerging and developing rapidly, notably thanks to the 
introduction of new biometric technologies and the progressive diminution of its cost.462 The 
application of the rules of personal data protection to biometric technologies has required 
some clarifications to address specific issues. Moreover, the debate relates to the legitimacy of 
the applications of biometric technologies, which are understood to raise specific risks and 
concerns with regard to the right to respect for private life, but also with regard to the right 
to a fair trial and the presumption of innocence, freedom of movement and the prohibition 
of discrimination. Biometrics applications for borders control purposes or national 
identification systems, such as ID cards, will not be addressed here specifically. Neither will 
be dealt with biometrics applications for criminal justice purposes. These applications 
actually require the adoption of specific legislations. Rather we will try to focus on the 
application of data protection principles to biometric applications that are not under the 
competence of regulation of the Legislator.  
 
3.6.1 Council of Europe and Biometrics 
The Council of Europe generally considers that biometric technology and biometric data 
are of a special nature, with regard to their biological nature containing possible health-
related data and their relative uniqueness.463 Given the inherently probabilistic character 
of biometric systems, the Consultative Committee has argued for a not to rapid installation 
of these systems considering that “an all too enthusiast rapid introduction may entail 
unforeseen effects that are hard to reverse”.464  We have seen earlier in the present chapter 
that the Court of Strasbourg also raised concerns regarding the possible future uses, yet 
unknown, of biometric data and gave strong weight to this argument to make fall DNA data 
under the scope of Article 8.465 The Parliamentary Assembly further adopted a resolution, 
calling upon Member States to elaborate a standardised definition of biometric data, revise 
the existing data protection legislations by adjusting them to the specificities of biometric 
technologies, recommend the use of biometrics template instead of raw biometrics 
whenever possible, and promote proportionality in particular promote proportionality in 
dealing with biometric data, in particular by « limiting their evaluation, processing and 
storage to cases of clear necessity, namely when the gain in security or in the protection of 
public health or of the rights of others clearly outweighs a possible interference with human 
rights and if the use of other, less intrusive techniques does not suffice.”466 It is easily 
understandable that the central issue will be in adopting a proportionate approach in the 
admissibility of biometrics systems.  
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3.6.2 European Union and Biometrics 
The Directive 95/46 does not specifically address the issue of biometrics technologies. The 
Draft Regulation contains specific references to biometrics, providing distinct definitions of 
‘genetic data’ and ‘biometrics data’. These last are defined as ‘any data relating to the 
physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of an individual which allow their 
unique identification, such as facial images, or dactyloscopic data’.467 The Draft Regulation 
further proposes to establish an obligation to carry out a data protection assessment 
regarding processing operations of genetic and biometric data.468 Waiting for the outcome 
of the legislative process regarding the Regulation proposal, we will present here how 
biometric data and biometric systems are presently dealt with by the European Union. In 
particular, the Article 29 Working Party has been led to consider the issue of biometric 
technologies in several opinions, notably in a first opinion on Biometrics published in 2003469 
and more recently, in a renewed opinion on biometric technologies in 2012.470 These opinions 
are of great interest for the purposes of PARIS project, since they contain essential elements 
regarding the specific risks raised by these technologies, elements regarding the application of 
Directive 95/46 to these technologies, and recommendations for the carrying out of privacy 
impact assessments when envisaging the recourse to these technologies. They are therefore of 
direct interest for the SAlegalT framework and require a detailed presentation. 
 
3.6.2.1 The Notions of Personal Data and Processing Applied to Biometric 
Technologies  
The Article 29 Working Party provides some definitions, relevant to biometric technologies. 
These definitions can be considered as an attempt to adopt standardized definitions at EU level 
and are therefore of interest for all EU Member States.  Biometric data are defines as 
“biological properties, behavioural aspects, physiological characteristics, living traits or 
repeatable actions where those features and/or actions are both unique to that individual and 
measurable, even if the patterns used in practice to technically measure them involve a certain 
degree of probability.”471 Biometric data will in most cases be personal data. They entail an 
element of content (A has these fingerprints, B has this face measures) and they can work as 
identifiers.472  
 
In 2003, the Article 29 Working Party defined a Biometric system as “applications that use 
biometric technologies, which allow the automatic identification, and/or 
authentication/verification of a person.”473 Due to the technological developments in the field 
of biometric technologies and the fact that they can also now be used for 
categorisation/segregation purposes, the Working Party suggests that a biometric systems 
could be defined more broadly including any system “that extracts and further processes 
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biometric data”.474 The extraction of biometric data from a biometric source (human tissue 
sample) qualifies as collection of personal data. More generally all operations within a 
biometric system qualifies as processing of personal data (enrolment, storage, matching). 
However the sources of biometric data (tissue samples, blood samples et cet…) are not 
personal data as such and their collection, storage and use are in general subject to separate 
rules. 
 
This leads the Working Party to consider that since in most cases, biometric systems involve the 
processing of personal data, these systems are submitted to the principles and obligations 
enshrined in Directive 95/46. The elements of legal analysis provided by the Working Party are 
of particular interest notably with respect to the general principle of proportionality and the 
lawful grounds for the processing of biometric data. Besides, any use of a biometric system 
should follow the recommendations of the Working Party regarding prior internal assessment 
of the purpose of the system475, prohibition of further incompatible use and other data quality 
safeguards.  
 
3.6.2.2 Some Elements to Assess the Proportionality of a Biometric Systems 
With respect to biometric systems, once the need (purpose pursued) has been identified 
accordingly with the principles of ‘specificity’ and ‘legitimacy’, the Working Party 29 
recommends to give prior consideration to four main factors to assess the proportionality of 
the biometric system envisaged, which follows in closed terms from the proportionality test of 
Article 8§2 of the ECHR. 
 
First, one must assess whether the system is necessary to meet the identified need. 
Convenience and cost effective reasons cannot be considered valid. There must be a 
demonstration that the system is essential for satisfying that need. Second, one must assess 
whether the system is likely to be effective in meeting that need and having regard to the 
specific characteristics of the biometric system envisaged. Third, one must assess the resulting 
loss of privacy and whether it is proportionate to the anticipated benefit. Basically, if the 
benefit is minor, the loss of privacy will not be considered appropriate. Finally, one must assess 
whether less intrusive means could achieve the desired aim (the least restrictive measure 
test).476  
 
3.6.2.3 Lawful Grounds for Processing Biometric Data 
Interesting elements of interpretation of the Directive 95/46 when applied in the context of 
biometrics systems are provided in relation to the lawful grounds that can be invoked (or not) 
for the installation of biometric systems.477 
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Consent 
The consent of the data subject may provide the ground for the processing of his/her biometric 
data according to specific conditions and circumstances. 
 
First, with regard to the circumstances, the Article 29 Working Party underlines that there are 
cases of strong presumption of invalid consent because of the imbalance between the data 
subject and the controller, notably between an employee and his employer. In these cases, the 
data subject’s consent will generally be considered as the weaker lawful grounds for the 
processing of his/her biometric data. It is extremely unlikely that the data subject’s consent will 
be considered to satisfy the conditions of a freely given consent. The processing of biometric 
data in the context of employment would therefore preferably be based on another lawful 
ground. 
 
Second, with regard to the conditions under which the data subject’s consent may validly justify 
the processing of biometric data requires that such consent satisfy the conditions of a freely 
given and informed consent. It is therefore submitted to two essential conditions. First, a valid 
alternative to the enrolment in the biometric system should be proposed to data subjects, in 
order to guarantee the freedom of choice of the data subject. A system that would discourage 
data subjects from using it would not ensure a freely given consent and would therefore be 
invalid. For the data subject to freely consent to enrol in the biometric system, he/she must be 
previously provided sufficient information about system so as to ensure fairness.  
 
Contract 
This legal ground can only apply when pure biometric services are provided (e.g. two persons 
are under contract with a laboratory to find out if they are brothers) and not when the 
enrolment of a person into a biometric system is a secondary service. 
 
Legal obligation 
Biometric data in passports, visas and some national identity cards are examples of cases where 
the processing of biometric data is provided by law. 
 
Legitimate interests of the controller 
For the record, the Directive provides that the processing of personal data can be justified 
where “necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by 
the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed, except where such interests are 
overridden by the interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject.” The 
controller can rely on such legal ground only when provides the demonstration that his 
interests objectively prevail over the rights of the data subjects not to be enrolled in the 
system. 
 
Biometric access control system for the security of property or individuals will generally be 
invoked by controllers as a legitimate interest. However, the Article 29 Working Party considers 
that “as a general rule, the use of biometrics for general security requirements of property and 
individuals cannot be regarded as legitimate interest overriding the interests of fundamental 
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rights.”478 The Working Party considers that the security of property and individuals may only 
validly justify the use of biometric system under two conditions: 
1) In presence of high risks situations; there must be evidence of objective and 
documented circumstances of the concrete existence of a considerable risk. The 
Working Party provides the example of the use of fingerprint and iris scan 
verification to control the access of a laboratory doing research on dangerous 
viruses.  
2)  After verification of possible alternative measures that could be equally effective 
but less intrusive (subsidiarity principle). 
 
3.6.2.4 Automated Processing 
In certain cases the processing of biometric data may lead to potential discriminatory 
consequences for the persons rejected by the system. There must be adequate safeguards 
against such automated decisions that can affect significantly the data subjects.479  
 
3.6.2.5 Transparency 
The obligation to inform the data subject is a key element to ensure a fair processing. Such a 
duty of transparency is challenged by current developments in biometric systems which can 
operate without the active participation of the data subjects. The data subjects may not 
differentiate cameras equipped with a facial recognition system from those that are not. The 
Article 29 Working Party considers that “any system that would collect biometric data without 
the data subject’s knowledge is to be avoided.”480 Consequently, if a biometric system does not 
require the active participation of the data subject, this should be compensated by the 
provision of adequate and relevant information.  
  
3.6.2.6 Sensitive Data 
As far as biometric data may reveal sensitive data, such as racial or ethnic origin or data 
concerning health, additional safeguards should be put in place as required under article 8 of 
the Directive 95/46.481 This is essential notably in view to prevent discriminations that are 
prohibited.  
 
3.6.2.7 Other Safeguards for People with Special Need 
The Working Party 29 is particularly concerned by the risks of stigmatisation or discrimination 
of vulnerable people and or individuals that are unable to enrol in biometric system for several 
reasons. It is recommended that more stringent measures be in place for those individuals.482  
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3.6.2.8 Security Principle 
It requires that technical and organisation measures be put in place to ensure the security of 
the personal data processed.483 According to the circumstances of the processing and whenever 
possible, the Working Party recommends that biometric data be stored as biometric templates, 
that centralised storage be avoided (especially where biometric data are used for verification 
purposes), that the system should allow to revoke the identity link (in order to renew it or to 
delete it in case of withdrawal of consent for example), that biometric information be always 
stored in encrypted form and that the decryption keys be only accessible on a need to know 
basis.484 
 
3.6.3 France and Biometrics 
The processing of biometric data is specifically foreseen in the Information Technology and Civil 
Liberties Act. Biometric applications carried out by the State for the identification or verification 
of identity of individuals must be authorized by Decree after consultation of the CNIL.485 Other 
“automatic processing comprising biometric data necessary for the verification of an individual’s 
identity” are submitted to the prior authorization of the CNIL.486 In practice, the CNIL has 
developed a doctrine distinguishing between two categories of processing of biometrics data: a 
limited list of processing of biometric data is submitted to a simplified declaration, while all 
other processing remain subject to prior examination and authorization of the CNIL. 
 
3.6.3.1 Biometric Applications Subject to ‘Simplified Declaration’ 
The CNIL has adopted ‘unique authorization’ for a series of processing of biometric data, which 
are therefore only submitted to a ‘simplified declaration’ to the CNIL. This is the case for the 
following biometric systems: 
- use of hand geometry to control access to work premises and mass catering487 
- use of fingerprinting exclusively stored in a personal device to control access to 
professional premises488 
- use of hand geometry to control access to school restaurants489 
- use of vein pattern recognition to control access to professional premises490 
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- use of fingerprinting in professional laptops.491 
 
This implies that for the above-mentioned situations, the use of certain biometric technology 
has been considered as proportionate by the CNIL, provided these uses also satisfy other data 
protection requirements, such as security requirements.  
 
3.6.3.2 Biometric Applications Subject to ‘Prior Authorization’ 
All other biometric applications are submitted to the prior authorization of the CNIL. In order to 
have a global overview of the CNIL policy regarding admissibility of uses of biometric 
applications, all relevant deliberations should be examined. A quick search into the database of 
‘Legifrance’ containing all CNIL deliberations regarding ‘fingerprinting’ shows that till now, 
about 238 deliberations, among which 174 authorizations and 64 refusals, have been adopted 
regarding uses of fingerprint data since 2005.  
 
The fact that most uses of biometric data (except those submitted to ‘simplified declaration’) 
are submitted to the CNIL’s prior authorization and that such authorizations/refusals are 
publicly available constitutes a good opportunity for further research into CNIL’s deliberations. 
Further research would be required to identify the cases that are now submitted to simplified 
declaration (certain deliberations may concern similar cases before the adoption of ‘unique 
authorization by the CNIL’), but mainly to identify which uses of biometrics are generally 
authorized or refused in order to identify the underlying proportionality policy of the CNIL in 
this field.  
 
3.6.4 Belgium and Biometrics 
If we exclude national identification documents, and biometric applications for criminal justice 
purposes, there is no specific legislation addressing the issue of biometrics technology on the 
model of the videosurveillance law. In contrast with the French example, there is little guidance 
and/or recommendations from the Privacy Commission relating to the interpretation of the 
Privacy Act in relation to biometric data. Only one Opinion on the processing of biometric data 
for authentication purposes has been published yet.492 In general, the Opinion of the Privacy 
Commission is consistent with the recommendations issued by the Article 29 Working Party in 
2012.  
 
As a principle, the Privacy Commission considers that biometrics data are personal data, 
although in some limited circumstances this could not be the case. In any case, it is 
recommended to dealt with biometric data with the same precaution that with personal 
data.493 The Privacy Commission recalls that if a processing of biometric data may validly rely on 
the data subject’s consent in some circumstances, the obtaining of consent does not necessarily 
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make the processing proportionate.494 A strict application of the proportionality principle in the 
case of biometrics is recommended. As the Article 29 Working Party, the Privacy Commission 
recommends to avoid a centralized storage of biometric information, preferring the storage in a 
card and or in a local device.495 It requires from the controller to assess the necessity of a 
biometric system in the light of other available means. In particular, the Privacy Commission 
expresses strong reserve regarding the necessity of biometric systems in schools environments 
and for purposes of controls of employees’ working time.496 This approach is quite contrasted 
with the French one where we have seen that the CNIL has provided some ‘unique 
authorizations’ for similar biometric applications. Biometrics systems should not be used only 
for convenience or costs reasons.497 Where necessary, its use should be strictly limited to the 
spaces/premises/services requiring such kind of security measures.498  
 
3.6.5 Perspective for the SALT Framework 
This brief overview of the issue of protection of personal data applied to biometrics 
technologies has allowed identifying first principles directly relevant for the SALT framework. 
The Working Party 29 provides some general guidance at EU level. However, as in the case of 
videosurveillance, the extent to which biometric applications are considered admissible must 
primarily be examined at national level. A brief overview of the French and Belgian approaches 
can already show some divergences. Interestingly, the issue is not always dealt with 
exhaustively at national level. While only general guidance is available in Belgium, extensive 
deliberations have been issued by the CNIL in France regarding biometrics applications. These 
deliberations translate CNIL’s proportionality policy in this respect (which however does not 
imply that it is fully consistent and compliant with ECHR’s proportionality policy). As explained, 
further research would be required to identify the underlying requirements applied by the CNIL 
during its authorization-making process. Such research could therefore allow to identify further 
criteria that are taken into account by the CNIL to accept or refuse a biometrics processing.  
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4 Accountability: a Way to Ensure Transparency and Trust 
 
Fanny Coudert (ICRI-KU Leuven-iMinds) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The European Commission has introduced in the proposals of the Data Protection Reform 
Package, a principle according to which personal data shall be processed under the 
responsibility and liability of the controller, who shall ensure compliance with the provisions 
adopted pursuant to these instruments. While not termed expressly, this principle is expected 
to introduce an accountability-based approach within the European data protection 
framework.  
 
The principle of accountability has gained importance in the privacy debates since the Opinion 
of Article 29 Working Party on the principle of accountability (2010).499 Accountability is 
approached as a way to put data protection into practice, in which the data controller could be 
required to demonstrate compliance with the data protection framework to supervisory 
authorities. 
 
The principle of accountability is however not new to data protection. The fourteenth Principle 
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines of 1981, 
one of the first data protection instruments, entitled “the Accountability principle” was already 
stating that “a data controller should be accountable for complying with measures which give 
effect to the principles stated above”. As detailed in the Explanatory paragraph, the 
introduction of this principle was motivated by the fact that “it is for his benefit that the 
processing of data is carried out”. Accordingly, it was seen as essential that under domestic law, 
accountability for complying with privacy protection rules and decisions should be placed on 
the data controller who should not be relieved of this obligation merely because the processing 
of data is carried out on his behalf by another party.  
 
The meaning of the term “accountability” is however not always clear and needs to be further 
refined. Understanding what the concept of accountability entitles and how it can be 
articulated with other close concepts such as the ones of liability, responsibility and 
answerability seems however an unavoidable task in the context of PARIS project. The field of 
political sciences has produced abundant literature in order to grasp the different meanings of 
accountability. To that end, a review of the most important pieces of the literature will allow us 
to clarify the concepts and the different elements that should be taken into account when 
designing accountability mechanisms.  
 
In a second part, this Chapter will focus on how such concept is being approached and 
introduced within the data protection framework. As mentioned above, the principle of 
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accountability is there closely linked to the ones of responsibility and liability. This will allow us 
to identify the issues linked to the introduction of an accountability-based approach into the 
data protection framework, as well as a first list of elements that should be integrated into 
accountability mechanisms. The findings of this Chapter are also expected to base the definitive 
list of requirements for the design of accountable policies, procedures and practices in 
surveillance systems that should integrate the SALT framework, which will be dealt with in 
Deliverable D.2.2. 
4.2  Understanding Accountability 
Accountability is the fact of being account-able, i.e. the ability to give an account. According to 
the Oxford Dictionary, being accountable is to be required or expected to justify actions or 
decisions. Accountability is thus a process which involves an accountor who is called by an 
accountee to make visible to others the motives and content of its decisions and actions. While 
the idea lying behind the concept is easy to grasp, accountability relationships exist in many 
ways and shapes, depending on the parties involved to the process, the relationship established 
between them and the different obligations stemming from the very process of giving an 
account. It follows that the concept is not always clearly defined and often confused with other 
close concepts such as responsibility, answerability, dialogue, control or responsiveness. 
   
The concept of accountability has been mostly the focus of research in the field of public 
governance, in public administration literature, by political scientists. The goal of accountability 
procedures is in this context twofold: to promote good governance and to foster compliance. 
The thorough analysis performed in this field allows us to drawing a clear picture of what 
should be understood under the concept of accountability and to define its intrinsic features. It 
also allows to clarifying the critical features that accountability mechanisms should integrate to 
achieve their goals. 
 
Accountability mechanisms are processes tending to increase visibility, thus transparency and 
trust. They first act as reflection and learning mechanisms, as long as they provide the 
necessary feedback about the intended and unintended effects of their practices.500 As stressed 
by Bovens501, “the possibility of sanctions from clients and other stakeholders in their 
environment in the event of errors and shortcomings motivates them to search for more 
intelligent ways of organizing their business. Moreover, the public nature of the accountability 
process teaches others in similar positions what is expected of them, what works and what 
doesn’t”. 
 
But accountability mechanisms can also act as promoting “proven compliance”, mere 
compliance being no more than “bling trust”, while accountability entails “proven trust”.502 
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Accountability mechanisms will act by “making bad – and good- acts visible”.503 “In a scheme of 
accountability it is possible for a person involved to prove good behavior because he or she took 
active, assignable steps to achieve a certain good”.504 However, “visibility alone does not 
guarantee compliance”, it only contributes to make compliance easier than violation.505 In 
words of Weitzner et al. “for those rare cases where rules are broken, we are well aware that 
we may be held accountable through a process that looks back through the records of our 
actions and assess them against the rules”.506 This role should however not be minimized as  
“the vast majority of legal and social rules that form the fabric of our societies are not enforced 
perfectly or automatically, yet somehow most of us still manage to follow most of them all the 
time”.507 This is because we “follow rules because we are aware of what they are and because 
we know there will be consequences, after the fact, if we violate them”.  
 
As shown by De Hert, “whist not being a straightforward legal concept, there is a relationship 
with the law and legal arrangements in the sense that the concept is used to challenge existing 
law or the lack of it”.508 Legal scholars will tend to focus on a different concept, the one of 
liability. Liability is the state of being legally responsible for something. But “a system of legal 
responsibility or liability can be based either on a logic of compliance or on a logic of account 
giving (…) an interesting aspect of liability is its capacity for modulation”.509 The introduction of 
a principle of accountability within the data protection framework is often accompanied with, 
on the one hand, the warning that the implementation of accountability mechanisms will not 
waive data controllers’ legal liability from lack of compliance, and on the other hand, with the 
expressed need to articulate both concepts, i.e. to what extent accountability mechanisms can 
contribute to demonstrate compliance and thus to modulate data controllers’ liability.510  
 
That being said, accountability is a concept that can stand on his own and which will take 
different shapes depending whether it is approached as a normative concept, in its broad and 
active sense of “organizational virtue” or whether it is approached as a social relation or 
mechanism, in its narrow or passive sense, as “mechanism of control”.511 Both approaches are 
of interest for the SALT Framework: 
1) Accountability understood in its broad or active sense, i.e. as a means to ease 
answerability, is a transparency mechanism whose goal is to increase the 
legitimacy of the decision-making process. Accountability mechanisms give 
transparency by actively engaging the accountor in a dialogue with the 
relevant stakeholders. 
2) Accountability understood in its narrow or passive sense, i.e. as a coercitive 
means to increase legal compliance with privacy-related legislation, a way to 
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exercise constrain or to hold stakeholders liable for their action, is a 
transparency mechanism whose goal is to increase trust in the design and 
use of surveillance systems. It can be concerned with the legal procedures 
directed to enforcement but it can also become a strong asset in the 
implementation of the principles of transparency or of foreseeability.  
 
Within the SALT framework, the first meaning of accountability will be more fitted to address 
the need to increase legitimacy of decisions relating to the balance between privacy and 
surveillance. Procedures based on this first meaning will be directed to decision-makers when 
opting for the implementation of surveillance systems. By contrast, the second meaning of 
accountability will operate at a lower level and will rather tend on providing trust in the design 
and further use of a surveillance system. Accountability mechanisms based on this second 
meaning and goal will be directed to system developers and operators during the life-cycle of 
the surveillance system. We examine both concepts in turn. 
4.2.1 Accountability as Organizational Virtue: Increasing Legitimacy of Decision-
Making. 
As showed by Bovens512, accountability as organizational virtue, i.e. in an active sense of virtous 
behaviour, is used as a normative concept, as a set of standards for the evaluation of the 
behaviour of public actors, or as a desirable state of affairs. This understanding can be found in 
American academic and political discourse as well as in a series of policy documents of the 
European Commission such as the 2001 White Paper on Governance. For the European 
Commission, it serves as a synonym for “clarity”, “transparency” and “responsibility”. Bovens 
shows that the term is even equated to broader concepts such as “involvement”, 
“deliberation”, and “participation”. It refers to no more than to a desirable quality of public 
officials and public organisations, as a norm of good governance which does not entail 
sanctions. Accountability is in that context understood as answerability of a public organization 
to its stakeholders for the use of the power granted to it. The active concept of accountability 
thus appears very hard to define substantively.  
 
As a way of example, One World Trust, a charity that conducts research on practical ways to 
make global organizations more responsive to the people they affect, has however tried to 
provide a definition and to set a series of criteria to measure the accountability of transnational 
actors.513 
 
This set of criteria is contained under “The Global Accountability Framework” which proposes 
norms of good corporate governance in the global arena. The framework is also used to 
annually assess the capabilities of 30 of the world’s most powerful global organizations from 
the intergovernmental, non-governmental, and corporate sectors to be accountable to civil 
society, affected communities, and the wider public (The Global Accountability Report). This 
framework became a reference for transnational actors as shown, for example, by the 
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“Accountability Frameworks in the United Nations System” study (2011) which takes this 
methodology as a basis to draft their own assessment methodology.514  
 
The One World Trust defines accountability as: “[…] the process through which an organisation 
makes a commitment to respond to and balance the needs of stakeholders in its decision-
making processes and activities and delivers against this commitment”.515 This definition 
emphasises the need for organisations to balance their response to accountability claims and 
prioritise between different stakeholder groups according to organisational missions and 
criteria such as influence, responsibility and representation. Importantly, an organisation must 
do this through a conscious, verifiable, transparent process, which, given the dynamics of 
external circumstances, needs to be repeated in a cyclical manner. This focus put on dialogue 
with stakeholders makes it highly relevant for the research conducted under PARIS. 
 
In this context, accountability mechanisms are not approached as a mechanism of control but 
rather as a process for learning. “Being accountable is about being open with stakeholders, 
engaging with them in an ongoing dialogue and learning from the interaction”.516 According to 
One World Trust, “first and foremost accountability is about engaging with, and being 
responsive to, stakeholders; taking into consideration their needs and views in decision-making 
and providing an explanation as to why they were or were not taken on board.”517 The ultimate 
goal of accountability mechanisms is to generate ownership of decisions and projects and to 
enhance the sustainability of activities.  
 
4.2.1.1 Criteria to Operationalize Accountability 
The Global Accountability Framework provides guidance to organizations on how to 
operationalize this understanding of accountability.518 Five dimensions should be taken into 
account when designing accountability mechanisms: the accountability strategy, transparency, 
participation, evaluation, and complaint and response mechanisms.  
 
The Accountability Strategy dimension refers to methods that allow the leadership of the 
organisations to effectively guide and manage the organisation’s approach to accountability.519 
In the other four dimensions, two main aspects are taken into account: policies and systems. 
“Policies” refer to the documents or policies issued by an organization through which it makes a 
commitment to the value and principles of each of the other dimensions. They enable this 
organization to foster a consistent approach and they enable stakeholders to hold organisations 
to account for stated commitments. “Systems” refers to the management strategies and 
resources through which an organisation encourages, enables and supports the 
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implementation of the commitments made in policy or supports the issue more broadly. 
Indicators in this category include leadership, training and accessibility.520 
 
To be deemed accountable, an organisation must integrate these five dimensions into its 
policies, procedures and practice, at all levels and stages of decision-making and 
implementation, in relation to both internal (e.g. staff) and external (e.g. policy makers) 
stakeholders. We describe each of these dimensions in turn, as understood by One World Trust. 
 
The Accountability Strategy 
The Accountability Strategy “displays the awareness, extent of understandings and commitment 
to accountability relationships with recognised stakeholders”.521 It provides evidence on the 
position of an organisation’s ability to exercise leadership on accountability and related 
reforms. This includes the definition of the mission of the organization, the identification of the 
stakeholders to whom this organization is accountable as each of these is likely to have 
different expectations, and the different forms of responsiveness and accountability which can 
be inferred from these relationships. 
 
As a way of example, in the 2012 The Global Accountability Report522, the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), was found not to have an overarching 
accountability strategy. This is because while the IBDR seemed to have an understanding of 
whom its stakeholders are (as indicated through various internal documents) but the process of 
stakeholder mapping and prioritisation was very decentralised, with each department 
undertaking their own processes in this regard. This was interpreted as the IBRD not having a 
global perspective of its stakeholders and the mechanisms that are in place to deliver 
accountability to each stakeholder group.  
 
Transparency  
Transparency requires “the provision of accessible and timely information to stakeholders and 
the opening up of organizational procedures, structures, and processes to their assessments”.523 
Doing so enables stakeholders to monitor an organisation’s activities and hold it to account for 
its commitments, actions and decisions. Organisations benefit from transparency by avoiding 
challenges of secrecy and distrust in view of their public impact. Transparency for instance 
encompasses responsibilities to articulate the values, evidence and purpose of the 
organization.524  
 
As a way of example, The World Bank’s Policy on Access to Information (AI policy) scored quite 
high on this requirement (80%) as it was found to be broadly in line with best practice 
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principles, and many of the management systems supporting the policy are also exemplary.525 
However, key weaknesses were identified such as the lack of formalization in the job 
descriptions of the responsibilities of key staff members tasked with implementing the AI policy 
are not formalised in their job descriptions, and the a lack of incentives to encourage staff to 
behave in an open and transparent manner. 
 
Participation 
Participation requires “the active engagement of both internal and external stakeholders in the 
decisions and activities that affect them”. At a minimum, participation must include 
opportunities for stakeholders to influence decision making, and not just possibilities for 
approval or acceptance of a decision or activity. Participation strengthens ownership and buy-in 
for what organisations do by those they affect.526 
 
As a way of example, the IBRD scored quite low (39%) in that matter.527 While it does have 
Operational Policies (OPs) related to engagement with indigenous peoples, which meet many 
principles of best practice, policies of this type need to be extended to all priority external 
stakeholder groups. There are guidelines for engaging with civil society, but these were not 
been formalised as Bank policy. 
 
Evaluation  
Evaluation requires that the organization “monitors and reviews its progress against goals and 
objectives, feeds learning from this into future planning, and reports on the results of the 
process”. Evaluation ensures that an organisation learns from and is accountable for its 
performance.  
 
The IBRD scored reasonably high in that regard (70%).528 The IBRD’s evaluation policy and 
quality management systems meet many best practice principles, although it was found there 
was some room for improvement, particularly in terms of incentivising staff to reflect on and 
learn from evaluations. The IBRD’s evaluation activities are carried out through staff monitoring 
and self-evaluations, and through the In-dependent Evaluation Group (IEG), which is an 
independent evaluation oversight body reporting directly to the Board of Executive Directors. 
 
Complaint and Response Mechanisms 
Complaints and response mechanisms require “channels developed by organisations that 
enable internal and external stakeholders to file complaints on issues of non-compliance with 
the organisation’s own policy frameworks or against its substantive decisions and actions, and 
which ensure that such complaints are properly reviewed and acted upon. Transparency, 
participation, and evaluation processes are used to minimise the need for complaint 
mechanisms. Complaint and response mechanisms are accountability processes of last resort 
but also a test for how serious organisations are about their accountability, and take interest in 
learning from their own mistakes.” This describes ways in which an organisation invites 
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feedback, comments and critique of its activities through a first party system. It captures how 
an organisation is answerable to its stakeholders.529  
 
The IBRD scored reasonably high in that regard (66%). There are two channels through which 
external stakeholders can lodge complaints with the IBRD. The Inspection Panel (IPN) handles 
complaints (referred to as ‘requests for inspection’) from any person who believes that they 
may have been negatively impacted by IBRD or IDA activities. The Integrity Vice Presidency 
(INT) investigates allegations of fraud and corruption made by any stakeholder. The IBRD’s 
policy in this dimension exhibits many elements of best practice, although the lack of 
stakeholder consultation on the policy is a key weakness. Similarly, some of the management 
systems in place, such as the quality management systems, are exemplary, whilst others, such 
as those relating to roles, responsibilities and leadership and building staff capacity, are weaker. 
 
4.2.2 Accountability as a Mechanism of Control: Providing Trust, Fostering 
Compliance. 
The narrow or passive sense of accountability refers to the fact for an organization to be called 
to account by some authority for its actions.530 This second meaning of accountability should be 
understood as a mechanism of oversight by a third party over the activities of the accountor 
against a predefined set of standard behaviour. It fosters trust in the accountor’s behaviour as 
long as it ensures the verifiability of the compliance of its activity against a pre-defined set of 
rules. It fosters compliance in that it is a “process of transparent interaction in which that body 
seeks answers and possible rectification” .531 The narrow sense of accountability is often 
identified with the core meaning of the concept. 
 
As stressed by Bovens532, accountability is here seen as a social ‘mechanism’, “as an 
institutional relation or arrangement in which an actor can be held to account by a forum”. 
Hence, the focus of accountability studies is not whether the agents have acted in an 
accountable way, but whether they are or can be held accountable ex post facto by 
accountability forums and on how accountability relationships operate.533 
 
Within PARIS project, this second meaning of accountability will aim at assuring that system 
developers and operators have integrated the relevant privacy standards and requirements 
into the design and use of their surveillance systems. This process of accountability will thus 
aim at ensuring trust and compliance. 
 
In this section, we first examine the core elements that should include any accountability 
mechanism. We then focus on the different dimensions that underlie any accountability 
relationships and which will have an influence on the way it will be operationalized.   
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4.2.2.1 Core Features of Passive Accountability 
There is consensus that accountability in its narrow sense should comply with three main 
requirements:  
 It should be external, i.e. it should involve a third party to whom the 
organization is being held accountable;  
 This third party should have rights of authority of the organization being 
called to account, meaning that it can require the organization to give an 
account and to impose sanctions or ask for rectifications according to a 
predefined line of behaviour (a code);  
 The process of accountability should involve a dialogue between the 
organization and the third party, i.e. the nature of the account given can be 
challenged and verified by the third party. 
 
We examine these core features that should be included in any accountability process, 
distinguishing accountability from other close concepts such as responsibility, responsiveness, 
control or dialogue. 
 
Accountability is external 
The account should first be given to some other person or body outside the agent. This 
requirement is compatible with accountability procedures internal to an organization, i.e. to 
hold the staff liable for their actions based on internal codes of conducts. It however implies 
the existence of a relationship between the accountor and the accountee. It excludes any “self-
accountability” mechanisms in which one is accountable to oneself only. 
 
Accountability should thus in that sense be distinguished from “responsibility”. As pointed out 
by Bennett, one can always act “responsibly” without reference to anyone else.534 
Responsibility is thus more related to the “ethical territory of personal liability, freedom of 
action and discretion, that is to the more internal aspects of an organization’s activity”.535 
Responsibility is left to cover the ‘internal’ functions of personal culpability, morality and 
professional ethics.536 
 
Rights of authority 
Accountability implies rights of authority of the third party to whom the account is given over 
the agent, in that those calling for an account are asserting rights of superior authority over 
those who are accountable, including the rights to demand answers and to impose sanctions.  
 
This requirement first means that the actor is obliged to inform the forum about his or her 
conduct, by providing various sorts of data about the performance of tasks, about outcomes, or 
about procedures.537 It also means that the forum may pass judgment on the conduct of the 
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actor. It may approve of an annual account, denounce a policy, or publicly condemn the 
behaviour of an official or an agency. In passing a negative judgment, the forum frequently 
imposes sanctions of some kind on the actor. The possibility of sanctions – not the actual 
imposition of sanctions - makes the difference between non-committal provision of information 
and being held to account. The actor may face consequences.538 
 
Accountability is thus more than “responsiveness”. The person to whom the entity is responsive 
has an option of choosing another entity and no right to demand that the private provider offer 
services that meet his or her perceived needs.539 Responsiveness relates more widely to the 
organization compliance with stakeholders demands, for whatever motive. It relies on a 
voluntary process while accountability relies on a coercitive process where the accountee is 
being called to give an account by a third party which can require an answer and eventually 
impose sanctions. 
 
Accountability mechanisms share the goal of control mechanisms in that it is grounded in the 
general purpose of making the accountor act in accordance with the wishes of the third party. 
The coercitive role of external pressure is pivotal. Accountability is however only one way to 
exercise control. In words of Mulgan540, “a reasonably clear distinction may still be maintained 
between accountability and control by which accountability remains merely one means, or set 
of means, for enforcing control, through the demand for explanation and the imposition of 
sanctions.” In that sense, Mulgan warned against the identification of accountability and 
control mechanisms: “from this perspective, institutions of accountability include all institutions 
that are aimed at controlling or constraining government power, for instance legislatures, 
statutory authorities, and courts.“ Law itself should not be approached as an accountability 
mechanism as the legal accountability mechanism only refers to that part of the law which lays 
down enforcement procedures and which involves the existence of a dialogue (the provision of 
information upon request). It follows that only a few institutions, such as audit offices, 
ombudsmen and administrative tribunals, are properly described as ‘institutions of 
accountability’ because their primary function is to call public officials to account. 
 
This is why legal scholars, within the debates revolving around the introduction of the principle 
of accountability into the data protection framework, have been very wary to warn against the 
risks of equating accountability with liability and have stressed the need to specify the value of 
the reports produced by accountability mechanisms in procedures engaging the liability of the 
actor.  
 
Accountability involves a dialogue 
Finally, accountability involves social interaction and exchange, in that one side, that calling for 
the account, seeks answers and rectification while the other side, that being held accountable, 
responds and accepts sanctions. Accountability thus implies a dialectical activity in that it 
involves an open discussion and debate about matters of public interest. “Calling people to 
account means inviting them to explain and justify their actions within two competing logics, 
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that of consequences and that of appropriateness.”541 As stressed by Mulgan, “even where 
apparently ‘bare’ information is sought, such as in financial accounting, the information will 
only make sense within an explanatory and justificatory framework assumed by the questioner 
and accepted, or contested, by the respondent. The various discourses of accountability, 
including assumptions of institutional and personal responsibility, are an important aspect of 
accountability and worth careful academic investigation.”542  
 
Accountability does however not equate to dialogue as it is based on an authority relationship, 
thus on an unequal relationship between the agent and the third party calling into account. The 
agent is exposed to the possibility to be asked to take direction from the third party and to 
accept sanctions, if necessary for unsatisfactory performance.543 
 
Understanding that the dialogue between the parties to the process is key for any 
accountability mechanism highlights the importance of the nature of account given. There 
needs to be a possibility for the forum to interrogate the actor and to question the adequacy of 
the information or the legitimacy of the conduct.544 Raab points out that “the account must 
also, and essentially, include descriptions and explanations of the actions.”545 The account given 
pursues a series of objectives, namely: 
 To enable the third party to better understand the organisations’ intentions and 
its understanding, or theory, of its own situation or how it might act in it.  
 To give visibility to the organization called into account‘s actions. As such 
actions are by nature invisible to the third party, they have to be re-presented, 
through stories or accounts, explanations, and justifications. Important here is 
what counts as information in the accountability process but also the “possibility 
for the audience to have the means to redefine the concepts and categories in 
terms of which the account is expressed, to propose alternative perspectives, 
and to back these up with evidence that might not be found in the organization’s 
own account. In turn, the audience must be able to defend its alternative 
through the same rules.”546 
Raab concludes that “there is more to accountability than the production and receipt of an 
account as a proxy, in symbols, for the performance of the company in making things and in 
selling and so on-and in protecting personally identifiable information”.547 Based on this 
analysis, Raab suggests some additional requirements to be looked upon when designing 
accountability procedures, namely:  
 what the rules and procedures might be 
 Whether they are rooted in data 
 How they might be open to testing 
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 How they might be amenable to the sceptical search for alternative 
explanations 
 Whether they invite dialogue with those who are not only an ‘audience’ but 
a constituency or a citizenry who are acted upon by the organization or, 
indeed, a government or a data controller, and for whom the action that is 
reported in the account is consequential”. 
 
4.2.2.2 Accountability Relationships 
Understanding accountability mechanisms as social relations enables to classify them based on 
the dynamics driving the relations and thus to adjust its features when designing such 
mechanisms.548 
 
Raab suggests approaching the concept of accountability through the one of stewardship, “by 
which is meant that one party entrusts another with resources and/or responsibilities”.549 To 
that end, he relies on the definition provided by Andrew Gray and William Jenkins which reads 
as follows: “to be accountable is to be liable to present an account of, and answer for, the 
execution of responsibilities to those entrusting those responsibilities. Thus accountability is 
intrinsically linked to stewardship. Stewardship involves two manifest parties: a steward or 
accountor, that is, the party to whom the stewardship or responsibility is given and who is 
obliged to present an account of its execution, and the principal or accountee, that is, the party 
entrusting the responsibility to the steward and to whom the account is presented. There is 
however, a third party in this relationship: the codes on the basis of which the relationship is 
struck and by which it is maintained and adjudicated. Codes may be explicit or more often 
implicit.”  
 
This approach seeks to make patent the rationale behind most accountability relationships, i.e. 
“the allocation of responsibility or vesting of authority which occurs prior to the accountability 
relationship being established”. Accountability relationships do not stand on their own, but are 
instituted as “checks” against potential misuses of power by the accountor.  
 
In that sense, the Office of the Auditor General of Manitoba has articulated accountability 
around two key elements: the conferring of responsibility and authority, and the answering for 
the use of that authority. According to this Office, “Having responsibility means having the 
authority to act, the power to control and the freedom to decide. It also means that one must 
behave rationally, reliably and consistently in exercising judgment. Answering for the use of 
authority means reporting and explaining actions, assuming obligations, and submitting to 
outside or external judgement.”550 
 
In order to understand the rationale underlying accountability relationships, three parameters 
should be taken into account: 1) the parties to the relation (who? To whom?), 2) the motivation 
driving the relation (why?) and finally 3) the nature of the account given (what?). 
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Stakeholders (who? To whom?) 
The first question to be asked is: who should render account? Who is the actor required to 
appear before the forum? In legal procedures, it is often the organisation as a corporate entity, 
which is held to give an account. We then talk about “corporate” or “organizational” 
accountability. This will be the case most often encountered in the SALT framework, therefore 
the one to which we will give priority.  
 
The second question to answer is: to whom is the account to be rendered? This will yield a 
classification based on the type of forum to which the actor is required to render account. It 
could refer to political, legal, administrative or social accountability. This is a key question as 
this will usually define the type of authority the accountee has over the accountor and the kind 
of sanctions that can be imposed on the actors in case it is found to be in breach of the rules.  
 
Motivation (Why?) 
The motivation underlying the accountability relationship is also an important element to take 
into account when designing or assessing the accountability procedures in place. The question 
to be answered here is “why the actor feels compelled to render account”. This relates largely 
to the nature of the relationship between the actor and the forum, and in particular to the 
question of why the actor has an obligation to render account. This will subsequently lead to 
classifications based on the nature of the obligation, for example obligations arising from a 
hierarchical or principal agent relationship, a contractual agreement, or which have been 
voluntarily entered into.  
 
Nature of the account to be given (What?) 
Finally, the last aspect to take into account is the nature of the account given. This aspect will allow 
to define the scope of the accountability relationship and thus to define the essential elements to 
be included into the account given. It will influence the elements to include into the report to be 
given and thus the content of the procedural mechanisms put in place by the accountor.  
 
In that regard, Bennet makes a clear distinction between accountability mechanisms directed to 
policies, procedures and practices551:  
 Accountability mechanisms focused on policies will look at the stated policy, compare it 
with what is said publicly by the organization (e.g. on its website), or in a code of practice, to 
a reference norm. It will mainly consist in an analysis of words. 
 Accountability mechanisms focused on procedures will look at whether the 
organization have an effective complaint handling process, whether there is a responsible 
person or a dedicated management framework or staff training. 
 Accountability mechanisms focused on practices will review whether the policies work 
in practice, whether they manage to achieve their goals.  
 
4.2.3 Relevance for the SALT Framework: Criteria for Efficient Accountability 
Mechanisms 
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Section 1 and 2 show that irrespective of whether accountability is approached from its 
broad sense as “answerability” or from its narrow sense as mechanism of control, both 
share common features that will shape accountability relationships. The main difference 
relies on whether the third party to whom the account is given owns rights of authority 
over the agent and thus whether the accountability process can end up in the imposition of 
sanctions or the agent been required to integrate corrections to its actions or decisions and 
in the value of such request. While in accountability process in the broad sense the impact 
of the whole process is largely defined by the agent itself, accountability processes in the 
narrow sense will end up in the agent having to enforce the decision of the third party with 
regard to the accountability mechanisms in place. 
 
While, as will be elaborated in the next section, accountability is being introduced within 
the data protection framework in its narrow sense, as a way to ensure compliance, the 
broad understanding of accountability can still be of interest for the SALT Framework as 
far as decision-makers are concerned. It leads to a greater involvement of the stakeholders 
to the decision-making process. 
 
As explained in Chapter 3, decision-makers -which in the data protection terminology will 
often be referred to as data controllers-, when deciding to implement a new surveillance 
system, will have to make a balance between security and privacy interests. As explained in 
chapter 3, this balance will most of the time result in carrying out a proportionality 
assessment which consists in a three-part test: 
 the ‘suitability’ test, which defines whether the measure is reasonably 
likely to achieve its objectives;  
 the ‘necessity’ test, which evaluates whether there are other less 
restrictive means capable of producing the same result;  
 the  proportionality test stricto sensu, which consists of a weighing of 
interests with which the consequences on fundamental rights are 
assessed against the importance of the objective pursued. 
 
When applying these criteria to the specificities of their case, the deciders will necessarily 
need to engage with their stakeholders, e.g. to check their perceptions of privacy or their 
views on alternative means capable to achieve the same results.  
 
As a way of example, a mayor who wants to reduce petty thefts in his city through the 
installation of a video surveillance system in the most affected areas could decide to engage 
into a dialogue with citizens, NGOs active in the field and security companies to obtain their 
views on the options taken and on acceptable alternative means in order to give more 
legitimacy to the final decision taken. In order to achieve this goal, the mayor will need to 
set up procedures that comply with the criteria explained above.  
 
The design of accountability processes should thus start by defining the following 
elements: 
1. Identify the stakeholders, i.e. whom the organization is answering to. Different 
stakeholders will have different expectations, generating different types of 
relationships and thus accountability processes should be adjusted to these 
different expectations. As a way of example, an accountability process directed to 
address citizens’ concerns about the impact of a surveillance system on their right 
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to privacy will focus on the provision of assurance that a series of privacy 
safeguards have been taken into account into the design of the system. By contrast, 
an accountability process directed to involve citizens’ in the decision of whether to 
implement a given surveillance system will rather tend to focus on the gathering 
and weighting of the different views of citizens in order to fully take them into 
account in the final decision taken. If the accountability processes is directed to 
provide a data protection authority with sufficient elements to check compliance 
with the applicable data protection framework, thus to the verifiability of the 
action taken by the agent in that perspective, the accountability process will tend 
to the production of evidence of compliance with such framework.  
2. Make explicit the motivation underlying the accountability process, i.e. why the 
organization decides to engage into such procedure. A first reason can be that the 
organization is subject to the authority to which the account is given and thus is 
bound to its requests. Such is the case when an organization decides to self-certify 
to a standard or voluntarily code which implies regular audits by third parties or 
the possibility for the supervision authority to inspect the agent’s practices in case 
of external complaint. Alternatively, the agent could seek to more largely involve 
its stakeholders in its activities in order either to give added-value to its products 
or greater legitimacy to its decisions. 
3. Identify the nature of the account that should be given, i.e. what should be the 
content and extent of the accountability procedure. This last element relates to 
very object of the accountability relationship established between the accountor 
and the accountee. Coming back to the idea of conceiving accountability 
relationships as stewardship ones, this comes to defining which kind of 
responsibility or power has been entrusted to the agent and thus what this agent 
should be answerable for. As stressed above, this for instance can involve that the 
accountability mechanisms will bear exclusively on the policies drafted by the 
organization, on the procedures implemented to make these policies work in 
practice, or on the practices of the organizations against their accountability 
commitments. 
 
Once the basic characteristic features of the accountability relationship have been clearly 
defined and identified, the methodology proposed by the Global Accountability Framework 
to set up accountability mechanisms can then be used as guideline. For the organization 
which wants to implement internally such accountability mechanisms or which want to be 
able to answer obligations stemming from an accountability relationships imposed 
externally, this means to set up: 
 An Accountability strategy which identifies the stakeholders to the process, their 
expectations, the mission statement of the organization for this process 
(motivation/intentions) and the mechanisms put in place. 
 Transparency mechanisms which gives visibility for the stakeholders of the 
actions taken in view of the obligation to give an account 
 Participation mechanisms which allow stakeholders to involve into a dialogue 
with the organization, obtain the information required, ask further explanation, 
contest the narrative given by the agent. 
 Evaluation mechanisms which allows the agent to obtain feedback over their own 
accountability mechanisms in view of further improvements 
 Complaint and response mechanisms, which allows an interaction with their 
stakeholders, so they can provide feedback on the accountability process. 
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Whenever policy-makers, business organisations or others collective entities decides to 
integrate accountability mechanisms in the legislative framework, code of conducts or 
standards, they should keep in mind these different features to ensure that the proposed 
accountability mechanisms are actually able to meet their goals.  
4.3 Implementing Accountability Within the Data Protection 
Framework 
This section focuses on the principle of accountability as introduced and articulated in the data 
protection framework. The principle of accountability is not new to data protection. It was 
introduced in one of the first international data protection instruments in 1981, the OECD 
Guidelines on the protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data. However, it is 
only recently that this principle has gained renewed interest. It is seen as a way to improve 
trust in data governance practices and to apply data protection rules in a more efficient and 
less burdensome way. This section proceeds to a review of the different initiatives taken place 
in the data protection arena, to further extract meaningful criteria to be used in the SALT 
framework.   
 
4.3.1 OECD Guidelines 
The Fourteenth 1981 OECD Guidelines provides that “A data controller should be accountable 
for complying with measures which give effect to the principles stated above”. Its role is to give 
effect in practice to all the other data protection principles.552 It relies on the idea that the data 
processing activities are carried out in the benefit of the data controller, which is by way of 
consequence entrusted with a specific responsibility, the one of adequately protecting and 
handling the personal information subject to data processing. This responsibility is not waived 
when the data controller delegates part or all data processing activities to a third party. The 
explanatory memorandum lists for instance the need to hold the data controller liable for 
breaches of confidentiality obligations, to subject him to legal sanctions (legal liability) or to 
accountability mechanisms established by codes of conducts.  
 
These guidelines however let to the participating countries the freedom to decide upon the 
best way to operationalize this principle into their legislative framework. It is also worth 
noticing that OECD Guidelines are primarily directed to international data flows. 
  
4.3.2 The Madrid Resolution  
Issued in 2010, the Madrid Resolution on International Standards adopted in 2009 at the 
International Conference of data Protection and Privacy Commissioners tries to undertake the 
task to agree on minimum data protection principles at international level. It is not aimed, as 
the OECD guidelines, to regulate international data flows but to promote a more internationally 
uniform approach to data protection. 
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Section 11 of the “Joint Proposal for a Draft of International Standards on the protection of 
Privacy with regard to the processing of Personal Data” introduces an Accountability principle. 
It provides that:  
 “Accountability principle. The responsible person shall: 
a. Take all the necessary measures to observe the principles and obligations set out in this 
Document  and in the applicable national legislation, and 
b. Have the necessary internal mechanisms in place for demonstrating such observance 
both to data subjects and to the supervisory authorities in the exercise of their powers 
[…]” 
 
The concept of accountability is there closely linked to the one of (legal) compliance. It however 
goes further than the principle as worded in the OECD Guidelines imposing upon data 
controllers (“the responsible person”) to implement internal mechanisms to demonstrate they 
are compliant. It is worth noticing that compliance should not only be demonstrated to 
supervisory authorities, which held supervision powers in terms of legal liability, but also to 
data subjects. This choice of words makes explicit the assumption on which data protection 
frameworks rely on, namely the transfer of power from the data subject to the data controller 
entailed by the transfer of personal information. Data controllers are answerable to the very 
entity conferring him such power, namely the data subject. 
 
The Madrid International Standards goes one step further than the OECD Guidelines by 
including a list of measures aimed at promoting better compliance (Article 22), namely:  
 The implementation of procedures to prevent, detect and react to data breaches, 
 The appointment of one or more data protection or privacy officers, 
 The periodic implementation of training, education and awareness programs among the 
members of the organization, 
 The periodic conduct of transparent audits by qualified and preferably independent 
parties,  
 The adaptation of information systems and/or technologies for the processing of 
personal data to the applicable laws on the protection of privacy with regard to the 
processing of personal data (privacy by design).  
 The implementation of privacy impact assessments prior to implementing new 
information systems and/or technologies for the processing of personal data, as well as 
prior to carrying out any new method of processing personal data or substantial 
modifications in existing processing.  
 The adoption of codes of practice the observance of which are binding and that include 
elements that allow the measurement of efficiency as far as compliance and level of 
protection of personal data are concerned, and that set out effective measures in case 
of non compliance.  
 
4.3.3 APEC Privacy Framework 
The Ministers of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation adopted the APEC Privacy Framework in 
2005 to both encourage the development of appropriate information privacy protections as 
well as to ensure the free flow of information within the Asia pacific Region. This framework is 
PARIS Project     Deliverable 2.1     v1.0 
31/07/2013    SEC - 312504      153 
largely based on OECD Guidelines. Its Preambule stipulates that “data controllers should be 
accountable for complying with measures that give effect to the Principles”. 
 
The Framework specifies what the principle of accountability should mean within the context of 
APEC data flows. Principle IX, par. 26, stipulates that domestic and international data transfers 
should be based on the consent of the individual or the data controller should exercise due 
diligence and take reasonable steps to ensure that the recipient person or organization will 
protect information consistent with the Principles.   
 
The introduction of the principle was followed by more practical work undertaken in the 
context of the APEC Pathfinder projects.553 The main objective of the Pathfinder projects is to 
develop a system that provides for “accountable cross-border data flows within the APEC 
region”554 for the protection of consumers while facilitating business access to the benefits of 
electronic commerce. This goal is to be achieved by developing and implementing a Cross-
Border Privacy Rules (CBPR) system, consistent with the APEC Privacy Framework.  
 
The Pathfinder projects aims at building a system that allows businesses to create their own 
CBPRs and consumers and regulators to rely upon “accountability agents” in the APEC region to 
make sure businesses are held accountable to their privacy promises.555 Accountability agents 
are any organisation that either certifies the compliance of business developed CBPRs with the 
APEC framework; and/or provides an efficient dispute resolution service to provide an avenue 
for consumers to address privacy complaints with business.  An accountability agent may be a 
regulator, such as a privacy commissioner. The term also includes privacy trustmarks, which are 
already well established in a number of APEC economies, as well as other organisations, for 
example, government agencies or ministries that may be distinct from a regulator but which 
fulfils this role.  
In order to operationalize such system, the Data Privacy Pathfinder project is still considering 
broader policy issues raised by the development of a CBPR system, most particularly in relation 
with the development of templates for businesses and the role of certification authorities, their 
recognition, their interaction with regulators and their integration within the policy framework.  
 
4.3.4 The Accountability Projects 
In 2009, the Center for Information Policy Leadership (CIPL), together with a number of Privacy 
enforcement agencies (European data protection authorities, the Japanese Consumer Affairs 
agency and the US Federal Trade Commission) and a series of experts from the private sector, 
NGOs and academia556, launched a series of projects collectively referred to as ‘the 
Accountability Projects’. As stressed by Alhadeff et al., “these projects were initiated as a result 
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of discussions on the topic of accountability which had taken place in the context of APEC and 
the International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners”.557 The focus is on 
accountability as a mechanism for global governance of data. 
 
The content of the different phases of the Accountability projects were driven by the concerns 
expressed by the different stakeholders in view of reaching a consensus on what it meant for an 
organization to be accountable558, namely: 
 Businesses expressed concerns about what might be expected of them in an 
accountability system, how their effort to meet these expectations would be measured 
and how the rules related to accountability would be defined and enforced 
 Privacy enforcement agencies ask how accountability might work under local law, how 
do enforcement agencies measure an organisation’s willingness and capacity to protect 
information when it is no longer in the privacy protection agency’s jurisdiction, how 
does the agency work with and trust agencies in other jurisdictions 
 Consumer advocates worry that accountability would lessen the individual’s ability to 
make his own determination about appropriate use of information pertaining to him. 
 
The project was thus articulated around three main questions559: 
 What will be expected of companies in an accountability system? 
 How will enforcement agencies monitor and measure accountability? 
 How can the protection of individuals be ensured? 
 
To the date of today, the project has been running into four phases each focusing on a specific 
aspect of an accountability-based system for data protection. First of all, the “Galway project” 
led by the Irish Data Protection Authority set out to define the essential elements of 
accountability, to consider the issues raised by stakeholders, and to suggest additional work 
necessary to establish accountability as a trusted mechanism for information governance; 
particularly in the context of global data flows. The “Paris project” hosted by the CNIL followed 
and went into further detail identifying common fundamentals of an accountable organization. 
The third Accountability project, the “Madrid project”, was hosted by the Spanish Data 
Protection Commissioner. This project investigated more specific issues related the 
measurement and validation of accountability (e.g., costs of compliance, types of validation). 
The Fourth Accountability project, which took place in 2012, in view of the evolution of 
accountability into an accepted, practical approach to privacy and data protection (in the EU, 
Canada, OECD, APEC), set as goal the development of a tool that would assist organisations in 
evaluating the steps they have taken internally to establish the conditions for accountability 
and in demonstrating them to data protection authorities or their recognized third-party 
agents.  
 
Accountability is defined as “a demonstrable acknowledgement and assumption of 
responsibility for having in place appropriate policies and procedures, and promotion of good 
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practices that include correction and remediation for failures and misconduct.”560 The definition 
gathers the essential elements of the narrow concept of accountability in that an organization 
should commit to implement specific policies, procedures and practices for which it is 
answerable for failure and misconduct. Whom this organization is answerable to is not taken 
into the definition. The different options have however been further explored in the third 
phase of the project. 
 
An accountability-based approach is seen as an “infrastructure that fosters responsible decision-
making, engenders answerability, enhances transparency and considers liability.”561 An 
accountability-based approach to data protection is expected to promote the implementation 
of practical mechanisms and to translate legal requirements and guidance into effective 
protection for data. 
 
The vision underlying these projects is thus not to redefine privacy or to replace existing laws 
and regulation but rather to “shift the focus of privacy governance to an organisation’s ability to 
demonstrate its capacity to achieve specified privacy objectives. It involves setting privacy 
protection goals for companies based on criteria established in law, self-regulation and best 
practice, and vesting the organization with both the ability and the responsibility to determinate 
appropriate, effective measures to reach those goals.”562 Most particularly, it is aimed at 
compensating situations where data subjects cannot exercise an effective control over data use 
as “accountability requires that organisations make responsible, disciplined decisions about 
data use even in the absence of traditional consent”.563  
 
The project expects that the adoption of an accountability-based approach will bring a strong 
added-value in the following areas564: 
 Greater flexibility in the implementation of data protection framework as long as it is 
expected to allow the organization to adapt its data practices to serve emerging 
business models and to meet consumer demands. Allowing for greater flexibility will 
enable organisations to more effectively conserve scare resources allocated to privacy 
protection. 
 Bridging disparate regulatory systems. Accountability relies less on the rule that exist 
where the data is processed and more on where the obligation is first established. It is 
expected to help bridge approaches across disparate regulatory systems by allowing 
countries to pursue common data protection objectives through very different – but 
equally reliable- means. It will also heighten the confidence of individuals that their data 
will be protected wherever it is located. 
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 Introduction of a risk-based approach. Accountability relies less on specific rules but 
instead requires that organisations adopt policies that align with external criteria found 
in law –generally accepted principles and best practices – and foster a level of data 
protection commensurate with the risks to individuals raised by loss or inappropriate 
use of data. The risks should be assessed and measured based on guidance from 
regulators, advocates, individuals and other members of industry. It will raise the quality 
of data protection, by allowing use of tools that best respond to specific risks and 
facilitating the rapid updating of those tools to respond quickly to new business models 
and emerging technologies. 
 Shift of the primary responsibility for data protection from the individual to the 
organization collecting and using data. An accountability-based approach is a proactive 
approach as long as accountability does not wait for system failure, rather it requires 
that organization be prepared to demonstrate upon request by the proper authorities 
that is securing and protecting data in accordance with the essential elements. 
 
4.3.4.1 Data Protection Accountability: the Essential Elements 
The first Accountability project focused around the fundamental question of how an 
accountability-based system might be designed in view of the establishment of accountability 
as a practical and credible mechanism for information governance.  
 
The Galway project found out that for an organization to implement accountable data 
governance practices, five essential elements should be present. These essential elements 
articulate the conditions that must exist in order that an organisation establishes, demonstrates 
and tests its accountability565: 
 
1. Organisation commitment to accountability and adoption of internal policies 
consistent with external criteria. An organization must implement policies linked to 
appropriate external criteria (found in law, generally accepted principles or industry 
best practices) and designed to provide the individual with effective privacy protection, 
deploy mechanisms to act on those policies and monitor those mechanisms. They must 
be approved at the highest level of the organization and performance against those 
plans at all levels of the organization must be visible to senior management. Important 
is to allocate sufficient and appropriate staff and to obtain the review and endorsement 
by members of the organisation’s executive committee or board of directors. 
 
2. Mechanisms to put privacy policies into effect, including tools, training and education. 
The organization must establish performance mechanisms to implement the stated 
privacy policies. Such mechanisms might include tools to facilitate decision-making 
about appropriate data use and protection, training about how to use those tools and 
processes to assure compliance for employees who collect, process and protect 
information. 
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3. Systems for internal, ongoing oversight and assurance reviews and external 
verification. Using risk management analysis, enterprises that collect and use personal 
information must monitor and measure whether the policies they have adopted and 
implemented effectively manage, protect and secure the data. It is argued that 
accountable organisations have traditionally established performance systems based on 
their own business culture. In that sense, the project highlights a series of characteristics 
that ensure successful performance systems:  
 they are consistent with the organisation’s culture and integrated into business 
processes 
 they assess risks across the entire data life cycle 
 they include training decision tools and monitoring 
 they apply to outside vendors and other third parties to assure that the 
obligations that come with personal data are met no matter where data is 
processed 
 they allocate resources where the risk to individuals is greatest  
 they are a function of an organisation’s policies and commitment.  
The organization should also periodically engage or be engaged by the appropriate 
independent entity to verify and demonstrate that it meets the requirements of accountability 
(internal audit department, assessment by privacy enforcement or third-party accountability 
agents provided external verification is trustworthy and affordable). 
 
4. Transparency and mechanisms for individual participation. Successful communications 
provide sufficient transparency such that the individual understands an organizations 
data practices as he or she requires (through privacy notices, icons, videos and other 
mechanisms). 
 
5. Means for remediation and external enforcement. They are means to address harm to 
individuals caused by failure of internal policies and practices. An individual should be 
appointed to serve as first contact point. Organisations must establish processes by 
which those complaints are reviewed and addressed. 
 
4.3.4.2 Demonstrating and Measuring Accountability 
The second phase of the project focused on fundamental conditions that accountable 
organisations should be prepared to implement and demonstrate to regulators.566 It further 
considered how and under what circumstances organisations would measure accountability by 
introducing the concept of “validated accountability”. 
 
Design of an accountability program 
Accountability requires that an organization stands ready to demonstrate its program if asked 
to do so by a data protection authority. The Accountability project identified nine common 
fundamentals that an accountable organisation should be prepared to implement and 
demonstrate to a regulator. Such fundamentals should however be applied in a flexible way 
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and tailored to the organization business model, data holdings, technologies and applications 
and the risks to privacy they raise for individuals.567 
 
The applicability of the fundamentals will depend on two main questions that each organization 
should answer before putting in place an accountability-based approach, mainly for what and 
to whom the organization is accountable.568 
Organisation can be accountable for (what?): 
 Existing law and regulation 
 Private sector oversight programs 
 Privacy promises 
 Ongoing risk assessment and mitigation 
Organisation can be accountable to different stakeholders (whom?): 
 Individuals who expect their data to be secured and to be used and managed 
responsibly 
 Regulators who require that organisations comply with applicable law and regulation 
 Business partners.  
 
Based on the “what” and “whom” questions, the design of the accountability program can take 
into account all or several of the nine elements identified below569: 
1. Policies. Existence of binding and enforceable written data privacy policies and 
procedures that reflect applicable laws, regulations and industry standards 
2. Executive oversight. Internal executive oversight and responsibility for data privacy and 
protection 
3. Staffing and delegation. Allocation of resources to ensure that the organisation’s 
privacy program is appropriately staffed by adequately trained personnel 
4. Education and awareness. Existence of up-to-date education and awareness programs 
to keep employees and on-site contractors aware of data protection obligations 
5. Ongoing risk assessment and mitigation. Implementation of a process to assist the 
organization understanding the risks to privacy raised by new products, services, 
technologies and business models and to mitigate those risks. 
6. Program risk assessment oversight and validation. Periodic review of the totality of the 
accountability program to determine whether modification is necessary 
7. Event management and complaint handling. Procedures for responding to inquiries, 
complaints and data protection breaches 
8. Internal enforcement. Internal enforcement of the organisation’s policies and discipline 
for non-compliance 
9. Redress. The method by which an organization provides remedies for those whose 
privacy has been put at risk. 
 
General vs. validated accountability 
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This project also introduces a distinction between “general accountability” and “validated 
accountability”. While general accountability will cover programs implemented by 
organizations in view of improving their data governance in general, “validated accountability” 
involves the will of an organisation to be recognized and validated as accountable.  
 
Validated accountability refers to the certification of an organization’s practices. Several 
reasons could ground such wish: to engage into certain activities, to make certain assertions or 
to be relieved of certain regulatory requirements (if provided as such by the regulatory 
framework). As a way of example, it is suggested that validated accountability could bring 
recognized qualification to engage in cross-border data transfer and data teaming, relief from 
specified administrative requirements, recognized Binding Corporate Rule status, mitigation of 
enforcement sanctions when appropriate.570 In such case, more formal review and 
measurement by a supervisory authority or a third-party accountability agent recognized by the 
supervisory authority may be required.  
 
More concretely, the project identified different stages in the measurement of an 
organisation’s accountability program. These may or may not occur sequentially but represent 
an ongoing process of education, risk assessment, self-certification, review and enforcement: 
1. The organization takes appropriate measures to establish processes and procedures 
that implement its privacy policies 
2. The organization self-certified that it meets the requirements of accountability 
3. The supervisory authority or recognized accountability agent reviews such filings and 
provide some form of acceptance of the certification 
4. The organization submits to enforcement by the supervisory authority or recognized 
accountability agent 
5. Supervisory authorities, recognized accountability agents, trade associations and 
government agencies engage in raising the awareness of organizations about the 
obligations that an accountable organization must meet, and the benefits that flow from 
being accountable. 
 
4.3.4.3 Issues Pending of Resolution 
At the end of the Galway571 and Paris projects572, a series of pending issues were identified as 
pivotal to encourage roust adoption of an accountability-based approach: 
 Policy makers and stakeholders should address questions about how accountability 
would work with existing legal regimes and whether reinterpretation or amendment of 
existing laws might be required to make it possible to hold organization accountable.  
 Stakeholders must also articulate the way in which the credibility of third party 
accountability programmes is established and tested for them to supplement the 
work of government agencies, most particularly how accountability is measured to 
ensure meaningful oversight. This means to define 1) how will remediation work in 
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an accountability approach, 2) how do organisations determine the appropriate 
validation mechanisms and 3) on what basis are third-party accountability agents 
recognized. 
 Finally, small- and medium-sized enterprises that wish to demonstrate 
accountability will face specific challenges that must be addressed such as questions 
of scalability. 
 
In the following sections, we will see how and to what extent the work carried out under the 
Accountability projects has influenced the debates revolving around the deployment of an 
accountability-based approach in the EU and Canadian legal frameworks. Works under the 
Accountability projects have been concomitant to policy discussions around the introduction of 
the accountability principle in the EU data protection framework, and to its specification into 
detailed guidelines in Canada. As mentioned above, Canadian and European privacy 
enforcement authorities have taken an active part to the Accountability projects. 
 
4.3.5 Canada: PIPEDA  
Canada is, to the best of our knowledge, the first country to have introduced explicitly an 
accountability principle into its legislative framework and to have started to operationalize the 
principle. The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) sets out 
ground rules for how private sector organizations may collect, use or disclose personal 
information in the course of commercial activities. PIPEDA also applies to federal works, 
undertakings and businesses in respect of employee personal information. 
 
4.3.5.1 The Principle of Accountability in PIPEDA  
The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) adopted in 2000 
introduces as first data protection principle, the accountability principle. “The accountability 
principle has been interpreted as requiring responsible organizations to take all reasonable 
steps to protect personal information under their control, regardless of where it is processed… In 
particular, organization are considered to remain responsible for the actions by third parties to 
whom the data has been transferred”.573 In words of Alhadeff et al, “the obligation flows with 
the information”.574 The offices of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Alberta and British 
Columbia acknowledged Accountability in relation to privacy as the acceptance of responsibility 
for personal information protection.575 For an organization to be accountable, “it must have in 
place appropriate policies and procedures that promote good practices which, taken as a whole, 
constitute a privacy management program. The outcome is a demonstrable capacity to comply, 
at a minimum, with applicable privacy laws.”576 Organizations are responsible for both personal 
information in its possession or custody and when such information is transferred to a third 
party who will process information on their behalf. In the latter case, organisations are 
                                                     
573 Jospeh Alhadeff, Brendan Van Alsenoy and Jos Dumortier, op. cit.  
574 Ibidem 
575 Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Alberta, Office of the Privacy Commissioner of 
Canada, Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia, Guidelines: Getting 
Accountability right with a  Privacy Management Program, 2012, available at: 
http://www.priv.gc.ca/information/guide/2012/gl_acc_201204_e.asp#e 
576 Ibidem 
PARIS Project     Deliverable 2.1     v1.0 
31/07/2013    SEC - 312504      161 
expected to exercise due diligence “in choosing third parties who will process information on 
their behalf and to negotiate sufficient contractual safeguards, including audit rights, to ensure 
a comparable level of protection”.577 
 
But not only does the PIPEDA introduces a principle of accountability, it also identifies a variety 
of measures that responsible organisations must implement in order to comply with the 
principle of accountability. Clause 4.1 of Schedule 1 requires organisations to designate one or 
more individuals who shall be accountable for the organisation’s compliance. This individual 
will be both responsible for the internal oversight of information practices but also to act as a 
point-of-contact towards external parties. 
 
More concretely, art. 4.1.4. of Schedule 1 mandate organizations to implement policies and 
practices to give effect to the principles, including (a) implementing procedures to protect 
personal information; (b) establishing procedures to receive and respond to complaints and 
inquiries; (c) training staff and communicating to staff information about the organization's 
policies and practices; and (d) developing information to explain the organization's policies and 
procedures. 
 
4.3.5.2 Privacy Management Programs 
In 2012, the Offices of the Privacy Commissioners of Canada, Alberta and British Columbia have 
issued guidelines for organisations to implement Privacy Management programs.578 Setting up 
a sound Privacy Management program is seen as a way to “get accountability” right and thus to 
comply with PIPEDA obligations in that regard. It is expected that “with a solid privacy 
management program, organizations will be able to identify their weaknesses, strengthen their 
good practices, demonstrate due diligence, and potentially raise the protection of personal 
information that they hold to a higher level than the bare minimum needed to meet legislative 
requirements”.579 
 
This document puts forward a series of benefits for organisations when developing and 
deploying a Privacy Management Program:  
 Ensure compliance 
 Foster a culture of privacy throughout an organization. As explained by the 
Commissioners, senior management support is vital in that it provides the needed 
resources to ensure appropriate training and education, risk assessment and 
monitoring, and auditing. It also sends a clear signal that privacy is vital to the 
organization. In turn, a culture of privacy encourages employee support and reinforces 
the privacy protections the organization puts in place. 
 Enhance trust and companies’ reputation towards their customers and clients 
 Optimize business processes. In the longer term, a privacy management program 
that is scaled to the organization’s needs is expected to save money and make good 
business sense. 
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 Minimize privacy breaches as privacy breaches are expansive for organizations both 
in terms of “clean up” and reputation repair 
 
Privacy Management Programs are formed of three building blocks: 1) Organizational 
Commitment, 2) Program controls and 3) Maintenance of the Privacy Management 
program.[19] 
1. Organizational commitment, i.e. development of an internal governance structure that 
fosters a privacy respectful culture. Not only should an organization develop program 
control to ensure compliance with the laws, but also to have a governance structure in 
place, with processes to follow and the means to ensure that they are being followed. 
This is what was referred to in the first part of this deliverable as an Accountability 
strategy. Concretely, this entails: 
 Buy-in from the top, i.e. Senior management support is key to a successful 
privacy management program and essential for a privacy respectful culture. 
Senior management needs to actively champion the privacy program. It should:  
 appoint the privacy point person(s) (Privacy Officer); 
 endorse the program controls; and 
 monitor and report to the Board, as appropriate, on the program. 
 Allocate sufficient resources 
 Privacy Officer, i.e. Organizations must appoint someone who is responsible for 
the privacy management program. In large organizations, the Privacy Officer may 
need to be supported by a Privacy Office with dedicated staff. He/She will: 
 establish and implement program controls; 
 coordinate with other appropriate persons responsible for related 
disciplines and functions within the organization; 
 be responsible for the ongoing assessment and revision of program 
controls; 
 represent the organization in the event of a complaint investigation by a 
privacy commissioner’s office; and 
 advocate privacy within the organization itself 
 Reporting, i.e. Reporting mechanisms need to be established, and reflected in 
the organization’s program controls. The organization needs to establish internal 
reporting mechanisms to ensure that the right people know how the privacy 
management program is structured and whether it is functioning as expected. 
Organizations should establish some form of internal audit and assurance 
programs to monitor compliance with their privacy policies. There will be times 
when privacy issues need to be escalated, for example, when there is a security 
breach or when a customer complains. Escalation means both involving people 
of relevant responsibility and ensuring that all the needed persons in the 
organization are included in the resolution of the issue. To ensure that related 
processes are being followed, organizations will need to monitor whether the 
needed steps are being taken when triggered. An effective reporting program: 
 clearly defines its reporting structure (in terms of reporting on its overall 
compliance activities) as well as employee reporting structures in the 
event of a complaint or a potential breach; 
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 tests and reports on the results of its internal reporting structures; 
anddocuments all of its reporting structures. 
 documents all of its reporting structures 
 
2. Program controls. These help ensure that what is mandated in the governance 
structure is implemented in the organization.  
 Personal Information Inventory. An organization needs to know what personal 
information it holds, how it is being used – and whether it really needs it at all. 
Every organization needs to determine: 
 what personal information it holds and where it is held (within the 
organization or by third parties, for example) and document this 
assessment; 
 why it is collecting, using or disclosing personal information and 
document these reasons; and 
 the sensitivity of the personal information it holds. 
 Policies. Organizations must develop and document internal policies that 
address obligations under the law. These policies need to be available to 
employees, and employees need to periodically sign off on them. These policies 
should be documented and should show how they connect to the applicable 
privacy legislation. Organizations should also incorporate privacy compliance 
requirements in other policies of the organization as appropriate. For example, 
in contract management policies, procurement policies, human resources 
policies and policies dealing with the disclosure of personal information to 
regulatory bodies, law enforcement agencies and internal security departments. 
The key policies that organizations must have in place are the following: 
 Collection, use and disclosure of personal information, including 
requirements for consent and notification; 
 Access to and correction of personal information; 
 Retention and disposal of personal information; 
 Responsible use of information and information technology, including 
administrative, physical and technological security controls and 
appropriate access controls; 
 Challenging compliance. Individuals have the right to challenge an 
organization’s compliance with applicable privacy legislation. 
Organizations should therefore have internal policies in place for staff to 
follow in the event that individuals wish to complain about the 
organization’s personal information handling practices 
 Risk Assessment tools. Privacy risks evolve over time. Organizations should 
develop a process for identifying and mitigating privacy and security risks, 
including the use of privacy impact assessments and security threat risk 
assessments. 
 Training and education requirements. A sound privacy management program 
requires all members of an organization to be aware of, and be ready to act on 
privacy obligations. Up-to-date training and education requirements for all 
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employees, tailored to specific needs, are key to compliance. For privacy training 
and education to be effective, it must: 
 be mandatory for all new employees before they access personal 
information and periodically thereafter; 
 cover the policies and procedures established by the organization; 
 be delivered in the most appropriate and effective manner, based on 
organizational needs; and 
 circulate essential information to relevant employees as soon as practical 
if an urgent need arises. 
 Breach and incident management response protocols. Organizations should 
have a procedure in place and a person responsible for managing a personal 
information breach. For larger organizations, a collaborative approach may be 
required, with employees from different parts of the organization working 
together. Responsibilities for internal and external reporting of the breach must 
be clear. 
 Service providers management. At a minimum, privacy requirements for service 
providers should include the following: 
 privacy provisions in contracts setting out requirements for compliance 
including binding the service provider to the policies and protocols of the 
organization and requiring the organization to be notified in the event of 
a breach; 
 training and education for all service provider employees with access to 
personal information; 
 sub-contracting; 
 audits; and agreements with service provider employees stating that they 
will comply with the organization’s privacy policies and protocols. 
 External communication. Organizations also have to develop a procedure for 
informing individuals of their privacy rights and the organization’s program 
controls. This external communication should be clear and understandable and 
not simply a reiteration of the law. It should: 
 provide enough information so that the public knows the purpose of the 
collection, use and disclosure of personal information as well as how it is 
safeguarded and how long it is retained; 
 notify individuals if their personal information is being transferred 
outside of Canada; 
 include information on who to contact with questions or concerns; and 
 be made easily available to individuals. 
 Individuals should be made aware of their ability to access their personal 
information held by the organization, and how to request correction or to 
complain about the organization’s privacy compliance, including the right 
to challenge the organization’s actions by submitting a complaint to the 
Privacy Commissioner. 
 
3. Ensuring the maintenance of the Privacy Management Program to ensure ongoing 
effectiveness, compliance and accountability. In order to properly protect privacy and 
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meet legal obligations, organizations must monitor, assess and revise their framework 
to ensure it remains relevant and effective. 
 Develop an Oversight and Review Plan. An oversight and review plan will help 
the organization keep its privacy management program on track and up to date. 
 Assess and revise program Controls. The effectiveness of program controls 
should be monitored, periodically audited, and where necessary, revised. 
Monitoring is an ongoing process and should address at a minimum the 
following questions: 
 what are the latest threats and risks? 
 are the program controls addressing new threats and reflecting the latest 
complaint or audit findings, or guidance of the privacy commissioners? 
 are new services being offered that involve increased collection, use or 
disclosure of personal information? 
 is training occurring, is it effective, are policies and procedures being 
followed, and is the program up to date? 
 The expectation is that an organization conducts assessments of its 
program controls in a focused, continuous and thorough manner. Based on the results 
of the assessment process, the Privacy Officer must consider whether to take action to 
update and revise the program controls. The role of Privacy Officers is key. In short, the 
following actions will need to be undertaken by the Privacy Officer: 
 monitor and update personal information inventory continuously to keep it 
current and identify and evaluate new collections, uses and disclosures; 
 review and revise policies as needed following assessments or audits, in 
response to a breach or complaint, new guidance, industry-based best practices, 
or as a result of environmental scans.  
 treat privacy impact assessments and security threat and risk assessments as 
evergreen documents so that the privacy and security risks of changes or new 
initiatives within the organization are always identified and addressed. 
 review and modify training and education on a periodic basis as a result of 
ongoing assessments and communicate changes made to program controls. 
 review and adapt breach and incident management response protocols to 
implement best practices or recommendations and lessons learned from post-
incident reviews. 
 review and, where necessary, fine-tune requirements in contracts with service 
providers. 
 update and clarify external communication explaining privacy policies. 
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4.3.6 The Data Protection Reform in the European Union 
4.3.6.1 Opinion 3/2010 of Article 29 Working Party 
In the context of the review of the EU Data Protection framework, Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party put forward a proposal for the introduction of a principle of accountability.580 
This principle would require data controllers to put in place appropriate and effective measures 
to ensure that the principles and obligations set out in the new framework are complied with 
and to demonstrate so to supervisory authorities upon request.  
 
More concretely, this Working Party suggested to wording the principle as follows: 
 “Article X – Implementation of data protection principles 
1. The controller shall implement appropriate and effective measures to 
ensure that the principles and obligations set out in the Directive are 
complied with. 
2. The controller shall demonstrate compliance with paragraph 1 to the 
supervisory authority on its request.” 
 
This proposal is motivated by the fact that EU data protection principles and obligations are 
often insufficiently reflected in concrete internal measures and practices. This Working Party 
fears that “unless data protection becomes part of the shared values and practices of an 
organization, and responsibilities for it are expressly assigned, effective compliance will be at 
considerable risk, and data protection mishaps are likely to continue.” The deployment of 
accountability mechanism is thus seen as a means to ensure compliance with the legal 
framework.  
 
Article 29 Working Party thus approaches the principle of accountability from its narrow sense. 
Accountability is approached from the perspective of showing “how responsibility is exercised 
and making this verifiable”.581 Trust is an important element of accountability mechanisms 
because “only when responsibility is demonstrated as working effectively in practice can 
sufficient trust be developed.”582 Focus is therefore put on the measures which should be taken 
or provided to ensure compliance in the data protection field.583 
 
As proposed in the Opinion, the legal architecture supporting accountability mechanisms would 
comprise two levels:  
1. A basic statutory requirement binding upon all controllers and which would 
consist in the implementation of measures/procedures and the maintenance of 
evidence thereto. The legal text would however not specify the types of 
measures to be implemented which should be the object of subsequent 
guidance given by national data protection authorities, by the Article 29 Working 
Party or by the Commission only for certain specific cases. However, while not 
contained in the proposal it is also envisaged to include an illustrative lists of 
measures that could be implemented by data controllers to comply with this 
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mandate, providing them with an indicative toolbox.584  Another alternative 
would consist in the assignment of clear internal responsibilities within each 
organization and the training of staff involved in the processing operations, such 
as the appointment of a Data Protection Officer as contemplated in article 18 of 
the 95/46/EC Directive. Finally, controls of the effectiveness of the measures 
taken should be organized by the data controller through monitoring, internal 
and external audits.  
2. Voluntary accountability systems that go above and beyond the minimum legal 
requirements by providing higher safeguards than those required under the 
applicable rules or by implementing requirements that provide a higher 
effectiveness. In that sense, Binding Corporate Rules are seen as providing a first 
example of accountability-based mechanism.  
 
One main concern of the Article 29 Working Party is to word the principle of accountability in 
such a way as to provide legal certainty, while at the same time allowing for scalability, i.e. 
“enabling the determination of the concrete measures to be applied depending on risk of the 
processing and the types of data processed.” This means that the wording of the principle 
should be precise enough as to give sufficient guidelines to data controllers when translating 
the principle into their information practices, but at the same time it should be broad enough 
as to allow its implementation to take into account the specifics of the data controller and of 
the data processing activities. Based on the criteria used to define security measures prescribed 
by article 17 of the Directive 95/46, tailoring the measures to be implemented would include 
aspects such as the size of the data processing operation/s, the intended purposes of the 
processing and the number of envisaged data transfers may determine the level of risk, the 
type of data, including whether they are sensitive or not. Indeed, the same measures cannot be 
preconized for health data processing activities and the ones motivated by the follow-up of 
customers’ purchases, or for video surveillance systems and the management of associations’ 
memberships. Similarly, Article 29 Working Party suggests using as criteria to assess the 
effectiveness of the measures implemented a) the risks of the data processing activity and b) 
the nature of the data processed. 
 
Examples of common accountability measures are provided as a way of example, namely: 
• Establishment of internal procedures prior to the creation of new personal data processing 
operations (internal review, assessment, etc); 
• Setting up written and binding data protection policies to be considered and applied to new 
data processing operations (e.g., compliance with data quality, notice, security principles, 
access, etc), which should be available to data subjects.  
• Mapping of procedures to ensure proper identification of all data processing operations and 
maintenance of an inventory of data processing operations,  
• Appointment of a data protection officer and other individuals with responsibility for data 
protection;  
• Offering adequate data protection, training and education to staff members. This should 
include those processing (or responsible for) the personal data (such as human resources 
directors) but also IT managers, developers and directors of business units. Sufficient resources 
should be allocated for privacy management, etc.  
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• Setting up of procedures to manage access, correction and deletion requests which should be 
transparent to data subjects;  
• Establishment of an internal complaints handling mechanism;  
• Setting up internal procedures for the effective management and reporting of security 
breaches;  
• Performance of privacy impact assessments in specific circumstances; 
• Implementation and supervision of verification procedures to ensure that all the measures 
not only exist on paper but that they are implemented and work in practice (internal or 
external audits, etc) 
 
Legal certainty is expected to be provided through the issuance of guidelines and the 
development of a model data compliance program which could be used by medium and large 
data controllers as a baseline upon which to draft their particular programs, a methodology 
already used for BCRs. In addition, certification schemes are seen as a tool to give data 
controllers assurance with regard to the adequacy of the accountability mechanisms put in 
place. This is however only possible if Data Protection Authorities can act over such certification 
scheme, either as “certifier of certifier” or by issuing enforceable models or referentials.  
 
Article 29 Working Party also suggests to develop a reflection on the need to impose certain 
obligations to the data processor or to the designers and/or manufacturers of ICT (information 
and communication technologies) could also be developed at the light of this accountability 
principle. 
 
This Working Party finally briefly touches upon the relation between accountability mechanisms 
and legal compliance to clearly separate both notions. Failure to implement adequate 
accountability mechanism should be subject to sanction, irrespective of the possibility to 
impose sanction for the violation of other data protection principles. It is argued that having 
implemented the required accountability mechanisms does not necessarily mean that a data 
controller complies with the substantive principles set forth in the Directive, i.e., it does not 
offer a legal presumption of compliance nor does it replace any of those principles. Accordingly, 
adopting measures to observe the principles must not in any case exclude data controllers from 
being subject to enforcement actions by data protection authorities. However, the Article 29 
Working Party opens the door to the possibility that, when assessing sanctions related to data 
protection violations, data protection authorities could give weight to the implementation (or 
lack of it) of measures and their verification.585 For this system to work, data protection 
Authorities should also be empowered to give precise instructions to data controller over their 
compliance systems. As explained above, this is an important part of any accountability 
relationship. 
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4.3.6.2 The EC Communication “A comprehensive Approach on Personal Data 
Protection in the European Union” 
Following the Article 29 Working Party, the EC identified in the 2010 Communication on “A 
comprehensive approach on personal data protection in the European Union”586 the need to 
enhance data controllers’ responsibility as a way to ensure more effective data protection. This 
means to spell out more clearly their obligations in the legal framework, including in relation to 
internal control mechanisms and cooperation with Data Protection Supervisory Authorities. The 
goal is to ensure that data controllers put in place effective policies and mechanisms to ensure 
compliance with data protection rules. The introduction of an accountability principle is 
approached as a way to achieve this goal. 
 
In that sense, three lines of actions were defined: 
 Mandatory appointment of independent Data Protection Officers and  
harmonization of the rules related to their tasks and competences;  
 Obligation for data controllers to carry out a data protection impact assessment 
(hereafter, “DPIA”) in specific cases, for instance, when sensitive data are being 
processed, or when the type of processing otherwise involves specific risks, in 
particular when using specific technologies, mechanisms or procedures, including 
profiling or video surveillance;  
 Promotion of the use of PETs (Privacy Enhancing technologies) and the possibilities 
for the concrete implementation of the concept of “Privacy by Design”, which means 
that “privacy and data protection are embedded throughout the entire life cycle of 
technologies, from the early design stage to their deployment, use and ultimate 
disposal”587 
 
In addition, the EC wished to foster the establishment of EU certification schemes in the field of 
data protection( “privacy seals”) for “privacy-compliant” processes, technologies, products and 
services, a need already identified in the context of the fostering of Privacy Enhancing 
technologies588, as a way to enhance data controllers’ responsibility. The EC argues that by 
opting for certified technologies, products or services could help to prove that the controller 
has fulfilled its obligations. The trustworthiness of such privacy seals should be ensured and 
their relation with the legal obligations and international technical standards should then be 
defined. 
 
4.3.6.3 Proposal for a Regulation 
On 25 January 2011, the European Commission published a proposal for a Regulation of the on 
the protection of individuals with regards to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data (hereafter “Draft Regulation”). At the date of writing, the proposal is 
still awaiting the first reading of the European Parliament. Several Committees of the European 
Parliament have already tabled a long list of amendments, most notably contained in the so-
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called Albrecht Report.589 The EDPS590 and Article 29 Working Party591 have also published their 
Opinion on the proposal. We however only will refer to those amendments that modify in a 
substantial way the content of the new provisions introduced in the Draft Regulation. 
 
Accountability as general principle of the data protection framework 
The Draft Regulation does not introduce an explicit principle of accountability as such but, in 
line with the EC Communication, it looks to enhance data controllers’ responsibility and liability.  
 
The Draft Regulation implements as general principle “a comprehensive responsibility and 
liability of the controller” which includes an obligation to demonstrate compliance with data 
protection rules. The Draft Regulation therefore introduces accountability in its narrow sense, 
i.e. as a way to ensure compliance with a set of rules, namely the principles set forth in the 
Regulation. Article 5 (f) states that:  
“[personal data must be] processed under the responsibility and liability of the 
controller, who shall ensure and demonstrate for each processing operation the 
compliance with the provisions of this Regulation.” 
 
This article should be read together with Recital 60 which stipulates that: 
 “Comprehensive responsibility and liability of the controller for any 
processing of personal data carried out by the controller or on the controller's 
behalf should be established. In particular, the controller should ensure and be 
obliged to demonstrate the compliance of each processing operation with this 
Regulation” 
 
The Albrecht report, following the recommendation of the EDPS592, has tabled two 
amendments (40 and 97) to introduce an explicit reference to accountability in recital 60 and in 
the text of article 5 (f). It is worth noticing that the amendment to Recital 60 is intended to 
make clear that accountability only entails an obligation to be able to demonstrate compliance 
on request. 
 
Measures tending to operationalize accountability 
This general principle is further specified in a series of articles contributing to the 
implementation of the accountability principle in the data protection framework, namely: 
1. Adoption of policies and implementation of appropriate measures to ensure and be 
able to demonstrate compliance with data protection rules, and to ensure that the 
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effectiveness of the measures is verified (article 22(1) and (3)). Both the EDPS593 and 
Article 29 Working Party594 have stressed the importance to reflect into the text the 
need for scalability of this general obligation in practice. 
These measures should include at minima: 
o Keeping documentation of all processing operations. This obligation replaces 
the general obligation to notify individual processing operations to the 
supervisory authorities contained in the Directive 95/46. Article 28 provides a 
list of documentation that should be kept by data controllers which should be 
made available on request to the supervisory authority. It is worth noticing that 
this obligation also extends to data processors. While the EDPS595 and the Article 
29 Working Party expressed their doubts about the feasibility of the 
implementation of this obligation in an increasingly dynamic environment, the 
amendments (43 and 188) introduced in the Albrecht Report rather seek to 
merge this article with Article 14 which details the information to be provided to 
the data subject. This report considers that both articles are two sides of a same 
coin and such an approach would reduce administrative burdens for data 
controllers at the time it would make it easier for individuals to understand and 
exercise their rights 
o Implementing data security requirements. Amendment 193 of the Albrecht 
Report proposes to extend the scope of the article from technical measures to 
procedures. The EDPS596 made two additional suggestions which were not taken 
into account. First, the EDPS stressed the need to explicitly refer to the three 
basic principles of security, namely confidentiality, integrity and availability. 
Second, the EDPS contended that the Regulation should also oblige the 
controller to adopt an information security management approach within the 
organization, including the implementation of an information security policy 
specific to the data processing performed, where appropriate.  
o Performing data protection impact assessments. DPIA are only mandatory 
where processing operations present specific risks to the rights and freedoms of 
data subjects by virtue of their nature, their scope or their purposes. A list of 
data processing operations considered as such is provided for by Article 33.2. 
This includes profiling, the monitoring of publicly accessible areas, especially 
when using video surveillance on a large scale and the processing of genetic or 
biometric data in large scale filing systems. The Albrecht Report follows the 
critics formulated by both the EDPS and Article 29 Working Party over the use of 
vague terms such as “large scale” and tables amendments to replace it by the 
following wording “where personal data are made accessible to a large number 
of persons or if high volumes of personal data about the data subject are 
processed or combined with other data”.  Another amendment also seeks to 
broaden the scope of application of this article by replacing the reference to 
video surveillance by a reference to “optic-electronic or other sensory devices”. 
o Complying with requirements for prior authorization or prior consultation of 
the supervisory authority wherever relevant. The Albrecht report suggests to 
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extending this obligation by referring not only to the supervisory authority but 
also to Data Protection Officers (Amendment 171). 
o Designating a Data Protection officer (DPO). Data controllers must appoint 
DPOs where the processing is carried out by a public authority or body; the 
processing is carried out by an enterprise employing 250 persons or more; the 
core activities of the controller or the processor consist of processing operations 
which, by virtue of their nature, their scope and/or their purposes, require 
regular and systematic monitoring of data subjects. The role of DPOs is to 
monitor internal compliance with the Regulation, monitoring the 
implementation and application of the policies and appropriate measures 
adopted by the controller. 
 
In addition, the Albrecht Report introduces amendments directed to compel data controllers to 
publish a regular report of their activities (Amendment 174) and to establish transparent 
information and communication to and with the data subject (Amendment 172).  
 
2. Notification of security breaches (Articles 31 and 32) 
 
3. Obligation to introduce the principles of data protection by design and by default in 
the design of new systems (Article 23). Concretely, this article entails that data 
controllers shall implement appropriate technical and organizational measures and 
procedures in such a way that the processing will meet the requirements of the 
Regulation and ensure the protection of the rights of the data subject. Such 
mechanisms should ensure an effective application of the data minimisation principle, 
the purpose specification principle and include access-right controls. The Albrecht 
Report put forwards amendments to further specify the content of the article 
(Amendments 41, 177, 178, 98). Amendment 98 is worth noticing as it suggests to 
introduce in article 5 a new general principle that would require producers of 
automated data processing systems (i.e. hard- and software) to take into account the 
principle of privacy by design and by default, even if they do not process personal data 
themselves. This means elevating the principles of privacy-by-default and privacy-by-
design to the rank of general data protection principles. 
 
4. EU certification mechanism and data protection seals and marks (Article 39). Such 
schemes should allow data subjects to quickly assess the level of data protection 
provided by controllers and processors and contribute to the proper application of the 
Regulation, taking into account the specific features of the various sectors and different 
processing operations. The EC is furthermore authorized to lay down technical 
standards for certification mechanisms and data protection seals and marks and 
mechanisms to promote and to recognize certification mechanisms and data protection 
seals and marks. Several amendments (51, 237, 238) contained in the Albrecht report 
seeks to further specify the conditions and characteristics of such schemes.  
 
4.3.6.4 Proposal for a Directive 
On 25 January 2011, the European Commission published a proposal for a Directive on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by competent 
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authorities for the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal 
offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and the free movement of such data (hereafter, 
the “Draft Directive”). At the date of writing, the proposal is still awaiting the first reading of 
the European Parliament. Several Committees of the European Parliament have already tabled 
a long list of amendments, most notably contained in the so-called Droustsas Report.597 The 
EDPS598, Article 29 Working Party599 have also published their Opinion on the proposal. We 
however only will refer to these amendments in so far as they modify in a substantial way the 
content of the new obligations. We also highlight the differences between the text of January 
2012 and the leaked text which circulated in November 2011 as the latest version considerably 
waters down the initial provisions relating to the accountability principle. 
 
Likewise the Draft Regulation, the principle of accountability is not introduced as such but 
through a new general principle of comprehensive responsibility and liability of the data 
controller (Article 4 (f)), who should ensure compliance with the provisions of the Directive. The 
wording does not reflect the obligation to demonstrate compliance as was initially contained in 
the leaked text from November 2011. All references explicitly made to the principle of 
accountability and to the obligation to demonstrate compliance in the explanatory 
memorandum of the proposal have also disappeared in the proposal of January 2012. This is 
thus a lighter version of the principle of accountability which has been opted for. This has been 
heavily criticised by both the EDPS600and Article 29 Working Party601 who called for the 
reintroduction of the provisions to make them consistent with the text of the Draft Regulation. 
The Droustsas report has put forward several amendments to reintroduce this obligation into 
the text of the Draft Directive (Amendments 24, 56 and 91).  
 
This general principle is further specified in a series of articles contributing to the accountability 
principle in the data protection framework, namely: 
 Obligation to adopt policies and mechanisms for ensuring and demonstrating 
compliance (Article 18) which include: 
o Obligation for controllers and processors to maintain documentation of all 
processing operations under their responsibility, instead of a general 
notification requirement to the supervisory authority (article 23) 
o Keeping of records (Article 24) 
o Implementation of security requirements (Article 27) 
o Designating a Data Protection Officer (Article 30) 
o Requirements for prior consultation of supervisory authorities (article 26) 
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 Notification of personal data breaches (article 28) and to communicate, in qualified 
circumstances to the data subject (article 29) 
 Member States must ensure the compliance of the controller with the obligations 
arising from the principles of data protection by design and by default (Article 19) 
In this sub-section, we only focus on the outstanding differences between the Draft Regulation 
and the Draft Directive. 
 
The general obligation of responsibility of the controller. 
Article 18.1 only introduces the obligation for data controllers to adopt policies and to 
implement appropriate measures to ensure that the processing is performed in compliance 
with the provisions of the Draft Directive. This article does not contain any obligation to 
demonstrate compliance upon request. Again, this provision is a watered down version of the 
one contained in the leaked draft which not only included an obligation to be able to 
demonstrate compliance but also extended this obligation to the assignment of internal 
responsibilities and the training of staff involved in the processing operation. 
 
Finally, it worth noticing that article 18 (former article 20) initially contained an obligation for 
data controller who publish a report (wherever this publication was voluntary or required by 
law) of its activities, that such report would contain the controller’s policies in relation to the 
protection of personal data, the risks linked to data processing by the controller and the 
measures taken to mitigate such risks. Exception was provided in cases when such publication 
was likely to jeopardize the protection of public interests or the security of processing. This 
obligation has been deleted from the proposal published in January 2012. 
 
Obligation to keep documentation 
While the wording of the obligation to keep documentation is similar to the one included into 
the Draft Regulation, there is no obligation to maintain documentation on time limits for the 
erasure of the different categories of data, nor on the verification mechanisms implemented, as 
the obligation to be able to demonstrate compliance has been suppressed from the proposal. 
 
The leaked text was much more comprehensive and included the obligation to keep 
documentation on two additional items: 
 An indication of the parts of the controllers’ or processor’s organization entrusted with 
the processing of personal data for a particular purpose 
 An indication of the legal basis of the processing operation for which the data are 
intended 
 
The Amendments contained in the Droustsas report first seek to reintroduce the items that 
have been suppressed from the leaked draft (Amendments 99, 100, 101, 104) and to extend 
the obligation to keep documentation on information about (a) the existence of profiling, of 
measures based on profiling, and of mechanisms to object to profiling, (b) the logic involved in 
any automated processing, (c) transfers to third countries and the legal ground on which the 
data is transferred. 
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The Droustsas report also looks to widen the scope of the information to be provided to the 
supervisory authority, to the categories of data subjects and of personal data processed, and a 
general indication of time limits for erasure, as suggested by the EDPS602. 
 
Obligation to keep records 
The Draft Directive imposes on data controllers to record all processing operations of personal 
data for purposes of verification of the lawfulness of the data processing, self-monitoring and 
for ensuring data integrity and data security. Records should be kept for at least the following 
processing operations: collection, alteration, consultation, disclosure, combination or erasure. 
These records should show the purpose, date and time of such operations and as far as possible 
the identification of the person who consulted or disclosed data.  
 
The requirement to make this information available on request to the supervisory authority has 
been removed from the January 2012 proposal. The Droutsas report, following the EDPS 
recommendation603, puts forward a specific amendment for its reintroduction (Amendment 
107), completed by a new recital (Amendment 26). Finally, amendment 106 looks to introduce 
the obligation to record the identity of the recipient of such data (as was worded in the leaked 
text) and to suppress the nuance introduced by the use of the term “as far as possible”. 
 
Implementation of data security requirements 
Article 27 of the Draft Directive contains a list of measures to be implemented by data 
controllers or processors, following an evaluation of the risks of the processing. These measures 
should be designed to: 
 deny unauthorised persons access to data-processing equipment used for 
processing personal data (equipment access control); 
 prevent the unauthorised reading, copying, modification or removal of data 
media (data media control); 
 prevent the unauthorised input of data and the unauthorised inspection, 
modification or deletion of stored personal data (storage control); 
 prevent the use of automated data-processing systems by unauthorised 
persons using data communication equipment (user control); 
 ensure that persons authorised to use an automated data-processing system 
only have access to the data covered by their access authorisation (data 
access control); 
 ensure that it is possible to verify and establish to which bodies personal data 
have been or may be transmitted or made available using data 
communication equipment (communication control); 
Amendment 114 and 115 of the Droutsas report foresees to align the text of the article with 
the one of the Draft Regulation and to extend this obligation to procedures and to data 
processors. 
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Prior consultation of the supervisory authority 
The Draft Directive introduces an obligation of prior consultation of the supervisory authority 
for processing of personal data which will form part of a new filing system where sensitive data 
are processed and where the type of processing, in particular, using new technologies, 
mechanisms or procedures, holds otherwise specific risks for the fundamental rights and 
freedoms, and in particular the protection of personal data, of data subjects. Member States 
may provide for the supervisory authority to make a list of the data processing activities which 
should be subject to prior consultation. 
 
The EDPS considers that the scope of the consultation procedure is too limited and should be 
aligned with the content of the Regulation604. However, taking into account that the scope of 
the obligation contained into the Regulation is based on the existence of DPIA which are absent 
from the text of the Directive, the EDPS suggests there should be an obligation for the 
controller or the processor to consult systematically the supervisory authority where a new 
processing operation is introduced in an existing filing system. In view of the EDPS, only an 
obligation to carry out a DPIA allows for the evaluation of risks and thus enables the 
assessment of whether prior consultation is required or not. The Droustsas report follows this 
recommendation and it tables two amendments in that sense (Amendment 28 and 111).  
 
Initially, supervisory authorities had the obligation to make proposals to remedy potential 
incompliance with the provisions of the Directive and could be consulted in the preparation of a 
legislative measure to be adopted by the national parliament in order to ensure compliance 
and to mitigate the risks involved for data subjects. Both measures were deleted in the 
proposal of January 2012 and are reintroduced in Amendments 112 and 113 of the Droustas 
report.  
 
Designating a Data Protection Officer 
While the provisions relating to the appointment of Data Protection Officer were much more 
detailed in the leaked text, in line with with the text of the Draft Regulation, the proposal put 
forward by the European Commission in January 2012 was much more concise. The Droutsas 
report tables a series of amendments (amendments 119 to 122) to reintroduce the original text 
and to ensure consistency with the text of the Draft Regulation. 
 
Data protection by design and by default  
The obligation to implement appropriate technical and organizational measures and 
procedures in such a way that the processing will meet the requirements of provisions adopted 
pursuant to the Directive which initially mirrored the text contained in the Draft Regulation has 
also been watered down. The obligation is now limited to implement mechanisms for ensuring 
that, by default, only those personal data which are necessary for the purposes of the 
processing are processed (article 19.2). References to the data minimization principle are 
deleted, as well as the requirement to ensure that the data are not made accessible to an 
indefinite number of individuals, by default. Amendment 93 of The Droustsas report, following 
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the critics formulated by the EDPS605 and Article 29 Working Party606, looks to reintroduce these 
aspects.  
 
Data Protection Impact Assessments  
Finally, the provisions for performing mandatory data protection impact assessments contained 
in the leaked text of November 2011 have disappeared from the proposal submitted on the 25 
January 2012. The EDPS607 points out that there is absolutely no justification for such deletion, 
more particularly when the specific nature of the processing operations carried out by law 
enforcement authorities makes it even more necessary to carry out such impact assessment608. 
Such instrument further contributes to the practical implementation of the principles of 
“privacy by design” and “privacy by default”. In that sense, Article 29 Working Party reminds 
that “one aspect of privacy by design is determining the risks of processing early on in the 
process and being able to mitigate those risks” and it urges to insert in the Directive provisions 
requiring a Data Protection Impact Assessment, including during the legislative procedure609. 
The Report Droustsas introduces a series of amendments that seek to reintroduce Data 
Protection Impact Assessments (Amendments 27, 92).  
 
4.3.7 Relevance for PARIS: Preliminary Criteria to Design Accountability 
Mechanisms in the SALT Framework. 
The review of these different initiatives revolving around the introduction of an accountability-
based approach in the data protection framework shows how they all converge on a series of 
basic features that should base any accountability mechanisms. In that sense, the 
Accountability projects, while mainly addressed to private organizations to overcome the 
difficulties proper to cross-border data exchanges, is valuable in that it systematizes the 
essential elements. It thus provides a sound basis on which building the design of 
accountability-based systems.  
 
This work should however be adjusted to the specifics of surveillance and it should be 
completed by studies carried out on privacy-by-design. As explained by Cavoukian et al, 
“privacy by design and accountability go together like innovation and high productivity. You can 
have one without the other, but it is hard.”610 While privacy-by-design and accountability are 
autonomous concepts that can operate independently, accountability relationships regulating 
data governance will greatly benefit from the tools provided by the privacy-by-design approach. 
Similarly, the privacy-by-design approach will surely develop more efficiently in a context where 
the organization is accountable to an external third party for its data governance policies, 
procedures and practices.  In that sense these authors show how the seven principles of privacy 
by design drawn by Dr. Cavoukian can be linked to the essential elements of accountability 
                                                     
605 Ibidem, §387-389 
606 WP191, p. 29 
607 EDPS, Opinion on the Data Protection Reform Package, §385 
608 Ibidem, §400 
609 WP191, p. 29 
610 Ann Cavoukian, Scott Taylor and Martin E. Abrams, “Privacy by Design: essential for organizational 
accountability and strong business practices”, Identity in the Information Society vol. 3-issue 2 (August 201): 
405-413, available at: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs12394-010-0053-z 
PARIS Project     Deliverable 2.1     v1.0 
31/07/2013    SEC - 312504      178 
identified by the Galway Project. Both approaches (accountability-based approach and privacy-
by-design) share the same goals and characteristics: 
1. They are both proactive not reactive; preventative not reactive. 
2. They set privacy as the default 
3. They seek to embed Privacy into the design of systems, procedures, policies 
4. They tend to match the different interests at stake to reach a result which is a positive 
sum of all, not a zero sum. Both approaches allow for a better understanding of the risks 
to both the organization and to individuals. 
5. They take an end-to-end lifecycle protection approach. 
6. They aim at increasing visibility and transparency of data governance practices to 
individuals and other relevant stakeholders. The accountable organization stands ready 
to demonstrate that it is open about what it practices, stands behind its assertions and 
is answerable when questions arise.  
7. Respect for User Privacy is at core of both approaches. 
 
Within the data protection framework, accountability is approached as implementation and 
enforcement mechanism of existing legal obligations. This is probably the reason why the EU 
rather uses the terms “responsibility” and “liability” than the one of accountability. It is 
however still to be seen how this accountability-based approach will be articulated with 
traditional enforcement mechanisms and which role it could play in making the legal 
framework more flexible without reducing its efficiency. Questions such as the ones raised by 
the Accountability project about how accountability would work with existing legal regimes, 
how to establish the credibility of third party accountability programs and to ensure scalability 
for SMEs, remain pending of resolution. It is however already possible to draw the general 
features of the system to be incorporated to the European legal framework. This system relies 
on four main streams: 
1. Adoption of policies and measures to demonstrate compliance with the rule 
which includes: keeping documentation of all data processing operations; 
implementing data security requirements; Data protection Impact Assessments; 
prior consultation/authorization of supervisory authorities; appointment of data 
protection officers 
2. Notification of security breaches 
3. Data protection by design and by default 
4. EU certification mechanisms and data protection seals and marks. 
As mentioned above, while, the introduction of the principles of data protection by design and 
by default does not generate accountability relationship, contrary to the other three streams, 
they however form important tools for the introduction of sound accountable data governance 
practices within an organization.  
 
It is however too early to see how the accountability-based approach will be operationalized in 
practice. This becomes even more blurry when looking at the Draft Directive, applicable to law 
enforcement, which only contain a watered-down version of the accountability-based approach 
included into the Draft Regulation. It is however worth noticing that the approach taken by the 
European Union is likely to end up introducing within the legislative framework the principles of 
privacy by design as a core tool for the introduction of an accountability-based approach to 
data protection, even if not explicitly. 
PARIS Project     Deliverable 2.1     v1.0 
31/07/2013    SEC - 312504      179 
 
As regard the operationalization of the principle of accountability, the most accomplished work 
in the field is certainly the one performed in Canada where the principle of accountability is 
already and clearly introduced into the data protection framework. This principle is 
accompanied by an obligation of due diligence every time the data are transferred to third 
parties on behalf of the data controller. In addition, the legal framework contains the basic 
features of what an accountability-based approach should entail in the context of data 
processing operations (namely, to appoint “one or several individuals accountable for 
organizations’ compliance –privacy officers; to implement policies and practices to protect 
personal information, procedure to handle complaints and inquiries, staff training and 
communication to explain policies and procedures). This has allowed the Canadian supervisory 
authorities to develop very specific and detailed guidelines to implement Privacy Management 
Programs. These guidelines not only integrate all basic elements identified in the Accountability 
projects but they also go further into the details of what should be a sound Privacy 
Management Program.  
 
These guidelines are however not designed with surveillance practices in mind and while 
forming a valuable basis for the definition of criteria for the SALT framework, they should be 
adapted to the specifics of such technologies. As mentioned above, this issue will be dealt with 
in the next PARIS deliverable (D.2.2). 
 
 Based on the review of the initiatives which aim at introducing an accountability-based 
approach within the data protection framework, a series of preliminary criteria can be 
extracted for the design of accountability schemes. 
 
Organisations willing to implement an accountability-based approach for their personal data 
governance will first need to identify clearly what they are accountable for and to whom. As 
mentioned above, organizations can be accountable for existing law and regulation, private 
sector oversight programs, privacy promises, ongoing risk assessment and mitigation. They can 
be accountable to different stakeholders such as individuals who expect their data to be 
secured and to be used and managed responsibly, regulators who require that organisations 
comply with applicable law and regulation and business partners.  Answers to these questions 
will condition the scale and nature of the measures to be implemented in the Privacy 
Management Programs. Such Programs should be seen as a way for accountable organizations 
to ensure they are able to give account of their data governance policies, procedures and 
practices whenever requested. They are therefore called to play a core role in any 
accountability scheme or relationship 
 
Privacy management Programs should be articulated around three main lines: 
 Policies and commitments. Organizations should design and implement privacy policies 
and procedures to enforce them, which ensure compliance with the data protection 
framework and other obligations stemming from voluntary standards or contractual 
relationships. This also means to obtain high-level commitment to protect individual 
privacy (senior management support), to appoint someone who is responsible for the 
program (such as a Data Protection Officer), to ensure meaningful transparency 
mechanisms (i.e. to communicate clearly to stakeholders such as data subjects about 
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the content of the policies and procedure) and finally to show willingness to 
demonstrate capacity to uphold promises and obligations. 
 Implementation mechanisms. Procedures should be implemented to ensure that the 
commitments taken by organisations to protect users’ privacy is effectively 
implemented internally and to help ensure that what is mandated in the governance 
structure is implemented in the organization. This includes to provide adequate staff 
training, to implement internal reporting procedures, to proceed to an inventory of the 
personal data processed and to identity data flows, to define procedures to handle 
complaints, to conduct periodic privacy risk assessments  as privacy risks evolve over 
time, and to implement event management protocols (i.e. in case of data breach) 
 Assurance practices. Organizations should be able to monitor and evaluate the 
soundness and effectiveness of the policies and procedures in place as well as to make 
real-time course corrections where necessary. This means to develop an oversight and 
review plan and to periodically assess and revise program controls.  
 
Finally, as framed by the Accountability projects, it is worth reminding that when introducing an 
accountability scheme within the legal framework, such scheme can be modulated into several 
stages, depending on the organisation’s level of commitment/rights of authority given to the 
accountee. The first two stages could be approached as accountability relationships in their 
broad sense, in that the accountor (who should be identified but is likely to be incardinated into 
citizens and consumers) does not have any right of authority over the accountor, in the sense of 
imposing sanctions. The last two stages reflect accountability relationships understood in their 
narrow sense, where the accountor should abide by the decisions made by the accountee.  
1. First stage.- The organization takes appropriate measures to establish processes and 
procedures that implement its privacy policies 
2. Second stage.- The organization self-certified that it meets the requirements of 
accountability 
3. Third stage.- The supervisory authority or recognized accountability agent reviews such 
filings and provide some form of acceptance of the certification 
4. Fourth stage.- The organization submits to enforcement by the supervisory authority or 
recognized accountability agent. . 
4.4 Main Notions in a Graph 
The graph below shows, in a simplified way and with the only purpose of illustrating the 
different notions used in this Chapter, how accountability relationships in surveillance systems 
could arise and intertwine. The different actors part to these relationships appears either on 
the first line, if they act as accountors (Who gives the account), or in the second line if they act 
as accountees (To whom is the account given). The third line indicates what can be the object 
of the account. Finally the fourth line indicates whether this relationship is likely to be framed 
as an accountability relationship understood in its broad or narrow sense (respectively, as 
“answerability” or “compliance”). 
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Figure 4: Accountability relationships 
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5 Privacy from a Computer Engineering Perspective 
 
Antonio Maña and Francisco Jaime (UMA), Zhendong Ma and Bernhard Strobl (AIT), Víctor 
Manuel Hidalgo (Visual Tools) and Mathias Bossuet (Thales) 
5.1 Principles of Privacy in ICT Systems 
Some of the most common principles for privacy in ICT systems are summarized in OECD’s 
Privacy Principles document611. There are eight OECD principles that correspond in great part to 
the legal requirements explained in the preceding section: 
1. Collection limitation: there should be limits to the collection of personal data, preferably 
with data subject’s consent. 
2. Data quality: personal data should be relevant to the usage purpose, accurate, complete 
and up-to-date. 
3. Purpose specification: purpose of data collection should be specified and fulfilled. 
4. Use limitation: personal data should normally not be disclosed, or used for purposes 
other than those specified. 
5. Security safeguards: personal data should be protected by security safeguards. 
6. Openness principle: there should be a policy of openness about developments and 
practices of personal data. 
7. Individual participation: an individual should have the right to obtain information from a 
data controller on data related to him. 
8. Accountability: a data controller should be accountable for complying with the 
principles. 
A similar set of principles has also been proposed for privacy in databases612, called 
“Hippocratic databases”. Specifically, the principles are: 
1. Purpose specification. 
2. Consent. 
3. Limited collection. 
4. Limited use. 
5. Limited disclosure. 
6. Limited retention. 
7. Accuracy. 
8. Safety. 
9. Openness. 
10. Compliance. 
                                                     
611
 OECD, “Annex to the Recommendation of the Council of 23rd September 1980: OECD Guidelines on the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (Part 2),” www.oecd.org 
612
 R. Agrawa, J. Kiernan, R. Srikant, and Y. Xu, “Hippocratic databases,” In VLDB '02: Proceedings of the 28th 
international conference on Very Large Data Bases (2002), pp. 143-154. 
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From the two sets of privacy principles, it is obvious that the centrepiece of privacy is personal 
data. The stakeholders around personal data are the individuals (data subjects), data 
controllers and third parties such as law enforcement actors. Hence the privacy principles 
provide guidelines on the handling of personal data and the interaction (i.e., “rule of the 
game”) among the stakeholders. 
From a system development point of view, privacy can be regarded as a non-functional 
requirement of ICT systems. Hence, two issues need to be taken into account when applying 
these principles: 
A balance between privacy and system functionality: privacy might have an inadvertent effect 
on a system’s performance and the capability. There should be a balance between the 
measures and resources for a system’s functional requirements and those non-functional 
requirements like privacy. 
A balance between security and privacy613: security and privacy are both non-functional 
requirements. Privacy is closely related to security. Security is the baseline to fulfil many 
privacy objectives. However, privacy can also create conflicting system requirements with 
respect to security. For example, anonymity sometimes conflicts with identification and 
authentication for security. 
Conceptually, there are many links between privacy principles and information security, 
typically modelled as a triad of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA). As shown in 
Figure 1, the eight OECD privacy principles614 can be loosely related to the information security 
triad around confidentiality and integrity, except for security safeguards, which are for both 
privacy and security. 
5.2 Concepts Related to ICT Privacy 
The privacy principles establish an overarching framework for many activities that address 
privacy challenges at the technological level. Within the framework of these principles, the 
researcher community has developed a comprehensive list of concepts related to ICT privacy. 
The most representative list is presented as privacy terminologies615. We list the relevant ICT 
privacy concepts below: 
Anonymity: anonymity of a subject means that the subject is not identifiable with a set of 
subjects, the anonymity set. Hence, we can derive that a subject is anonymous it its 
anonymity holds. 
                                                     
613
 Security is understood here from the point of view of ‘data security’ 
614
 We use the most representative OECD privacy principles. 
615 A. Pfitzmann and M. Hansen et al., “A terminology for talking about privacy by data minimization: 
Anonymity, Unlinkability, Undetectability, Unobservability, Pseudonymity, and Identity Management,” Tech. 
Report, v0.34, Aug. 2010, http://dud.inf.tu-dresden.de/literatur/Anon_Terminology_v0.34.pdf 
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Figure 5. Privacy Principles and Information Security Triad 
Pseudonymity: a pseudonym is an identifier of a subject other than the subject’s real name. The 
subject is pseudonymous if a pseudonym is used as identifier instead of one of its real 
names. Pseudonymity is the use of pseudonyms as identifiers. 
Unlinkability: unlinkability of two or more items of interest (e.g., subjects, messages, actions, 
etc.) from an attacker’s perspective means that within the system, the attack cannot 
sufficiently distinguish whether these items of interest are related or not. Linkability is the 
negation of unlinkability. 
Undetectability and unobservability: undetectability of an item of interest from an attacker’s 
perspective means that the attacker cannot sufficiently distinguish whether it exists or not. 
Unobservability of an item of interest means undetectability of the item of interest against 
all subjects uninvolved in it and anonymity of the subjects involved in the item of interest 
even against the other subjects involved in that item of interest. 
 
From a technical point of view, to achieve privacy in an ICT system usually means to achieve 
one or more of the above concepts. For example, when privacy is of concern, we do data 
anonymisation for the records in a database, aim for anonymity or pseudonymity for an identity 
management system, or achieve anonymous usage of location-based services. Table 1 below 
gives a short description of ICT systems examples and the privacy concepts involved. 
 
Example systems System description 
Privacy concept in the 
application domain 
Database system A database is a collection of structured data. A 
database captures and represents real-world 
information with abstract records and the 
relationships between records. Database system 
is a system for the storing, manipulation, 
Data privacy 
K-anonymity 
L-Diversity 
T-Closeness 
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retrieving of data and the management of 
database.   
(c,t) – Isolation
616
 
 
Identity management 
System (IdM) 
Identity management systems (IdM) are 
information systems and technologies for identity 
management, including the management of 
identities, their roles and privileges within one or 
cross multiple security domains. 
ID privacy 
Anonymous identity 
Pseudonym 
Location-based 
Services (LBS) 
Information services that use a user’s location 
data (spatial and temporal) for location related, 
tailored services. Typically a user interacts with a 
service provider with his mobile device. 
Location privacy 
Anonymous ID or Pseudonym 
Location anonymisation 
Table 1. Example ICT Systems and the Privacy Concepts Involved 
5.3  Concepts of Privacy-Enhancing Technology 
The privacy principles and concepts do not automatically achieve privacy in ICT systems. To 
enforce privacy in ICT systems, we need measures that reduce personal data disclosure and 
ensure only authorized party can process or access personal data. These ICT measures are 
referred to as Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (PET). The following table provides an overview 
of the existing PETs. 
PET Description 
Encryption Data can be encrypted such that only one with the right decryption key can read 
the original data. Data encryption achieves data privacy during communication 
and data storage. 
Access control Privacy is about an individual’s control over the collection and access to his 
personal data. Access control controls who can access data and how the data 
can be accessed according to defined access policies.  
Privacy policy specification and 
enforcement 
Privacy policy defines a set of privacy rules on how personal data is handled 
throughout the data lifecycle in a system. Coupled with right policy enforcement 
mechanisms, privacy can be achieved according to the system designer and user 
preferences. 
Anonymisation Data anonymisation removes identity information in personal data such that it is 
not possible to link a data item to an identifiable person. 
Pseudonym Pseudonyms are used where identification is needed. Pseudonyms can be 
chained to provide conditional anonymity, i.e., an authorized party can link a 
pseudonym to a real person under certain circumstance. 
Privacy proxy A privacy proxy acts on behalf of a user to interact with an untrusted third party 
to hide the real identity of the user. 
Obfuscation A technique to deliberately degrade the quality of a data set such that the data 
can no longer be linked to an identifiable person. 
Mix network/mix zone A mix network is a store-and-forward network that conceals a user’s identity 
and action by relaying a user’s messages within the network before forwarding 
them to the final destination. A mix zone applies the same concept to conceal a 
user’s movement. 
Table 2. Overview of Existing PETs 
                                                     
616 B. Fung, K. Wang, R, Chen, and P. Yu, “Privacy-Preserving data publishing: a survey of recent 
developments,” ACM Computing Surveys, 42(4), 2010. 
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5.4 Privacy Concepts Used in Videosurveillance  
Video surveillance technology has gained significant progress in recent years in terms of video 
capabilities (e.g., high zooms, automatic controls, night vision, and video analytics) and storage 
capacity. At the same time, video surveillance becomes more pervasive as the coverage of 
surveillance systems increases. This makes video surveillance privacy very challenging. 
 
To address the challenges, the following concepts have been proposed in the past: 
Decoupling personal data from video data.  As proposed by A. Cavarello617, advanced video 
signal processing capability can be embedded into smart cameras such as separate data 
stream: a metadata stream describing instance, trajectories, and a video stream capturing 
personal data, are sent to different locations in the system, where surveillance operators can 
only see the rendered metadata stream. The implementation of the concept can be done at 
the source of the data flow, i.e., the cameras. 
Differentiated access to video data. Other authors618 propose a privacy-preserving video 
console. The system design is based on six basic questions related to a video privacy model: 
(1) what data is present, (2) has the subject given consent, (3) what form does the data take, 
(4) who sees the data, (5) how long is data kept, and (6) how raw is the data. The system 
controls the data presentation and the rawness of that data. The system manages operator 
access to different versions of video-derived data according to an access control list defined 
using the video privacy model. The implementation of the concept requires a system-wide 
design and many enforcement points. 
The privacy concepts applied in video surveillance systems also use those PETs for non-video 
ICT systems, for example619: 
Privacy information identification. Privacy-related information is identified in the video data, 
such as a person’s face, his or her clothing with specialties (e.g. cloth color), etc. 
Data obfuscation. Video obfuscation techniques are then used to modify, replace, or remove 
the privacy information from video data. Such obfuscation techniques include black box, 
pixilation, blurring, and object replacement and removal. 
Privacy data management. As unmodified video data is also needed in video surveillance 
systems. A challenge is how to manage privacy data, i.e. how to provide a mechanism to 
enable legitimate users (e.g. law enforcement) to access privacy information in video data. 
In addition, technical concepts aiming at qualifying the quality of the video-stream and its 
usability to extract privacy data have been standardized. The most used is the rotakin factor, 
commonly used e.g. to specify minimal characteristics of a video-surveillance system to allow 
identification of a filmed person by a human operator. 
                                                     
617 A. Cavallaro, “Privacy in video surveillance,” IEEE Signal Processing Magazine [168], 2007. 
618 A. Senior, S. Pankanti, A. Hampapur, L. Brown, Y. Tian, A. Ekin, J. Connell, C. Fe Shu, and M. Lu, “Enabling 
Video Privacy through Computer Vision,” IEEE Security and Privacy, 3(3), 50-57, May 2005. 
619 A. Senior (Ed.), “Protecting privacy in video surveillance,” Springer, 2009. 
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5.5 Privacy by Design and PIAs in Surveillance Systems 
4.5.1 Privacy by Design 
Privacy by design has gained a wide recognition in the privacy research community in recent 
years. How to embed privacy and data protection throughout the entire life cycle of video 
surveillance systems, from design to deployment, operation and ultimate disposal is a very 
challenging issue. 
  
A large amount of uncertainties exists in the life cycle of a video surveillance system. For 
example, from customer requirements to system designer’s decision on technology and actual 
hardware and software. This is only in the design time. More issues arise during the system run 
time. These issues can be very dynamic. For example, who should be allowed to access video 
data besides the operator, or how can we ensure privacy if the owner or operator of a 
surveillance system uses video data other than real-time monitoring of events in their 
perimeter? Many issues are hard to foresee during design time. 
 
Having privacy by design as an ultimate goal, our research in the PARIS project aims to come up 
with an implementable privacy by design practice based on the “State-of-the-Practice” and the 
combined expertise of the PARIS consortium. The privacy by design practice will be developed 
to cope with the uncertainties, to some extent, during the video surveillance system life cycle. 
 
4.5.2 Privacy Impact Assessment and Computer Engineering 
Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) refers to systematic processes intended to evaluate the impact 
upon Privacy of a technological tool or a technological system. The PIA approach is based on 
systematic auditing methods and can for this reason be compared to risk assessment. The 
system under assessment is submitted to a predefined listed of questions related to Privacy 
harms and Privacy protections.  
 
PIA is most of the time applied before the deployment of a system to ensure that new projects 
comply with information privacy principles and to identify the potential effects that a proposal 
may have upon individual privacy. PIA is often referred to as an “early warning system”.  
 
PIA is a new approach to privacy and is mainly held by governmental organizations and applied 
to whole systems. PIA is not well taken into account in the computer engineering field. 
5.6 Advances in New Technologies and their Impacts on Privacy 
The different advances made in technology have led to an increased probability of user’s 
privacy to be breached. Several trends within the technological world have made this possible. 
The first trend regards to the constant improvements made to hardware. On one hand, these 
hardware improvements have resulted in an increase of the speed at which information can be 
analyzed. On the other hand, the amount of information that can be recollected and stored has 
also significantly increased. 
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The second trend is related to the increasing connectedness of the hardware over networks, 
which enhances the processing capacity. In this way, different hardware devices connected 
through Internet can process the information. 
The third trend is the outstanding software advances. These advances have greatly improved 
the algorithms for extracting information stored both, locally and remotely on the network. 
Finally, the fourth trend relates to the creation of companies and organizations responsible for 
collecting, organizing and analyzing the information they have, or which third parties have 
provided. 
At present, there are technologies that enable various companies and organizations to collect, 
aggregate, analyze and share information of people with different objectives. For example, 
Global Positioning System (GPS) locators attached to trucks can provide near-real-time 
information on their whereabouts and even their speed, giving truck-shipping companies the 
opportunity to monitor the behaviour of their drivers. 
5.6.1 Hardware Advances 
During the last years, hardware technology has increased exponentially. This growth has greatly 
increased the computation speed. Thanks to this, computational tasks that were too complex 
for being processed in an acceptable time by ancient computers can now be tackled easily. 
For example, CPUs have made a great performance improvement, and memory size has been 
multiplied by a factor of 100 or more. All this has resulted not only to a higher computation 
speed, but also to the ability to handle large amounts of data, which was not possible in the 
past. Furthermore, it is important to highlight the expansion of capabilities to store 
information. As a consequence, data can be stored for longer periods of time. A good example 
of this is shown by the capacity to store video streams in high quality, which can take up several 
megabytes of storage for each second of video. In the past, this was just too much information 
to be stored for long periods. All these improvements are linked to a reduction in costs, 
allowing different organizations to rapidly increase their capabilities in processing and data 
storage. 
With more data (including more kinds of data) being kept in its raw form, arises the following 
concern: every electronic transaction a person ever enters into can be kept in readily available 
storage, and audio and video footage of all public activities of that person could also be 
available. This information, originally gathered for purposes of commerce, public safety, health 
care, or for some other reasons, could then be available for other uses than those originally 
intended. The fear lies in the temptation to use all of this information, either by a governmental 
agency, by private corporations or even individuals, which is so great that it will be nearly 
impossible to guarantee the privacy of anyone from some sort of prying eye, if not now, then in 
the future. 
Another important hardware trend is the evolution of specific devices. These devices have 
moved from analog to digital data generation, from devices on specialized networks to those 
connected to larger networks, and from expensive and specialized devices only deployed under 
rare circumstances, to cheap and ubiquitous devices either too small or too common to be 
generally noticed. Examples of this kind of devices are cameras, biometric devices, mobile 
phones, global positioning sensors, etc. 
With the increase in hardware performance, more data can be processed, and this together 
with an improved storage has allowed for storing much more details about individuals than 
before. Besides, the connection of different devices to the network enables generated data to 
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move around it. As a consequence, due to the increase of processing and storage capacity, and 
the possibility of exchanging different data among different devices, it is possible to get more 
information about people. 
5.6.2 Software Advances 
Once we have seen the different hardware advances, we will see the software related advances 
that impact over people’s privacy. Software has reached significant improvements, especially in 
the area of information fusion or data integration techniques, data mining and new algorithms. 
All these techniques have greatly facilitated the capacity of data extraction. Besides, distributed 
computing and parallel techniques have led to the possibility of having several devices working 
together to solve a problem that could not previously be solved by a single machine due to 
different constraints. 
Information fusion is the process that combines different sources of information in order to 
obtain more accurate, reliable and robust information. This information will be used to make 
better decisions than those obtained from a single data source. A good example of these 
techniques is the information that hospitals handle related to their patients. Hospitals can 
share their patients’ information in order to make new findings by the analysis of the fused 
information. However, since patient privacy must be kept, the exact information should not be 
shared, unless the information disclosed by any hospital keeps their patients anonymity. 
Data mining is the computational process of discovering patterns in large data sets involving 
methods at the intersection of artificial intelligence, machine learning, statistics, and database 
systems. The overall goal of the data mining process is to search, analyze and aggregate 
different data in order to extract information from a data set and transform it into an 
understandable structure for further use.  A good example about how this kind of technique 
could affect people’s privacy can be read in this report620.  According to this report, some 
important companies found suitable to expand its data mining to combine users' personal data 
across all their accounts and services, including mail, internet searching, map and location 
information, and photo sharing, with no way for individuals to opt out. 
Finally, thanks to the algorithm progress we are able to obtain information that was 
unthinkable a few years ago due to hardware limitations or lack of knowledge. Besides, hard 
work in algorithms optimization has made them faster. For example, advances in computer 
vision have allowed tracking several persons at the same time basing on different features such 
as the colour of their clothes, heights or motion detected in the image. 
As a result of the improvements in both speed and efficiency of software and hardware, 
computation tasks that were unthinkable only a short time ago are now possible on low-cost, 
commodity hardware running commercially available software. Some of these new tasks 
involve the extraction of information about the individual from data gathered from a variety of 
sources. A concern from the privacy point of view is that—given the extent of the ability to 
aggregate, correlate, and extract new information from seemingly innocuous information—it is 
now difficult to know what activities will in fact compromise the privacy of an individual. 
5.6.3 Advances in Connectivity and Ubiquity 
If we combine advances in software and hardware together with connectivity in the digital age, 
a multiplier effect is obtained.  In this way, a computer connected to Internet can take 
                                                     
620 http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/oct/15/google-privacy-policy?newsfeed=true 
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advantage of other devices in terms of computational power, storage capacity and the data 
stored in them. 
Connectivity has an important link with hardware, since improvements in network technology 
have made possible that data transferred over the network had increased considerably. As a 
result, the network has become a common and very useful way for exchanging data among 
different systems. From the privacy point of view, interconnectivity simplifies information 
access from anywhere in the world, allowing different devices and organizations to share 
information related to people. If in addition to connectivity we add hardware improvements 
and enhancements in software techniques, individuals’ privacy can be seriously affected. 
5.6.4 Conclusions 
As a conclusion, the use that organizations or some individuals make of technology has the 
potential to threaten the privacy of people. Once the data are collected and stored, they are 
available for analysis. In addition, computers connected to the network can share any data and 
aggregate them to its source of information. Such process generates more data on an 
individual, and this information at the same time can be stored and shared with other devices. 
The new surveillance is less visible and more continuous in time and space, provides fewer 
opportunities for targets to object to or prevent the surveillance, is greater in analytical power, 
produces more enduring data, is disseminated faster and more widely, and is less expensive. 
Essentially, all these changes represent additional surveillance capabilities at a lower cost, and 
exploitation of these changes would bode ill for the protection of privacy. 
5.7 Applications 
In this section we are going to examine the different surveillance technologies that can have an 
impact on the privacy of the user. 
We can classify the different surveillance systems based on their technology. Based on that, we 
can divide the different surveillance technologies in: visual surveillance, biometrics, 
dataveillance, communications surveillance, sensors, and location technologies. Here, it is 
important to highlight that we are going to do a special emphasis on video surveillance and 
biometrics since the SALT concept is going to be validated for these technologies. 
5.7.1 Visual Surveillance 
We can divide this group in five areas: video surveillance, imaging scanners, UAVs, satellites and 
photography. 
5.7.1.1 Video Surveillance 
This type of surveillance uses video cameras for the purpose of observing an area. Data 
collected by theses cameras is usually recorded and may be watched by the surveillance system 
operator (or law enforcement officer). For this reason, they are commonly connected to a 
recording device or an IP network. Cameras and recording equipment used to be relatively 
expensive in the past, and they required human personnel to monitor camera footage. But 
analysis of footage has been made easier by automated software that organizes digital video 
footage into a searchable database, and by video analysis software. The amount of footage has 
also been drastically reduced by motion sensors, which allows recording only when motion is 
detected. With cheaper production techniques, nowadays surveillance cameras are simple and 
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inexpensive enough to be used even in home security systems, as well as for everyday 
surveillance. 
5.7.1.2 Imaging Scanners 
Imaging scanners are systems that generate visible images based on the detection of non-
visible waves of the electromagnetic spectrum. For this purpose, these systems can use infrared 
scanners, sonar imaging, thermal imaging, x-ray imaging, radiation or millimetre wave imaging. 
A good example of these systems is the use of infrared barriers to detect intrusion in restricted 
areas at the outer. Another good example of the use of these systems can be found in how 
authorities have followed the attacks in the Boston marathon (2013), since police used thermal 
cameras to detect the presence of the suspect in a boat. 
These devices can be easily made and they can reproduce the images on a computer screen 
through walls from across a street. Some of these devices are portable and can be attached to 
drones or helicopters. However, others are fixed in place. Each one of these systems can detect 
chemical components and weapons, while some of them also incorporate privacy enhancing 
technology (PET) elements, such as remote operator workstations or software filters that blur 
sensitive areas of the body. 
While infrared, thermal and other types of portable imaging scanners have been available to 
law enforcement agencies for some time, the use of body scanners in airports and other 
locations is relatively recent, but increasingly widespread.  Body scanners are widely used in 
airports of different countries such as The Netherlands, USA, Canada, Spain, Russia or Australia. 
Besides airports, body scanners are also being used in other contexts, such as border crossings 
and security purposes (weapons, drugs or other prohibited materials). Thermal and infrared 
imaging scanners may also be used for disaster relief or emergency response (searching for 
survivors) and by various government, law enforcement and security authorities to search for 
suspects or gather information about the number and location of occupants inside a building. 
5.7.1.3 UAVs 
An Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), commonly known as drone, is an aircraft without a human 
pilot on board. Its flight is controlled either autonomously by computers in the vehicle, or under 
the remote control of a pilot on ground or in another vehicle. These vehicles can accommodate 
different devices as cameras, sensors or other information gathering equipment. UAVs are 
typically used for military operations. However, they can also be used in civilian applications. 
UAVs are designed for dangerous works, and so avoid endangering the lives of pilots. Another 
important characteristic about UAVs is that they can be very difficult to detect by their target 
because they can work in silence. 
We can find some examples of use of this kind of devices in policing, border control, emergency 
response and monitoring environmental hazards. Police forces use these devices to monitor 
individuals such as squatters, festivalgoers, hooligans, and demonstrators and undocumented 
workers. 
5.7.1.4 Satellites 
Earth observation, communication and other satellites have been orbiting the Earth since the 
beginning of the space program. Initially, these satellites were used for military purposes. More 
recently, such satellites have been used for civilian applications. Satellites have helped law 
enforcement in intercepting or obtaining information from mobile phones, radio transmissions, 
emails, IP addresses or file transfers. Satellites also assist the army and other state authorities 
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in reconnaissance operations, and can take static photographs or video of places or people. 
Satellites also provide services such as location based services for mobile phones, satellite 
navigation services for cars or other vehicles, vehicle location tracking and recovery services, 
tracking of individuals, emergency services, environmental management (such as erosion 
tracking), disaster response services and images for entertainment. Drivers, employees, smart 
phones’ owners and others who use location services can be strongly affected. 
5.7.1.5 Photography 
Photos of different individuals can be taken from several devices at different locations.  The 
most historic device that performs this function is the portable camera.  Nowadays, we can find 
different portable devices, such as mobile phones, which can take and store photos of people. 
Even these photos can carry related data associated with the place where they were taken 
and/or the time when they were shot. These photos can be used to identify people or objects, 
which may later disclose information relating to individuals (i.e. number plates).  For example, 
police uses a radar system for vehicles in order to detect when a car exceeds certain speed 
limits. When this happens, the system takes a photo in order to identify the owner’s vehicle 
through its number plate. 
Photography can be used for identification purposes including, but not limited to, mug shots, 
passports, driving licenses and other identity documents. Police or other authorities may also 
use this type of surveillance to monitor traffic offenses such as speed cameras, red light 
cameras, bus lane cameras, etc. Finally, this surveillance system may be used for less 
conventional forms of surveillance such as “happy slapping” by young people. 
5.7.2 Biometrics 
In recent years, biometric systems have considerably grown and we can see how a large 
number of people use them every day. A good example of these systems lies on those that 
allow us to enter in rooms with restricted access, or those that allow companies to monitor the 
time their employees spend on their work places. 
In any case, before talking in more detail about biometric technology, it is very important to 
have a clear idea about these systems behaviour. For this reason, we are going to see some 
basic definitions in order to facilitate this task. 
The word Biometric comes from ancient Greek words Bios for life and Metron for measure. 
According to its origin, we can understand the biometric word as the measures of different data 
related to life.  But, what do we understand by biometric data? 
Biometric data: “Biological properties, behavioural aspects, physiological characteristics, 
living traits or repeatable actions where those features and/or actions are both unique to 
that individual and measurable”621. 
Based on the above definition, we know that biometric data are unique and we can measure 
them through some specific system with a very particular purpose. These systems are called 
biometric systems and they can be defined as follow: 
Biometric system: “application that uses biometric data in order to allow the automatic 
identification, and/or authentication/verification, and/or categorization of a person”622. 
                                                     
621 Article 29 Working Party, WP136, p. 8, WP193, p. 3 (Available at: -
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2007/wp136_en.pdf) 
622 Article 29 Working Party, WP193, p. 5 (Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-
29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2012/wp193_en.pdf) 
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Once we have seen what a biometric data and a biometric system mean, we will show the 
requirements a biometric data must satisfy to define a system as a biometric system: 
Universality: All the individuals should own the characteristic. 
Uniqueness: The characteristic should be enough to distinguish any individual. 
Permanence: The characteristic should be invariant over time. 
Measurable: The characteristic has to be measured qualitatively. 
In theory, the previous requirements are the only necessary ones. However, in practice we have 
to take into account some other requirements: 
Performance:  Refers to the level of accuracy and speed of recognition of the system, taking 
into account the operational and environmental factors involved. In these systems, accuracy 
is frequently defined in terms of the percentage of false positives and false negatives. 
Acceptability: Refers to the extent of the population that would be predisposed to accept the 
identification system. 
Resistance to circumvention: Refers to how easy it would be to cheat the system with 
fraudulent techniques. 
Once we have seen the main characteristics that any biometric data must have, we are going to 
introduce the main different phases in which a biometric data is processed within a biometric 
system. These four phases are: acquisition, enrolment, storage and matching. 
Acquisition: In this phase, the biometric system gets the biometric data via some type of sensor 
(e.g., camera, finger print reader…). 
Enrolment: In this phase the biometric system extracts the specific features from a biometric 
data. These features are used to generate a template, which is then linked to an individual. A 
good example of this could be an access control using a face recognition system in order to 
allow people to enter in a specific room.  Everybody who is going to have enough permission 
to go into the room needs the system to previously obtain their appropriate data during the 
enrolment process. 
Storage: The features obtained in the enrolment phase must be stored (i.e. a centralized 
database). 
Matching: The next time someone uses the system, after the individual enrolment and data 
storage phases, the system will generate a template for the current individual that will be 
compared against the database data in order to know whether the individual is accepted or 
not. 
The goal of all these phases is to know whether the individual is going to be accepted or not. 
Therefore, these systems have two traditional basic operations: identification and 
verification/authentication. In addition, due to the latest technological developments, is also 
possible to perform another operation mode: categorization/segregation. 
Identification: The system attempts to detect the identity of an individual without that 
individual claiming a particular identity. In this case the template generated by the biometric 
system is compared with all the templates previously stored. 
Verification/authentication: The biometric system authenticates an individual’s claimed 
identity. For that, the template generated by the biometric system is only compared against 
the enrolled template corresponding to the desired person. 
Categorization: In this operation mode it is not important to identify or verify the identity of the 
person, but if his/her biometric data belongs to a specific group.  For example, if the user is a 
woman or a man, the system will behave in a different way. 
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After explaining the main concepts of biometrics and the different features that biometric data 
must satisfy, the following question arises: why are biometrics used? 
If we don’t use biometric systems, the mechanisms that a person has to verify his/her identity 
or to identify himself/herself are: using a password, a cryptography key, a smart card or 
something similar. But this kind of methods is associated to some security problems. For 
example, the password, cryptography key or smart card could be forgotten, lost, stolen or even 
the own user could share them with others. As a consequence, the integrity of the system could 
be put at risk. Biometrics exploits the fact that certain biological characteristics are unique and 
unalterable and are also impossible to miss, transfer or forget. Furthermore, they require the 
presence of the person at the moment of the identification.  This makes them more reliable and 
secure than passwords. 
Biometric systems can be used in numerous contexts such as security, e-commerce, law 
enforcement, health, social services and surveillance. Below, we are going to assess the current 
technologies that can be found in the market. 
 
5.7.2.1 Fingerprint Recognition 
This technology is based on identifying an individual through its fingerprint. The skin on the 
surface of a fingerprint consists of raised folds of skin, known as ridges, which are separated by 
valleys. Its operation takes a fingertip image and then reduces such image to a template 
(mathematical representation of the fingerprint). Next, a biometric device stores this template. 
Furthermore, the template is linked with something that associates the user with the 
fingerprint, such as an identification number or the user’s name. Then, each time the person 
needs to be identified, for example to record his/her hours of admission, or to return to work, 
he/she places his/her finger on the reader. 
Some of the features used to establish the mathematical representation of the fingerprint are 
the core, the delta and the minutiae. The core is the centre point of a particular fingerprint, the 
delta is a point where three patterns are deviated and the minutiae can be ridge endings or 
ridge bifurcation. A ridge ending is where a ridge stops and a ridge bifurcation is where a ridge 
is separated in two. In the following figure, we can see an image with the core, the delta, and 
the minutiae. 
 
Figure 6. Core, Delta and Minutiae 
It is important to highlight that this technology is the most used biometric system in the current 
market, which is due to its flexibility to be adapted to numerous systems. It usually is suitable 
for verification systems and small-to- medium-scale identification systems. One of the problems 
of this type of systems is that it requires a big amount of computational resources. Besides, 
these systems also show another important inconvenient: the possibility of an identification or 
verification failure, which may be due to environmental or occupational reasons (i.e. cuts…). 
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5.7.2.2 Iris Recognition 
The iris is the annular region of the eye bounded by the pupil and the sclera (white of the eye) 
on either side. The human iris is a unique structure for each individual. It is a very complex 
system and it remains unalterable for the individual’s life. To make possible the recognition, the 
individual looks at a camera and his/her iris is illuminated through an infrared light. After that, 
the algorithm creates a mathematical representation of the iris. This representation will be 
stored and linked to a person, if we are in the enrolment process, or it will be compared against 
the templates previously stored in the identification or verification phase. 
It is important to highlight that the system operates well in both, identification and 
verification/validation applications. These systems are used in many contexts, such as airports 
or border controls. Their main advantage is their reliability. 
 
5.7.2.3 Face Recognition 
These systems consist on automated or semi automated processes that extract facial 
characteristics in order to compare the spatial geometric features for user identification or 
verification. The source for the identification can be both, photographic images and video. The 
identification can be done in 2D, 3D, or a combination of both. Normally, in the first stage of 
the process (enrolment), the system builds the template by taking multiple photos of the user. 
The next time the system tries to identify or verify a user, the new extracted features are 
compared with the previously stored. It is possible for the system to never find an identical 
template stored. For this reason, the matching process will consider the most similar template, 
or all the templates that exceed a specific threshold will be selected and sent to a human 
operator, who will establish the final correspondence. 
These systems have two well-defined parts. First of all, the system has to locate a face within 
the image.  Once the face has been located, the system is able to carry out the analysis. The 
features extracted are related to the location and shape of the facial attributes such as eyes, 
eyebrows, nose, lips and chin, and their spatial relationships.  
This kind of biometric systems is also very used. Face recognition is a nonintrusive method and 
facial images are probably the most common biometrics used in the identification mode. 
However, it presents some drawbacks. The first one is that the captured view could be 
drastically different from the one taken during the enrolment process. Another problem refers 
to the illumination conditions in which the photo is taken, since they can affect a lot the 
outcome of the analysis. 
 
5.7.2.4 Hand Recognition 
Hand geometry recognition systems are based on a number of measurements taken from the 
human hand. The recognition of the hand can be done in two and three dimensions.  
Two-dimensional systems look at palm lines patterns, which are used to establish the template. 
However, three-dimensional ones are based on the dimensions of the hand (finger length, hand 
height, etc.…) in order to create the corresponding template. 
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Although it is not the most secure biometric technique, the use of the palm as a mean of 
authentication has proved an ideal solution for medium security applications, where 
convenience is considered more important than safety or precision. 
Commercial hand systems are usually used as verification systems. They have been installed in 
hundreds of locations around the world. The technique is very simple, relatively easy to use, 
and inexpensive. Environmental factors such as dry weather or individual anomalies such as dry 
skin do not appear to have any negative effects on the verification accuracy of hand geometry-
based systems. However, personal jewelries, such as rings, or limitations in dexterity can quite 
hinder the extraction of the required features. Another important drawback is the length of the 
sensor, which prevents its installation within an embedded device. 
 
5.7.2.5 Vein Recognition 
This system captures veins of the hand distribution because their distribution under the skin is 
relatively distinct among individuals and stable. To achieve this purpose the system uses a 
camera and infrared light in order to detect the visible blood vessels. The main features 
extracted to generate the template are blood vessel branching points, vessel thickness and 
branching angles. 
Vein patterns are unique to each individual and, apart from their size, the pattern does not 
change over time. In addition, veins are extremely difficult to misuse, since they are not visible 
to naked eye. For these reasons, vein recognition systems are one of the most secure biometric 
systems. 
 
5.7.2.6 Ear Geometry Recognition 
This type of biometric recognition is based on analyses of the shape of the outer ear, the ear 
lobes, bone structure and the distance between salient points on the pinna from a landmark 
location on the ear. 
As in the face recognition system, we find two well-defined parts in this algorithm. First of all, it 
needs to locate the ear on the image. Secondly, the algorithm extracts the features of the 
biometric data. Some things that the algorithm has to take into account are the differences in 
skin tone due to lighting variation, the presence of earrings and the hair occlusions. This kind of 
things can make the recognition more difficult. 
The main problem of this system is that extracted features are not very distinctive for 
authentication purposes. Generally, ear recognition is used as a supplementary biometric 
technique. 
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5.7.2.7 Palm Print Recognition 
The palm of the hand contains patterns of ridges and valleys, much like the fingerprints. Human 
palms also contain additional distinctive features such as principal lines and wrinkles that can 
be captured even with a low-resolution scanner. These patterns of the palm are used to create 
the template. The template can be representative of the entire palm surface or it can be 
confined to specific smaller regions of the palm surface, depending on the performance 
requirements.  
Similarly to fingerprints, palm prints are susceptible to fail due to cuts or similar things. Palm 
print recognition is considered to be highly accurate, though the quality of the images can 
affect the error rates because the area of the palm is longer than the finger’s, therefore palm 
prints are theoretically more distinctive than fingerprints. However, this advantage becomes in 
a disadvantage if we take into account the system cost, since this sensor is more expensive and 
longer than fingerprints’. Decisions to implement palm print recognition systems must balance 
the need for accuracy against the cost and the interoperability issues associated with this 
technology. This kind of technology is increasing in commercial and law enforcement 
applications. 
 
5.7.2.8 Retina Scan 
The retinal vasculature is rich in structure and is supposed to be a unique characteristic of each 
individual and each eye. The retina recognition is done comparing the complex blood vessels 
located in the eye. The acquisition requires a person to lean into an eyepiece and look at a 
specific point. An infrared light, which is invisible to the user, illuminates the eye and it is 
reflected back to the sensor. Then, the algorithm creates a template based on the blood vessel.  
Retina recognition systems are expensive and tend to have low acceptance levels. They are not 
widely utilized outside high security and national security applications. 
Retinal recognition is a very accurate system for both, verification and identification modes. In 
fact, as it is very difficult to change or replicate the retinal vasculature, it is considered the most 
secure biometric system. Some people consider that retina scan is invasive and health concerns 
have been raised relating to potential thermal damage to the eye. In addition, this system can 
reveal some medical conditions, e.g., hypertension. For these reasons retina recognition does 
not have a large acceptance among people. 
 
5.7.2.9 Gait 
Gait is the peculiar way one walks. Gait is enough discriminatory to use in low security systems 
working in verification mode. Another important characteristic is that gait is not universal, since 
not all individuals are able to walk. Gait may not remain invariant, due to changes in body, 
weight, injuries, or due to inebriety. These systems are generally widely accepted. Some 
specific conditions such as illumination and shadows can significantly affect to its accuracy. 
For data acquisition, the system uses a camera to get images in order to generate a relationship 
between different points of the movement of the body. These points together with other 
characteristics such as shape and cadence generate the template. 
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5.7.2.10 Voice Recognition 
This system tries to recognize an individual by his/her voice. The voice of people can be 
distinguished based on the shape and size of the appendages (e.g., vocal tracts, mouth, nasal 
cavities, and lips). The acquisition of biometric data is carried out through a microphone. There 
are two different types of voice recognition: text dependent and text independent. In the text 
dependent mode, the user must read a predetermined phrase. In this case, during the enrolling 
phase the user should repeat the phrase a specific number of times for the system to create the 
template. On the other hand, in the text independent mode, the user’s voice is analyzed 
regardless of what he/she is saying. 
One disadvantage is that an individual’s voice may vary, due to speech changes because of age, 
physical conditions (such as common cold) or even the emotional state. Another disadvantage 
is that these systems are especially sensitive to a number of factors such as background noise 
or the state of the microphone and the communication channel. Another important 
characteristic is that human voice is not universal since not all individuals are able to talk. Voice 
biometrics are usually used in verification-based applications, and have been implemented in 
the financial services sector, especially e-commerce and e-banking (e.g. in banks these systems 
are used to allow users to access their accounts, and also in the law enforcement sector for 
forensic purposes).  
 
5.7.2.11 Signature Recognition 
The way a person signs his or her name is considered a characteristic of that individual. These 
systems assess some characteristics points of the signature, as well as the speed, direction and 
pressure of writing among other things. In the enrolment phase the user should provide several 
signatures in order to create a more representative template. 
Signature is not universal, since there is a big amount of people who are unable to write. 
Besides, signatures are not considered very distinctive. However, they have been accepted as a 
mean of verification for various governments, as well as for legal, financial and commercial 
transactions. This kind of systems is primarily used in verification mode. One important 
disadvantage is that signature recognition is not very accurate. 
 
5.7.2.12 DNA 
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is the one-dimensional (1–D) ultimate unique code for one’s 
individuality— except for the fact that identical twins have identical DNA patterns. Despite the 
fact that DNA is one of the most effective methods, since the performance of DNA matching is 
highly accurate, its utility is limited for different reasons. First of all, it cannot be conducted in 
real time, i.e. it takes a few hours. Secondly, for privacy issues: DNA contains information of a 
person concerning certain diseases. If the genetic information of the DNA samples was 
transferred to third parties such as insurance companies or employers, it could lead to 
discriminating measures against individuals with a specific genetic. DNA is usually used in 
identification systems. It has limited commercial uses. This technology is mostly used for 
paternity tests, criminal identification and forensics. 
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5.7.2.13 Multimodal Systems 
The use of several biometrics can solve some of the problems presented by some biometric 
systems. Such systems, known as multimodal biometric systems, are expected to be more 
reliable. Multimodal biometric systems make much more difficult for an intruder to 
simultaneously spoof the multiple biometric traits of a legitimate user.  They are normally used 
in the authentication mode. 
These systems have three operation modes: serial mode, parallel mode, and hierarchical mode. 
Serial mode: the output of one biometric is used to narrow down the number of possible 
identities for the next biometric system.  
Parallel mode: information from multiple traits is simultaneously used to perform recognition. 
Hierarchical mode: the different results of biometric data are combined in a tree structure. 
Multimodal biometric systems integrate information presented by multiple biometric 
indicators. For this reason, they have some techniques to enable data fusion. Multimodal 
systems can be used in one of the following scenarios: 
1. Multiple sensors are used to sense the same biometric identifier. 
2. Multiple biometrics. In this case different biometric systems are combined (e.g. face and 
fingerprint recognition). 
3. Multiple units of the same biometric. For example, one image from each of the two 
irises of a person may be combined. 
4. Multiple snapshots of the same biometric. For example, several images of the face of a 
person could be combined. 
5. Multiple representations and matching algorithms for the same biometric. It combines 
different representations and matching algorithms to improve the recognition accuracy. 
One disadvantage of multimodal systems is that the cost of the system increases because of the 
use of multiple sensors (e.g., when combining fingerprints and face recognition). However, their 
use is very recommendable for high security applications, large-scale identification systems, 
and negative identification applications, which will increasingly use multimodal biometric 
systems. 
5.7.3 Dataveillance 
Dataveillance or data surveillance is the process that recollects personal information based on 
electronic data traces from different sources to investigate or monitor people’s daily activities 
and their interactions. Some examples about dataveillance are: employers can monitor 
employees’ calls and e-mails; cellular phone companies can have access not only to the calls but 
also to the location of their customers; credit card companies know their clients’ online and 
offline shopping habits. 
We can distinguish two types of dataveillance: mass data surveillance, which refers to the 
monitoring of a group of people, and personal data surveillance, which refers to the monitoring 
of one specific person. The following are some of the different techniques applied to obtain 
personal information. 
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5.7.3.1 Data Mining 
Data mining is the computational process of discovering patterns or correlations in large data 
sets in order to transform a big amount of information into an understandable structure for 
further use. For example, US government uses data mining in order to stop terrorist programs. 
As it has been discussed above, some authors have discussed623 how this kind of technique 
could affect people’s privacy. 
When these patterns or correlations are used to identify or represent people, they can be 
called profiles. The main goals of profiling are criminal profiling and the analysis of risks for 
insurance companies. Data mining is typically the first step in this process, as it defines the 
classes (“suspects or prospects”) where users can then be profiled in. Profiling then attempts to 
predict, or at least pre-empt, individual future behaviour by relying on the stereotypes learned 
during the data mining step, ultimately classifying individuals as potential risks or commercial 
windfalls. 
 
5.7.3.2 Data Fusion 
We define information fusion as the process that combines different sources of information in 
order to obtain more accurate, reliable and robust information to make better decisions than 
those obtained with just a single data source. 
A good example of data fusion is a tracking system. Let’s imagine a system with several 
cameras, each one associated to a tracking algorithm. On this environment, the system has to 
cope with many objects moving in the scene at the same time and with events. This system 
should be able to track each target in order to understand the behaviour of every actor. Thus, 
when the system detects a possible suspect outside of the range of vision of the camera 1, and 
then it appears on the camera 2, the system can merge content from the two tracking systems 
in order to know that it is tracking the same person. 
 
5.7.3.3 Cyber Surveillance 
The term cyber surveillance typically refers to the tracking of online behavior, which in most 
cases is synonymous with browser activity (i.e., Web surfing). In a broader sense, however, it 
can also include the monitoring of all Internet traffic, i.e., including e-mail, peer-to-peer 
connections, VoIP… 
Maybe the most prevalent form, although limited, of cyber surveillance, is represented by the 
cookies.  Many companies try to track users by using cookies across two or more seemingly 
unrelated websites to learn about the user’s surfing preferences. 
5.7.4 Communication Surveillance 
Throughout history, all kind of communications has been treated to be intercepted. Almost as 
soon as a new technology appears, big efforts are done in order to intercept communications. 
First of all we will explain some interesting concepts. Electronic eavesdropping is the 
interception of electronic conversations without the knowledge or consent of at least one of 
the participants. Wiretapping is a subset of electronic eavesdropping where a wire is involved in 
the communication. 
                                                     
623 http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/oct/15/google-privacy-policy?newsfeed=true 
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These types of communication can be intercepted at numerous points along the path: in one of 
the devices used by the communication users, or also at various locations along the way. 
In the context of surveillance, the following technologies are relevant: 
 
5.7.4.1 Telephone Lines 
Telephony has changed a lot from 1970. The most important changes are based on technology. 
Below, we are going to see these improvements: 
- The move to digital signal. 
- The replacement of optical fibre and the former continental copper cables for 
intercontinental communication satellites. 
- The transition from electromechanical circuit switching to computer-based switching. 
These shifts also changed the nature of wiretapping. Digital wiretaps work remotely and they 
are usually installed in the telephone company’s switch.  However, if the conversation travels 
with a strong encrypted method, the only possibility to know the message lies in wiretapping 
either the telephone itself, or the target’s organization before the device that encrypts the 
signal. 
 
5.7.4.2 Mobile Phones 
Mobile phones include many security measures. Some of these measures are challenge-
response authentication, frequency hopping and strong encryption algorithms. All these 
measures allowed a secure signal transmission over the air for a long time. However, it has 
been possible to break these communications in the recent years, although it still requires 
strong computation resources. 
It is also important to understand how the mobile phone communications work. The 
communication is encrypted between the mobile phone and the base station. Next, it travels 
unencrypted through the mobile provider’s core network. Then, it is encrypted again between 
the other telephone and its respective base station. As an example, it is important to mention 
the Greek case in 2005 by which cellular phones of government and military officials had been 
illegally wiretapped for over half a year. 
 
5.7.4.3 Voice-Over-IP 
The “Voice over Internet Protocol” makes the communication possible by using Internet as a 
medium instead of using telephone lines. This system usually uses the RTP protocol. Data is cut 
in different small packages, which can be sent via different paths to their destination. This fact 
makes VoIP calls very difficult to wiretap. 
The voice is not necessarily encrypted. However, the standard H.235.6 defines an encryption 
mechanism. Though, when the exchange of the key (to encrypt the message) between the 
different involved devices is done, interception can be performed with a man-in-the-middle 
attack at the VoIP provider –this is the foreseen mechanism for lawful interception. A good 
example of VoIP is the well-known application Skype. Here, the key exchange is done in a peer-
to-peer manner among the partners. Because of this, the only way of wiretapping a 
communication is before the voice encryption. 
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5.7.4.4 Call Logging 
Eavesdropping into a communication along the line is difficult and expensive, and often 
impossible. Call logging is the cheaper and easier alternative, since it only records the time and 
duration of the conversation, as well as the identities of the communicating parties. 
Analyzing who is communicating with whom, when the content is not accessible, has military 
roots. British intelligence, for example, after intercepting (but not decoding) German Air Force 
transmissions in 1941, was able to infer that a unit was composed of nine and not twelve 
planes as previously assumed, leading to a reassessment of the German Air Force’s overall 
strength. 
 
5.7.4.5 Monitoring Text-Based Communication 
Another kind of surveillance on communications is based on text. Examples of messages than 
can be intercepted are e-mail or instant messaging (IM). Text-based messages can be 
intercepted either in one of the end-user devices or along their path. 
5.7.5 Sensors 
Sensors represent another type of surveillance technology with a growing market in relation to 
security, although every type of sensor usually performs only one specific task. For this reason 
sensing systems can be composed by several different sensors. Then, we are going to see the 
different kind of sensors used in security. 
 
5.7.5.1 Heat Sensors 
The two main types of sensors are passive infrared sensors and infrared cameras. 
Passive infrared sensors are small devices. These systems are connected to an integrated 
circuit, and when the temperature changes, the sensor induces a current that closes a second 
circuit. This second circuit is responsible for another function. These sensors are used to detect 
human presence. It is very common to find them in systems to prevent theft. 
Infrared cameras are devices that form an image by using the different levels of infrared 
radiation. The different levels of infrared radiation are represented as follows: low levels of 
infrared are cold colours, and high levels of radiation are warmer colours. Infrared cameras are 
used in many domains. A good example in the area of surveillance is the recently monitoring of 
the attacks in the Boston marathon (2013), since police had used thermal cameras to detect the 
presence of the suspect in a boat. Besides, these systems are CCTV complement in some 
domains such as border crossing. 
 
5.7.5.2 Explosive and Drug Detectors 
We can distinguish two main categories: bulk detection and trace detection. Bulk detection of 
explosives or drugs uses the same technology as the previously discussed imaging scanners. On 
the other hand we have the trace detection categories. These detectors have the goal to detect 
and identify residual traces that indicate either the presence of specific chemicals or someone’s 
recent contact with chemicals such as drugs or explosives. For that purpose, first of all a sample 
is collected, then the sample is analyzed, and finally the results go through a comparing 
process. 
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In the decade after 2000, several US airports have introduced portals for trace detection of 
explosives. 
 
5.7.5.3 Metal Detectors 
Metal detectors are in charge of detecting the presence of metals. For that purpose, they use 
electromagnetic technology. These systems can work with a very low frequency or use pulse 
induction. Both types create electromagnetic fields and detect either the presence of a 
magnetic object, or the alteration of the original electromagnetic field due to the presence of 
metal. 
 
Traditionally, they have been used at airports. During the last years, metal detectors have also 
been used at railway stations, museums and sport events. 
 
Apart from these sensors, there are more sensors coupled with new investigations, which are 
focused on obtaining more information of individuals to study their behaviours. For example, 
suspects can be identified through the use of remote cardiovascular or respiratory sensors. 
Furthermore, multimodal systems formed by several sensors can also be generated. 
5.7.6 Location 
Nowadays, we have quite a lot of location systems. But we can classify them in:  triangulation, 
proximity sensing or scene analysis. 
Triangulation is a technique that uses the geometric properties of triangles to estimate the 
target localization. It can be divided into two derivations: lateration and angulation. Lateration 
technique estimates the position of a target according to its distances from multiple reference 
units. On the other hand, the angulation technique estimates the localization by computing 
angles relating to multiple reference points. 
Proximity sensing systems try to know the proximity of an object to a specific point. The 
location is a consequence of the neighbourhood relation with a known spot. An example of this 
technique is the use of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) to determine the presence of an 
RFID tag near a given antenna. Another example is an existing connection between an 
electronic device and a Wi-Fi antenna to determine the device’s presence within the range of 
the Wi-Fi antenna. 
Scene analysis infers the position of an entity from a neighbourhood relation. For example, we 
can use this technique together with a vehicle license plate recognition system. A recognized 
plate implies the proximity of the corresponding vehicle to the checkpoint. 
Below we will see in more detail the predominant localization systems. 
 
5.7.6.1 GPS (Global Positioning System) 
The Global Positioning System (GPS) is a space-based satellite navigation system that provides 
location using time-of-arrival-based triangulation. 
The GPS location is computed on the receiver’s side only. A GPS receiver calculates its position 
based on the time it takes to get a signal sent by a satellite. Satellites are continuously sending 
messages. These messages include the time the message was transmitted and the satellite 
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position at time of message transmission. The receiver uses the messages received to 
determine the transit time of each message and computes the distance to each satellite using 
the speed of light. Each of these distances and satellites' locations defines a sphere. The 
receiver is on the surface of each of these spheres when the distances and the satellites' 
locations are correct. These distances and satellites' locations are used to compute the location 
of the receiver using navigation equations. In typical GPS operation, four or more satellites 
must be visible to obtain an accurate result. Four sphere surfaces do not typically intersect. 
GPS has become a widely deployed and useful tool for commerce, scientific uses, tracking, and 
surveillance. For example, in the US, police has planted hidden GPS tracking devices in people's 
vehicles to monitor their movements, without authorization. 
 
5.7.6.2 Triangulation for Mobile Phones 
Mobile phones can be located using a simple proximity sensing or via triangulation between 
several cell towers. With the proximity technique, it is possible to determine the grid cell in 
which individual mobile phones are situated. With triangulation technique, mobile position can 
be known with much greater accuracy. 
This system is used to improve responses to emergency calls, but also to better locate 
suspected criminals. Regulators have asked mobile telephony operators in the US to be able to 
locate mobile telephones within 150 meters. 
 
5.7.6.3 RFID Positioning 
RFID or Radio-frequency identification is the wireless non-contact use of radio-frequency 
electromagnetic field to transfer data, for the purposes of automatically identifying and 
tracking tags attached to objects. 
RFID tags can be either passive, active or battery assisted passive. An active tag has an on-board 
battery and periodically transmits its ID signal. A battery assisted passive (BAP) tag has a small 
battery on board and it is activated when in the presence of an RFID reader. A passive tag is 
cheaper and smaller because it has no battery. Instead, the tag uses the radio energy 
transmitted by the reader as its energy source. 
On the other hand, we can classify the Readers in: Passive Reader Active Tag (PRAT) and Active 
Reader Passive Tag (ARPT). A PRAT system has a passive reader, which only receives radio 
signals from active tags. On the other hand, an ARPT system has an active reader, which 
transmits interrogator signals and also receives authentication replies from passive tags. 
These tags can be used to identify products, passports, vehicles, tracking people, etc. RFIDs can 
also be used to locate tags instead of physical objects and thus be explicitly used for 
positioning. For example, a tag embedded in a shoe could serve as a de facto identifier for the 
person who wears it. 
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6 Preliminary Recommendations for the SALT Framework 
 
 
All partners: 
Claire Gayrel and Nathalie Trussart (CRIDS-UNamur), Fanny Coudert (ICRI-KU Leuven-
iMinds), Fernando Casado, Francisco Jaime, Carmen Hidalgo and Antonio Maña (UMA), 
Zhendong Ma and  Bernhard Strobl (AIT), Víctor Manuel Hidalgo (Visual Tools), Mathias 
Bossuet (Thales) and Daniel Le Métayer (INRIA), Christophe Jouvray and Antonio Kung 
(Trialog) 
 
In all the previous chapters, preliminary recommendations have been expressed in order to 
help in identifying the relevant criteria for the design of the SALT framework and to prepare the 
next steps of this research project, and more precisely of this work package 2 dedicated to the 
definition of the concepts for a Socio-political, ethicAl, Legal and Technical framework (SALT 
framework) and analysis of the concept of accountability and of its rationale. As presented in 
Figure 7, all chapters have highlighted the main concerns and issues addressed by the project.  
 
Figure 7 Overview of Results Achieved in this Document 
According to all results mentioned in Figure 7, this last chapter brings together those 
preliminary recommendations for the design of the SALT framework. 
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Chapter I (Introduction: A Multidisciplinary Approach to Privacy) aimed at 
providing a general introduction of the deliverable. After recalling its objectives and scope, it 
starts with a section which is dedicated to terminology where conceptual remarks needed for 
the well understanding of the progression of this study are made. First ones concern the 
important notion of “privacy”. Second ones concern the notion of “surveillance”. Third ones 
concern privacy-surveillance paradigms. Different rationales are exposed regards to the balance 
between surveillance and privacy. Following a section devoted to the concept of privacy-by-
design, the risks and the challenges of this approach. Then, as a result of those precedent 
remarks, a set of observations concerns the prism through which the SALT Framework is 
developed and offers the opportunity to underline the uniqueness of the SALT framework 
compared to other privacy frameworks used for the privacy by design of a system-to-be. Finally, 
a final round of remarks concern the multidisciplinary approach adopted in this text. 
It’s worth mentioning that different reasons, both theoretical and methodological, for the re-
wording of the initial formulation of the SALT framework, as presented in the description of 
work of PARIS’ project. Initially, SALT sands for Socio-political, Anthropological, Legal and 
Technological dimensions of privacy. The arguments presented were sufficient to make us 
choose another word to anchor the A of the SALT Framework.  Two main constraints guide this 
choice. (1) The first one is to avoid the use that has been made by academic knowledge in 
favour of social acceptability paradigms and the methodological bias that have been induced by 
such a posture. (2) The second one is to inform about individual and collective dimensions of 
privacy. For all those reasons, from now on, the SALT Framework refers to the Socio-political, 
ethicAl, Legal and Technical dimensions of privacy.  
 
Several challenges for the future steps of this research project were identified.  
(1) The first one concerns the integration in the SALT framework of an extended 
conceptualisation of privacy that takes into account its socio-political, ethical, legal and 
technical dimensions, the concept of accountability and its implications. An extended 
version of privacy implies to go beyond the sole legal and technical compliance for 
reaching pro-active proposals regards to orphan dimensions. One singularity of the 
PARIS project lies in its aim to broaden the scope of privacy concerns taken into 
account, while integrating supplementary dimensions to the usual legal and technical 
ones, going beyond the technical security requirements and the legal compliance. 
Privacy is more than data protection and more than privacy as informational 
confidentiality. 
(2) A second one concerns the precision needed in the characterisation of the surveillance 
technologies that will serve as case studies during the next steps of this research. 
Starting from a generic definition of surveillance allows and make necessary to 
characterize, among different technologies of surveillance, one the one hand, the ones 
which are chosen as case studies and, on the other hand, the other ones for which the 
SALT framework is also relevant but may make necessary further development of the 
SALT framework in order to respond to their specificity. Several provisional 
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characterizations were identified: the type of surveillance’s practices (watching, 
listening, following, etc.); the type of surveillants (public authorities, private actors, 
etc.); the target – direct and indirect - of the surveillance (people or objects, particular 
individuals, groups or social categories of persons, etc.); the technology used (video 
surveillance, imaging scanners, fingerprint recognition, etc.); the purpose of the 
surveillance (crime control, marketing, etc.); the locations and perimeters kind of 
surveillance (transport facilities, public space, communication facilities, etc.); the 
publicity/visibility of the surveillance (do the surveilled know precisely when, where, 
why and how they are under surveillance?); etc. 
(3) A third and very important challenge concerns privacy-by-design philosophy or, more 
precisely the possible translation of the general principles of privacy-by-design into the 
effective design of systems of surveillance. Rather than considering the criticisms 
addressed to privacy-by-design as describing the reality of what is a privacy-by-design 
process and what are its outputs, those criticisms may be seen as showing some risks 
any privacy-by-design process runs. In that sense, the privacy-by-design concept may 
gain robustness in demonstrating how it avoids these risks. This is surely a challenge for 
the PARIS’ project. While leaving the sole point of view of rhetoric, the critics exposed 
above not only identify risks any Privacy-by-Design process runs, they also identify the 
gap between the spirit of the Privacy-by-Design and the incorporation of Privacy-by-
Design into a system-to-be. The Paris project offers the opportunity to put these difficult 
challenges to the test. In that sense, it is a real scale experiment of what may be the 
actualisation of high privacy-by-design expectations. The first step of this real scale 
experiment lies in the building of the SALT framework which is characterized by its 
multilateral perspectives: different knowledge and practices – be they come from 
academic or private sectors. 
(4) A fourth and also important challenge regards engaging a public into the design of a 
surveillance system-to-be and the ways the SALT framework may participate or not to 
such a difficult task. The task is complicated by a very large definition of what is a 
stakeholder: added to the traditional stakeholders taken into account regards to 
surveillance technologies, that those who are involved in developing, implementing and 
operating surveillance systems, as well as the technological, economic, political and 
social drivers associated with this implementation – government and public authorities, 
industry, academia, policy makers, NGOs, the media – there is also civil societies and 
citizens or groups of citizens who are targets of surveillance technologies or who simply 
are or may be supporting the effects of those technologies. The issue related to this 
necessity of engaging a public is not just on which regards justice. Rather, it is also an 
issue which regards methodological requirement. Indeed, more we are around a 
system-to-be, more we are likely to identify from our respective perspective what the 
privacy issues at hand are. A relating remark was made about the important distinction 
between end-user and surveilled people. In this line, the asymmetrical stakeholder 
participation in different decision-making processes or Privacy Impact Assessment 
exercises regards to surveillance technologies must be taken into account. The largest 
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possible engagement of a public into the design of surveillance system is one of the 
responses to it.  
(5) A fifth challenge, related to the third and the fourth ones, is the success of the 
multidisciplinary approach of PARIS’ project. The first step in gathering the largest 
viewpoints on privacy begins there. Some methodological precautionary were provided 
in this introduction. 
(6) A last challenge was outlined under the name of “zones of undecidability” and still need 
to be worked out. Indeed, starting from a multi-perspectivism approach does not solve 
the problem of how to articulate the different conceptions of privacy. This problem of 
articulation induces more precise questions, like: WHAT: what is holding the articulation 
(e.g. what technical system? A decision-making process? A practice of judging?)? WHO: 
who is in charge of articulating these different conceptions (e.g. a legislator? A judge? A 
computer scientist?)? And for which purposes (e.g. a decision-making process? An 
impact assessment? A judging practice? ) HOW: What are the procedures, the 
constraints, the criteria adequate to reach this articulation with regard to the specific 
practice of the person (or people) who are in charge with this articulation? SCOPE: What 
are the scopes of the articulation and what are the zones which should not be 
articulated, regards to the responses to the previous questions? Those zones are the 
zones of undecidability. Those zones of undecidability are also of interests for the SALT 
Framework. There are several reasons for this. (1) In order to avoid for the system (the 
SALT Framework management tool) to take the place of decision-making processes that 
it is devoted to help finalizing and that is in charge of possible redefinition of the 
borders between zones which has to articulated and those which has to remain 
undecidable. (2) In order to be able to adapt e.g. to the emergence of new surveillance 
technologies, new negative impacts on privacy, new public claims regards to their 
privacy, new rules regards to privacy. 
Several risks and precautionary were also stated. 
(1) A first precautionary was expressed regards to the relationships between surveillance 
and privacy. A general classification of the kind of relationships between surveillance 
and privacy was offered as guidance tool for such thinking. 
(2) Several methodological risks were identified regards to the uses which are made of 
social sciences in what is designated as the social acceptability paradigm.  
Chapter II (Privacy from Socio-Political and Ethical Perspectives) is composed of 
three main sections.   
The section 2.2 (Privacy from a Psychosocial Perspective) is dedicated to several issues. 
Psychology is an applied and academic field that studies the human mind and behaviour. 
Research in psychology seeks to understand and explain how we think, act and feel. Applied 
psychology focuses on the use of different psychosocial principles to solve real world problems. 
So it is important to take into account the psychology perspective when developing the SALT 
framework. It must consider its definition, its dimensions, its functions and the effect the lack of 
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privacy can cause on the population. People expect to have a balance between the privacy they 
desire and the one they obtain. We have to keep in mind that one of the objectives of PARIS is 
to help in developing privacy-enhanced surveillance systems. The study of privacy-security 
relationship from the point of view of social psychology must:  
 Analyze the balance between desired privacy and achieved privacy in different types of 
spaces. 
 Evaluate the optimal degree of surveillance in different spaces (public, semi-private and 
private). 
 Analyze the acceptance of security systems implementation. 
 Evaluate how the provision of information influences the public’s will to trade certain 
degrees of privacy in favor of the benefits provided by surveillance systems.  
 Evaluate the conflict among privacy, security and surveillance systems in the population. 
 Analyze the social and psychological consequences of the invasion (lack) of privacy. 
The section 2.3 (Privacy from a Socio-Political Perspective) contains two main inputs. (1) The 
claim of privacy as a social value is the keystone of the socio-political perspective on privacy. 
That is defending privacy as a social value, while challenging the sole addressing a challenge 
both to the conception of privacy as an individual right and/or value and to the one of its 
consequential turn of mind, that is the balancing relationships between privacy – conceived as 
an individual interest and/or value and/or right – and other social values such as (national) 
security. (2) The general claim in favour of privacy as a social value must be sustained by a 
conceptualization of privacy. Regards to the kind of conceptualization proposed, the effects are 
very different. In fact, the way privacy is conceptualised allows identifying very different kind of 
harms or concerns. This is worth emphasizing for the construction of the SALT framework which 
may be very different regards to the kind of taxonomy or conceptualization of privacy retained 
for its construction. Indeed, as a short term research aim, the reading of different existent 
taxonomies of privacy reveals that, while planning the construction of the taxonomy which will 
be relevant for the SALT Framework, it is necessary to be transparent in the methodological 
design of the taxonomy and reasons for choosing certain criteria rather than others. 
Therefore a full subsection is dedicated to the identification – their outline and their interests 
for the SALT framework - different taxonomies of privacy which are of interest for the 
construction of the SALT Framework. In the next deliverable (D 2.2), a detailed analysis of their 
content still must be done regards to different details such as, for example: (1) The types of 
categories retains in the taxonomies. For example, a taxonomy which takes into account as a 
relevant criteria the intellectual property rights regime over information is very different than 
one which takes into account the social context of intersubjectivity; (2)Ttheir purpose. Indeed, 
the purpose of the taxonomy is not trivial. Helping Law enforcement or helping the design of a 
system-to-be which integrates Privacy-By-Design principles are two very different purposes. 
Regards to the kind of purpose, some common criteria to the analyzed taxonomy may be 
relevant (or not) for the SALT Framework; (3) the sources used. For example, legal sources or 
theoretical rationales built on the study and analyze of new and emerging technologies provide 
very different perspective on privacy; (4) The consequences and the types of consequence of 
the breaking of the criteria used in those different taxonomies. For example, the consequence 
may be law pursuit or a psychological effect on individuals. (5) Criticisms that have been 
addresses to those different taxonomies. 
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The several existent taxonomies which are worth being analyzed in the next deliverable are the 
following ones. (1) Finn, Wright and Friedewald: seven types of privacy (2) Steeves: privacy in 
intersubjective and social interactions (2) Solove: A taxonomy of privacy problems (3) 
Nissenbaum: contexts of privacy (4) Extended version of Privacy Impact Assessment.  
 
The section 2.4 (Privacy from an Ethical Perspective), proceeds to a review of the state-of-the 
art of the ethical perspective on privacy. Regards to the aim of this text of indentifying relevant 
criteria for the design of an ethical-based approach within the SALT framework, the focus is 
placed on (1) several ethical approaches that may be of interest for extracting ethical issues 
relating to surveillance technologies and (2) on several existent ethical frameworks. Different 
key sources are identified along this section and listed at this end with the recommendation to 
analyze them in details during the next step of this research. The next deliverable (D 2.2) will 
build on the findings of this section to provide a definitive list of requirements, adapted to the 
context of surveillance. 
One specific remark is worth mentioning. Surveillance technologies are a challenge for ethics. 
If generally speaking, what is an “ethical issue” is in itself an issue, the question remains largely 
open regards to surveillance technologies. This is true for different reasons.  A first reason is 
related to surveillance technologies itself. The argument is also true for ICT’s technology at 
large. Indeed, “the development of new ICTs and other security technologies are generally 
complicating the definition of the role of ethics, as well as the identification of its theoretical 
approaches and operational instruments needed to address ICTs-related issues.”624  One 
explanation is that intentional actions are at the heart of traditional ethics of science and 
technology which thinks from the duo of the lonely scientific Frankenstein who intentionally 
creates his creature. However, scientific and technological developments “have the potential to 
bring unintentional or highly unpredictable consequences that are usually the result of 
collective decisions”.625 According to René von Schomberg, we do not have ethical theory at 
our disposal which would be an Ethics of Knowledge Policy and Knowledge Assessment626 that is 
an ethics which addresses “both the aspect of unintentional side consequences (rather than 
intentional actions) and the aspect of collective decisions (rather than individual decisions).”627 
A second reason is that it is not sure that a specific field of research such as surveillance ethics 
exist. If Gary T. Marx was one of the first scholars who identified ethical issues and coined 
ethical tools in order to help in identifying them regards to surveillance technologies628, most of 
the inspirations for offering ethical perspective on surveillance technologies come from ICTs 
ethics, computer ethics, ethics of technology, technology ethics, philosophy of technology, 
                                                     
624
 Ibid., 61. 
625
 Ibid. 
626
 René von Schomberg, "From the ethics of technology towards an Ethics of knowledge Policy abd Knwoledge 
Assessment," in A working document for the European Commission services (EU: European Commission's 
Directorate General for Research, 2007). 
627
 Silvia Venier and Emilio Mordini, "Deliverable 4. FInal Report - A Privacy and Ethical Impact Assessment 
Framework for Emerging Sciences and Technologies," in PRESCIENTproject. Privacy and emerging fields of scienbce 
and technoolgy: Towards a common framework for privacy and ethical assessmenttechnologies: Five case studies 
(EC: Seventh Framework Programme (FP7), 2012), 62. 
628
 G.T. Marx, "Ethics for the new surveillance", The Information Society, 14 (1998): 171-85. 
PARIS Project     Deliverable 2.1     v1.0 
31/07/2013    SEC - 312504      211 
professional ethics or applied ethics.629  Few researches have been devoted to ethical issues 
relating specifically to surveillance technologies. A lot of research still has to be done. 
Several sources were identified for further investigating towards ethical issues and criteria that 
may be relevant for their integration into the SALT framework. (1) The Lisbon treaty and its 
reformed version signed in 2007. (2) The Charter of Fundamental Rights. (3) The European 
Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE) and specially its current work on an 
Opinion on the Ethics of Security and Surveillance Technologies which is to be finalised by the 
beginning of 2014, Opinion that will be the first one regards to those issues.  A first public 
Round table is organised on 18 September 2013 in Brussels, involving experts from inside and 
outside academia, the Chairs of the National Ethics Councils (NECs) or equivalent bodies within 
the EU and beyond, representatives of the European and international institutions, civil society 
organizations and other stakeholders and members of the public. (4) Commission’s Framework 
Programme(FP7) Seventh of research. Regards to researches funded under the Commission’s 
Framework Programmes Seventh (FP7) of research and technological development, a set of 
ethical questions are asked to whom make proposals in order to help candidates in identifying 
ethical dilemmas and issues that may rise in their research630. The questions-based approach is 
particularly interesting. The specific Data protection and privacy ethical guidelines631 is of 
interest and may be a start to identify ethical issues that may be taken into account in the SALT 
Framework. Nevertheless, other ethical issues listed for example under the heading Informed 
Consent must also be considered in more details. 
Among different ethical approaches, we favoured an ethical approach that consider ethics as a 
savoir-faire, a pragmatic approach, for which the questions-based approach developed, as we 
seen above, by the Commission’s Framework Programme (FP7) Seventh of research, and also 
by David Wright whom ethical framework is developed further in the chapter. The questions-
based approach is especially of interest for the integration of ethical perspective in the SALT 
framework. This approach implies also a challenge for the design of the SALT framework while 
fostering stakeholder’s thinking and decision, rather than offering them stable responses. 
Two existent privacy frameworks regards to ethical issues were presented. Other ones may 
still be identified during the next step of this research. Those two ones are of interest for the 
design of the SALT Framework and should be analysed in more details during the second step of 
this project and more specifically regards the two specific surveillance technologies that are at 
the core of the PARIS project: CCTV and biometric surveillance technologies. (1) Beatrice von 
Silva-Tarouca Larsen: Ethics and CCTV surveillance. Her book is especially interesting because 
it deals specifically CCTV surveillance technologies. (2) David Wright: an ethical framework to 
assess the impact of ICTs. This author makes very important proposals which are of interest for 
identifying relevant criteria for the SALT framework. He identifies different ethical 
values/principles/issue, explains them and offers a question-based approach with concrete 
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questions that may be addressed regards to all of those ethical issues.  Here are those ethical 
values/principles and related ethical issues retained by Wright. Further analysis of those ethical 
values/principles and related ethical issues is needed and must imply a particularly focus on the 
questions formulated by Wright regards to each of them.  
(2) Respect of autonomy (right to liberty) 
xii. Dignity 
xiii. Informed consent 
xiv. Nonmaleficience (avoiding harm) 
xv. Safety 
xvi. Social solidarity, inclusion and exclusion 
xvii. Isolation and substitution of human contact 
xviii. Discrimination and social sorting 
(7) Beneficence 
i. Universal service 
ii. Accessibility 
iii. Value sensitive design 
iv. Sustainability 
(8) Justice 
i. Equality and fairness (social justice) 
(9) Privacy and data protection 
i. Collection limitation (data minimisation) and retention 
ii. Data quality 
iii. Purpose specification 
iv. Use limitation 
v. Confidentiality, security and protection of data 
vi. Transparency (openness) 
vii. Individual participation and access to data 
viii. Anonymity 
ix. Privacy of personal communications: monitoring and location tracking 
x. Privacy of the person 
xi. Privacy of personal behaviour 
Beside the list of ethical values/principles and related issues, several points received a 
particularly strong attention because they are real challenges for the design of the SALT 
framework 
(1) The need to involve stakeholders in the process, in the sense that stakeholders are 
defined as all the people who are or may be interested in or are or may be affected by 
the outcome. It will be a challenge for the SALT framework to be able to translate such a 
necessity to involve different stakeholders who are not solely the experts who prepare 
the SALT framework. It is evident that the involvement of stakeholders – more than 
experts and less than a general public – is out of the scope of a SALT framework. The 
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same can be said about the integration of the ethical tools above mentioned, ethical 
tools which may facilitate the involvement of stakeholders.  However, I suggest 
investigating about the possible integration of several questions about the involvement of 
stakeholder into the SALT framework: Were stakeholders consulted or are going to be 
consulted? Who are those stakeholders? Is there one or several ethical tool which are 
used in order to help the involvement of those stakeholders and which ones?  
(2) Another challenge for the SALT framework will be to integrate the questions-based 
approach chosen by Wright and to address privacy issues (including ethical issues) in such 
a way that those questions will be likely to generate self questioning for the user of the 
SALT framework and eventually debate among stakeholders (with the meaning defined 
above). 
(3) A remark is worth to be mentioned here, regards to the SALT framework. The specific 
people or person or group of people who use the SALT framework should be identified 
considering their role or undertaking or responsibilities regarding privacy issues 
(including ethical issues). Indeed, the perspective on privacy issues (including ethical 
issues) will be different for different stakeholders.  
 
Chapter 3 (Privacy from a Legal Perspective - European Legal Framework for 
Privacy and Data Protection) dedicated to the state of the art regarding privacy and data 
protection requirements within the EU allowed us to seeing that the objective to achieve a 
correct balance is actually a concern shared at various levels, legislative and operational, and a 
challenge for the European Union and its Member States. We have explained the filiation and 
differences in scope of the right to privacy and the right to data protection, claiming that one of 
the challenges for the SALT framework will be the integration of both rights. This first work has 
allowed us identifying preliminary criteria for the design of the SALT framework and identifying 
pending issues regarding the very perimeter of the SALT framework. 
 
Preliminary criteria and perimeter: integration of privacy and data protection requirements  
As far as the identification of privacy interests are at stake, we have suggested that the SALT 
framework establish as a principle that any envisaged surveillance technology involve potential 
concerns according to Article 8§1  of the ECHR. In our view, this could be established as a 
precautionary principle. We have then claimed that the SALT framework should instead focus 
its attention on the way to integrate the elements of the ECHR caselaw in relation to legal and 
legitimate interferences. We propose to build on the permissible limitation test proposed by P. 
De Hert, who has identified seven core elements: the technology should be used in accordance 
with and as provided by the law; the technology or processing should serve a legitimate aim; 
the technology should not violate the core aspects of the privacy rights; the technology should 
be necessary in a democratic society; the technology should nor have or give unfettered 
discretion; the technology should be appropriate, least intrusive and proportionate; the 
technology should be consistent with other human rights.632 The next deliverable will therefore 
focus on the possibilities to operationalize the principle of proportionality in the SALT 
framework.  
 
                                                     
632
 Paul De Hert, “A Human Rights Perspective on Privacy and Data Protection Impact Assessment”s, op. cit., p. 33-
76 
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Besides, the fundamental principles of data protection, as expressed in Directive 95/46 also 
provide the essential elements that any surveillance technology shall integrate. We have seen 
that the protection of personal data is not limited to data security requirements and that other 
elements (definition of purpose(s), principle of minimisation, restriction to onward transfers, 
contractual relationships between controllers and processors, limited retention duration et 
cetera) are all relevant requirements that should be taken into account by the SALT framework. 
For this task, the privacy and data protection impact assessment framework regarding RFID 
applications633 published by the European Commission constitutes a good starting point.  
 
Challenge: operationalizing proportionality into a process 
One of the essential task of the future work during the next phases of the PARIS project will be 
to develop a proposal that integrate both privacy and data protection approaches. If both rights 
are distinct (and we have insisted on their differences in scope), we have also claimed that the 
protection of personal data should be considered with regard to its filiation with the right to 
privacy and that the right to data protection is not an end per se but an instrument to the 
service of the protection of private life. In this way, the data protection requirements 
(purposes, minimisation et cetera) will all play a role in the operationalization of the general 
principle of proportionality. Another task will be to operationalize the proportionality principle 
in an on-going process and not as an initial or final one-shot assessment. Indeed, the 
proportionality analysis or proportionality assessment integrated into the SALT framework 
should be updated according to the adjustments/modifications of the ‘surveillance project’ 
during the decision making and design process of the surveillance technology. 
 
Pending issue: extent of integration of national requirements 
One of the main issues regarding the integration of legal requirements into the SALT framework 
relates to the scope and extent of integration of national privacy and data protection rules and 
interpretation of these rules. In other words, it also questions the extent to which the SALT 
framework intends to integrate the national state of law. According to the Member State 
and/or the surveillance technology, such integration may be more or less complex. For 
example, in the case of France and biometric technologies, the CNIL has developed extensive 
‘jurisprudence’ in the framework of its power of authorization. An in-depth analysis of CNIL’s 
deliberations may allow identifying the underlying policy of the CNIL in this respect. The 
fundamental criteria of such policy could then be integrated into the SALT framework in order 
for it to provide a kind of preliminary opinion regarding the possible acceptance by the CNIL of 
the biometric system envisaged by a controller.  In this case, it is likely that the outcome of the 
SALT framework (as far as legal requirements are concerned) be of some help and use to 
controllers in order to assess and eventually optimize or reconsider their biometric system 
before addressing an authorization request to the CNIL. On the contrary, in the case of Belgium 
where there is almost no guidance available from the Privacy Commission, the SALT framework 
in relation to biometrics may well be limited to an overall impact assessment. It will be difficult 
to integrate more criteria than those generally defined under the Privacy Act and the 
proportionality principle. The added value that the SALT framework could bring should 
nevertheless not be underestimated. A lots of work still have to be done to familiarize data 
                                                     
633
 European Commission, Privacy and Data Protection Impact Assessment Framework for RFID Applications, 12 
Januray 2011, available at : http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/enet/documents/rfid-pia-framework-final.pdf  
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controllers, processors and system designers with the fundamental principles of privacy and 
data protection.  
 
Besides, the integration of national state of law into the SALT framework also raise issues in 
relation to its compatibility with European privacy and data protection established standards. In 
the ideal of the world, the hierarchy of norms commands that each Member States national 
laws and regulations (and Data Protection Authority’s interpretative work) complied with 
higher European (EU-ECHR) established standards and norms. However, in the real world, the 
implementation and application at national level of those standards may be more or less 
consistent with higher ranked European norms. The conciliation into the SALT framework of the 
fundamental principle of proportionality and European data protection standards may reveal 
contradictions. For instance, although the case of the United Kingdom has not been examined 
in the present report, current caselaw across the Channel raise concerns, not to say 
contradictions, with European interpretations of the right to privacy and data protection. A 
judgement of 2003 has developed a narrow interpretation of the notion of personal data634 
that has the consequence to leave out many users of basic CCTV systems out of the scope of 
the Data Protection Act, although this is explicitly contrary to the objective of Directive 
95/46.635 Applying the SALT framework to videosurveillance in the United Kingdom for instance 
may reveal specific difficulties, if the SALT framework has the double and contradictory aim to 
integrate both European and UK state of the law. This raises the issue of the extent to which 
the SALT framework should be ‘nationally rule-based ‘ (based on national positive law) or 
should be limited to a ‘European standard-based’ (based on European recognized fundamental 
principles of privacy and data protection known as ‘standards’). If both approaches should 
ideally be fully consistent and compatible, there may be difficulties to reconcile them in some 
cases.  
 
The chapter 4 (Accountability: A Way to Ensure Transparency and Trust) proceeds 
to a review of the state-of-the-art on the principle of accountability in view of extracting 
preliminary criteria for the design of an accountability-based approach for personal data 
governance practices within the SALT framework. The different initiatives reviewed do however 
not address the specifics of surveillance practices, which means that further work is required to 
tailor these preliminary criteria to the context of surveillance. The next deliverable (D.2.2.) will 
build on the findings of this Chapter to provide a definitive list of requirements, adapted to the 
context of surveillance.  
 
Accountability is a concept which can be approached as a normative concept, in its broad and 
active sense of “organizational virtue”, or as a social relation or mechanism, in its narrow or 
                                                     
634
 Durant v. The Financial Services Authrority, Court of Appeal, 8 December 2003. See the explanations of Douwe 
Korff, in United Kingdom Country Study, 4-11. This study was carried out in the framework of a European 
Commission research services contract destined to provide a Comparative study on different approaches to new 
privacy challenges, June 2010, available here : 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/studies/new_privacy_challenges/final_report_country_report_A
6_united_kingdom.pdf  
635
 See the analysis of the consequences of the Durant case to CCTV by Lilian Edwards, “Switching off the 
Surveillance society? Legal Regulation of CCTV in the United Knigdom”, in Reasonable Expectations of Privacy? 
Eleven Country Reports on Camera Surveillance and Workplace Privacy, ed. Sjaak Nouwt et al. (The Hague: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 96-102 
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passive sense, as “mechanism of control” [2]. Both approaches are of interest for the SALT 
Framework: 
3) Accountability understood in its broad or active sense, i.e. as a means to ease 
answerability, is a transparency mechanism whose goal is to increase the 
legitimacy of the decision-making process. Accountability mechanisms give 
transparency by actively engaging the accountor in a dialogue with the 
relevant stakeholders. 
4) Accountability understood in its narrow or passive sense, i.e. as a coercitive 
means to increase legal compliance, as a way to exercise constrain or to hold 
stakeholders liable for their action, is a transparency mechanism whose goal 
is to increase trust in the design and use of information systems. It can be 
concerned with legal procedures directed to enforcement but it can also 
become a strong asset in the implementation of the data protection 
principles of transparency and of foreseeability.  
 
Within the SALT framework, the first meaning of accountability will be more fitted to address 
the need to increase the legitimacy of decisions which involve a balancing exercise between 
privacy and surveillance interests. Accountability mechanisms relying on the first meaning could 
address the needs of decision-makers when considering the implementation of surveillance 
systems. Accountability mechanisms understood as compliance instruments will operate at a 
lower level and will rather tend on providing trust in the design and further use of surveillance 
systems. They will rather be directed to system developers and operators during the life-cycle 
of the surveillance system.  
 
As elaborated in section 2 both concepts of accountability share common features. In short, 
accountability relationships involve a third party external to the accountable agent and in which 
the latter is asked to answer the requests of the former, which may result in corrective actions 
taken by the agent. The main difference between the broad and narrow sense of accountability 
relies on whether the third party to whom the account is given owns rights of authority over 
the agent and thus whether the accountability process can end up in the imposition of 
sanctions or the agent been required to integrate corrections to its actions or decisions. When 
accountability is understood in its broad sense the impact of the whole process is largely 
defined by the agent itself, while in the second case the process might end up in a decision of 
the third party which should mandatorily be enforced by the agent. 
 
The graph below shows, in a simplified way and with the only purpose of illustrating the 
different notions used in this Chapter, how accountability relationships in surveillance systems 
could arise and intertwine. The different actors part to these relationships appears either on 
the first line, if they act as accountors (Who gives the account), or in the second line if they act 
as accountees (To whom is the account given). The third line indicates what can be the object 
of the account. Finally the fourth line indicates whether this relationship is likely to be framed 
as an accountability relationship understood in its broad or narrow sense (respectively, as 
“answerability” or “compliance”). 
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Figure 8: Accountability Relationships 
 
The review of the different initiatives in view of the introduction of an accountability-based 
approach within the data protection framework in section 3 shows that they approach 
accountability as implementation and enforcement mechanism of the existing framework 
(compliance). However, none of the policy instruments reviewed provides for a definition of the 
principle of accountability. In PARIS, we will, as first step, rely on the definition proposed by the 
Accountability Projects who gathered experts from privacy authorities, the private sector, NGOs 
and Academia. Accountability is defined as “a demonstrable acknowledgement and assumption 
of responsibility for having in place appropriate policies and procedures, and promotion of good 
practices that include correction and remediation for failures and misconduct.” In that context, 
accountability is understood as the obligation and/or willingness to demonstrate and take 
responsibility for performance in light of agreed-upon expectations.  
 
Accountability relationships will differ depending on the parties to the relationship, its content 
and motivation. Four elements will thus determine the shapes and meaning of an 
accountability relationship: who is accountable to whom, why and what for. These four 
elements should be clearly identified and made explicit before accountability mechanisms are 
incorporate into general policies or to organisations’ policies. 
 
The design of accountability processes should thus start by defining the following elements: 
1. Identify the stakeholders, i.e. whom the organization is answering to. 
Different stakeholders will have different expectations, generating different 
types of relationships.  
2. Make explicit the motivation underlying the accountability relationship, i.e. 
why the organization decides to engage into such procedure. An organization 
can engage into the implementation of accountability mechanisms to ensure 
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compliance but also to give added-value to its products or greater legitimacy 
to its decisions. 
3. Identify the nature of the account that should be given, i.e. what should be 
the content and extent of the accountability procedure. This comes to 
defining which kind of responsibility or power has been entrusted to the 
agent and thus what this agent should be answerable for.  
 
As shown by the Accountability projects, within the data protection framework, three 
stakeholders can be identified, all of them having different expectations, namely: 
 Businesses are concerned about what might be expected of them in an accountability 
system, how their effort to meet these expectations would be measured and how the 
rules related to accountability would be defined and enforced 
 Privacy enforcement agencies are concerned about how accountability might work 
under local law, how do enforcement agencies measure an organisation’s willingness 
and capacity to protect information when it is no longer in the privacy protection 
agency’s jurisdiction, how does the agency work with and trust agencies in other 
jurisdictions 
 Consumers advocates, representing citizens, worry that accountability would lessen the 
individual’s ability to make his own determination about appropriate use of information 
pertaining to him. 
 
Once the basic characteristic features of the accountability relationship at stake has been 
defined and identified, the methodology proposed by the Global Accountability Framework to 
set up accountability mechanisms can then be used as general guideline. The work carried out 
by the Accountability projects and the Canadian Privacy Commissioners, as well as several 
policy instruments such as Madrid Declaration of the European Commission proposals of the 
Data Protection Reform, help specifying such general guidelines to the specific context of data 
protection.  
 
For the organization which wants to implement accountability mechanisms for its data 
governance practices, this means to set up: 
 
 An Accountability strategy which identifies the stakeholders to the process, their 
expectations, the mission statement of the organization for this process 
(motivation/intentions) and the mechanisms put in place. 
o Adoption of internal, biding and enforceable privacy policies consistent with 
external criteria (law, biding codes of conducts, international standards). 
o Organisation commitment to accountability: support of top management, 
allocation of sufficient resources and adequately trained staff. 
o Appointment of a person responsible for the overview of the policies set forth 
such as a Data Protection Officer. 
o The implementation of the principles of privacy-by-design and privacy-by-
default within the organization for the monitoring of products and services 
design. 
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o Transparency mechanisms which gives visibility for the stakeholders of the 
actions taken in view of the obligation to give an account such as privacy 
notices, icons, videos. 
o Participation mechanisms which allow stakeholders to involve into a dialogue 
with the organization, obtain the information required, ask further explanation, 
and contest the narrative given by the agent. Organizations can be for instance 
obliged to provide information on their accountability mechanisms to 
supervisory authorities and/or other stakeholders (such as data subjects) on 
request. 
 
 Evaluation mechanisms which allows the agent to obtain feedback over their own 
accountability mechanisms in view of further improvements. This requirement refers to 
systems for internal, ongoing oversight and assurance reviews and external verification. 
 
 Complaint and response mechanisms, which allows an interaction with their 
stakeholders, so they can provide feedback on the accountability process. This might 
involve the implementation of complaint procedure and means for remediation. 
 
Finally, as framed by the Accountability projects, it is worth reminding that when introducing an 
accountability scheme within the legal framework, such scheme can be modulated into several 
stages, depending on the organisation’s level of commitment/rights of authority given to the 
accountee. The first two stages could be approached as accountability relationships in their 
broad sense, in that the accountor (who should be identified but is likely to be incardinated into 
citizens and consumers) does not have any right of authority over the accountor, in the sense of 
imposing sanctions. The last two stages reflect accountability relationships understood in their 
narrow sense, where the accountor should abide by the decisions made by the accountee.  
1. First stage.- The organization takes appropriate measures to establish processes and 
procedures that implement its privacy policies. 
2. Second stage.- The organization self-certified that it meets the requirements of 
accountability. 
3. Third stage.- The supervisory authority or recognized accountability agent reviews such 
filings and provide some form of acceptance of the certification. 
4. Fourth stage.- The organization submits to enforcement by the supervisory authority or 
recognized accountability agent. 
 
There are also pending issues that might be taken into account in further steps of this research. 
As far as accountability is concerned, the position taken in PARIS is that it can significantly 
enhance privacy protection in the context of surveillance provided that sufficient guarantees 
are provided.  
Accountability is a critical feature of surveillance systems: Accountability is especially needed 
for surveillance systems because it is impossible to rely entirely on ex ante protection tools 
such as consent, obfuscation or anonymisation tools. Whatever privacy enhancing technologies 
are used, personal data will be collected (and very often even potentially sensitive data) and 
the only protection for individuals will be the guarantee that those data will be used properly 
(by the right people for the right purpose).  
PARIS Project     Deliverable 2.1     v1.0 
31/07/2013    SEC - 312504      220 
But accountability in the context of surveillance rises challenging issues. Among these issues, let 
us mention:  
 Actors: multiple actors pay a role in surveillance systems (owner, operators, processors, 
designers, auditors, subjects, etc.) and their interests may be conflicting. 
 Data: multiple modalities (types of data) can be used by surveillance systems, with 
different levels of precision. 
 Processing: specific operations (blurring, matching, etc.) have to be taken into account. 
In addition, knowledge inference (aggregation, data mining) raises further issues 
(traceability, status of the inferred knowledge, etc.). 
In order for accountability to bring the required level of guarantee to individuals, an 
accountability framework should636: 
 Cover not only accountability of policies and procedures, but also accountability of 
practices (following Colin Benett's terminology). 
 Cover the whole data life cycle (collection, inference, copy, transfer, sharing, access, use 
by the controller, correction by the subject, deletion, etc.). 
 Be supported by definitions of policies and procedures which are defined precisely 
enough for auditors to establish the compliance of data controllers (and hence to 
increase the trustworthiness of the whole process and the confidence of the subjects). 
One of the goals of PARIS with respect to accountability is to provide a framework and 
guidelines for such an accountability framework. 
 
In chapter 5 (Privacy from a Computer Engineering Perspective), the focus of the 
SALT framework is on system engineering, i.e., methods and technologies to design and build 
surveillance systems that are privacy friendly and preserving.  Therefore, in this deliverable, we 
investigate several fundamentals related to system engineering at a conceptual level.  As 
described in Chapter 5, privacy principles, concepts, and enhancement technologies are closely 
related basics for electronic privacy. The overarching privacy principles provide guidelines. 
Privacy concepts extend these guidelines to specific technological domains. Privacy-enhanced 
technologies implement the concepts and thus are the technical measures to achieve privacy. 
 
Note that neither legal nor technical means alone can achieve privacy in surveillance systems. 
Laws can be bypassed or violations can be undetected if there are no technical measures in 
place. Technical measures would suffer from deterrent powers if legal requirements and 
accountability are not defined. As a result, we regard system engineering as a technical 
enforcement of the SALT framework that complements the other pillars. 
                                                     
636 Butin, Denis, Marcos Chicote and Daniel Le Métayer, Strong Accountability: Beyond Vague 
Promises in Serge Gutwirth, Ronald Leenes & Paul De Hert (eds.), Reloading data protection, 
Springer, Dordrecht,  2014, forthcoming. 
 
PARIS Project     Deliverable 2.1     v1.0 
31/07/2013    SEC - 312504      221 
 
Video surveillance system is basically different from other information and communication 
systems. Hence the methods and technologies are domain-specific.  Nevertheless, we foresee 
that many concepts and technical measures developed in other domains are applicable to 
surveillance systems with slight modifications. We also foresee that those measures currently 
used for information security from risk assessment to access control are highly relevant to 
privacy in surveillance systems. These topics will be further developed to be integrated into the 
SALT framework in the next round of our work. 
 
It is also worth to notice that little by little, the user’s privacy is being increasingly threatened 
by the amazing improvement of technologies. For example, hardware improvements have led 
to an increase of the speed at which information can be analyzed, and of the storage capacity 
of such information. In addition, the rising connectedness over networks has made possible to 
share and process large amounts of information. Finally, software advances have greatly 
improved the algorithms for extracting information stored both, locally and remotely on the 
network. 
 
All these improvements have led to the appearance of new surveillance technologies, which 
depending on their use could damage individual’s privacy. As we show in this document, 
according to their technology, surveillance systems can be classified into: visual surveillance, 
biometrics, dataveillance, communications surveillance, sensors, and location technologies. 
New surveillance is less visible and more continuous in time and space, it provides fewer 
opportunities for targets to object to or prevent the surveillance, it is greater in analytical 
power, it produces more enduring data, it is faster and more widely diffused, and it is less 
expensive.  
 
Such progress and technologies generate more data on an individual. Therefore, it is necessary 
to take into account from the visualization and design of the product or application, all privacy 
related aspects in order to minimize the impact on the user. 
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http://www.priv.gc.ca/information/pub/gd_sec_201011_e.asp 
Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Alberta, Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada, Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner for British 
Columbia, Guidelines: Getting Accountability right with a  Privacy Management Program, 
2012, available at: http://www.priv.gc.ca/information/guide/2012/gl_acc_201204_e.asp#e 
Consultative Committee on the Convention for the protection of Individuals with regard to the 
automatic processing of personal data (T-PD), Progress Report on the application of the 
principle of Convention 108 to the collection and processing of biometric data (2005) 
 
7.4 Documentation from the European Institutions 
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European Commission 
European Commission, Privacy and Data Protection Impact Assessment Framework for RFID 
Applications, 12 Januray 2011, available at : 
http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/enet/documents/rfid-pia-framework-final.pdf  
European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data, COM(2012)11 final, Brussels, 25 Januray 2012 
European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by 
competent authorities for the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or 
prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and the free 
movement of such data, COM(2012)10 final, Brussels, 25 January 2012 
Commission Staff Working Paper, Operational Guidance on taking account of Fundamental 
Rights in Commission Impact Assessments, SEC(2011)567 final, 6 May 2011 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic 
And Social Committee and the Committee Of The Regions, A comprehensive approach on 
personal data protection in the European Union, COM(2010) 609 final, Brussels, 4 
November 2010 
Communication from the Commission, Strategy for the effective implementation of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights by the European Union, COM(2010)573/4, 19 October 2010 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on 
Promoting Data Protection by Privacy Enhancing Technology (PETs), COM(2007) 228 final, 2 
May 2007 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on improved 
effectiveness, enhanced interoperability and synergies among European databases in the 
area of justice and home affairs, COM(2005)0597 final, 24 November 2005 
CORDIS: Community research and Developement Information Service, "Getting Through Ethics 
Review," in Sventh Framework Programme (FP7) (EU: European Commission). Available at: 
http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ethics_en.html#ethics-cl 
European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European Commission, "The 
Protection of fundamental ethical principles in international research and innovation 
programmes," in Report on the third meeting of the European Commission's international 
Dialogies on Bioethics, ed. bepa: Bureau of European Policy Advisers (Brussels: European 
Commission , 2011). Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/european-group-
ethics/docs/ibd/idb_20sept.2011.pdf 
Expert Working Group on data protection and privacy, "Data Protection and privacy ethical 
guidelines," in Ethical Review in FP7 (EU: European Commission, 2009). Avalaible at: 
ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/fp7/docs/privacy.doc  
Leaked text of Proposal for a Directive of The European Parliament and of the Council on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by competent 
authorities for the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of 
criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and the free movement of such 
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data (“Police and Criminal Justice Data Protection Directive”) published by Statewatch at: 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2011/dec/ep-dp-leas-draft-directive.pdf 
 
European Parliament 
European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Draft Report on 
the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
protection of individual with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation) (COM(2012)0011 – C7-
0025/2012 – 2012/0011(COD)), doc num. PE501.927, 17 December 2012, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/pr/922/922387/92
2387en.pdf 
European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, “Draft Report on 
the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by competent 
authorities for the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of 
criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and the free movement of such 
data”, doc num. PE 501.928v02-00, 20 December 2012, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=COMPARL&mode=XML&language=
EN&reference=PE501.928 
 
7.5 Main Legal Sources 
 
International 
OECD Guidelines of 1980 governing the protection of privacy and transborder data flows of 
personal data 
 
Council of Europe 
Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
signed in Rome, 1950 
Council of Europe Convention 108 for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data signed in Strasbourg, 1981 
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1604 (2008) on videosurveillance of  
public areas of 25 January 2008 (non binding) 
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1797 (2011) on the need for a global 
consideration of the human rights implications of biometrics of 11 March 2011 (non 
binding) 
 
European Court of Human Rights Caselaw 
ECHR, Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 7 December 1976 
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ECHR, Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 25 April 1978 
ECHR, Klass v. Germany, 6 September 1978, 
ECHR, Malone v. United Kingdom, 2 August 1984 
ECHR, X. & Y. v. The Netherlands, 26 March 1985 
ECHR, Leander v.  Sweden, 26 March 1987 
ECHR, Olsson v. Sweden, 24 March 1988 
ECHR, Gaskin v. United Kingdom, 7 July 1989 
ECHR, Kruslin v. France and Huvig v. France, 24 April 1990 
ECHR, Niemietz v. Germany, 16 December 1992 
ECHR, Andersson v. Sweden, 25 February 1992 
ECHR, Costello-Roberts v. The United Kingdom, 25 March 1993 
ECHR, Frield v. Austria, 26 January 1995 
ECHR, Z. v. Finland, 25 February 1997 
ECHR, Halford v. United Kingdom, 25 June 1997 
ECHR, Pierre Herbecq and the Association Ligue des droits de l’homme v. Belgium, 14 January 
1998 
ECHR, Amann v. Switzerland, 16 February 2000 
ECHR, Rotaru v. Romania, 4 May 2000 
ECHR, P.G. and J.H. v. United Kingdom, 25 September 2001 
ECHR, Pretty v. The United-Kingdom, 29  April 2002 
ECHR, Peck v. United Kingdom, 28 January 2003 
ECHR, Perry v. United Kingdom, 17 July 2003 
ECHR,  Evans v. The United Kingdom, 7 March 2006 
ECHR, S. and Marper v. United Kingdom, 4 December 2008 
ECHR, Uzun v. Germany, 2 September 2010 
ECHR, Aydogdu v. Turkey, 11 January 2011 
 
European Union 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the automatic processing of personal data and on 
the free movement of such data, OJEC L281, 23 November 1995. 
Regulation 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community 
Institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data, OJEC L8, 12 January 2001 
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Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 July 2002 concerning 
the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector, OJEU L201, 31 July 2002. 
Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the 
retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly 
available electronic communications services or of public communications networks, OJEU 
L 105 of 13 April 2006 
Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JAI of 27 November 2008 on the protection of personal 
data processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, 
OJEU L350, 30 December 2008  
Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European, Union and the Treaty established the 
European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007. Available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:SOM:EN:HTML 
 
European Court of Justice Caselaw 
E.C.J., 9 November 2011, Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Harmut Eifert v. Land Hessen, 
joint cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 
E.C.J., 24 November 2011, Asociación Nacional de Establecimientos Financieros de Crédito 
(ASNEF) and Federación de Comercio Electrónico y Marketing Directo (FECEMD) v. 
Administración, del Estado, joint cases C-468/10 et C-469-10 
 
National Law 
France 
Act No. 78-17 of  6 January 1978 on Information Technology, Data Files and Civil Liberties – Loi 
No. 78-17 Informatique et Libertés du 6 Janvier 1978 – as amended 
Act No. 95-73 of 21 january 1995 on homeland security orientation and programming - Loi 
n°95-73 du 21 janvier 1995 d’orientation et de programmation pour la sécurité intérieure 
Décret n°96-926 du 17 octobre 1996 relatif à la vidéoprotection pris pour l’application des 
articles 10 et 10-1 de la loi n° 95-73 du 21 janvier 1995 d’orientation et de programmation 
relative à la sécurité 
 
Belgium 
Privacy Act of 8 December 1992 on the protection of privacy in relation to the processing of 
personal data – Loi du 8 décembre 1992 relative à la protection de la vie privée  à l’égard 
des traitements de données à caractère personnel, MB, 18/03/1993 
Loi réglant l’installation et l’utilisation de cameras de surveillance du 21 mars 2007, M.B., 
31/05/2007, further referred to as the “videosurveillance law” 
Loi visant à modifier la loi réglant l’installation et l’utilisation de cameras de surveillance du 12 
novembre 2009, MB, 18/12/2009 
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Arrêté Royal du 2 juillet 2008 relatif aux déclarations d’installation et d’utilisation de caméras 
de surveillance 
Arrêté Royal du 10 février 2008 définissant la manière de signaler l’existence d’une surveillance 
par caméra, MB, 21/02/2008 
Circulaire ministérielle du 10 décembre 2009 relative à la loi du 21 mars 2007 réglant 
l’installation et l’utilisation de caméras de surveillance, telle que modifiée par la loi du 12 
novembre 2009, M.B., 18/12/2009, as amended on 13 may 2011, M.B., 20/05/2011, 
further referred to as the « Ministerial Circular of 2009 » 
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Appendix 1. Taxonomy: the Main Categories in a Video 
Surveillance System 
 
Zhendong Ma and Bernhard Strobl (AIT) 
 
In this section we will define a basic taxonomy to classify the conceptualization of the video, 
everything related to a video surveillance system, the different existing permission to access 
the video, the kind of users that can access to the system and different organizations or users 
that can interact with the organization responsible for video surveillance equipment. Before 
starting to describe this classification, it is important to stare the graphical representation of 
that taxonomy (Figure 9). 
 
 
Figure 9: Taxonomy for Video Surveillance 
We will start with the first layer, the grey group. This group represents the video concept, 
different things that can be seen through the video. For example, we can observe a vehicle, an 
individual, a specific alarm, or other objects. In order to make a more detailed classification in 
this group we are going to rely on the taxonomy of the Vidi Video Project637. In this project the 
video content is conceptualized as follows:  a “concept” can describe either the context of the 
video (e.g., indoor, traffic surveillance, a building with a specific security), or the content which 
                                                     
637 VIDI-Video Project, http://www.vidivideo.info/ 
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can be a physical object characterizing or present in the scene (e.g., building, person, animal) or 
a detectable action/event occurring (e.g., falls, intrusions, movement detection, interaction 
between people).  Figure 10 shows a graphical representation of the taxonomy of the Vidi 
Video Project. 
 
Figure 10: Video Concept Classification 
After seeing the video concept classification, we are going to focus on the second layer. This 
layer is related to everything that has to do with a video surveillance system (storage, 
monitoring). Now, we are going to describe each of the blocks in this layer: 
 Camera. It is the sensor through which the system receives video.  The cameras can be 
statics or pan-tilt-zoom cameras. The static cameras are installed to focus on a fixed area. 
The pan-tilt-zoom cameras use remote control to focus on an area from alternate angels, 
providing a wider coverage. Some important properties about the cameras are:  resolution, 
frame rate, kind of compression. 
 Data transportation. It is the medium through which the video is transported. For example, 
the organization responsible for the system can deliver the video through network (e.gl, 
cable, wireless) or the mail to the police if necessary. 
 Storage. It is the medium where the video is stored. The most common is stored the video in 
the internal hard disk of the video surveillance equipment. The video could also be stored in 
different places through the cloud, as well as in a USB or CD. 
 Video Pre-processing. This module is in charge of making the necessary operations in order 
to prepare the video for subsequent use. For example if we want to store the images with a 
different size or kind of compression, this module will do the resize of the images or 
compress/decompress the images in the appropriate format. 
 Video Search/Retrieval. Through this module we can get some specific video sequences 
based on date or the content of the video if we use a mechanism to make annotations over 
the video. Once, we have found the specific sequences we can visualize the sequence or 
export the video in order to obtain this sequence for a specific purpose (e.g., deliver to the 
police). 
 Live video. Through this module we can watch in real time what is happening in the area 
covered by the camera. For example, this module allows operators to check an alarm in 
order to verify whether it is a false alarm or not. 
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 Video analysis. Thanks to this module, if we have the proper algorithms, we can classify the 
different objects in an automatic mode or detect a specific event as an intrusion or an alarm 
generated by motion detection. 
 Video annotation. Sometimes, there are systems which include video annotation 
functionality through which we can provide extra information.  Here we can classify the kind 
of annotations in Automatic or User annotations. Through the automatic annotations the 
system can add some information as the size of the video. Through the user Annotations, the 
user can write down some comments to the video (i.e., the operator can indicate that in this 
part of the video exist a possible suspects). 
 Logger. From the privacy perspective, this module is very important. Since, it is in charge of 
recording all the actions that the different users carry out. For example, when some 
operator deletes some sequences, this module is going to record that this operator has 
deleted this particular sequence corresponding to a specific time and data. 
To finish with this group, it is important to emphasize that the first two layer are linked through 
the vide analysis and video annotation module. Thanks to these two modules we can 
conceptualize the video based on the schema provided by the Vidi video project. 
Thirdly, we are going to explain the third layer. On this layer, we will focus on establishing the 
different permissions that the user has to view, handle, modify or delete anything related to 
the system.  You can see the different permissions below. 
 Modify the configuration.  We must establish who is responsible for change the different 
computers settings as the network, camera, event and profile parameters. 
 View Video. We must define what are the user how can monitor the live video or the video 
storage. 
 Delete Video. We must assign who are the users with the proper permissions to delete 
video sequences. 
 Export Video. In the same way, we have to detail who are the users with the enough 
permission to retrieve the video. 
 Physical access. Finally, it is important to keep this equipment in safe areas with restricted 
access in order to prevent theft. For this reason, we must define a responsible person who 
has access to that area. 
The fourth layer is related to the individuals of the organization who can access to the digital 
video recorder system. Depending on the system and the organization we can have many users 
accessing to the video.  A very basic classification could be next (different user roles described 
could vary greatly depending on system or organization): 
 Operator. This user could have permissions to watch only the live video. 
 Supervisor.  This user could have permissions to watch the live video, search and watch the 
video storage. 
 Administrator. This user could have all the permissions of the systems. 
The fifth layer is related to the authorities (e.g., the police).  The authorities can order some 
specific sequences (some day at certain time) in order to investigate a crime or something 
similar. As a consequence the organization will deliver the corresponding information. 
Finally, we are going to present the sixth layer. This layer has to do with the users how are 
undergone to the system.  On this occasion we can see that users can interact with the 
organization. In this case, this interaction can be based on the law. For example, the law can 
require that:  
 The organization informs the users that they are being recorded.  
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 The user can give their consent or not 
 The user can have the right to access, modify and delete their personal information. 
It is important to remark that all these layers are influenced by the law. For example, in France, 
the only user who can delete the video sequences is the administrator. 
  
PARIS Project     Deliverable 2.1     v1.0 
31/07/2013    SEC - 312504      242 
Appendix 2. Privacy Benefits and Harms. One Perspective 
 
Here below are two tables taken from the appendix of the PRESCIENT project, in its 
“Deliverable D1: Legal, social, economic and ethical conceptualisations of privacy and data 
protection”. 638  
 
The first one reproduces the taxonomy of types of privacy proposed in 2013 by Rachel L. Finn, 
David Wright and Michael Friedwald.639 
 
The second one shows the benefits and harms corresponding to each of these types of privacy. 
 
As mentioned in the chapter II, the identification of privacy benefits and harms depends on the 
types of conceptualization of that is retained. That means that this one is of great interest but 
may be subject of modification and completion with the help of other privacy taxonomies, 
regards to the specificity of the SALT Framework. 
  
                                                     
638
 Serge Gutwirth et al., "Deliverable D1: Legal, social, economic and ethical conceptualisations of privacy and data 
protection," in PRESCIENT. Privacy and emerging fields of science and technology: Towards a common framework 
for privacy and ethical assessment (EC: Seventh Framework Programme, March 2011), 63-7. 
639
 Rachel L. Finn, David Wright and Michael Friedewald, "Seven Types of Privacy," in European Data Protection: 
Coming of Age, ed. Serge Gutwirth (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), 3-32. 
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Seven Types of Privacy 
 
 
 
Table 3 Seven Types of Privacy 
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Privacy Benefits and Harms 
 
Table 4 Privacy Benefits and Harms 
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Appendix 3.  The SALT Framework: an Ambitious Vision for 
Integrating a Wide Scope of Privacy’s Dimensions  
 
Antonio Kung and Christophe Jouvray (Trialog), Antonio Maña and Francisco Jaime 
(UMA), Zhendong Ma and Bernhard Strobl (AIT), Víctor Manuel Hidalgo (Visual Tools) 
and Mathias Bossuet (Thales) 
 
Privacy is complex, multi-facet, and evolving. Therefore, it is very difficult for those behind 
video surveillance systems, e.g., system designer, developer, and operator etc. to take into 
account of all social, anthropological, psychological, cultural, legal, and technical constraints 
and regulations related to privacy. Consequently, it is very challenging to ensure compliance in 
the design, implementation, deployment, and operation of video surveillance systems. This will 
require not only a broad and cross-disciplinary knowledge but also a deep understanding of 
many related factors. Moreover, external factors are not static, which means surveillance 
systems need to react and adapt to the changes (e.g., changes of legal requirements or public 
opinion) accordingly. 
 
We foresee that the SALT framework will include overarching privacy principles, privacy-by-
design process and methodology, privacy assessment procedure, privacy-enhancement 
measures and controls, practical guidance, and supporting tools for privacy preserving video 
surveillance systems. The framework should help designers and developers to understand and 
take into account the relevant factors. Additionally, the SALT frameworks should support 
operators in modifying their systems and operations according to changing political and social 
environment. On the practical side, we envision that the SALT framework will be modular and 
build upon existing advances in privacy research and best industrial practices.  
 
Besides, we envision that there would be some kind of knowledge representation of the SALT 
framework, e.g., in the form of an expert system, which includes measures and tools for 
usability, manageability, extensibility, and adaptability of the framework. 
 
The SALT framework will contain a set of knowledge provided by a group of experts concerning 
to the scope of surveillance systems. Depending on their field of expertise, these experts may 
focus their knowledge towards four different fields of knowledge: Social, Anthropological, Legal 
and Technological (hence the origin of the acronym SALT). 
 
There are several types of actors who will interact with the SALT framework, such as the 
aforementioned experts, the surveillance system designer, the system operator, the subject 
under surveillance, or even a public authority. Each of them uses the SALT framework for 
different, but related, purposes. Therefore, in order to facilitate the use of the SALT framework, 
a management tool will be implemented. This tool will aid to the addition of new concerns 
(data related to surveillance systems provided by the experts) to the framework, and the 
extraction of filtered information according to a certain surveillance system. The SALT 
framework will play a key role during the design phase of a surveillance system, since it will 
help system designers to take design decisions. 
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Surveillance systems require a special consideration concerning their design process: as any 
other system, a surveillance system has to be designed before it is deployed, but in this case 
each instance is different, since the scenario characteristics where the system will be deployed 
have also to be taken into account. Therefore, design decisions are taken not only during design 
time, but also during deployment time. 
 
With this in mind, system designers, attending to the given system specifications and the 
scenario characteristics, make use of the SALT framework instances corresponding to the 
particular context they are working with (country, public space, etc.). An instance is a specific 
view of the SALT framework corresponding to a particular filter provided by the user, i.e. a 
subset of information from the whole framework. This knowledge entitles designers to take the 
proper design decisions to develop the desired surveillance system. 
 
Figure 11 shows a comprehensive view of the SALT framework. It describes its relationship with 
all types of actors that can interact with it. As it can be seen, it distinguishes between six types 
of actors: 
 
 
Figure 11: SALT Framework Complete Lifecycle 
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 PARIS consortium: these are the people working in PARIS project. They define the SALT 
framework concept, the process for a SALT framework creation, and also the final 
engineering process. 
 SALT experts: these are the people who will provide the specific knowledge from the social, 
anthropological, legal and technological scopes. Taking into account the concept of a SALT 
framework and following the process of a SALT framework creation, they will be able to 
instantiate several SALT framework instances with their corresponding data. 
 Surveillance system designer: these are the people who represent the owner of the 
surveillance system. The owner decisions influence designers’ requests. System designers 
gather the system specifications depending on the scenario they are dealing with. Then, they 
select the proper SALT framework instance (probably more than one) and use it to create a 
SALT compliant surveillance system. 
 Surveillance system operator: these are the people who operate a given surveillance 
system. In order to do so, they require access to the system specifications, and in this case, 
since they are working with a SALT compliant system, they also need access to the SALT 
framework instance(s) used for the system development. 
 Citizen: this person is the subject of surveillance. There may be various possible ways for the 
system to interact with citizens: the most simple would be a warning about their entrance 
into a surveilled area. 
 Public authority: represents the persons responsible for the system accountability aspects. 
In order to accomplish their task, they require access to the accountability information 
produced by the surveillance system: typically auditable logs, which may be compared 
against the information stored within the SALT framework. 
 
There are many other potential possibilities for using a SALT framework (e.g., a public authority 
could use it to analyze citizens’ behaviours, tendencies or desires regarding to surveillance in 
order to align laws with them). However, this kind of use is not outside of the scope of the 
project and will therefore not be considered in the definition the SALT process that we are 
developing. 
 
At first sight, the main functionality of the SALT framework regards to the surveillance system 
designer. Figure 12 shows how the SALT framework helps designers to take their design 
decisions. 
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Figure 12: Excerpt of the Metamodel of the SALT Framework from a Surveillance System Development 
Perspective 
Recall that we mentioned that it is very difficult for those behind video surveillance systems, 
e.g., system designer, developer, and operator etc. to take into account of all social, 
anthropological, psychological, cultural, legal, and technical constraints and regulations related 
to privacy. To aid designers to take these constraints into account while performing their task 
SALT Framework instances will be captured in a computer-processable and engineering-
oriented format. In this way, while designing a surveillance system developers will be able to 
use of one or several SALT framework instances to provide the necessary information about 
those perspectives. Each instance contains specific information, called SALT concerns, which are 
divided into four different groups: psycho-social concerns, anthropological concerns, legal 
concerns and technological concerns. 
 
Designers’ starting point is a surveillance goal which has to be fulfilled for a given asset type. 
For example, a surveillance goal could be recognizing what is being recorded by a video-
camera, whereas a car license plate would be an asset type. The existence of a surveillance goal 
and an asset type brings in the following considerations: 
 
How the surveillance goal is addressed will depend on the surveillance technology available, for 
example, a wireless video-camera. The use of this technology will entail a series of risks, and as 
a consequence, it could occur a number of privacy harms. 
 
Depending on the asset type, the system will use one or another security technology to protect 
the resources from possible privacy harms. For example, ciphering the video recorded data. 
With all these elements in mind, it is mandatory to produce some kind of countermeasures in 
order to protect the system from possible harms. The way a countermeasure is provided will be 
by implementing a determined security technology (e.g., data ciphering). 
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Therefore, system designers will have to take a design decision taking into account the 
surveillance goal they have to fulfill for a given asset type, the surveillance technology that will 
be used for achieving such goal, and the countermeasures needed to avoid possible privacy 
harms. Besides, they will have to consider the SALT concerns given by the SALT framework 
instances that correspond to the contexts of the scenario where the surveillance system is 
going to be deployed. 
 
For the sake of clarity and ease of use, privacy harms can be divided into different groups: 
confidentiality breach, exposure, disclosure, etc. 
 
Before and After the SALT Framework 
 
Let’s see how the SALT framework technology influences all actors that interact with it: 
 SALT experts: 
Before: each expert works with a big amount of data concerning to his own scope of 
applicability. This is raw data (not normalized), usually expressed in terms of common language, 
which includes the slang and technical terms typical from each area of expertise. This fact limits 
the availability of information inter-areas and complicates the understanding of information 
even when a given expert gains access to data concerning to a scope different from his/her 
own. 
After: data from different scopes is centralized within a SALT framework, thus it is easily 
accessible by all experts regardless their area of expertise. Moreover, the information stored 
within the framework follows a normalized representation, which helps to its understanding. 
 Surveillance system designer 
Before: system designers have to cope with a design/deployment process. They have to design 
a surveillance system for a given scenario without having specific information concerning its 
special characteristics, information such as social issues, legal constraints, privacy 
requirements, etc. Therefore, once they are up to deploy the system and face those problems, 
they have to go back to the design phase of the process and make all required changes before 
trying to deploy it again. 
After: with a SALT framework at hand, all social, anthropological, legal and technological 
information for a given scenario is available at design time, allowing system designers to create 
an accurate system design before its final deployment. This fact does not prevent from an 
iterative process, indeed, it is possible to repeat any phase of the process and add any new 
required functionality. However, it allows for a faster deployment, since the first design will 
better meet the system specifications. 
 Surveillance system operator 
Before: they work with a surveillance system, which they know how to operate, but they may 
not know whether a determined action is applicable or not for a given circumstance (it may be 
forbidden to record a child’s face, for example), therefore they may fall into an undesired 
behaviour. 
After: they have access to the SALT framework instance(s) used within the system they work 
with. Therefore, apart from knowing how to operate the system, they also know the social, 
anthropological, legal and technological constraints corresponding to their system scenario. 
Because of this, they are qualified to make an optimized used of the system. 
 Citizen 
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Before: they enter a space under surveillance without any knowledge regarding the 
surveillance system that is watching them. They may not even know they are entering a space 
under surveillance. This fact derives to a potential privacy threat. 
After: it is not yet established how the surveillance system interacts with citizens, but at least it 
can warn them about their entrance into a SALT compliant area under surveillance hence they 
can be sure that the system fulfils certain privacy requirements. 
 Public authority 
Before: their ability to request accountability to the system is very limited, since the system 
does not provide information regarding this matter. Hence, their actions are restricted too. 
After: the system provides them with auditable logs regarding its operators’ actions. These logs 
can be compared against the SALT concerns used for the system design, thus the public 
authority can check the correctness of all actions. This fact allows them to take whatever 
corrective actions required. 
 
 
 
